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Abstract
We present a novel, tool-supported model-driven methodology for developing secure
data-management applications. Data-management applications are focused around so-
called CRUD actions that create, read, update, and delete data from persistent stor-
age. These operations are the building blocks for numerous applications, for example
dynamic websites where users create accounts, store and update information, and receive
customized views based on their stored data. When the data managed is sensitive, then
security is a concern and the use of these actions must be controlled.
Within our methodology, developers proceed by modeling three different views of the
desired application: its data model, security model, and GUI model. These models for-
malize respectively the application’s data domain, authorization policy, and its graphical
interface together with its behavior. Afterwards a model-transformation function auto-
matically lifts the policy specified by the security model to the GUI model. This allows
a separation of concerns where behavior and security are specified separately, and sub-
sequently combined to generate a security-aware GUI model. Finally, a code generator
automatically generates a multi-tier application, along with all support for access control,
from the security-aware GUI model.
Overall, we see our contributions as follows. First, our methodology offers Model
Driven Architecture’s purported benefits for data-management applications. By work-
ing with models, developers can focus on the application’s data, behavior, security, and
presentation, independent of the different, often complex, technologies that are used to
implement them. Second, our use of model transformations leads to modularity and sepa-
ration of concerns: the GUI model and the security model can be changed independently
and by different developers, if desired. This avoids the problems with hardcoded secu-
rity policies that are difficult to maintain and audit. Finally, our methodology is quite
powerful and compares favorably to alternatives. In particular, it leverages well-known
security languages for modeling rich, fine-grained access control policies, which must often
be manually encoded in other proposals. Moreover, our new language for GUIs supports
modeling realistic, dynamic web interfaces (where the web content varies based on the
user’s actions or user-provided data), without limiting the interfaces to a fixed set of
templates or interaction patterns, as in other methodologies. Of course, the proof of the
pudding is in the eating and we report on applications that we developed, which provide
evidence of the applicability of this approach.
Resumen
En esta memoria presentamos una metodolog´ıa original encuadrada en el a´rea de desa-
rrollo de software dirigido por modelos. En particular, es una metodolog´ıa automa´tica
apoyada en herramientas para el desarrollo de aplicaciones seguras de gestio´n de datos
guardados en una capa persistente. Las aplicaciones de gestio´n de datos se centran en
las llamadas acciones CRUD de crear, leer, modificar y borrar datos del almacenamiento
persistente. Estas operaciones son el bloque ba´sico de numerosas aplicaciones como, por
ejemplo, pa´ginas web donde los usuarios crean cuentas, almacenan y modifican informa-
cio´n y reciben vistas personalizadas basadas en los datos que almacenan. Cuando los datos
gestionados son sensibles, medidas de seguridad deben protegerlos, por lo que el uso de
estas acciones debe ser controlado.
En nuestra metodolog´ıa, los desarrolladores proceden modelando tres vistas de la apli-
cacio´n deseada: el modelo de datos, el modelo de seguridad y el modelo de la interfaz
gra´fica de usuario (GUI, de sus siglas en ingle´s). Estos modelos formalizan respectiva-
mente un dominio de datos, una pol´ıtica de autorizacio´n y una interfaz gra´fica junto con
los eventos que permiten la interaccio´n con el usuario y dirigen el flujo de informacio´n.
Despue´s, una funcio´n de transformacio´n de modelos traslada automa´ticamente la pol´ıtica
especificada por el modelo de seguridad al modelo de GUI. La metodolog´ıa descrita permi-
te la separacio´n de tareas, de manera que el comportamiento y la seguridad se especifican
de forma separada y posteriormente se combinan para generar un modelo de GUI segu-
ro. Finalmente, un componente de generacio´n de co´digo genera de forma automa´tica una
aplicacio´n multicapa, junto con todo el soporte de control de acceso, a partir del modelo
de GUI con seguridad.
A continuacio´n describimos las que son, en nuestra opinio´n, las contribuciones princi-
pales. Primero, nuestra metodolog´ıa ofrece los beneficios pretendidos por la Arquitectura
Dirigida por Modelos (MDA, por sus siglas en ingle´s) para las aplicaciones de gestio´n de
datos. Trabajando con modelos, los desarrolladores pueden centrarse en la estructura de
los datos, el comportamiento, la pol´ıtica de seguridad de la aplicacio´n y su presentacio´n,
independientemente de las diferentes (y a menudo complejas) tecnolog´ıas que son usadas
para implementarlas. Segundo, nuestro uso de transformaciones de modelos hace posible
la modularidad y la separacio´n de aspectos: el modelo de GUI y el modelo de seguridad
pueden modificarse de manera independiente y por diferentes desarrolladores, si se desea.
Esto evita los problemas relacionados con modificar a mano las pol´ıticas de seguridad, las
cuales son dif´ıciles de mantener y analizar. Finalmente, nuestra metodolog´ıa es realmente
potente, compara´ndose favorablemente con otras alternativas. En particular, toma ventaja
de los bien conocidos lenguajes de seguridad para modelar pol´ıticas de control de acceso
ricas y de grano fino, las cuales tienen que ser a menudo codificadas manualmente en otras
propuestas. Adema´s, nuestro nuevo lenguaje para GUIs soporta el modelado de interfaces
web dina´micas para la gestio´n de datos reales (donde el contenido web var´ıa segu´n las
acciones del usuario), sin limitar las interfaces a un conjunto fijo de plantillas o patrones
de interaccio´n como en otras metodolog´ıas. Por supuesto, no se puede evaluar el e´xito de
esta metodolog´ıa sin haberla llevado a la pra´ctica, por lo tanto, detallamos informacio´n
sobre aplicaciones que hemos desarrollado con nuestra metodolog´ıa, las cuales evidencian
la aplicabilidad de la misma.
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Model building is at the heart of system design. This is true in many engineering
disciplines and is increasingly the case in software engineering. Proponents of model-driven
engineering have in the past been guilty of making overambitious claims: positioning it as
the Holy Grail of software engineering where modeling completely replaces programming.
However, there are specialized domains where MDE can truly deliver its full potential: in
our opinion, security-aware GUIs for data-centric applications is one of them.
1.1 Model-driven software engineering
The ever-growing development and use of information and communication technology
is a constant source of security and reliability problems. Clearly we need better ways of
developing software systems. Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [61] is a software devel-
opment methodology that focuses on creating models of different system views from which
system artifacts such as code and configuration data are automatically generated.
Domain-specific modeling languages In our opinion, however, only by limiting the
domain it is possible to define sufficiently precise modeling languages that support the
automatic generation of fully functional applications. Arguably, the late adoption of MDE
is due to the difficulty in defining effective domain-specific modeling languages and also
to the effort required for developers to learn modeling languages and the art of model
building. Defining a good domain-specific modeling language requires finding the right
abstractions and degree of precision to capture relevant aspects of the structure and the
logic of a software system. Moreover, for a modeling language to be really usable and useful
for software developers, appropriate tools must be provided to build models, analyze them,
and keep them synchronized with end products.
Model-transformations In MDE, transformation is the way of using models to pro-
duce other development artifacts. The following types of transformations have been widely
used so far:
Generation of code and execution artifacts: Models may be mapped to code or other
artifacts that affect the system’s runtime behavior. When generating code, the
transformation function amounts to a kind of translator or compiler. Examples of
other artifacts that can be generated from models are deployment and configuration
data, which also affects the system’s behavior.
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Figure 1.1: Use of models in model-driven security
Generation of models: Models may be mapped to other models. Typically such
transformations add details, specialize constructs, or change representations. An
example of this is the specialization of platform-independent models to platform-
specific models. In general, model transformations support problem decomposition
during development where design aspects can be separated into different models
which are later composed.
Generation of test cases: Test cases can be generated from models.
1.2 Model-driven security
Model-driven security[66, 11, 7, 8, 36, 9, 44] is a specialization of MDE to the domain
of security. As discussed in [9], models can be used for the following four activities in the
development of secure systems:
A1. Precisely documenting security requirements together with design requirements.
A2. Analyzing security requirements.
A3. Model-based transformation, such as migrating security policies on application data
to policies for other system layers or artifacts.
A4. Generating code, including complete, configured security infrastructures.
Figure 1.1 depicts these activities and their interrelationships. Designers specify secu-
rity-design models that combine security and design requirements (A1). When modeling
languages have a well-defined semantics, one can formally analyze these designs (A2).
When designing secure systems, security may be relevant at different system layers or
views. Using model transformations, one can migrate a security policy from one model to
other models (A3). Finally, one can use tools to automatically generate code and other
system artifacts directly from the models (A4).
The crucial part of the specialization that model-driven security brings about concerns
the modeling language. Instead of adopting a one-language-fits-all approach, [11] proposes
a general schema for integrating security requirements into system design models. The
main idea is to define security modeling languages that are general in that they leave
open the nature of the protected resources, i.e., whether these resources are data, busi-
ness objects, processes, controller states, etc. Figure 1.2 provides examples of different
security notions which could be specified using a security modeling language (top-left)
that one might integrate with different design modeling languages (bottom-left), resulting
in a security-design modeling language (right side). For example, one might combine a
modeling language for Role Base Access Control (RBAC) with Class Diagrams, as indi-
cated in bold in the figure. This combination is made by defining a dialect (or “glue”),
which identifies elements of the design language as the protected resources of the security
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Figure 1.2: Model-languages and their combination
language. In this way, one can flexibly define languages for formulating different kinds of
system designs along with their security requirements.
1.3 Secure data-management applications
Data-management applications are focused around so-called CRUD 1 actions that cre-
ate, read, update, and delete data from persistent storage. These operations are the
building blocks for numerous applications, for example dynamic websites where users cre-
ate accounts, store and update information, and receive customized views based on their
stored data. When the data managed is sensitive, then security is a concern and the use
of these actions must be controlled.
Access control is the standard approach to restricting users’ actions on data. When
the access-control policies are sufficiently simple, it may be possible to formalize them
declaratively, independent of the application’s business logic. For example, multi-tier
systems for web-based applications often build support for role-based access control into
the application server, which is configured independently of the application’s procedural
details. In contrast, fine-grained access control policies may depend not only on the user’s
credentials but also on the satisfaction of constraints on the state of the persistence tier,
i.e. on the values of stored data items. In such cases, authorization checks are typically
implemented programmatically, by directly encoding them at appropriate places in the
application. Unfortunately, these programmatic additions are cumbersome, error prone,
and scale poorly. Moreover, they are difficult to audit and maintain as the authorization
checks are spread throughout the code, and security policy changes require code changes.
1.4 Model-driven development of secure data-management
applications
We propose in this work a methodology for the model-driven development of secure
data-management applications. It consists of languages for modeling multi-tier systems,
and a toolkit for generating these systems. Within our methodology, a secure data-
management application is modeled using three interrelated models:
1. A data model defines the application’s data domain in terms of its classes, attributes,
associations, and (side-effect free) methods;
2. A security model defines the application’s security policy in terms of authorized
access to the actions on the resources provided by the data model.
1This is true for applications in which their persistent layer is a database. When the persistent layer is
either a LDAP or cloud storage, the actions are not exactly the same.
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Figure 1.3: Model-driven development of security-aware GUIs.
3. A graphical user interface, or GUI model, defines the application’s graphical inter-
face and application logic. Note, in particular, that this model formalizes both UI
structure and behavior.
The heart of this methodology, illustrated in Fig. 1.3, is a model-transformation func-
tion that automatically lifts the policy that is specified in the security model to the GUI
model. The idea is simple but powerful. The security model specifies under what condi-
tions actions on data are authorized. The control information in the GUI model specifies
which actions are executed in response to which events. Lifting essentially consists of
prefixing each data action in the GUI model with the authorization check specified in
the security model. The resulting GUI model is security aware. It specifies UI structure,
information flow with persistent storage, and all authorization checks.
We have implemented this methodology within a toolkit, called ActionGUI [1], that
performs this many-models-to-model transformation. From the resulting security-aware
GUI model, ActionGUI generates a deployable application, along with all support for
access control, based on the following, standard three-tier architecture.
1. Presentation tier: Users access web applications through standard web browsers,
which render the content (HTML and JavaScript) dynamically provided by the web
server.
2. Application tier: The toolkit generates Java Web Applications. The applications
run in a web server (such as Tomcat or GlassFish), processing client requests and
generating content, which is sent back to the client for rendering. When processing
client requests, the generated applications interpret their underlying security-aware
GUI models.
3. Persistence tier: The generated application manages information stored in a database.
For each application, the toolkit generates the corresponding database schema from
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the application’s data model.
The author’s main contributions
ActionGUI is the latest result of a very ambitious project to which several researchers
have contributed in different ways over the past seven years.
The beginnings of the ActionGUI project can be traced back to 2008, and in particular
to the project reported in [36]. The main driver behind this seminal work was the use
of model-driven security for developing an industrial application. The authors succeeded
in modeling, using SecureUML [11], the application’s fine-grained access control policy.
However, the process of manually encoding the modeled policy within the application’s
graphical user interface was unreasonably time-consuming and error-prone.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs provided the raison d’eˆtre for the ActionGUI project:
namely, the quest for
a model-driven solution for lifting the access control policy to the application’s graph-
ical user interface.
Furthermore, it provided the project’s success criteria: namely, that the intended solution
should
support full model-driven development (from models to code) and
be applicable in industrial-strength applications.
As detailed below, the author’s contributions to the ActionGUI project has been always
directed towards the satisfaction of these success criteria. In fact, one can say in all fairness
that he is responsible of the extent to which these success criteria are currently satisfied.
The first concrete model-driven solution to the aforementioned problem came in 2009.
In [77, 76, 13] the idea of using a many-models-to-model transformation to make a GUI
model security-aware with respect to a security model was introduced for the first time.
This solution was soon supported by SSG [44], a novel development environment for
automatically building security-aware GUIs.
SSG was in fact the author’s first contribution to the ActionGUI project. It consisted
of a number of Eclipse plugins including three model editors, a model-transformation tool,
and a code generator. A key part of the SSG’s seminal code generator was EOS [33], a
Java component designed and implemented by the author for efficiently evaluating OCL
expressions. The author also implemented a mapping from OCL to first-order logic for
checking the unsatisfiability of OCL constraints [34] using SMT solvers. This mapping was
further elaborated in [39] and is currently integrated in the ActionGUI toolkit. Among
other applications, it has been successfully used to formally reason about fine-grained
access control policies [43].
According to the ActionGUI project’s success criteria, it was necessary to test the
proposed model-driven solution and toolkit in a real scenario. To this end, the author
obtained from the Fundacio´n Vodafone a one-year grant (September 2010 – August 2011)
for developing a CRM solution and a volunteer management system for a Hospital and
Care Center in Madrid.
To carry out these applications, which were eventually reported in [12], the author
had to extend in many decisive ways the solution originally proposed in [13] as well as its
associated toolkit [44]. In particular, at the level of the modeling language for GUIs, the
author introduced widget variables as a key modeling element, and tables and combo-boxes
as new widget types. Then, at the level of the modeling language for security policies,
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
the author extended SecureUML in two crucial ways: first, by replacing the action of
updating a link between two objects (whose meaning was originally ambiguous) with two
new separate actions, one for creating a link and the other for deleting it; and, secondly, by
allowing two new special variables, namely value and target, to appear within authorization
constraints, in order to significantly increase its expressiveness. The author, as the main
responsible at that time of the ActionGUI toolkit, was the one in charge of implementing,
all these new modeling features. Our enriched solution to the problem of making a GUI
model security-aware with respect to a security model was first presented in [10], along
with the associated toolkit.
The next major case study was carried out by the author in the context of the NESSoS
project (October 2010 –March 2014). NESSoS is the European Network of Excellence on
Engineering Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems [71]. The case study,
which is reported in [42], consists of a web-based system for electronic health record
management. While carrying out this case study, the author discovered a major limitation
in the model-transformation for lifting the security policy to the GUI level. Let us briefly
discussed this limitation and the successful solution eventually proposed by the author.
In the previous work [13, 10] the lifting of the security policy to the GUI level consisted
of prefixing each event in the GUI model with the authorization check specified in the
security model. However the author realized that, since the data actions executed by an
event may change the persistence tier’s state, checking authorization at the level of events,
and therefore before executing any data action, is sufficient only (i) if the underlying
security policy does not contain authorization constraints, or (ii) if they do not depend
on values that are changed during the execution of the event’s data actions. To overcome
this limitation, the author proposed to check authorizations before executing each event’s
data action, while providing at the same time events with a transaction semantics: either
all of the data actions are executed in the given order, or none of them are executed at all.
This substantial generalization of [13, 10] appeared first in [12, 6] and is the one currently
supported in the ActionGUI toolkit.
Last but not least, the author has significantly contributed to the ActionGUI project
by writing the user manual and the installation manual of the ActionGUI toolkit, as well
as the technical documentation of the ActionGUI modeling languages. It is worth noticing
that this material (in its different versions) has been successfully used by students and in-
structors in various courses, including: “Automatic Generation of Smart, Security-Aware
GUI Models.” (Seminar on Model-Driven Engineering, IRISA, Rennes, France, Novem-
ber 2009); “Model-driven security: foundations, tools, and practice” (11th International
School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design, Bertinoro, Italy, September 2011);
“Security Engineering” (Master-level course, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, October 2012 –
January 2013); “ActionGUI Day” (Industrial training day, IMDEA Software, June 2013),
and “Model-Driven Engineering in Action” (Faculty course, Industrial University of Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam, January – February 2014). The latest versions of the ActionGUI
user and installation manuals are available at the ActionGUI web site [1].
1.5 Summary
Chapter 2: A methodology for developing secure data-management applications. We
present ActionGUI as a novel model-driven methodology for developing secure data-
management applications. System developers proceed by modeling three different
views of the desired application: its data model, security model, and GUI model.
These models formalize respectively the application’s data domain, authorization
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policy, and its graphical interface together with the application’s behavior. After-
wards a model-transformation function lifts the policy specified by the security model
to the GUI model. This allows a separation of concerns where behavior and security
are specified separately, and subsequently combined to generate a security-aware
GUI model.
Chapter 3: Supporting our methodology for developing secure data-management ap-
plications. After a brief report on the current status of the ActionGUI toolkit, we
report on our experience developing the Eye OCL Software (EOS) evaluator, a Java
component for efficient OCL evaluation on medium-large scenarios, and we also ex-
plore various approaches for evaluating OCL expressions on really large scenarios.
Then, we propose a mapping from a subset of OCL into first-order logic (FOL) and
use this mapping for checking the unsatisfiability of sets of OCL constraints. We
argue that our mapping is both simple, since the resulting FOL sentences closely
mirror the original OCL constraints, and practical, since we can use automated rea-
soning tools, such as automated theorem provers and SMT solvers to automatically
check the unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets of OCL constraints. Finally, we propose
a methodology for reasoning about fine-grained access control policies, whose autho-
rization constraints are specified in OCL, using the aforementioned mapping from
OCL to FOL.
Chapter 4: Developing secure data-management applications with our methodology.
We provide a detailed report on our use of ActionGUI to develop a secure data-
management application. This application is based on a case study proposed within
NESSoS, the European Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet
Software Services and Systems [71]. The eHealth case study consists of a web-
based system for electronic health record management (EHRM). Electronic health
records (EHR) store information created by, or on behalf of, a health professional
in the context of the care of a patient. The eHealth case study is interesting as
an example of developing a secure data-management application and it provides a
proof-of-concept for the application of the ActionGUI methodology to an industry-
relevant problem. To provide further evidence of the usefulness of our methodology,
we also include in this Chapter a summary of four other web applications that we
have developed using ActionGUI.
Chapter 5: Related work. We focus on works that are directly related to our main
contribution, namely, ActionGUI as a novel, tool-supported model-driven method-
ology for developing secure data-management applications. First, we compare Ac-
tionGUI with other proposals for modeling data-management applications. Secondly,
we compare ActionGUI with other tools (in this case, commercial tools) for devel-
oping secure data-management applications.
Chapter 6: Concluding remarks and future work. We discuss two main directions
along which we will further develop the ActionGUI project. First, we plan to enhance
the ActionGUI toolkit so as to turn it into a full, robust, industrial-strength devel-
opment platform. Secondly, we plan to extend the applicability of the ActionGUI
technology by generalizing its main technological components and by implementing
them as software services (SaaS).




In this Chapter we present ActionGUI as a novel model-driven methodology for de-
veloping secure data-management applications. System developers proceed by modeling
three different views of the desired application: its data model, security model, and GUI
model. These models formalize respectively the application’s data domain, authorization
policy, and its graphical interface together with the application’s behavior. Afterwards a
model-transformation function lifts the policy specified by the security model to the GUI
model. This allows a separation of concerns where behavior and security are specified
separately, and subsequently combined to generate a security-aware GUI model.
In [10, 13, 44] we proposed the idea of using model transformations, to lift the security
policy formulated in terms of the data model, to the GUI model. Here we improve and
generalize this previous work. Lifting previously consisted of prefixing each event in the
GUI model with the authorization check specified in the security model. However since
the data actions executed by an event may change the persistence tier’s state, checking
authorizations at the level of events, and therefore before executing any data action, is
sufficient only if the underlying security policy does not contain authorization constraints
(which was explicitly assumed in [13]), or if they do not depend on values that are changed
during the execution of the event’s data actions (as was the case in the examples discussed
in [10]). To overcome this limitation, we check now authorizations before executing each
event’s data action and we provide events with a transaction semantics: either all of the
data actions are executed in the given order, or none of them are executed at all. The
complete formal account of our methodology is given in the technical report [6]. Here
we provide instead a high-level account of the correctness of the model-transformation
function, which lies at our methodology’s core.
2.1 Background
For modeling an application’s data and security policy, we leverage existing modeling
languages, namely, ComponentUML and SecureUML [11]. In this section we briefly intro-
duce these languages. Since SecureUML uses the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [73]
to model authorization constraints, we also summarize its main features.
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2.1.1 ComponentUML
Data models provide a data-oriented view of a system. Typically they are used to
specify how data is structured, the format of data items, and their logical organization,
i.e., how data items are grouped and related. Our methodology employs ComponentUML
for data modeling. ComponentUML provides a subset of UML class models where en-
tities (classes) can be related by associations and may have attributes and methods. In
ComponentUML, associations are binary: they always have two association-ends connect-
ing two, not necessarily distinct, entities.
While ComponentUML and SecureUML have a graphical concrete syntax (see [11]), to
simplify and clarify the presentation, we shall use textual concrete syntax. The complete
definition of the ComponentUML syntax is given in Appendix A. In this syntax, entities
are declared with the keyword Entity followed by the entity’s name, and its attributes
and association-ends, which are enclosed within brackets. Attributes and association-
ends are declared together with their types. Moreover, since associations are binary, each
association-end is declared together with its opposite association-end, designated by the
keyword oppositeTo. Multiplicities other than * and 1 are specified using OCL invariants.
Finally, comments are introduced with //.
As the following example illustrates, data models specify how the application’s data is
structured, independently of how it will be visualized or accessed.
Example 1 We use a simple chatroom application as a running example throughout
this chapter. A demo version of this application can be found at [1]. The application
provides an online discussion site where users converse by posting messages. Note that
there are two types of users: registered and unregistered users. Registered users have their
nicknames and passwords stored in the persistence tier. As usual, some options are only
available to registered users, who log into the application by entering a valid nickname
and password.
Here we use ComponentUML’s textual syntax to model the chatroom’s data model.
The model, called ChatRoomDTM, consists of three entities representing chatrooms, regis-
tered users, and messages. The associations between these entities represent the relation
between the registered users and the chatrooms in which they participate, the relation
between the registered users and the messages that they have written, and the relation
between the messages and the chatrooms where they have been posted. The entities’ at-
tributes represent that each chatroom has a topic, each chatroom can be public or not,
each registered user has a nickname and a password, and each message has a body.
1 Entity Chatroom {
2 String topic
3 Boolean public
4 //registered users participating in this chatroom
5 Set(User) participants oppositeTo chatrooms
6 //messages posted in this chatroom
7 Set(Message) messages oppositeTo chatroom }
8 Entity User {
9 String nickname
10 String password
11 //chatrooms in which this registered user participates
12 Set(Chatroom) chatrooms oppositeTo participants
13 //messages written by this registered user
14 Set(Message) messages oppositeTo owner }
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15 Entity Message {
16 String body
17 //chatroom where this message is posted
18 Chatroom chatroom oppositeTo messages
19 //registered user that wrote this message
20 User owner oppositeTo messages }
2.1.2 Object Constraint Language (OCL)
The Object Constraint Language (OCL) [73] is a language for specifying constraints
and queries using a textual notation. As part of the UML standard, it was originally
intended for modeling properties that could not be easily expressed using graphical nota-
tion, such as class invariants in a UML class diagram. Every OCL expression is written in
the context of a model (called the contextual model), and is evaluated on an object model
(also called the instance or scenario) of the contextual model. This evaluation returns a
value but does not alter the given object model, since OCL’s evaluation is side-effect free.
OCL is strongly typed. Expressions either have a primitive type, a class type, a tuple
type, or a collection type. OCL provides standard operators on primitive data, tuples,
and collections. For example, the operator →includes checks whether an object is part of a
collection. OCL also provides a dot-operator to access the values of the objects’ attributes
and association-ends in the given scenario. For example, suppose that the contextual
model includes a class c with an attribute at and an association-end as. Then, if o is an
object of the class c in the given scenario, the expression o.at refers to the value of the
attribute at for the object o in this scenario, and o.as refers to the objects linked to the
object o through the association-end as. Finally, OCL provides operators to iterate over
collections, such as →forAll, →exists, →select, →reject, →collect, and →iterate.
2.1.3 SecureUML
SecureUML [11] extends Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [52] with authorization
constraints. These constraints can be used to specify policies that depend on properties of
the system state, for example, that a user can only post a message to a chatroom where
the user participates. More specifically, SecureUML allows one to formalize access control
decisions that depend on two kinds of information:
1. static information, namely the assignments of users and permissions to roles, and
the role hierarchy, and
2. dynamic information, namely the satisfaction of authorization constraints in the
current system state.
SecureUML therefore supports the modeling of roles and their hierarchies, permissions,
actions, resources, and authorization constraints. Moreover, one can also model assign-
ments: which permissions are assigned to a role, which actions are allowed by a permission,
which resources are affected by a permission, and which authorization constraint must be
satisfied before granting a permission.
SecureUML is, however, generic in that it leaves open the nature of the protected
resources, i.e., whether these resources are data, business objects, processes, controller
states, etc. In our methodology, we use an extension of SecureUML [11] that combines
SecureUML with ComponentUML. In this extension, which for the sake of brevity we will
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Table 2.1: SecureUML+ComponentUML: actions and resources.
Resource Atomic Actions Composite Actions
Entity create, delete read, update, full access
Attribute read, update full access
Method execute
Association-end read, create, delete full access
still call SecureUML, the protected resources are the entities, along with their attributes,
methods, and association-ends, while the actions are those shown in Table 2.1.
Note that there are two classes of actions: atomic and composite. Atomic actions
are intended to map directly onto existing operations on the persistence tier. Composite
actions hierarchically group lower-level atomic actions. For example, the full access com-
posite action for an attribute groups together the read and update atomic actions for this
attribute. Finally, authorization constraints are specified using OCL, where the context
of an OCL expression is the underlying data model. Additionally, OCL expressions in se-
curity models may contain the variables self, caller, value, and target, which are interpreted
as follows:
self refers to the resource upon which the action will be performed if the permission
is granted. Notice that the resource of an attribute, a method, or an association-end
is the entity to which it belongs.
caller refers to the user that will perform the action if the permission is granted.
value refers to the value that will be used to update an attribute if the permission is
granted.
target refers to the object that will be added (or removed) at an association-end if
the permission is granted.
The reader familiar with the original presentation of SecureUML [11] may notice that
we have introduced two new variables that can be used in authorization constraints: the
variables value and target. Furthermore, to avoid potential ambiguities, we have refined
the association-end update action into two separate actions: association-end create and
association-end delete.
The complete definition of our SecureUML syntax is given in Appendix B. In this
syntax, the entity modeling the system’s users (or, more specifically, the system’s callers)
is declared with the keyword User. The roles that these users can take are declared with
the keyword Role followed by the role’s name, and its permissions, which are enclosed
within brackets. The keyword inherits, appearing between two roles, declares that the first
role is subordinated to the second role in the role hierarchy, and therefore inherits all its
permissions.
Permissions are introduced by naming the resources to which they grant access. Each
permission consists of a list of actions through which the corresponding root resource can
be accessed. Actions on attributes, methods, or association-ends are declared along with
their names. For example, Read::attr denotes the read action on the attribute attr. The if–
then construction is used to declare that the permission to execute an action is constrained
by a condition. This condition is the authorization constraint that is associated to the
permission.
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As the following example illustrates, security models specify the application’s access
control policy in a fine-grained way. These models depend, of course, on how the ap-
plication’s data is structured, but not on how it is visualized or accessed through the
application’s graphical user interface.
Example 2 We use the SecureUML’s textual syntax to model a policy for posting and
reading chatroom messages. Our model, called ChatRoomSTM, has two roles: the role
DefaultR represents everybody, i.e., both registered and unregistered users, and the role
UserR represents only registered users. Our policy states that everybody can read any
message posted in a public chatroom, but that only registered users can read messages
posted in a private chatroom, provided they participate in that chatroom. Moreover,
only registered users can post messages in public chatrooms; they can also post to private
chatrooms, provided they also participate in that chatroom.
1 User User
2 Role DefaultR {
3 Chatroom {
4 //everybody can access the messages posted in a
5 //public chatroom
6 if self.public then Read::messages }
7 Message {
8 //everybody can read the body of any message
9 //posted in a public chatroom
10 if self.chatroom.public then Read::body } }
11 Role UserR inherits DefaultR {
12 Chatroom {
13 //every registered user can access the messages that
14 //are posted in a chatroom in which she participates
15 if self.participants→includes(caller)
16 then Read::messages }
17 Message {
18 //every registered user can read the body of any
19 //message that is posted
20 //in a chatroom in which she participates
21 if self.chatroom.participants→includes(caller)
22 then Read::body
23 //every registered user can create a new message
24 Create
25 //every registered user can claim ownership of any
26 //unowned message
27 if self.owner.oclIsUndefined() and target=caller
28 then Create::owner
29 //every registered user can change the body of any
30 //message she owns




35 //every registered user can post in a public chatroom any
36 //message she owns,
37 //provided it is not yet posted anywhere
38 if self.owner=caller and target.public
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39 and self.chatroom.oclIsUndefined()
40 then Create::chatroom
41 //every registered user can post, in a chatroom in which
42 //she participates, any message she owns,
43 //provided it is not yet posted anywhere
44 if self.owner=caller and target.participants
45 →includes(caller)
46 and self.chatroom.oclIsUndefined()
47 then Create::chatroom } }
SecureUML provides various constructs for expressing complex access control policies
compactly and intuitively, for example, by using action and role hierarchies or by declaring
default policies. Nevertheless, as we will describe in Section 2.3.1, every security model
S can be uniquely transformed into a semantically equivalent model S[ for which the
following holds:
Remark 1 Let S be a security model. Then, for every atomic action act and every role r
in S, there is exactly one permission in S[ (possibly constrained by false) for r to execute
act.
Informally, the model S[ makes the security policy specified in S completely explicit.
Thus, let Auth be the function that, for every security model S, role r, and action act ,
returns the authorization constraint associated to the unique permission that is defined in
S[ for r to execute act . We will use this function Auth to define the model-transformation
that, in our methodology, lifts the security policy from the security model to the GUI
model. We conclude this section with some examples that illustrate in which sense Auth
makes the security policy specified in a security model explicit.
Example 3 Consider the chatroom’s security model, ChatRoomSTM, in Example 2.
Note that UserR is a subrole of DefaultR (in line 11), which means that UserR will inherit
all the DefaultR’s permissions. Thus, Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Read::body) returns:
self.chatroom.public (from ln. 10)
or
self.chatroom.participants→includes(caller) (from ln. 21).
Note also that the association-end messages is opposite to the association-end owner.
This means that a create (respectively delete) action on messages will be constrained by the
same authorization that constrains a create (respectively delete) action on owner, having
simultaneously replaced the variable self by target and the variable target by self. Thus,
although no permission is explicitly given for the role UserR to execute a create action on
messages, Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Create::messages) returns:
target.owner.oclIsUndefined() and self=caller (from ln. 27).
Finally, note that there is no permission explicitly given to the role DefaultR for execut-
ing an update action on the attribute body. Since permissions are denied by default (and
no other rules can be applied in this case, like the ones for role inheritance or opposite
association-ends) Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Update::body) returns false.
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2.2 GUI Models
GUI models provide a human-interface oriented view of a system. Together with
data models, they constitute platform independent application models, omitting security
aspects.
Informally, a GUI consists of widgets, which are visual elements that display informa-
tion and trigger events that execute actions. In this section we present a key component
of our methodology: a novel language for modeling GUIs for data-management applica-
tions, called GUIML (GUI Modeling Language). It is important, however, to understand
that GUIML is a language for modeling not only the structure of a GUI, i.e, the elements
(widgets) that comprise it, but also the GUI’s behavior, i.e., how its elements will react
(actions) in response to user interactions with them (events). In fact, the key feature of
GUIML is the language it provides for modeling the GUI’s behavior, which uses OCL to
specify both the conditions and the arguments for the different actions. The complete
definition of the GUIML syntax is given in Appendix C. In this syntax, OCL expressions
are enclosed in square brackets. This feature enables both the security model and the
GUI model to “speak” the same language (namely, OCL in the context of the common,
underlying data model). This allows us to define rigorously the transformation function
that lifts the security policy to the GUI level.
We next briefly describe the main elements of GUIML, namely, widgets (with their
associated variables), events, and actions. We will also illustrate them later with a simple
example: a window for our chatroom application, where users can read and post messages
in a chatroom.
Widgets
A GUI model consists of widgets of different types: windows (pages, when referring to
web applications), combo-boxes (selectable lists), tables, date fields, boolean fields (check
boxes), buttons, text fields, and labels. Widgets can be displayed in containers, which are
also widgets. Widgets other than windows must be contained in another widget, and only
windows, combo-boxes and tables may contain other widgets. Widgets may own variables,
which store values for later use, and trigger events, which execute actions.
In concrete syntax, a widget is declared with a keyword like Window, Button, and
TextField, according to its type, followed by the widget’s (local) name, and the declaration
of the variables it owns, the events it triggers, and the widgets it contains, all enclosed in
brackets. The global name of each widget must be unique. If a widget is a window, its
global name is the name given in its declaration. Otherwise, the global name results from
concatenating, using dot, the global name of the widget’s container with the name given
in its declaration.
Variables
Each widget declaration may contain variable declarations, listing the variables owned
by the widget. In concrete syntax, a variable declaration consists of the variable’s type
followed by its name.
There are also variables that are, by default, owned by every widget of a given type.
These variables are implicitly declared in every widget declaration, and their values are
handled in special ways. Here we only discuss the predefined variables that we will use
in our example. The variables caller and role are predefined in every window. They store,
respectively, the application’s user and the user’s role. The variable text is predefined in
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every label, button, and text field. This variable stores the string displayed on the screen
within the label, button, and text field; also, when a user types in a text field, the value of
its variable text is automatically updated. The variable rows is predefined in every combo-
box and table. This variable stores the collection of items that can be selected from the
combo-box or table. The variable row is also predefined in every combo-box and table
where, for each row, it stores the item that can be selected.
Events
Each widget declaration may contain event declarations. Events are triggered when
specific actions are executed upon their widgets, and they themselves can execute actions
either on data or on other widgets.
The actions executed when an event is triggered are specified using statements. A state-
ment is either an action, a conditional statement, an iteration, or a sequence of statements.
In GUIML, the conditions in both conditional statements and iterations are specified us-
ing OCL expressions, whose context is the underlying data model. Additionally, they can
refer to the widget variables. In GUIML, when widget variables are referred within OCL
expressions, they are enclosed in dollar signs. Note that each sequence of statements asso-
ciated to an event is executed as a single transaction: either all its statements successfully
execute in the given order, or none of them are executed at all.
In concrete syntax, events are declared with the keyword event, followed by their types,
and the sequence of statements that they execute, enclosed in brackets. In our example
we will use two types of events: onCreate and onClick. The former are triggered when
the widgets are created and the latter are triggered when widgets are clicked upon. In
particular, a window is created when an open action that has this window as its target
is executed. All the other widgets are created immediately after their corresponding
containers are created.
Actions
Every event declaration contains a sequence of statements that specifies the actions
executed when the event is triggered. These actions can be executed either on objects
belonging to the persistence tier or on objects belonging to the presentation tier. The
former are called data actions, and the latter are called GUI actions. Note that some
actions may take arguments whose values are only known at run-time, for example a
delete action whose argument is the item selected by the user in a combo-box, or an
update action whose argument is the number entered by the user in a text field. In
GUIML, these values are specified using OCL expressions. Again, the context of these
expressions is the underlying data model, but they can also refer to the widget variables.
Next, we briefly describe some of the GUIML data actions and their concrete syntax.
Entity create: It creates a data item in the persistence tier. Its arguments are the
type of the data item and the variable that stores the data item. It is declared by
the statement variable := new type.
Entity delete: It deletes a data item from the persistence tier. Its argument is
object, which is the data item deleted. It is declared by the statement delete [object].
Attribute read: It reads the value of a data item’s attribute in the persistence tier.
Its arguments are the data item object whose property is read, the attribute read,
and the variable that stores the value read. It is declared by the statement variable
:= [object .attribute].
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Attribute update: It modifies the value of a data item’s attribute in the persistence
tier. Its arguments are the data item object whose attribute is modified, the attribute
modified, and the new value. It is declared by the statement [object .attribute] :=
[value].
Association-end read: It reads the collection of items that are linked to an item’s
association-end in the persistence tier. Its arguments are the data item object whose
property is read, the association-end assocEnd read, and the variable that stores the
collection read. It is declared by the statement variable := [object .assocEnd].
Association-end create: It creates a link in the persistence tier between two
data items. Its arguments are the source data item srcObject, the target data item
tgtObject, and the association-end assocEnd through which the target data item is
linked to the source data item. An association-end create action is declared by the
statement [srcObject .assocEnd] += [tgtObject].
Association-end delete: It deletes a link in the persistence tier between two data
items. Its arguments are the source data item srcObject, the target data item tgtOb-
ject, and the association-end assocEnd from which the target data item is removed.
It is declared by the statement [srcObject .assocEnd] –= [tgtObject].
Finally, we describe some of the GUI actions that are defined in GUIML.
Set: It updates the value of a variable. Its arguments are the name of the variable
and variable’s new value. It is declared by the statement variable := [value].
Open: It opens a window. Its argument is target, which names the window opened.
Additionally, it may take as arguments any number of pairs (variablei, valuei), where
variablei is the name of a variable owned by its target window, and valuei is the value
that is assigned to variablei when target is opened. It is declared by the statement
open target (variable1 : [value1], . . . ,variablen : [valuen]).
Back: It moves back to the previous window. It is declared using the keyword back.
Fail: It forces a rollback in the current transaction, whereby the corresponding
statement is not successfully executed. It is declared using the keyword fail.
Skip: It does nothing. It is declared using the keyword skip.
We now provide an example that illustrates the main elements of the GUIML language:
a window ReadPostWI for our chatroom application, where users can read and post messages
in a (previously selected) chatroom. As this example will show, GUI models depend on
how the application’s data is structured — after all, they describe how users interact
with this data — but not on the application’s access control policy.1 In our example,
this separation of concerns is reflected by the fact that the GUI model for the window
ReadPostWI is completely unaware of the security policy for reading and posting messages
in our chatroom application.
Example 4 We use GUIML to model the window of our chatroom application where
users can read and post messages in a chatroom. This window is named ReadPostWI. It
1Of course, in terms of the final application’s usability, there is a dependency: an application’s GUI can
end up being unusable precisely because of the application’s security policy.
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owns a variable chatroomSel that stores a previously selected chatroom (the action that
opens the window ReadPostWI will assign a value to this variable). The window ReadPostWI
contains four widgets:
a table ReadPostsTB for visualizing the messages posted in the selected chatroom;
a text field WritePostEN for writing a new message;
a button PostBU for posting in the selected chatroom the message written in the text
field WritePostEN; and
a button BackBU for moving back to the previous window.
The model is as follows:
1 Window ReadPostWI {
2 //this variable stores the previously selected chatroom
3 Chatroom chatroomSel
4 //this table visualizes the messages posted
5 //in the selected chatroom
6 Table ReadPostsTB {
7 event onCreate {
8 rows := [$ReadPostWI.chatroomSel$.messages] } }
9 //in this text field the user writes her new message
10 TextField WritePostEN {
11 event onCreate { text := [”] } }
12 //by clicking on this button, the user posts her new message
13 //in the selected chatroom
14 Button PostBU {
15 event onCreate { text := [’Post’] } }
16 //by clicking on this button, the user moves back to
17 //the previous window
18 Button BackBU {
19 event onCreate { text := [’Back’] } } }
20 //we continue with this table
21 Table ReadPostWI.ReadPostsTB {
22 //each row of this table shows the body of a message
23 //of the selected chatroom
24 columns {
25 [’Message’] : Label BodyPostLB {
26 event onCreate {
27 text := [$ReadPostWI.ReadPostTB.row$.body] } } } }
28 //we continue with this button
29 Button ReadPostWI.PostBU {
30 event onClick {
31 newPost := new Message
32 newPost.owner += [$ReadPostWI.caller$]
33 newPost.body := [$ReadPostWI.WritePostEN.text$]
34 newPost.chatroom += [$ReadPostWI.chatroomSel$] } }
35 //we continue with this button
36 Button ReadPostWI.BackBU {
37 event onClick { back } }
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Note that the table ReadPostsTB and the buttons PostBU and BackBU are modeled par-
tially inside the window ReadPostWI and partially outside this window. This is supported
by our concrete syntax in order to improve the readability of the GUI models. However,
to avoid ambiguities, when a widget is modeled outside its widget container, the widget’s
global name is used. Note too that the table ReadPostsTB is unaware of the security policy
for visualizing messages, which in our running example states that, only registered users
are authorized to read messages posted in private chatrooms where they participate. Sim-
ilarly, the button PostBU is unaware of the security policy for posting messages, which is
that only registered users can post messages in public chatrooms and in private chatrooms
but, in the latter case, they must also participate in these chatrooms.
2.3 Security-aware GUI Models
2.3.1 Making the security policy explicit
In this section we define a transformation that, for every security model S, produces
the security model S[, which makes explicit the security policy declared in S. We define
this transformation in four steps. Note that, as stated in Remark 1, the following holds
at the end of our transformation: for every atomic action act and every role r in S, there
is exactly one permission in S[ (possibly constrained by false) for r to execute act .
Step 1: Copy the explicit permissions
Atomic actions. Let act be an atomic action. Suppose that there is a permission in
S for a role r to execute act under a constraint auth. Then, there is also a permission
in S[ for r to execute act under the same constraint auth.
Step 2: Unfold the security model
Action hierarchies. Let CA be a composite action. Suppose that there is a permission
in S for a role r to execute CA under a constraint auth. Then for every atomic action
act contained in CA, there is a new permission in S[ for r to execute act under the
same constraint auth.
Role hierarchies. Let act be an atomic action and let r and r′ be two roles. Suppose
that r is a subrole of r′ in S, and that there is also a permission in S for r′ to execute
act under the constraint auth. There is then a new permission in S[ for the role r
to execute act under the same constraint auth.
Delete actions. Let entity be an entity. Suppose that there is a permission in S
for a role r to delete entity under a constraint auth. Then for every association-end
assoc owned by entity , there is a new permission in S[ for r to execute the action
Delete::assoc under the same constraint auth.
Opposite association-ends. Let assoc and assoc′ be two opposite association-ends.
Let act be the action Create::assoc. Suppose that there is a permission in S for a
role r to execute act under the constraint auth. There is then a new permission
in S[ for the role r to execute Create::assoc′ under the constraint that results from
simultaneously replacing in auth the variable self by target and the variable target by
self. Unfolding is similar when act is the action Delete::assoc.
Step 3. Add default permissions to the security model
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Denying by default. Let r be a role and let act be an atomic action. Suppose that
there is no permission in S[ for the role r to execute act . There is then a new
permission in S[ for the role r to execute act under the constraint false. That is, the
role r will be denied access to execute act in all circumstances.
Step 4. Simplify the resulting security model
Disjunction of constraints. Let r be a role and let act be an action. Suppose that
there are n permissions in S[ for the role r to execute act . These n permissions are
then simplified to a single permission whose authorization constraint results from
disjoining together all the authorization constraints of the n individual permissions.
2.3.2 Making the GUI models security-aware
In this section we describe the heart of our methodology: a model-transformation
function Sec that, given a GUI model G and a security model S, automatically generates
a new GUI model Sec(G,S). The generated model is identical to G except that it is
security aware with respect to S. The transformation function Sec works by wrapping
around every data action act in G an if-then-else statement with the following arguments:
a condition that reflects the constraints associated to the permissions specified in S,
for each of the different roles, to execute the action act ;
a then-branch that contains the action act ; and
an else-branch that contains the action fail.
Thus, the semantics of the if-then-else statement ensures that act will only be executed if
the constraints associated to the corresponding permissions are satisfied. Moreover, this
semantics also guarantees that, if these constraints are not satisfied, then the action fail
will be executed, forcing a rollback in the current transaction.
More specifically, to generate the aforementioned if-then-else statement, the function
Sec makes use of Remark 1. In particular, for each role r in S, it calls the function
Auth(S, r, act) to obtain the expression that ultimately (i.e., when the security policy is
made completely explicit) constrains the permission given to r for executing act . However,
since this expression may contain the variables self, value, target, and caller, the function Sec
must also replace these variables by the actual arguments of the action act (including its
actual user). We denote the resulting OCL expression by Auth(S, r, act)[args], where args
are the arguments specified in the GUI model for the action act . Finally, since different
roles may be constrained by different expressions, the condition generated by Sec will have
the form:
((r1 = [Window .role] and Auth(S, r1, act)[args])
or . . . or
(rn = [Window .role] and Auth(S, rn, act)[args])),
where r1, . . . , rn are all the roles declared in S. (Recall that the actual application’s user
and its role are always stored in the variables caller and role, which are owned by every
window in the GUI model.)
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The following examples illustrate the model-transformation function Sec. As previ-
ously mentioned, the complete, formal account of our methodology, including the model-
transformation function Sec, is given in [6]. Nevertheless, the interested reader can find
in Section 2.3.3 a high-level account of the correctness of Sec.
Example 5 Consider line 33 in Example 4. It specifies the third action that will be
executed when the button ReadPostWI.PostBU is clicked upon, namely,
newPost.body := [ReadPostWI.WritePostEN.text].
Recall that := refers to an update action, in this case to the action Update::body. The
function Sec will replace this by the following if-then-else statement:
if ((DefaulR = [ReadPostWI.role] and false)
or
(UserR = [ReadPostWI.role] and
([newPost].owner = [ReadPostWI.caller]
and [newPost].chatroom.oclIsUndefined())))
then newPost.body := [ReadPostWI.WritePostEN.text]
else fail.
To understand the condition generated by Sec, note that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, DefaultR,
Update::body) is equal to false, but that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Update::body) is equal
to self.owner = caller and self.chatroom.oclIsUndefined(). Thus, the function Sec must replace
the variable self by the newly created message newPost (since this is the object upon which
the action Update::body will be executed), and the variable caller by ReadPostWI.caller (since
this is the user that will execute the action Update::body).
Example 6 Consider line 32 in Example 4. It specifies the second action that will be
executed when the button ReadPostWI.PostBU is clicked upon, namely,
newPost.owner += [ReadPostWI.caller].
Recall that += refers to an association-end create action, in this case to the action Cre-
ate::owner. Then, the function Sec will replace this line by the following if-then-else state-
ment:
if ((DefaulR = [ReadPostWI.role] and false)
or
(UserR = [ReadPostWI.role] and
([newPost].owner.oclIsUndefined()
and [ReadPostWI.caller]=[ReadPostWI.caller])))
then newPost.owner += [ReadPostWI.caller]
else fail.
To understand the condition generated by Sec, note that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, DefaultR,
Create::owner) is equal to false, but that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Create::owner) is equal
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to self.owner.oclIsUndefined() and target=caller. Thus, the function Sec must replace the vari-
able self by the newly created message newPost (since this is the object upon which the
action Create::owner will be executed), the variable caller by ReadPostWI.caller (since this
is the user that will execute the action Create::owner), and the variable target also by
ReadPostWI.caller (since the actual user is precisely the object that will be added by the
Create::owner as the owner of the newly created message).
Our next example illustrates how our model transformation Sec leads to modularity
and separation of concerns whereby the GUI model and the security model can be changed
independently, if desired.
Example 7 Suppose that we decide to allow anyone (not only registered users, but
also unregistered ones) to post messages in public chatrooms. To update the chatroom
application’s security-aware GUI model, we just carry out the following steps:
Step 1 Change the original chatroom’s security model to reflect our security policy
changes. We call the new security model PubChatRoomSTM and show below the new
permissions for the role DefaultR (i.e., for everybody using the application) to create
a message, update the body of a message, and post a message in a chatroom:
Role DefaultR {
Message {
//everybody can create a new message
Create
//everybody can change the body of
//any unowned message




//everybody can post in a public chatroom
//any unowned message
//provided it is not yet posted anywhere
if self.owner.oclIsUndefined() and target.public
and self.chatroom.oclIsUndefined()
then Create::chatroom } }
Step 2 Apply our model transformation to the original chatroom GUI model and
the modified chatroom security model to generate the updated security-aware GUI
model. We show below the result of this transformation for line 33 in Example 4.
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([newPost].owner = [ReadPostWI.caller]
and [newPost].chatroom.oclIsUndefined()))))
then newPost.body := [ReadPostWI.WritePostEN.text]
else fail.
It is interesting to compare this result with the one explained in Example 5 for the case
of the security model ChatRoomSTM. To understand the differences, note that Auth(Chat-
RoomSTM, DefaultR, Update::body) is equal to false, but that Auth(PubChatRoomSTM, De-
faultR, Update::body) is equal to self.owner.oclIsUndefined() and self.chatroom.oclIsUndefined().
Also, recall that UserR inherits all permissions from DefaultR and, in particular, its new per-
mission for updating the body of a message, which is constrained by Auth(PubChatRoomSTM,
DefaultR, Update::body).
Note that in this example, the function Sec may generate conditions that can be further
simplified. However, for the sake of illustration, here and elsewhere, we show the results
of Sec without further simplification.
2.3.3 Correctness of our Model Transformation
We sketch here the correctness of our model transformation Sec, which is defined
relative to the semantics of GUI models. Full details are provided in [6]. We define the
semantics of GUI models by first giving a set of inference rules that defines a transition
relation −→ between triples of the form 〈stm, I, θ〉, where stm is a statement, I is a scenario
(i.e., an instance of the underlying data model), and θ represents a state of the widget
variables. We provide inference rules for each possible statement: namely, for every type
of data action and GUI action (base cases), and for arbitrary sequences of statements,
conditional statements, and iterator-statements (inductive cases). In particular, for data
actions, the inference rule has the form
〈act(args), I, θ〉 −→ 〈skip, res(I), res(θ)〉 ,
where:
args are the arguments of the data action act ,
res(I) specifies the scenario that results from executing act(args) in the scenario I
and widget variable state θ, and
res(θ) specifies the widget variables’ new state after executing act(args) in the sce-
nario I and widget variable state θ.
Crucially, no inference rule leading to skip is defined for the GUI action fail.
We then define the operational semantics of an event ev that executes the actions
specified by an statement stm as the set of all the transitions
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗ 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉 ,
where −→∗ is the reflexive-transitive closure of −→.
By definition, this operational semantics for events is security-unaware: it does not
respect the authorization constraints that, according to the given security model, should
constrain the execution of data actions. To provide a security-aware operational semantics
for events, we define the security-aware versions of the inference rules. In particular, given
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a security model S, for each role r, and for each type of data action act , the security-aware
version of the inference rule for act and r has the form
J(Auth(S, r, act)[args])θKI = true
〈act(args), I, θ〉 −→ 〈skip, res(I), res(θ)〉 ,
where:
JexprKI denotes the value of the expression expr in the scenario I; and, therefore,
J(Auth(S, r, act)[args])θKI denotes the evaluation in the scenario I of the authoriza-
tion Auth(S, r, act) that constrains the only permission that, according to Remark 1,
ultimately allows users with the role r to execute the action act , given that arg are
the arguments of act and θ is the state of the widget variables.
These security-aware inference rules define the transition relation −→S . Finally, given
a security model S, we define the security-aware operational semantics of an event ev that
executes the actions specified by an statement stm as the set of all the transitions
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗S 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉 .
The theorem below formalizes the correctness of our model-transformation function
Sec. It states that evaluating a statement transformed by Sec following the security-
unaware operational semantics, returns the same result as evaluating the original state-
ment using the security-aware semantics. Hence the transformed statement respects the
authorization constraints formalized in the underlying security model.
Theorem Let S be a security model and let stm be a statement. Then, for every scenario
I, and every widget variables’ state θ,
〈Sec(stm, S), I, θ〉 −→∗ 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉 ⇐⇒




Security-aware GUI models are platform independent and can be mapped to implemen-
tations employing different technologies. This includes desktop applications, web applica-
tions, and mobile applications. As part of our work, we built the ActionGUI toolkit [1],
which automatically generates web-based data-management applications from security-
aware GUI models.
After a brief report on the current status of the ActionGUI toolkit, we report in this
Chapter on our experience developing the Eye OCL Software (EOS) evaluator, a Java
component for efficient OCL evaluation on medium-large scenarios, and we also explore
various approaches for evaluating OCL expressions on really large scenarios. Then, we
propose a mapping from a subset of OCL into first-order logic (FOL) and use this mapping
for checking the unsatisfiability of sets of OCL constraints. We argue that our mapping is
both simple, since the resulting FOL sentences closely mirror the original OCL constraints,
and practical, since we can use automated reasoning tools, such as automated theorem
provers and SMT solvers, to automatically check the unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets
of OCL constraints. Finally, we propose a methodology for reasoning about fine-grained
access control policies, whose authorization constraints are specified in OCL, using the
aforementioned mapping from OCL to FOL.
3.1 The ActionGUI toolkit
The ActionGUI toolkit features model editors for constructing and manipulating data,
security, and GUI models. These editors share our own OCL parser, which takes as addi-
tional input the variables introduced by the different models, along with their respective
types: in the case of security models, the variables self, caller, target, and value, and in
the case of GUI models, all the given widget variables. Crucially, the ActionGUI toolkit
implements our model transformation to generate security-aware GUI models. Finally,
it includes a code generator that, given a security-aware GUI model, produces a web
application based on the following, standard three-tier architecture.
1. Presentation tier (also known as front-end): Users access web applications through
standard web browsers, which render the content (HTML and JavaScript) dynami-
cally provided by the web server.
2. Application tier: The toolkit generates Java Web Applications, implemented using
the Vaadin framework [82]. The applications run in a web server (such as Tomcat or
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GlassFish), process client requests and, generate content, which is sent back to the
client for rendering. They may also manipulate data stored in the persistence tier.
When processing client requests, the generated application interprets its underlying
security-aware GUI model. In particular, it performs the required security checks
before modifying any data stored in the persistence tier or sending any data to
the presentation tier. This involves, of course, dynamically evaluating the OCL
expressions appearing in the security-aware GUI model.
3. Persistence tier (also known as data tier or back-end): The generated application
manages information stored in a database. For each application, the toolkit generates
the corresponding database schema from the application’s data model. This schema
contains the SQL commands to create the database.
As a model-driven development tool, the ActionGUI toolkit produces its best results
when the intended data-management application’s functionality can be reduced to CRUD
actions and its dynamics consists of navigating through windows and exchanging informa-
tion with the underlying database. For applications in this category, ActionGUI automat-
ically generates the complete implementation from the corresponding data, security, and
GUI model. Note that calling CRUD actions is modeled in GUIML using data actions,
and navigating and passing information through windows is modeled using GUI actions,
namely, open, back, and set. Of course, some data-management applications will require
additional functionality, for example, the possibility of sending emails, printing tables, or
exporting data in specific formats. As expected, the ActionGUI toolkit does not gen-
erate code for these non-CRUD methods. Instead, it includes their implementation —
which must be provided by the application developer — in the generated application and
when the application needs to interpret one of these methods, it simply calls the method
provided.
3.2 Evaluating OCL expressions
In [33] we report on our experience developing the Eye OCL Software (EOS) evaluator,
a Java component for efficient OCL evaluation. We first motivate the need for an efficient
implementation of OCL in order to cope with novel usages of the language. We then discuss
some aspects that, based on our experience, should be taken into account when building
an OCL evaluator for medium-large scenarios. Finally, we explore various approaches for
evaluating OCL expressions on really large scenarios.
3.2.1 Motivation
As part of our research, we have looked at different usages of OCL beyond its “initial
requirements as a precise modeling language complementing UML specifications.” Two
related applications have drawn our interest [16, 3, 4, 35, 8], both having to do with using
OCL to analyze user-defined models by evaluating queries on the corresponding instances
of their metamodels. Since these instances typically contain a large number of elements,
evaluating expressions on them comes at a high computational cost.
Consider, for example, the use of OCL to express metrics for Java programs (this
application was suggested to us by members of the Triskell group at IRISA, France). The
scenarios on which the program metrics will be evaluated, are the instances of the Java
metamodel corresponding to the programs: thus, the larger the programs the larger the
3.2. Evaluating OCL expressions 27
scenarios1 and, consequently, the higher the computational cost of evaluating the program
metrics.
We report in [33] on our experience developing the Eye OCL Software [41] (EOS)
component, an OCL evaluator designed with the goal of performing efficient evaluation of
OCL expressions on medium-large size scenarios. In particular, we discuss i) the need for
an efficient implementation on OCL in order to cope with the novel usages of the language;
ii) the aspects that we have taken into consideration to improve the efficiency of the EOS
evaluator on medium-large scenarios; iii) the limits of the current OCL implementations
for dealing with really large scenarios. Although we include the results of applying a
benchmark to several OCL evaluators, this Section is not a comparative study (see [54] for
a study of this kind). In fact, the results are included here only to show the performance of
some OCL tools on medium-large scenarios and to illustrate the aspects that we consider
that should be taken into account when implementing an efficient OCL evaluator for
medium-large scenarios. Interestingly, this quality —OCL engine efficiency on medium-
large scenarios— is not covered by the benchmark proposed in [54]: in fact, the largest
scenario proposed for testing OCL engine efficiency in [55] contains only 42 objects and 42
links among them. Furthermore, despite the results of our benchmark, this Section is not a
promotional brochure for our EOS component: as a “product”, our OCL evaluator is still in
its infancy. To motivate the need for OCL engines that can efficiently evaluate expressions
on medium-large size scenarios, we show in Table 3.1 the time that currently takes to
evaluate two given OCL expressions on three different, small-medium size scenarios for
a number of OCL evaluators: namely, USE 2.4.0 [40], RoclET [2], OCLE [30], MDT
OCL [59], and EOS [41].2 The tests were run on a laptop computer, with Windows XP
Professional installed, a processor Intel Pentium M 2.00GHz 600MHz, and 1GB of RAM.
Also, in the case of the EOS and USE evaluators, we run the JVM with its parameters
-Xms and -Xmx set to 1024m.
The scenarios considered in these tests are instances of the model Library shown in
Figure 3.1: each scenario is referenced by a number n, which also indicates its “size”;
more precisely, for each n, the scenario #n is a library that contains exactly 10n books,
each book with a unique title different from “Hobbit”. The OCL expressions used in these
tests are
Book.allInstances()−>forAll(b|b.title <> ’Hobbit’)(3.1)
Book.allInstances()−>forAll(b1,b2|b1 <> b2 implies b1.title <> b2.title).(3.2)
The first expression says that the library does not contain any book titled “Hobbit”, while
the second one says that the library does not contain two different books with the same
title. Obviously, the cost of evaluating these expressions depends on the number of books
in the library and the cost of accessing, and storing for later use, information about these
books. For example, in order to evaluate the expressions (3.1) and (3.2) on scenario #3
we have to perform, respectively, 103 and 2× 103 × 103 times the operations of accessing
and storing a book’s title. But this is precisely one of the challenges for OCL engines
when evaluating expressions on medium-large size scenarios: namely, to efficiently access
the information contained in, possibly, all the objects that populate the scenarios.
1 As an example, the SpoonEMF application, developed by the Triskell group generates, for a standard
Java program with 10 lines, a scenario with 113 objects; for a program with 100 lines, one with 1180
objects; and for a program with 500 lines, one with 3470 objects.
2In the case of USE, we have run our experiments using its version 2.4.0. For MDT OCL, we have
run the experiments using the plug-in “OCL Interpreter”, version 1.2.0v200805130238. Finally, for our
experiments in OCLE, we have used its version 2.0.
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Scenario Expression RoclET OCLE MDT OCL EOS USE
#2 (1) < 1s < 1s < 1s 0ms 230ms
(2) > 10m ≈ 4s < 1s 50ms 240ms
#3 (1) − ≈ 3s < 1s 10ms 240ms
(2) − > 10m ≈ 4s 841ms 1s342ms
#4 (1) − − < 1s 20ms 261ms
(2) − − ≈ 5m12s 1m18s 2m12s
Table 3.1: Evaluating performance on medium-large scenarios.
-title : String
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Figure 3.1: The model Library.
Notice that in Table 3.1 we use > t to indicate that we stopped an experiment after
having passed time t without obtaining the result. Also, we use a dash to indicate that
we did not run the experiment, because we already stopped the execution of a “simpler”
one. Finally, since RoclET, OCLE and MDT OCL do not report their execution time in
milliseconds, we use < 1s to indicate that the result of an evaluation was output in less
than 1 second, and we use ≈ t to indicate that the result of an evaluation was output
approximately in time t.
3.2.2 Measuring the cost of evaluating expressions
Although the computational cost of evaluating a particular OCL expression on a given
scenario, obviously depends on the algorithms and data structures used to implement
each tool, based on our experience, there are two measurements worthwhile considering
before launching the evaluation process: first, the maximum number of times that objects’
properties will be accessed and, second, the maximum size of the collections that will be
built. In the case of medium-large size scenarios, the challenge for OCL engines is that
these measurements typically return large numbers.
To illustrate this challenge, we show in Table 3.2 the performance of MDT OCL, EOS,
and USE when evaluating different iterator-expressions whose evaluation require access-
ing many times objects’ properties and/or building large collections. All the expressions
in Table 3.2 were evaluated on the same scenario, namely, an instance MyLibrary of the
model Library shown in Figure 3.1 which contains 103 authors, each author with 10 dif-
ferent books, and each book with a title different from “Hobbit”.3 For the sake of the
experiment, we artificially increased the size of the collections to be iterated upon: in
particular, in Table 3.2, the terms p1, p2, and p3 refer, respectively, to the expressions
“Book.allInstances().author.books”, “p1.author.books”, and “p2.author.books”,
which on the scenario MyLibrary evaluate to collections with 105, 106, and 107 books,
respectively.4 The iterator-expressions in Table 3.2 were evaluated on a laptop computer,
3In the case of MDT OCL, the scenario MyLibrary was loaded from an XMI file; for EOS, it was built
using a Java program that simply calls the appropriate EOS’s interface methods for defining the scenario;
and for USE, it was loaded from a file that contained the appropriate USE commands to build the scenario.
4A more “natural” approach will be to consider scenarios with larger number of books but, as we will
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with Windows XP Professional installed, a processor Intel Pentium M 2.00GHz 600MHz,
and 1GB of RAM. Also, in the case of the EOS and USE evaluators, we run the JVM
with its parameters -Xms and -Xmx set to 1024m. For the reason explained above, in the
case of the MDT OCL evaluator, all times shown in Table 3.2 are approximated (≈).5
The Error evaluation time indicates that we could not evaluate the expression due to an
OutOfMemoryError in Java.
Let exp(pi), with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, be the time that takes to evaluate an iterator-expression
exp on the collection generated by evaluating the term pi. With respect to the performance
of MDT OCL, EOS, and USE, Table 3.2 shows that, for the same exp, the time exp(pi+1)
is approximately 10 × exp(pi) in these tools. Table 3.2 also shows that, for the same pi,
the time exp(pi) depends for these tools on the number of accesses to objects’ properties
that are required to evaluate the body of the iterator-expression exp; we have organized
accordingly the expressions in three groups: A, B, and C. Consider, for example, the
evaluation times for the first expression in each group. Finally, Table 3.2 shows that,
again for the same pi, the time exp(pi) depends as well for these tools on the size of the
collection that need to be built. Consider, for example, the evaluation time for the first
two expressions in Group C: notice that to evaluate
(3.3) p3−>collect(x|x.author.books.title)−>size()
will require to allocate memory for storing a collection with 108 titles, while evaluating
(3.4) p3−>collect(x|x.author.books.title−>size())−>sum()
will only require to allocate memory for storing a collection with 107 integers. Using these
and similar expressions, we regularly use the above mentioned measurements, namely, the
maximum number of times that objects’ properties will be accessed and the maximum
size of the collections that will be built, to check the performance of the EOS evaluator
and look for possible optimizations.
3.2.3 The implementation of the EOS evaluator
ITP/OCL [31] is a rewriting-based OCL evaluator, based on an executable equational
semantics for OCL [49]. Although this tool performs reasonably well on small-medium size
scenarios, its performance does not scale up to medium-large size scenarios. Prompted
by our interest on applications that require efficient OCL evaluation on medium-large
size scenarios, we decided to implement the Eye OCL Software (EOS) evaluator, a Java
component whose design follows the key ideas behind the ITP/OCL tool. Its implemen-
tation includes an OCL parser (which uses SableCC [53]) and an OCL evaluator, the
latter consisting of about 7K lines of Java code. It covers the full OCL 2.0 Standard
Library [72], with the exception of the OclMessage type and its operations. With the idea
of making it as ‘pluggable’ as possible, the EOS component is not based on any particular
(meta)modeling framework: its public interface provides methods to insert elements, one-
by-one, into user-models and scenarios, and to input the expressions to be evaluated as
discuss in Section 3.2.4, none of the tools support well the loading of scenarios with more than 106 objects.
5 We have also run the same experiments using a desktop computer, with Window Vista Business
installed, a processor Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9300 2.50GHz 2.50 GHz, and 2GB of RAM. Again, in the
case of the EOS and USE evaluators, we run the JVM with its parameters -Xms and -Xmx set to 1024m.
In the case of EOS and MDT OCL the results were similar to those shown in Table 3.2. In the case of
USE, however, the evaluations were completed, approximately, in half the time taken by the single-core
test machine.
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MDT EOS USE
p1 < 1s 30ms 1s12ms
p2 −>size() < 1s 190ms 7s330ms
p3 ≈ 5s 931ms 1m22s
Group A MDT EOS USE
p1 < 1s 80ms 1s212ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.title)−>size() ≈ 1s 391ms 10s84ms
p3 ≈ 18s 3s 896ms 1m48s
p1 < 1s 90ms 981ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.title <> ’Hobbit’)−>size() ≈ 2s 481ms 8s432ms
p3 ≈ 20s 4s 516ms 1m30s
Group B MDT EOS USE
p1 < 1s 240ms 6s810ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.author.books)−>size() ≈ 6s 2s 140ms 1m42s
p3 ≈ 58s 17s 736ms Error
p1 < 1s 221ms 3s565ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.author.books−>includes(x))−>size() ≈ 7s 1s 893ms 32s677ms
p3 ≈ 1m 1s 17s 906ms 5m32s
p1 < 1s 251ms 3s475ms
p2 −>forAll(x|x.author.books−>includes(x)) ≈ 5s 1s 963ms 32s6ms
p3 ≈ 53s 17s 30ms 5m25s
p1 < 1s 260ms 3s685ms
p2 −>select(x|x.author.books−>includes(x))−>size() ≈ 5s 2s 13ms 35s411ms
p3 ≈ 55s 17s 605ms 5m51s
Group C MDT EOS USE
p1 ≈ 2s 290ms 8s412ms




p1 ≈ 2s 270ms 4s957ms




p1 ≈ 2s 280ms 4s777ms




Table 3.2: Evaluating performance: MDT OCL, EOS, and USE.
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MDT OCL EOS USE
Scenario XMI Mem Time Mem Time Mem Time
#3 50KB 111MB < 1s 20MB 40ms 88MB 1s
#4 500KB 112MB < 1s 22MB 661ms 116MB 35s
#5 5MB 125MB ≈ 45s 50MB 2m36s 209MB 8m25s
#6 50MB > 20m > 20m > 20m
Table 3.3: Evaluating loading cost: MDT OCL, EOS, and USE.
strings of ASCII characters. This decision allowed us also to design the EOS’s data struc-
ture for internally storing user-models and scenarios in such a way that objects’ properties
are efficiently accessed. The other possible novelty in its implementation is that, before
evaluating a collect expression, we try to (over)estimate the size of the resulting collection
and allocate memory in advance. The rest of the EOS implementation is rather straight-
forward: OCL iterator-expressions are executed using Java for/while loops and standard
OCL operations, when possible, are executed using the appropriate Java operators. As
expected, expressions are evaluated in EOS following an eager strategy: in particular,
collection-expressions are fully evaluated and their resulting elements are all allocated in
memory.
3.2.4 Limitations
To evaluate expressions on really large scenarios, we need first to solve the problem
of loading the scenarios in the OCL evaluators. To illustrate this challenge, we show
in Table 3.3 the time and memory taken by MDT OCL, EOS, and USE, when loading
different scenarios of the model Library. Each of the scenarios is identified by a number n,
which also indicates its “size”: more precisely, for each n, the scenario #n exactly contains
10n books. Notice that for scenario #6, with 106 books, none of the tools were able to
finish in less than 20 minutes.6
So far, we have explored two different approaches for addressing this problem, both
based on the representation of user-models and scenarios as relational databases. The
first approach consists on modifying the EOS evaluator so as to look for the information
contained in the scenarios directly in its database representation. The advantage of this
approach is that it only requires modifying the evaluation of dot-expressions in the ex-
pected way: namely, accessing the value of an object’s attribute or the value of an object’s
association-end will be now implemented as a basic SQL select-query. The concrete form
of these queries depends, of course, on the mapping used to represent models as relational
databases (see, for example, [75, 80] and [56]). To check the feasibility of this approach,
we modified the EOS evaluator accordingly: unfortunately, the cost of evaluating dot-
expressions through the JDBC driver was so high that it made impractical the use of the
modified EOS evaluator for evaluating expressions on medium-large scenarios.7
The second approach consists on translating OCL expressions into expressions in a
query language already available for relational databases. To the best of our knowledge,
the most interesting results in this line are discussed in [47, 58] and provide the foundations
of the OCL2SQL tool [57, 81]. However, the solution offered in [47, 58] is not satisfactory
yet. First, it only considers a restricted subset of the OCL language: in particular, it
6With respect to the “extra” time taken by the EOS tool to store scenarios, compared to MDT OCL,
it is possibly due to the extra computation required to store scenarios in the EOS internal data structure.
7For this experiment, we mapped each class to a table whose columns correspond to its attributes, and
each association to a table whose columns correspond to its association-ends.
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Scenario Time
# 1 ≈ 0m25s
# 2 ≈ 45m
Table 3.4: Evaluating performance: OCL2SQL.
cannot deal with iterators, tuples or nested collections. Second, it only applies to Boolean
expressions and not to arbitrary queries. Finally, the “complexity” of the SQL expressions
resulting from this translation is so high that makes also impractical its use for evaluating
expressions on medium-large scenarios.8
3.3 Checking the unsatisfiability of OCL expressions
In [34] we propose a mapping from a subset of OCL into first-order logic (FOL) and
use this mapping for checking the unsatisfiability of sets of OCL constraints. We argue
in [34] that our mapping is both simple, since the resulting FOL sentences closely mirror
the original OCL constraints, and practical, since we can use automated reasoning tools,
such as automated theorem provers and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers
to automatically check the unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets of OCL constraints. SMT
generalizes boolean satisfiability (SAT) by incorporating equality reasoning, arithmetic,
fixed-size bit-vectors, arrays, quantifiers, and other useful first-order theories [5].
3.3.1 Motivation
The lack of tool support for OCL was pointed out in [29] as a main cause for the limited
adoption of the language in industry. Since then, many initiatives have been brought to
fruition and their outcomes are available to designers (see [46]). Among the tool categories
that have received significant attention are:
Parsers: to check the syntactical well-formedness of an expression: e.g., the Dresden
OCL 2.0 parser [62, 81].
Evaluators: to obtain the value of an expression within a contextual model: e.g.,
USE [40], MDT OCL [59], and EOS [33].
Translators: to map (for different purposes) an expression into a (logically equiva-
lent) expression in other languages and/or formalisms: e.g.,
– OCL2SQL [57, 81] maps OCL constraints into SQL queries;
– UMLtoCSP [23, 22] maps OCL constraints into constraint programming ex-
pressions, to support automated bounded verification of UML class diagrams,
annotated with OCL constraints;
– MOMENT [27] and ITP-OCL [32] map OCL into equational logic (although us-
ing different approaches) to support automated evaluation of OCL expressions
using term-rewriting.
– KeY [15] includes a mapping of OCL into first-order logic to allow interactive
reasoning about UML diagrams with OCL constraints.
8The OCL2SQL’s main developer has confirmed that the efficiency of the OCL2SQL tool has not been
tested on medium-large scenarios (e-mail communication, May 2008).
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– HOL-OCL [17, 18] maps OCL into higher-order logic also to allow interactive
reasoning about UML diagrams with OCL constraints.
The work presented in [34] belongs to the third category: it proposes a mapping from
OCL to first-order logic, which is defined with the purpose of supporting (unbounded)
unsatisfiability checks for OCL expressions using automated reasoning tools. In our view,
being able to check the unsatisfiability of (sets of) OCL expressions is a powerful tool,
since it will allow modelers to (among other tasks):
Verify class invariants, by checking that they logically imply the expected con-
straints/properties;
Verify method preconditions, by checking that the class invariants do not logically
imply their negations; and
Verify method postconditions, by checking that they do not logically imply the
negation of (any of) the class invariants.
However, also in our view, what will make an unsatisfiability checker not only powerful, but
also practical, is being automated. Given the undecidable nature of the full OCL language,
one can only expect to have an automated unsatisfiability checker for a large class of OCL
expressions. In [34] we do not attempt to define how large and/or interesting is the class of
unsatisfiable OCL expressions, that we are able to check automatically. Nevertheless, we
argue that our mapping is both simple, since the resulting FOL sentences closely mirror
the original OCL constraints, and practical, since we can use existing automated theorem
provers (e.g., Prover9 [67]) and/or SMT solvers (e.g., Yices [48]) to automatically check
the unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets of OCL constraints.
3.3.2 Unsatisfiability of OCL constraints
The notion of unsatisfiability that we propose emphasizes the logical meaning of OCL
constraints; in fact, it basically translates to OCL the standard notion of unsatisfiability for
logic formulas. There are other notions of satisfiability/unsatisfiability for OCL constraints
in the literature, which we will briefly discuss at the end of this section.
In what follows, we denote by OCL constraint any OCL expression of type Boolean.
We do not assume that instances of models always have a finite a number of elements.
Definition 1 Given a model (class diagram) M, and a set of OCL constraints Φ, we
say that Φ is M-unsatisfiable if and only if there does not exist an M-instance (object
diagram) O on which every constraint in Φ evaluates to true.
To illustrate this notion, we introduce the following example. Table 3.5 shows a list of
OCL constraints: they all refer to the simple model Library2 shown in Figure 3.2. In this
model, libraries contains Books and books have Authors, pages, and an ISBN code.
According to Definition 1, the following subsets (among others) of the constraints
shown in Table 3.5 are Library2 -unsatisfiable: {1,2}, {1,8}, {1,10}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {2,5},
{2,6}, {7,8}, {11, 13}, {12}, {14}, and {15}.
Notice that the subset {9,10,11} is not Library2 -unsatisfiable: a library with just one
book will satisfy these constraints. On the other hand, the subset {9,10,11,16} is indeed
Library2 -unsatisfiable. Notice also that the subset {17} is not Library2 -unsatisfiable: a
library with an infinite number of books will satisfy this constraint. On the other hand,
the subset {17, 18} is indeed Library2 -unsatisfiable.
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-pages : Integer
-isbn : String






Visual Paradigm Community Edition [not for commercial use] 
Figure 3.2: The model Library2.
1. Book.allInstances()−>isEmpty().
2. Book.allInstances()−>exists(x|x.pages > 300).
3. Book.allInstances()−>forAll(x|x.pages < 300).
4. Book.allInstances()−>select(x|x.pages > 300)−>isEmpty().
5. Book.allInstances()−>reject(x|x.pages <= 300)−>isEmpty().
6. Book.allInstances()−>collect(x|x.pages)−>asSet()−>forAll(i|i < 300).
7. Book.allInstances()−>forAll(x|x.authors−>isEmpty()).
8. Author.allInstances()−>exists(a|a.books−>notEmpty()).









16. Book.allInstances()−>size() > 1.
17. Book.allInstances()−>forAll(b|Book.allInstances()−>exists(x|x.pages > b.pages)).
18. Book.allInstances()−>size() = 2.
Table 3.5: List of constraints.
As mentioned before, other notions of satisfiability/unsatisfiability of UML models with
OCL constraints can be found in the literature. In particular, the notions used in [23, 24]
are those of weak and strong satisfiability (and related notions are also introduced in [18]).
Weak satisfiability means that there exists a finite instance of the model in which at least
one class is populated with at least one element. Strong satisfiability means that there
exists a finite instance of the model in which all its classes are populated with at least one
element. Notice that, if a set of constraints is unsatisfiable (in our sense), then it can not
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be weak nor strong satisfiable. On the other hand, if a set of constraints is not weak nor
strong satisfiable, it does not imply that is unsatisfiable (in our sense).
3.3.3 A mapping from OCL to FOL
In this section we provide a high-level description of a mapping from a subset of OCL
into first-order logic (FOL). The interested reader can find in [34] the full details of this
definition. Given a set of OCL constraints, our mapping generates a set of FOL formulas
such that, if the resulting set is unsatisfiable, then the original set is also unsatisfiable.
OCL constraints specify properties that must be satisfied by a model. In order to do
so in a concise way, OCL provides different constructors to refer to specific collections
of elements. In a nutshell, our mapping is defined recursively over the structure of OCL
expressions:
Boolean-expressions are translated to formulas, which essentially mirror their logical
structure; Integer-expressions are basically copied; at this point, we do not consider
String-expressions.
Collection-expressions are translated to predicates, whose meaning is defined by ad-
ditional formulas generated by the mapping; at this point, we only consider Set-
expressions.
Association-ends are translated to predicates, which are also defined by formulas
generated by the mapping; at this point, we do not consider qualified associations.
Attributes are translated to functions, which are left undefined by the mapping.
Checking unsatisfiability
A crucial advantage of our mapping is that the resulting formulas can be checked for
unsatisfiability using automated reasoning tools, such as automated theorem provers and
SMT solvers. To illustrate our point, we have tried to automatically prove the unsatis-
fiability of different subsets of the constraints shown in Table 3.5 using Prover9 [67] (an
automated theorem prover) and Yices [48] (an SMT solver). The results are shown in
Table 3.6. The symbol
√
indicates that the corresponding tool was able to prove the
unsatisfiability of the input set of formulas, while the symbol • indicates that the tool
concluded without finding a proof. Both tools finished each task in less than a second,
running on a standard laptop computer. In our experiments, we used both provers with
their default (command) options.
Prover9 [67] is a resolution/paramodulation automated theorem prover for first-order
and equational logic. It uses two default limits which, although good in practice, can
prevent proofs from being found. Not surprisingly (since it does not support integer
arithmetic), Prover9 could not automatically prove the unsatisfiability of some of the
subsets of constraints in our experiment.
Yices [48] is a high-performance SMT solver that decides the satisfiability of propo-
sitional formulas that mix uninterpreted function symbols and equality with interpreted
symbols from various theories, in particular for linear real and integer arithmetic, but also
for recursive data types, tuples, records, lambda expressions and quantifiers among oth-
ers. Of course, when dealing with quantifiers, SMT solvers cannot be complete, and may
return unknown after a while, meaning that they can neither prove the quantified formula
to be unsatisfiable, nor can they find an interpretation that makes it satisfiable. However,
Yices was able to automatically prove the unsatisfiability of all the subsets of constraints
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{1,2} {1,8} {1,10} {2,3} {2,4} {2,5} {2,6} {7,8} {11,13} {12} {14} {15}
Prover9
√ √ √ • √ • • √ √ √ √ √
Yices
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Table 3.6: Case study: checking unsatisfiability.
in our experiment. This result is certainly encouraging for our purposes; moreover, we
expect to take advantage of its decision procedures for recursive data types, tuples, and
records, in order to prove the unsatisfiability of more complex subsets of OCL constraints.
3.3.4 Limitations
The mapping from OCL to first-order logic proposed here, supports the direct use of
SMT solvers to check the satisfiability of OCL expressions, but under specific restrictions
both on the expressions that are allowed, and on the instances of data models that are
checked. Not surprisingly, some of these restrictions are imposed to avoid the problem of
coping with undefinedness in OCL. In particular, our mapping i) only considers instances
where all attributes are defined and ii) does not allow expressions containing operators
that can generate undefined values. In [39] modifications of the previous mapping are
proposed that, although grounded on the same principles underlying our mapping, are
designed to overcome the limitations of the latter with regard to undefinedness in OCL.
Let us explain the key difference in a nutshell. Under restrictions i) and ii) above, a Boolean
OCL expression can only evaluate to either true or false. Thus, to reason in this context
using Boolean OCL expressions it is sufficient to define a mapping that formalizes when
a Boolean OCL expression evaluates to true. This is precisely what we do in the mapping
propose here. However, in the presence of undefinedness, Boolean OCL expressions can
also evaluate to null or invalid. To cope with this fact, [39] defines four different mappings
which formalize, respectively, when a Boolean OCL expression evaluates to true, when to
false, when to null, and when to invalid.
In the near future, we plan to further extend the mapping from OCL to first-order
logic [34, 39] to deal with larger subsets of OCL. First, we should be able to deal with
generalizations. The idea here is to add, by default, the expected sentences formalizing
that every element in the sub-class collection also belongs to the super-class collection.
Second, we should be able to deal with bags. We have not yet found a solution for
translating Bag-expressions using predicates, as we do for Set-expressions (the obvious one
of using an additional argument, indicating the number of occurrences of a given element
in the bag, does not seem to work). Third, we should be able to deal with size-expressions.
We do not have yet a general solution for this: dealing with constraints like (16) and
(18) in Table 3.5 and, in general, with constraints that simply restrict the multiplicity of
collections, is rather simple; defining a mapping for arbitrary size-expressions appearing
anywhere inside constraints, requires further investigation. Finally, it would be interesting
to define a mapping for general Collection-expressions and for Tuple-expressions, and to
explore the capabilities of SMT solvers to automatically check the unsatisfiability of the
resulting formulas. In the long term, we should prove, of course, the correctness of our
mapping with respect to a formal semantics of the OCL language.
3.4 Reasoning about access control policies
In this Section we present a novel, tool-supported methodology for reasoning about
fine-grained access control policies (FGAC). We also briefly report on our experience using
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the Z3 SMT solver [45] for automatically proving non-trivial properties about FGAC
policies.
The key component of our methodology is the mapping [34, 39] from OCL to first-
order logic discussed in Section 3.3.3, which allows one to transform questions about FGAC
policies into satisfiability problems in first-order logic. Although this mapping does not
cover the complete OCL language, our experience shows that the kind of OCL expressions
typically used for specifying invariants and authorization constraints, are covered by the
mapping. More intriguing is, however, the issue about the effectiveness of SMT solvers
for automatically reasoning about FGAC policies. Although our experience so far is ex-
tremely encouraging (all problems are solved in less than a second), we should not forget
that our results completely depend on the interaction between (i) the way our mapping
translates into first-order logic the relevant OCL expressions (invariants and authorization
constraints), and (ii) the heuristics implemented in the SMT solver.
3.4.1 Motivation
Model-driven engineering supports the development of complex software systems by
generating software from models. Model-driven security [9] is a specialization of this
paradigm, where system designs are modeled together with their security requirements,
and security infrastructures are directly generated from the models. Of course, the quality
of the generated code depends on the quality of the source models. If the models do not
properly specify the system’s intended behavior, one should not expect the generated
system to do so either. Quod natura non dat, Salmantica non praestat.9 Experience
shows that even when using powerful, high-level modeling languages, it is easy to make
logical errors and omissions. It is critical not only that the modeling language has a well-
defined semantics, but also that there is tool support for analyzing the modeled systems’
properties.
A running example
Here we introduce the example that we use to illustrate our methodology for reasoning
about FGAC policies.
Data model. In Figure 3.3 we use ComponentUML’s graphical syntax to define a data
model, named EmplBasic.dtm. This model specifies that every employee may have a
name, a surname, and a salary; that every employee may have a supervisor and may
in turn supervise other employees; and that every employee may take one of two roles:
Worker or Supervisor. In the terminology of ComponentUML, Employee is an entity ; name,
surname, salary, and role are attributes; supervisedBy and supervises are association-ends; and
Role is an enumerated class. Notice that the association-end supervises has multiplicity 0..*,
meaning that an employee may supervise zero or more employees, while the association-
end supervisedBy has multiplicity 0..1 meaning that an employee may have at most one
supervisor.
Invariants We can refine the model EmplBasic.dtm (Figure 3.3) by adding invariants
to this model. In particular, consider the following constraints:
1. There is exactly one employee who has no supervisor.
9Less elegantly said, garbage in, garbage out.
38 Chapter 3. Supporting the methodology
< < r o l e > >
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Figure 3.3: EmplBasic.dtm: a data model for employees’ information.
< < r o l e > >
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Figure 3.4: Empl.stm: a security model for accessing employees’ information.
2. Nobody is its own supervisor.
3. An employee has role Supervisor if and only if it has at least one supervisee.
4. Every employee has one role.
These constraints can be formalized in OCL as follows:
(1) Employee.allInstances()−>one(e|e.supervisedBy.oclIsUndefined())
(2) Employee.allInstances()−>forAll(e|not(e.supervisedBy = e))
(3) Employee.allInstances()−>forAll(e|(e.role = Supervisor implies e.supervises−>notEmpty())
and (e.supervises−>notEmpty() implies e.role = Supervisor))
(4) Employee.allInstances()−>forAll(e|not(e.role.oclIsUndefined())
In what follows, we will refer to the constraint (1) as oneBoss, (2) as noSelfSuper,
(3) as roleSuper, and (4) as allRole. Also, we will denote by Empl1.dtm the refined ver-
sion of EmplBasic.dtm that includes as invariants the constraints oneBoss, noSelfSuper,
roleSuper, and allRole.
Security model. In Figure 3.4 we use SecureUML’s graphical syntax to define a secu-
rity model, named Empl.stm. This model specifies a basic FGAC policy for accessing the
employees’ information modeled in Empl1.dtm. Permissions are assigned to users depend-
ing on their roles, which can be Worker or Supervisor. Also, users with role Supervisor inherit
all the permissions granted to users with role Worker, since Supervisor is a subrole of Worker.
Finally, permissions are constrained by authorization constraints: namely,
1. A worker is granted permission to read an employee’s salary, provided that it is its
own salary, as specified by the authorization constraint caller = self.
3.4. Reasoning about access control policies 39
2. A supervisor is granted unrestricted permission to read an employee’s salary, as
specified by the authorization constraint true.
3. A supervisor is granted permission to update an employee’s salary, provided that it
supervises this employee, as specified by the authorization constraint self.supervisedBy
= caller.
Recall the function Auth discussed in Section 2.1.3: namely, that for every security
model S, role r, and action act , Auth(S, r, act) returns the authorization constraint defined
in S for r to execute act . Consider now the value of Auth(S, r, act) in the following cases:
Auth(Empl.stm, Worker, update(salary))= false.
Auth(Empl.stm, Supervisor, update(salary))=
self.supervisedBy = caller or false.
Auth(Empl.stm, Worker, read(salary))= caller = self.
Auth(Empl.stm, Supervisor, read(salary))= caller = self or true.
3.4.2 Categories of security properties
Next, we will explain and illustrate with examples, how one can use the mapping from
OCL to first-order logic proposed in [39], to reason about security models. This mapping
essentially consists of two, inter-related components: (i) a map from data models and
Boolean OCL expressions to first-order formulas, called ocl2foldef ; and (ii) a map from
Boolean OCL expressions to first-order formulas, called ocl2fol. The following remark
formalizes the main property of this mapping:
Remark 2 Let D be a data model, with invariants expr1, . . . , exprn, and let expr be a










∪ ocl2foldef(expr) ∪ {¬(ocl2fol(expr))}
is unsatisfiable.
In what follows, given a security model S, we use the term scenario to refer to any
valid instance of S’s underlying data model in which a user requests permission to execute
an action. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that neither the user requesting
permission, nor the resource upon which the action will be executed, can be undefined.
We organize our examples in blocks or categories. In the first block, we are interested
in knowing if there is any scenario in which someone with role r will be allowed to execute
an action act . Notice that, by Remark 2 the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the following
set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
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Example 8 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Worker is allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)? Recall
that
Auth(Empl.stm, Worker, update(salary))= false.
According to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘No’, since the following set of
formulas is clearly unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Worker) ∧ ocl2fol(false))}.
Example 9 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)?
Recall that
Auth(Empl.stm, Supervisor, update(salary))= (self.supervisedBy = caller or false).
According to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of
formulas is satisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)
∧ ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy =caller or false))}.
Example 10 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is allowed to change its own salary? Notice that in any scenario in
which someone is requesting to change its own salary, the values of self (i.e., the employee
whose salary is to be updated) and caller (i.e., the employee who is updating this salary)
are the same. According to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘No’, since the
following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)
∧ ocl2fol(self =caller and(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Example 11 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of someone who has no supervisor at
all? Notice that in any scenario in which someone (caller) is requesting to change the
salary of someone (self) who has no supervisor at all, the value of self.supervisedBy must be
null. According to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘No’, since the following set of
formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)
∧ ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = null and
(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
In our second block of examples, we are interested in knowing if there is any scenario
in which someone with role r will not be allowed to execute an action act . Notice that, by
Remark 2, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ¬(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
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Example 12 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is not allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)?
According to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of
formulas is satisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor) ∧
¬(ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
In our third block of examples, we are interested in knowing if there is any scenario
in which nobody with role r will be allowed to execute an action act. Notice that, by
Remark 2, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)∀(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r)⇒
¬(ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act))))}.
Example 13 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which nobody with
role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)? According
to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of formulas, which
we will refer to as Forms(Ex 13), is satisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(self )∀(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)⇒
¬(ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
In our fourth block of examples, we are interested in knowing if, in every scenario,
there is at least one object upon which nobody with role r will be allowed to execute an
action act. Notice that, by Remark 2, the answer will be ‘Yes’ if and only if the following
set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∀(self )∃(target)∃(value)∃(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
Example 14 Consider the following question: In every scenario, is there at least one
employee whose salary can not be changed by anybody with role Supervisor? According
to Remark 2, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of formulas is
unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∀(self )∃(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor) ∧
ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false))}.
To conclude, we want to illustrate the importance of taking into account the invariants
of the underlying data model when reasoning about FGAC policies. Let Empl2.dtm be
the data model that results from adding to the model EmplBasic.dtm the invariants
noSelfSuper, roleSuper, allRole, plus the following invariant:
5. Everybody has one supervisor.
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This invariant, which we will refer to as allSuper, can be formalized in OCL as follows:
Employee.allInstances()−>forAll(e|not(e.supervisedBy.oclIsUndefined()))
Example 15 Consider the security model Empl.stm this time with Empl2.dtm as its un-
derlying data model. Consider again the question that we asked ourselves in Example 13:
namely, is there any scenario in which nobody with role Supervisor is allowed to change the
salary of someone else (including itself)? According to Remark 2, the answer to this ques-
tion is different from Example 13, namely, ‘No’, since the set of formulas Forms(Ex 13) is
now unsatisfiable.
Finally, let Empl3.dtm be the data model that results from removing from Empl2.dtm,
the invariant roleSuper.
Example 16 Consider the security model Empl.stm, but this time with Empl3.dtm as
its underlying data model. Consider, once again, the question that we asked ourselves in
Example 13: namely, is there any scenario in which nobody with role Supervisor is allowed to
change the salary of someone else (including itself)? According to Remark 2, the answer
to this question is now different from Example 15, namely, ‘Yes’, since the set of formulas
Forms(Ex 13) is now satisfiable.
3.4.3 Proving security properties
We briefly report here on our experience using the Z3 SMT solver [45] to automati-
cally obtain the answers to the questions posed in the examples in Section 3.4.2. Table 3.7
below summarizes the results of our experiments. For each example, we show the time
that Z3 takes to return an answer (in all cases, less than 1 second); the answer that it
returns (in all cases, the expected one); and the first-order model that it generates when
the answer is sat, i.e., when it finds that the input set of formulas is satisfiable. Each
model represents a scenario (not necessarily the one discussed in Section 3.4.2 for the corre-
sponding example), and here we simply indicate the number of employees that it contains,
which employees are linked through the association-end supervisedBy, which employees
have the role Worker, which employees have the role Supervisor, which employee is the
one requesting permission to change the salary (caller), and which employee is the one
whose salary will be changed (self ), if permission is granted. We ran our experiments
on a laptop computer, with a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 4GB 1067 MHz
memory, using Z3 version 4.3.2 9d221c037a95-x64-osx-10.9.2. Finally, the input for Z3 has
been generated using our tool SecProver [79]. This tool takes the following parameters: a
data model, a security model, a set (possibly empty) of invariants, an action, a role, a set
(possibly empty) of additional constraints, and a question type. SecProver automatically
generates the set of first-order formulas whose satisfiability will determine, according to
our methodology, the answer to the given question.
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Ex. Time Ans. Interpretation
8 0.078s unsat —–
9 0.107s sat
#employees = 3
supervisedBy = {(e3, e2),
(e1, e2)}
Worker = {e1, e3}
Supervisor = {e2}
caller = e2, self = e1
10 0.041s unsat —–
11 0.042s unsat —–
12 0.306s sat
#employees = 6
supervisedBy = {(e1, e2),
(e2, e3), (e4, e2),
(e5, e3), (e6, e3)}
Worker = {e1, e4, e5, e6}
Supervisor = {e2, e3}







14 0.485s unsat —–
15 0.060s unsat —–
16 0.506s sat
#employees = 15
supervisedBy = {(e1, e2),
(e2, e4), (e3, e4), (e4, e6),
(e5, e4)(e6, e12), (e7, e4),
(e8, e14), (e9, e4), (e10, e4),
(e11, e15), (e12, e13),




Table 3.7: Automatic reasoning over the examples 8-16 introduced in Section 3.4.2.




To provide evidence of the usefulness of our methodology, we report in this Chapter
on our use of ActionGUI to develop a secure data-management application, based on
an eHealth case study proposed within NESSoS, the European Network of Excellence
on Engineering Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems [71]. The NESSoS
eHealth case study consists of a web-based system for electronic health record management
(EHRM). Electronic health records (EHR) store information created by, or on behalf of,
a health professional in the context of the care of a patient. As further evidence of the
usefulness of our methodology, we also include in this Chapter a summary of four other
web applications that we have developed using ActionGUI.
Overall, our experience demonstrates the methodology’s potential for developing real-
world applications. First, the use of model-transformation and code-generation frees the
developer from programming fine-grained authorization constraints and inserting them at
all the required places throughout the application’s code and with the correct arguments.
Except for small applications, this is cumbersome and error-prone, since the number of
data actions associated to events may be on the order of hundreds. Secondly, our method-
ology supports modularity and separation of concerns. In particular, the security model
can be changed independently of the GUI model, without requiring one to re-program
and re-insert all the new fine-grained authorization constraints, since this is automatically
done by our model-transformation.
4.1 A secure eHealth application
We report here on our use of ActionGUI to develop a secure data-management ap-
plication, called eHRMApp. This application is based on a case study proposed within
NESSoS, the European Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet Soft-
ware Services and Systems [71]. The eHealth case study consists of a web-based system
for electronic health record management (EHRM). Electronic health records (EHR) store
information created by, or on behalf of, a health professional in the context of the care of
a patient.
Electronic health records are highly sensitive and therefore their access must be con-
trolled. Part of the challenge in this case study was to model the access control policy
and build an application that enforces it at runtime. The policy consists of various autho-
rization rules along the lines of: The access control criteria for an EHR depends, among
others, on the type of EHR. For instance, a highly sensitive record might be only avail-
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able to the patient’s treating doctor (and perhaps a few others, in rare situations). Such
rules necessitate fine-grained access control, where access control decisions depend not
only on the user’s credentials but also on the satisfaction of constraints on the state of the
persistence layer, i.e. on the values of stored data items.
We show how ActionGUI’s modeling languages can be used to specify the applica-
tion’s data model (e.g., hospital staff, health records), security policy (e.g., rules like the
above) and behavior. Moreover, by illustrative examples, we highlight various features
of the ActionGUI methodology and toolkit. Overall, the eHealth case study is interest-
ing as an example of developing a secure data-management application, and it provides a
proof-of-concept for the application of the ActionGUI methodology to an industry-relevant
problem.
The NESSoS eHRMApp application scenario defines different system use cases along
with the associated access control policy. The use cases include: register new patients
in a hospital and assign them to clinicians, such as nurses or doctors; retrieve patient’s
information; register new nurses and doctors in a hospital and assign them to a ward;
change nurses or doctors from one ward to another; and reassign patients to doctors.
We will focus on a representative use case as a running example: reassigning patients to
doctors. We will use this example to illustrate ActionGUI’s modeling languages as well as
the model-based separation of concerns supported by the ActionGUI methodology.
4.1.1 The eHRMApp’s data model
The full data model for the eHRMApp application contains 18 entities, 40 attributes,
and 48 association-ends. We discuss below just the entities, attributes, and association-
ends that are required for our running example.
Figure 4.1 presents this data model, formalized using ComponentUML’s textual syn-
tax. As this example shows, ActionGUI data models specify how the application’s data is
structured, independently of how it will be visualized or accessed.
Professional. This entity represents the eHRMApp’s users. The role assigned to each user
is specified by its role attribute. The roles considered are DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATOR,
DOCTOR, NURSE, and SYSTEM. The medical centers where a user works are linked to
the user through the association-end worksIn. If a user is a doctor, then it is linked to the
corresponding doctor information through the association-end asDoctor. Similarly, if a user
is an administrative staff, then it is linked to staff information through the association-end
asAdministrative.
MedicalCenter. This entity represents medical centers. The departments belonging to a
medical center are linked to the medical center through the association-end departments.
The professionals working for a medical center are linked to the medical center through
the association-end employees.
Doctor. This entity represents doctor’s information. Doctor’s information is linked to the
corresponding professional through the association-end doctorProfessional. The departments
where a doctor works are linked to the doctor’s information through the association-end
doctorDepartments. The patients treated by a doctor are linked to the doctor’s information
through the association-end doctorPatients.
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Entity Professional {
Role role
Set(MedicalCenter) worksIn oppositeTo employees
Doctor asDoctor oppositeTo doctorProfessional
Administrative asAdministrative oppositeTo administrativeProfessional }
Entity MedicalCenter {
Set(Department) departments oppositeTo belongsTo
Set(Professional) employees oppositeTo worksIn }
Entity Doctor {
Professional doctorProfessional oppositeTo asDoctor
Set(Department) doctorDepartments oppositeTo doctors
Set(Patient) doctorPatients oppositeTo doctor }
Entity Administrative {
Professional administrativeProfessional oppositeTo asAdministrative }
Entity Department {
MedicalCenter belongsTo oppositeTo departments
Set(Doctor) doctors oppositeTo doctorDepartments
Set(Patient) patients oppositeTo department }
Entity Patient {
Doctor doctor oppositeTo doctorPatients
Department department oppositeTo patients }
enum Role { DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATOR DOCTOR NURSE SYSTEM }
Figure 4.1: The eHRMApp’s data model (partial).
Administrative. This entity represents administrative staff information. Administrative
staff information is linked to the corresponding professional through the association-end
administrativeProfessional.
Department. This entity represents departments. The medical center to which a de-
partment belongs is linked to the department through the association-end belongsTo. The
doctors working in a department are linked to the department through the association-end
doctors. The patients treated in a department are linked to the department through the
association-end patients.
Patient. This entity represents patients. The doctor treating a patient is linked to the
patient through the association-end doctor. The department where a patient is treated is
linked to the patient through the association-end department.
4.1.2 The eHRMApp data model’s invariants
The full eHRMApp application data model is constrained by 66 data invariants, for-
malized using OCL. The following three invariants are representative.
1. Each patient is treated by a doctor.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|not(p.doctor.oclIsUndefined()))
2. Each patient is treated in a department.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|not(p.department.oclIsUndefined()))
3. Each patient is treated by a doctor who works for a set of departments, including the
department where the patient is treated.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p| p.doctor.doctorDepartments→includes(p.department))
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1 Role ADMINISTRATOR {
2 Patient{




7 then Update::doctor }
Figure 4.2: Examples of the eHRMApp security model’s permissions.
These invariants make precise the intended meaning of the associations between the
entities Patient, Doctor, and Department. The first two invariants state that the doctor and
the department associated to a patient cannot be undefined, i.e., null. The third invariant
states that a doctor who treats a patient must work in the department where the patient
is treated, although the doctor may also work in other departments.
4.1.3 The eHRMApp’s security model
Electronic health records are, by their nature, highly sensitive and the NESSoS case
study informally defines the policy that regulates their access. As expected, the authoriza-
tion to carry out certain actions is not only role-based, but also context-based. In other
words, the eHRMApp access control policy is fine-grained.
The full eHRMApp application’s security model contains 5 roles and 573 permissions,
where each permission authorizes users in a role, to execute an action upon the satisfaction
of an authorization constraint formalized in OCL. In Figure 4.2 we present examples of two
permissions, modeled using SecureUML’s textual syntax. The first permission authorizes
a user (caller) with the role ADMINISTRATOR, to reassign a patient (self) to a department
(value), provided that the user works in a set of medical centers, that includes the one to
which the department will be reassigned. The second permission authorizes a user (caller)
with the role ADMINISTRATOR, to reassign a patient (self ) to a doctor (value), provided
two conditions are satisfied: (i) the user works in a medical center, where the doctor to
which the patient will be reassigned, also works; and (ii) the user works in a medical
center, that owns the department where the patient is currently being treated.
As this example illustrates, ActionGUI’s security models are formulated in terms of
the application’s data. This formalization is independent of how the data is visualized or
accessed through the application’s graphical user interface.
4.1.4 The eHRMApp’s GUI model
The full eHRMApp application’s GUI model contains 8 windows for the following
use cases: login to the application; access a medical center’s information; register a new
patient; review a patient’s information; reassign a patient to a doctor and department;
access options reserved for the medical center’s director; introduce a professional into the
system; and reassign a professional to a department. Here are some other concrete figures
about the size of the GUI model: i) Widgets: 19 buttons; 73 labels; 19 text fields; 5 boolean
fields; 1 date field; 1 combo-box; and 9 tables; ii) Statements: 34 if-then-else statements;
iii) Data actions: 11 create actions; 41 update actions; 5 add link actions; and 2 remove
link actions; iv) GUI actions: 157 set actions; and 7 open actions; v) OCL expressions:
361 expressions (77 non-literals).
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We discuss below the window relevant for our running example: the window movePa-
tientWI for reassigning a patient to a doctor and a department. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present
our model of this window, in GUIML’s textual syntax. Note that, in contrast with Exam-
ple 4, onCreate events are implicitly declared in widget variables’ initialization. Figure 4.5
contains a screenshot of the actual window generated from this model. The window
movePatientWI assumes that both a medical center and a patient have previously been se-
lected. This information is stored, respectively, in the variables medicalCenter and patient
(lines 2-3). The window movePatientWI contains the following widgets:
A label patientLa that displays the name and surname of the selected patient (lines
5–7).
A label departmentLa that displays the name of the department where the selected
patient is treated (lines 8–9).
A label doctorLa that displays the name and surname of the doctor who treats the
selected patient (lines 10–13).
A label departmentsLa that displays a message inviting the user to select a department
(lines 14–15).
A label doctorsLa that displays a message inviting the user to select a doctor (lines
16–17).
A table departmentsTa that displays information about the departments that belong
to the selected medical center (line 22); in particular, the name of each of these
departments is shown (line 31-34). Also, when the user selects a department from
this list, it refreshes the list of doctors displayed in the table doctorsTa (see below)
with the doctors who work for the selected department (lines 19–21).
A table doctorsTA that is initially empty (line 24). As previously explained, upon
selection of a department in the table departmentsTa, it displays information about
the doctors who work for the selected department (lines 19–21); in particular, the
name and surname of each of these doctors are shown (lines 35-41).
A button moveBu that, when clicked upon, if there is a department selected in the
table departmentsTa (line 44), and there is also a doctor selected in the table doctorsTa
(line 45), then:
– it reassigns the selected department to the selected patient (line 46);
– it reassigns the selected doctor to the selected patient (line 47);
– it notifies the user that the reassignment succeeded (lines 48).
Otherwise, it notifies the user that either a doctor (line 50) or a department (line 52)
must first be selected.
A button backBU that, when the user clicks on it, it returns to the previous window
(line 55).
As this example illustrates, ActionGUI’s GUI models depend on how the application’s
data is structured — after all, they describe how users interact with this data — but
not on the application’s security policy. Of course, in terms of the final application’s
usability, there is a dependency: a GUI can end up being unusable precisely because of
the application’s security policy.
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1 Window movePatientWi {
2 MedicalCenter medicalCenter
3 Patient patient
4 String text := [’Move a patient’]
5 Label patientLa {
6 String text := [’Patient: ’.concat($movePatientWi.patient$.contact.name)
7 .concat(’ ’).concat($movePatientWi.patient$.contact.surname)] }
8 Label departmentLa {
9 String text := [’Department: ’.concat($movePatientWi.patient$.department.name)] }
10 Label doctorLa {
11 String text := [’Doctor: ’.concat($movePatientWi.patient$.doctor.
12 doctorProfessional.name).concat(’ ’).
13 concat($movePatientWi.patient$.doctor.doctorProfessional.surname)] }
14 Label departmentsLa {
15 String text := [’Select the new department:’] }
16 Label doctorsLa {
17 String text := [’Select the new doctor:’] }
18 Table departmentsTa {
19 Department selected {
20 if [not $selected$.oclIsUndefined()] {
21 movePatientWi.doctorsTa.rows := [$selected$.doctors] } }
22 Set(Department) rows := [$movePatientWi.medicalCenter$.departments] }
23 Table doctorsTa {
24 Set(Doctor) rows := [Doctor.allInstances()→select(false)]
25 Doctor selected }
26 Button moveBu {
27 String text := [’Move the patient’] }
28 Button backBu {
29 String text := [’Back’]
30 }
Figure 4.3: A window for reassigning a selected patient (part I)
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31 Table movePatientWi.departmentsTa {
32 columns{
33 [’Department’] : Label department {
34 String text := [$departmentsTa.row$.name] } } }
35 Table movePatientWi.doctorsTa {
36 columns {
37 [’Doctor’] : Label doctor {
38 String text :=
39 [$doctorsTa.row$.doctorProfessional.name
40 .concat(’ ’)
41 .concat($doctorsTa.row$.doctorProfessional.surname)] } } }
42 Button movePatientWi.moveBu {
43 event onClick {
44 if [not $departmentsTa.selected$.oclIsUndefined()] {
45 if[not $doctorsTa.selected$.oclIsUndefined()] {
46 [$movePatientWi.patient$.department] := [$departmentsTa.selected$]
47 [$movePatientWi.patient$.doctor] := [$doctorsTa.selected$]
48 notification([’Success’],[’The patient has been reassigned.’],[0]) }
49 else {
50 notification([’Error’],[’Please, select first a doctor.’],[0]) } }
51 else {
52 notification([’Error’],[’Please, select first a department.’],[0]) } } } }
53 Button movePatientWi.backBu {
54 event onClick {
55 back } }
Figure 4.4: A window for reassigning a selected patient (part II)
Figure 4.5: Screenshot of the window for reassigning a selected patient
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46.1 if [[$movePatientWi.role$ = ADMINISTRATOR
46.2 and $movePatientWi.caller$.worksIn
46.3 →includes($departmentsTa.selected$.belongsTo)] {
46.4 [$movePatientWi.patient$.department] := [$departmentsTa.selected$] }
46.5 else { fail }





47.6 [$movePatientWi.patient$.doctor] := [$doctorsTa.selected$] }
47.7 else { fail }
Figure 4.6: The security-aware actions for reassigning a selected patient
4.1.5 The eHRMApp’s security-aware GUI model
As explained in Section 2.3, the heart of ActionGUI is a model-transformation function
that, essentially, prefixes each data action in the GUI model with the authorization check
specified in the security model. The full eHRMApp application’s GUI model contains 59
data actions, and therefore the automatically generated eHRMApp application’s security-
aware GUI model contains the same number of authorization checks.
As an illustrative example of our model-transformation function, we show in Figure 4.6
the part of the security-aware GUI model for the button moveBu’s event onClick that is
relevant for our running example. The action of reassigning the selected patient to the
department selected in the table departmentsTa (line 46 in Figure 4.4) is now wrapped
by an if-then-else statement (lines 46.1-46.5 in Figure 4.6) whose condition reflects the
permission for executing this action given by line 3 in Figure 4.2. Similarly, the action
of reassigning the selected patient to the doctor selected in the table doctorsTa (line 47 in
Figure 4.4) is wrapped by an if-then-else statement (lines 47.1-47.7 in Figure 4.6) whose
condition reflects the permission for executing this action given by lines 5–7 in Figure 4.2.
4.1.6 Generating the eHRMApp application
The ActionGUI toolkit automatically generates the complete eHRMApp application
in under 10 seconds. The generated .war file includes the Vaadin library as well as other
external libraries. The Vaadin library is responsible of 70% of the size of the generated file
and only 10% of this file corresponds to the code that ActionGUI automatically generates
to interpret the application’s model. The size of the .war file containing the complete
application is roughly 12 MB.
4.2 Other applications
We report here on other four web applications that we developed using ActionGUI.
We begin by briefly describing these applications and then we provide concrete figures,
which include also the eHRMApp application extensively described before, using different
metrics. We conclude with other more subjective considerations.
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Customer Relationship Management (CRMApp) We have developed a web ap-
plication for managing customers of a Hospital and Care Center. This application allows
marketing and public relations personnel to manage contact information, including fil-
tering contacts based on different criteria and exporting the results in Excel files. As
customer data is highly sensitive, data is subject to a restrictive access-control policy.
For example, a marketing and PR staff member can only access the contact information,
of those contacts previously selected as targets of a marketing campaign to which he is
assigned. The application also allows a General Manager to create marketing campaigns,
select the targeted patients, and assign marketing and PR staff members to campaigns.
Volunteer Management (VMApp) We have developed a web application for man-
aging a care center’s volunteer program. Using this application, the program’s coordina-
tors can take actions such as: introduce new volunteers; create, edit, and modify tasks;
and propose these tasks to the volunteers, based on the volunteers’ time availability and
preferences. The access-control policy stipulates, for example, that volunteers are only
authorized to edit their own personal information, such as their preferences and time
availability, and to accept or reject their own tasks.
Meal Service Management (MSMApp) This is a web application for managing a
student residence’s meal service. Using this application, a resident can notify the admin-
istration whether he will have a meal at the residence’s cafeteria, in which of the available
time slots, and if he will bring a guest. A resident shall only edit his own meal selection
and within a specific time window, which depends on the selected meal. Administrators
can create new resident accounts, and list the meals requested for each available time slot.
Chatroom (ChatApp) This is an extension of our running example: in addition to
posting messages in a selected chatrooms, users can also create and delete chatrooms,
under specific conditions.
CRMApp, VMApp, and MSMApp are commercial applications. They were developed
for real customers, and they are currently being used by their different stakeholders. In
contrast, eHRMApp was developed, as we explain in Section 4.1, as part of a case study
proposed by industrial partners in an ongoing European project. The interested reader can
find more information about this case study, as well as a demo version of the eHRMApp
application, at [1].
In Table 4.1 we measure these applications, reporting on the size of the database that
they manage and the number of registered users (at the time of writing this manuscript).
In particular, for each commercial application, we indicate: the number of registered users;
the current size of the associated database; the number of tables defined by its database
schema; and the maximum number of rows currently contained in any of these tables.
In Table 4.2 we measure our applications from a different perspective, namely, the size
of their underlying models. In particular, for each application, we show: the size of the
corresponding XML files; the number of their widgets (by types); the number of if-then-
else and iterate statements associate to their events; the number of data and GUI actions
(by types) also associated to their events; and the number of OCL expressions used to
define the conditions in the if-then-else statements, the sources in the iterator statements,
or the arguments in the data and GUI actions. We also indicate how many of these OCL
expressions are non-literal expressions, as well as their average size and the average number
of widget variables that they contain.
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CRMApp VMApp MSMApp eHRMApp ChatApp
Commercial/Academic (*) Com. Com. Com. Acad. Acad.
Num. of users (**) 25 95 24 NA NA
Size of database (**) 4.19 Mb 1.18 Mb 0.9 Mb NA NA
Num. of tables 125 52 16 46 7
Max. num. of rows (**) 4100 112 665 NA NA
(*) “Commercial” means that this application is being used in a business environment by
real users and stakeholders. (**) At the time of writing this manuscript.
Table 4.1: Example applications: size of the application’s data
CRMApp VMApp MSMApp eHRMApp ChatApp
Models
Size of data model (XML) 33,9 Kb 17.7 Kb 3,5 Kb 8,9 Kb 1,5 Kb
Size of security model (XML) 24,4 Kb 26.7 Kb 1,4 Kb 18,5 Kb 5,8 Kb
Size of GUI model (XML) 1611,2 Kb 1538,7 Kb 309,7 Kb 136,7 Kb 29,2 Kb
Widgets
Num. of windows 49 102 11 8 3
Num. of buttons 182 293 30 18 10
Num. of labels 691 697 83 66 7
Num. of text fields 159 169 10 19 4
Num. of boolean fields 67 9 0 5 1
Num. of date fields 14 16 2 1 0
Num. of combo boxes 52 33 24 1 0
Num. of tables 65 85 7 9 2
Statements
Num. of if-then-else 650 334 150 35 7
Num. of iterate 66 13 0 0 1
Data actions
Num. of creates (entity) 50 22 4 11 2
Num. of deletes (entity) 14 33 0 0 2
Num. of updates 268 180 15 25 4
Num. of creates (assoc) 111 66 3 21 4
Num. of deletes (assoc) 32 30 0 4 0
GUI actions
Num. of sets 1840 1553 569 120 24
Num. of opens 164 234 18 7 7
OCL Expressions
Num. of expressions 3847 3221 925 331 74
Num. of non-literal expressions 1478 1105 390 80 16
Avrg. size of non-literal expres-
sions (*)
5,21 5,93 5,31 4,06 5,75
Avrg. num. of widget variables
per non-literal expression
1,09 1,27 1,17 1,09 0,94
(*) “Size” is calculated counting the number of OCL operators, including literals.
Table 4.2: Example applications: size of the application’s models
With respect to code-generation, the ActionGUI toolkit generates all our example
applications in under a minute. The generated .war file includes the Vaadin library and
some other external libraries (as well as, in the case CRMApp and VMApp, custom code
for sending mails and exporting data). The Vaadin library is in fact responsible of 70%
of the size of the generated file, while only 10% of this file corresponds to the code that
ActionGUI automatically generates to interpret the application’s model (as expected, the
size of this interpreter does not vary much between applications). For our examples, the
average size of the .war file containing each application is roughly 12 MB.
4.3 Evaluation
We conclude this Chapter with several more subjective considerations. As these are
just based on our experience, their significance should not be overemphasized. Nevertheless
they may give the reader an impression of what it is like to use ActionGUI.
First, the learning curve for ActionGUI appears moderate. The time required to learn
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to model a secure data-management application depends on the modeler’s familiarity with
class diagrams, security diagrams and, above all, OCL. Assuming modest knowledge of
UML, learning to model (non-toy) applications using ActionGUI takes less than 4 hours,
which is arguably much less than what is required to learn enough of web technologies to be
able to program (and correctly deploy) these applications. This estimate is based in part
on experience teaching model-driven development of secure data-management applications
to students at ETH Zurich and having them carry out projects using ActionGUI.
Second, the time needed to model a secure data-management application depends on
the experience of the modeler (in particular, his command of OCL) and the complexity
of the application (in particular, the number and the size of the OCL expressions used
in the model). However, as a rule of thumb, modeling a menu window that contains 6
buttons that, when clicked upon, will open other windows, may take less than 30 minutes.
In contrast, modeling a window that contains an online form with 10 text fields and a
button that, when clicked upon, will first check that the entries are correctly filled and
then will submit the form (i.e., update the database), may take one to two hours. And
approximately the same time is required to model a select&display window that contains a
table with 5 columns and a combo box, and that will change the information displayed in
the table depending on the combo box selection. The take-home message is that modeling
time is directly proportional to the number and size of the OCL expressions used in the
models. This should not come as a surprise since these expressions are the ones that define
the application’s logic.
Finally, the main advantages of our approach concern the quality and ease of mainte-
nance of the generated applications, which results from using our many-models-to-models
transformation and our code-generator. First, this transformation effectively frees the
developer from having to program fine-grained authorization constraints and insert them
at all the required places within the application’s code and with the correct arguments.
Except for small applications, this is a cumbersome and error-prone task, since the number
of data actions associated to events may easily be on the order of several hundred; see, for
example, CRMApp and VMApp. Moreover, these data actions are typically called with
different arguments each time. Second, our approach supports modularity and separation
of concerns. In particular, the security model can be changed independently of the GUI
model, without worrying about re-programming and re-inserting all the new fine-grained
authorization constraints since this is automatically done by our transformation. Again,
given the large number of these checks together with the complexity of the corresponding
authorizations, we argue that, for non-toy security data-management applications, our
approach effectively reduces the maintenance costs.
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Chapter 5
Related work
In this Chapter, we focus on works that are directly related to the main contribution
of our work, namely, ActionGUI as a novel, tool-supported model-driven methodology for
developing secure data-management applications. We have organized the related work in
two sections, not completely disjoint. First, we will compare ActionGUI with other pro-
posals for modeling data-management applications, and, in particular, their graphical user
interfaces. Then, we will compare ActionGUI with other tools (in this case, commercial
tools) for developing secure data-management applications.
Modeling secure data-management applications As a modeling tool, UWE [14,
21, 19, 63] provides the modeler with a higher-level of abstraction than ActionGUI. In
particular, the actions executed by the widgets’ events are described in UWE using nat-
ural language. Thus, unless the models are appropriately refined, as discussed in [63],
UWE does not support code-generation. In contrast, UWE provides specific diagrams for
modeling GUI presentations and navigations, which facilitate the task of GUI modeling.
In this respect, we define in [20] a mapping that transforms high-level UWE models into
more concrete ActionGUI models that, once completed by the modeler, can be directly
used to generate the intended applications. Finally, [19] extends UWE to use SecureUML
for modeling security policies. However, this work does not use a model-transformation
to lift the security policy to the GUI level. Instead the UWE modeler is responsible for
adding all the appropriate authorization checks to the GUI model.
Like ActionGUI, ZOOM [60] allows GUI modelers to specify widgets, their events, and
their actions. Moreover, using an extension of Z [86], one can specify the conditions of
the actions and their arguments, similar to how this is done in ActionGUI using OCL.
In contrast to ActionGUI, ZOOM does not provide a language for modeling security, and
security aspects are not explicitly considered in this approach. Moreover, ZOOM does not
support code-generation. It only provides interpreters for model animation.
In contrast to ActionGUI, UWE, and ZOOM, the approaches presented in [37, 38, 51]
do not provide a language for modeling GUIs. They instead implement different rules
for automatically deriving GUIs, based on either the application’s data model, as in [37,
38], or the application’s prototypical scenarios, as in [51]. As expected, the behavior of
the resulting GUIs is limited and, based on our experience, insufficient to cope with the
logic embedded in real data-management applications. Moreover, security aspects are not
addressed in these proposals.
There is other related work that falls between the two extremes of full GUI mod-
eling and full GUI derivation. The OO-method [74, 69] supports building GUIs using
UI-patterns. These patterns specify the possible interactions with the application’s data
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based on the classes, attributes, and associations that are declared in the underlying data
model. This approach has the advantage of reducing the time required for modeling GUIs.
However, the UI-patterns impose restrictions on the type of GUIs that can be modeled,
both in terms of their structure and their behavior. Moreover, this approach only sup-
ports role-based access control, but not fine-grained access control. The Interaction Flow
Modeling Language (IFML) [85] is another approach that falls in this category. IFML
is the OMG’s standard modeling language for expressing content, user interaction and
control behavior at the applications’ front-ends, as well as the binding to the applications’
persistence and business logic layers. IFML is an improved version of its predecessor,
the WebML language [28]. Concretely, WebML was oriented to design component-based
platform-specific models (PSMs), for web applications’ front-ends; whereas IFML is ori-
ented to design component-based platform-independent models (PIMs), for any kind of
applications’ front-ends. IFML is integrated in the commercial WebRatio toolkit [84]. Its
component-based language design imposes, again, restrictions on the type of GUIs that
can be modeled. Furthermore, security aspects are not at all considered in IFML.
Other approaches that fall in this category are [78, 64]. In both cases, the modeler must
associate to each widget container the specific data type accessed using the widget. As
before, the possible interactions with the underlying data is limited by the default behavior
implemented for these widget containers. Security aspects are also not considered.
Finally, there are approaches whose primary focus is to support UI design at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. Prominent examples are the XML User Interface Language
(XUL) [70] and the USer Interface eXtensible Markup Language (UsiXML) [65]. XUL is
the Mozilla’s XML-based language for building user interfaces of applications like Firefox.
UsiXML is an XML-compliant markup language that describes the UI for multiple usage
contexts, such as Character User Interfaces (CUIs), Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs),
Auditory User Interfaces, and Multimodal User Interfaces.
Clearly, ActionGUI is designed for a different purpose than XUL and UsiXML. In par-
ticular, ActionGUI is designed for developing secure data-management applications. A key
design decision for ActionGUI was to ensure that the security model and the GUI models
“speak” the same language. To the best of our knowledge, neither XUL nor UsiXML
are concerned with security aspects of the UIs. Moreover, ActionGUI is designed for
the model-driven development of secure data-management applications, and this has two
clear consequences. First, ActionGUI’s modeling languages are designed to be technology-
agnostics, in contrast with XUL, which is tightly linked to Mozilla-related technologies.
Second, ActionGUI’s modeling languages are designed to support the automatic genera-
tion of ready to be deployed applications from the models. As a result, ActionGUI models
are more concrete than general UsiXML models, which can be defined at any of the four
abstraction levels specified in the Cameleon Reference Framework (CRF) [25]. In partic-
ular, a GUI modeler always works at the CRF-Concrete UI level, while the WAR (Web
application ARchive) file generated from a GUI model (along with the associated security
and data models), belongs to the CRF-Final UI level.
Finally, we note that [83] has carried out promising work on extending our methodology
to cope with business processes, which are typically defined at the Task & Concepts
abstraction level in CRF. Along these lines, it would be interesting to investigate ways of
extending our methodology to support UI modeling at the CRF-Abstract UI level, where
interaction details are abstracted away.
Developing secure data-management applications There are also other tools like
WebRatio [84], Olivanova [26], and Lightswitch [68] that support development methodolo-
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gies for building data-management applications that are similar to the ActionGUI method-
ology. In these tools, application development starts by building a data model that reflects
the data structure required for the database. The development process continues by ap-
plying different UI generation patterns to the data model. These patterns enable data
retrieval, data editing, data creation, and database search. In contrast to what these tools
can provide, the ActionGUI toolkit offers developers the full flexibility to create designs,
without burdening them with the restrictions imposed by the obligatory use of a fixed
number of given patterns. The above tools also impose a major restriction at the level of
data management, i.e., at the level of data access and visualization: the information that
can be referenced and therefore that can be accessed and visualized within one screen, can
only come from one table of the database or, at most, from two tables that are reachable
from each other within one navigation step.
The three tools, WebRatio, Olivanova, and Lightswitch, support the definition and
generation of RBAC policies at different granularity levels. Lightswitch supports granting
or denying permissions (whose actual behavior must be manually programmed) to execute
create, read, update, or delete actions on entities for users in different roles. WebRatio
and Olivanova also support granting or denying permissions to execute a similar set of
actions on entity’s properties, individually, for users in different roles. In WebRatio and
Olivanova, the role of the authorization constraints could be played by preconditions
restraining the invocation of actions through a concrete UI. Note, however, that none of
these tools implement an algorithm capable of lifting to the UIs, the security policy that
governs the access to data.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks and future
work
The methodology we propose constitutes a further development of the idea of model-
driven security [9]. The two main innovations are an expressive language for model-
ing an application’s graphical user interface and behavior, and a many-models-to-model
transformation that lifts a security policy specified on the application’s data model to
this behavioral model. Our transformation function captures the idea that authorization
policies regulating complex transactions can be generated uniformly from much simpler
policies on data. Despite our use of expressive modeling languages, we have shown for
data-management applications that it is possible to generate automatically complete de-
ployable applications. Our methodology is supported by the ActionGUI toolkit. The
reported applications show the toolkit’s potential for developing real-world applications.
In the future we plan to further develop the ActionGUI project in two main directions:
Enhancing the ActionGUI toolkit. There is still much work ahead to turn this
toolkit into a full, robust, industrial-strength development platform. In the short term,
we plan to develop improved model editors and better support for integrating custom
code. Then, in the medium term, we would also like to support model analysis, based on
the formal semantics of our models and on the correctness of our model transformation.
The following are examples of questions we would like to be able to formally answer.
Will every sequence of action executed by every event in the model, preserve the data
model’s invariants? Will authorization checks ever force a transaction roll-back? Do the
conditions in the GUI model make redundant the authorization checks, generated by the
model transformation? Analysis support would allow us to optimize generated code and
support assurance activities like system certification. Finally, in the long term, we would
like to support GUIs running on different platforms, like mobile devices. We also plan
to add support for handling privacy policies: modeling and generating code to enforce
that data usage must follow the purpose for which the data was collected and may entail
obligations.
Extending the applicability of the ActionGUI methodology and tools. Se-
cureDAO is a Java library developed by Gonzalo Ortiz de Jaureguizar to enforce fine-
grained access control within ActionGUI applications. It is designed to execute any of
the so-called CRUD actions (i.e, create, read, update, and delete data), but only if the
authorization constraint specified for this action in the given security model is satisfied.
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Figure 6.1: SecureDAO’s Current Architecture.
The CRUD actions are executed by the SecureDAO’s resource manager, while the autho-
rization constraints are checked by the SecureDAO’s access control manager. SecureDAO
has a very modular architecture, which is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
In the future, we plan to develop an enterprise-oriented model-driven security enforce-
ment mechanism, by extending SecureDAO in the following dimensions:
SecureDAO as a service, so that not only one but multiple applications could manage
the same resources with the same access control policies.
A more general resource manager, so that not only data but also methods could be
managed.
A more general access control manager, so that not only SecureUML-based policies
but other well-defined security policies could be effectively checked.
To accomplish these goals we will need to address the following research and techno-
logical challenges:
SecureDAO is currently implemented as a Java library. To provide SecureDAO as a
service we need to wrap it in an enterprise application that could be used by different
customers applications through application level entry points. Our challenge here is
to automatically provide type-safe, easy-to-use SecureDAO’s entry points, based on
the customer application’s underlying data model.
SecureDAO’s resource manager’s applicability is currently limited to data which is
stored in MySQL databases that use very specific databases schemes. A more general
resource manager should, first of all, be able to manage data stored in different (also
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non-relational) databases. Our challenge here is to build a generic resource man-
ager, which could be instantiated by providing a well-defined mapping from the cus-
tomer application’s underlying data model, to the customer application’s database
schema. Furthermore, a more general resource manager should be able to execute
also non-CRUD actions (i.e., general methods). Our challenge here is to provide a
clean connection between the resource manager and the libraries implementing the
required non-CRUD actions.
SecureDAO’s access control manager applicability is currently limited to policies
which are declared using SecureUML models, and whose authorization constraints
are formalized using the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [73]. Our challenge here
is to build a generic access control manager, which could be instantiated by providing
a well-defined evaluation semantics of an arbitrary authorization language.







data unit name ::= [‘A’-‘Z’] ([‘0’-‘9’,‘A’-‘Z’,‘a’-‘z’])* ;
property name ::= [‘a’-‘z’] ([‘0’-‘9’,‘A’-‘Z’,‘a’-‘z’])* ;
enum literal name ::= ([‘A’-‘Z’,‘ ’])+ ;
collection type ::= ‘Set’ | ‘Bag’ | ‘OrderedSet’ | ‘Sequence’ ;
primitive type ::= ‘Integer’ | ‘Boolean’ | ‘String’ | ‘Real’ ;
eol ::= \n | \r | \r\n ;
Production rules
<DataModel> ::= eol* <ListOfDataUnitsDec>? ;
<ListOfDataUnitsDec> ::= <DataUnitDec> eol* <ListOfDataUnitsDec>? ;
<DataUnitDec> ::= <EntityDec> | <EnumDec> ;
<EntityDec> ::= ‘entity’ data unit name (‘extends’ data unit name)?
‘{’ eol+ <EntityBody>? ‘}’ ;
<EntityBody> ::= <PropertyDec> eol+ <EntityBody>? ;
<PropertyDec> ::= <PropertyTypeDec> property name
(‘oppositeTo’ property name)? ;
<PropertyTypeDec> ::= <CollectionTypeDec> | <BasicTypeDec> ;
<CollectionTypeDec> ::= collection type ‘(’ <PropertyTypeDec> ‘)’ ;
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<BasicTypeDec> ::= primitive type | data unit name ;
<EnumDec> ::= ‘enum’ data unit name ‘{’ eol+ <EnumBody> ‘}’ ;




identifier ::= ([‘0’-‘9’,‘A’-‘Z’,‘a’-‘z’,‘ ’])+ ;
action type ::= ‘fullAccess’ | ‘create’ | ‘delete’ | ‘read’ |
‘update’ | ‘add’ | ‘remove’ ;
eol ::= \n | \r | \r\n ;
ocl expr ::= ‘[’ (-[ ])+ ‘]’ ;
Production rules
<SecurityModel> ::= eol* <ListOfRolesDec>? ;
<ListOfRolesDec> ::= <RoleDec> eol* <ListOfRolesDec>? ;
<RoleDec> ::= ‘role’ identifer (‘extends’ identifer)? eol*
‘{’ eol* <RoleBody>? ‘}’ ;
<RoleBody> ::= <ListOfPermissionsDec> ;
<ListOfPermissionsDec> ::= <PermissionDec> eol* <ListOfPermissionsDec>? ;
<PermissionDec> ::= identifer eol* ‘{’ eol* <PermissionBody>? ‘}’ ;
<PermissionBody> ::= <ListOfListsOfActions> ;
<ListOfListsOfActions> ::= <ListOfActions> eol+ <ListOfListsOfActions>? ;
<ListOfActions> ::= <ActionDec> <RestListOfActions>? <ConstraintDec>? ;
<ConstraintDec> ::= ‘constrainedBy’ eol* ocl expr ;
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<ActionDec> ::= action type <ResourceActionDec>? ;
<ResourceActionDec> ::= ‘(’ identifer ‘)’;




identifer ::= [‘A’-‘Z’,‘a’-‘z’,‘ ’] ([‘0’-‘9’,‘A’-‘Z’,‘a’-‘z’,‘ ’])*;
simple widget type ::= ‘Label’ | ‘Button’ | ‘TextField’ |
‘PasswordField’ | ‘BooleanField’ | ‘DateField’ ;
primitive type ::= ‘Integer’ | ‘Boolean’ | ‘String’ | ‘Real’ ;
collection type ::= ‘Set’ | ‘Bag’ | ‘OrderedSet’ | ‘Sequence’ ;
ocl expr part ::= (-[‘[’,‘]’,‘$’])+;
exception type ::= ‘SecurityException’ | ‘ModelException’ | ‘Exception’ ;
Production rules
<GUIModel> ::= <ListOfWidgetsDec>? ;
<Path> ::= identifier (‘.’ identifier)* ;
<ListOfWidgetsDec> ::= <WidgetDec> <ListOfWidgetsDec>? ;
<WidgetDec> ::= <WindowDec> | <TableDec> | <ComboBoxDec> | <SimpleDec> ;
<WindowDec> ::= ‘Window’ <Path> ‘isMain’? ‘{’ <ListOfVarsDec>?
<ListOfWidgetsDec>? <ListOfEventsDec>? ‘}’ ;
<TableDec> ::= ‘Table’ <Path> ‘{’ <ListOfVarsDec>? <ColumnBlock>
<ListOfEventsDec>? ‘}’ ;
<ComboBoxDec> ::= ‘ComboBox’ <Path> ‘{’ <ListOfVarsDec>? <WidgetDec>
<ListOfEventsDec>? ‘}’ ;
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<SimpleDec> ::= simple widget type <Path> ‘{’ <ListOfVarsDec>?
<ListOfEventsDec>? ‘}’ ;
<ColumnBlock> ::= ‘columns’ ‘{’ <ListOfColumnsDec> ‘}’ ;
<ListOfColumnsDec> ::= <GUIExpr> ‘:’ <WidgetDec> <ListOfColumnsDec>? ;
<ListOfVarsDec> ::= <VarDec> <ListOfVarsDec>? ;
<VarDec> ::= TypeDec identifier (‘:=’ <GUIExpr>)?
(‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec> ‘}’)? ;
<TypeDec> ::= <PrimitiveType> | <EntityType> |
<CollectionType> | <TupleType> ;
<PrimitiveType> ::= primitive type ;
<EntityType> ::= identifier ;
<CollectionType> ::= collection type ‘(’ <TypeDec> ‘)’ ;
<TupleType> ::= ‘Tuple’ ‘(’ <ListOfTupleAttrs> ‘)’ ;
<ListOfTupleAttrs> ::= identifier ‘:’ <TypeDec> (‘,’ <ListOfTupleAttrs>)? ;
<ListOfEventsDec> ::= <EventDec> <ListOfEventsDec>? ;
<EventDec> ::= <OnCreateDec> | <OnClickDec> | <OnViewDec>
<OnCreateDec> ::= ‘event’ ‘onCreate’ ‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’;
<OnClickDec> ::= ‘event’ ‘onClick’ ‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’;
<OnViewDec> ::= ‘event’ ‘onView’ ‘(’ identifier ‘)’
‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’;
<ListOfActionsDec> ::= <ActionDec> <ListOfActionsDec>? ;
<ActionDec> ::= <Path> ‘:=’ ‘new’ identifier
| <Path> ‘:=’ <GUIExpr>
| <Path> ‘+=’ <GUIExpr>
| <Path> ‘-=’ <GUIExpr>
| ‘delete’ <GUIExpr>
| <GUIExpr> ‘:=’ <GUIExpr>
| <GUIExpr> ‘+=’ <GUIExpr>
| <GUIExpr> ‘-=’ <GUIExpr>
| ‘reevaluate’ <Path>
| ‘open’ identifier (‘(’ <ListOfOpenArgsDec> ‘)’)*
| ‘back’
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| identifier ‘(’ <ListOfOperationArgsDec>? ‘)’
| ‘if’ <GUIExpr> ‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’
| ‘if’ <GUIExpr> ‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’ ‘else’
‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’
| ‘foreach’ identifier ‘in’ <GUIExpr> ‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’
| ‘notification’ ‘(’ <GUIExpr> ‘,’ <GUIExpr> ‘,’ <GUIExpr>
| ‘try’ ‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec> ‘}’ <CatchDec>+
| ‘exit’;
<ListOfOpenArgsDec> ::= <OpenArgDec> (‘,’ <ListOfOpenArgsDec>)? ;
<OpenArgDec> ::= identifier ‘:’ <GUIExpr> ;
<ListOfOperationArgsDec> ::= <GUIExpr> (‘,’ <ListOfOperationArgsDec>)? ;
<CatchDec> ::= ‘catch’ ‘(’ <CaughtExceptionsDec> identifier? ‘)’
‘{’ <ListOfActionsDec>? ‘}’;
<CaughtExceptionsDec> ::= exception type |
exception type ‘or’ <CaughtExceptionsDec>;
<GUIExpr> ::= ‘[’ <ListOfGUIExprParts> ‘]‘ ;
<ListOfGUIExprParts> ::= <GUIExprPart> <ListOfGUIExprParts>? ;
<GUIExprPart> ::= ocl expr part | ‘$’ <Path> ‘$’ ;
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La construccio´n de modelos es la parte principal del disen˜o de sistemas. Esto es cierto
en varias disciplinas de la ingenier´ıa, sobre todo en el caso de la ingenier´ıa del software.
En el pasado, los defensores de la Ingenier´ıa Dirigida por Modelos (MDE, de sus siglas
en ingle´s) han sido culpables de pretensiones demasiado ambiciosas: posiciona´ndola como
el Santo Grial de la ingenier´ıa del software donde el modelado reemplaza completamente
a la programacio´n. En general, esto no es posible, sin embargo, hay dominios especializa-
dos donde MDE puede ciertamente desarrollar todo su potencial: en nuestra opinio´n, las
aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos a partir de interfaces gra´ficas de usuario es uno de
ellos.
7.1 Ingenier´ıa del software dirigida por modelos
El continuo aumento del desarrollo y uso de las tecnolog´ıas de la informacio´n y la
comunicacio´n es una fuente constante de problemas de seguridad y fiabilidad. Claramente
necesitamos mejores formas de desarrollar sistemas software. La Ingenier´ıa Dirigida por
Modelos (MDE, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [61] es una metodolog´ıa de desarrollo de software
centrada en crear modelos de diferentes vistas del sistema desde los cuales los distintos ar-
tefactos del sistema, tales como el co´digo fuente y los datos de configuracio´n, son derivados
o, si es posible, generados de manera automa´tica.
Lenguajes de modelado de dominio espec´ıfico En nuestra opinio´n, so´lo limitando
el dominio es posible definir de manera suficientemente precisa lenguajes de modelado que
soporten la generacio´n automa´tica de aplicaciones totalmente funcionales. Se puede decir
que la tard´ıa adopcio´n de la MDE se debe a la dificultad que conlleva definir lenguajes de
modelado de dominio espec´ıfico que sean efectivos, as´ı como tambie´n al esfuerzo requerido
por los desarrolladores para aprender lenguajes de modelado y el arte de la construccio´n de
modelos. Definir un buen lenguaje de modelado de dominio espec´ıfico requiere la bu´squeda
de las correctas abstracciones y grado de precisio´n, para capturar los aspectos relevantes de
la estructura y la lo´gica de un sistema software. Adema´s, para que un lenguaje de modelado
sea realmente u´til y utilizable para los desarrolladores de software se deben proporcionar las
herramientas apropiadas para construir modelos, analizarlos y mantenerlos sincronizados
con los productos finales.
Transformaciones de modelos En MDE, la manera de usar modelos para producir
otros artefactos de desarrollo es mediante la transformacio´n de modelos. Los siguientes
tipos de transformaciones has sido ampliamente usadas hasta ahora:
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Figura 7.1: Uso de Modelos en Seguridad Dirigida por Modelos
Generacio´n de co´digo y ejecucio´n de artefactos: Los modelos pueden ser mapeados a
co´digo u otros artefactos que afectan al comportamiento en tiempo de ejecucio´n de los
sistemas. Cuando se genera co´digo, la funcio´n de transformacio´n equivale a un tipo
de traductor o compilador. Ejemplos de otros artefactos que pueden ser generados a
partir de modelos son artefactos de desarrollo o de datos de configuracio´n, los cuales
tambie´n afectan al comportamiento del sistema.
Generacio´n de modelos: Los modelos pueden ser mapeados a otros modelos. Normal-
mente dichas transformaciones an˜aden detalles, especializan construcciones o modi-
fican representaciones. Un ejemplo es la especializacio´n de modelos independientes
de plataforma a modelos de plataformas espec´ıficas. En general, las transformaciones
de modelos soportan el problema de descomposicio´n durante el desarrollo, donde as-
pectos del disen˜o pueden ser separados en diferentes modelos, los cuales se componen
ma´s adelante.
Generacio´n de casos de prueba: Estos casos pueden generarse desde los modelos.
7.2 Seguridad dirigida por modelos
La seguridad dirigida por modelos (MDS, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [66, 11, 7, 8, 36, 9, 44]
es una especializacio´n de MDE en el dominio de la seguridad. Tal y como se trata en [9],
los modelos pueden ser usados para las siguientes cuatro actividades en el desarrollo de
sistemas seguros:
A1. Documentacio´n precisa de requisitos de seguridad, en conjunto con requisitos de
disen˜o.
A2. Ana´lisis de requisitos de seguridad.
A3. Transformaciones basadas en modelos, tales como migrar pol´ıticas de seguridad de
los datos de la aplicacio´n a pol´ıticas para otros artefactos o capas del sistema.
A4. Generacio´n de co´digo, incluyendo infraestructuras de seguridad configuradas y com-
pletas.
La Figura 7.1 describe estas actividades as´ı como la relacio´n entre ellas. Los disen˜adores
especifican modelos de disen˜o de seguridad los cuales combinan seguridad y requisitos de
disen˜o (A1). Cuando los lenguajes de modelado tienen una sema´ntica bien definida, estos
disen˜os pueden analizarse formalmente (A2). En el disen˜o de sistemas seguros, la seguridad
puede ser relevante en diferentes capas o niveles. Mediante el uso de transformaciones de
modelos se pueden migrar pol´ıticas de seguridad de un modelo a otros modelos (A3).
Finalmente, se pueden usar herramientas para generar de manera automa´tica co´digo u
otros artefactos del sistema directamente de los modelos (A4).
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Figura 7.2: Lenguajes de Modelado y su Combinacio´n
La parte crucial de la especializacio´n que la seguridad dirigida por modelos trae consigo,
afecta al lenguaje de modelado. En vez de adoptar una estrategia basada en un u´nico
lenguaje que sirva para todo, [11] propone un esquema general para integrar requisitos de
seguridad en los modelos de disen˜o del sistema. La idea principal es definir lenguajes de
modelado de seguridad gene´ricos de manera que dejen abierta la naturaleza de los recursos
protegidos, es decir, si estos recursos son datos, objetos de negocio, procesos, estados del
controlador, etc. La Figura 7.2 muestra ejemplos de diferentes nociones de seguridad las
cuales pueden ser especificadas usando un lenguaje de modelado de seguridad (arriba a la
izquierda) que puede ser integrado en diferentes lenguajes de modelado de disen˜o (abajo
a la izquierda), dando lugar a un lenguaje de modelado de disen˜o con seguridad (a la
derecha). Por ejemplo, se podr´ıa combinar un lenguaje de modelado para Control de Acceso
Basado en Roles (RBAC, de sus siglas en ingle´s) con Diagramas de Clases, tal y como se
indica en negrita en la figura. Esta combinacio´n esta´ hecha a partir de la definicio´n de un
dialecto que identifica los elementos del lenguaje de disen˜o como los recursos protegidos
del lenguaje de seguridad. De esta manera, se pueden definir lenguajes de manera flexible
para formular distintos tipos de disen˜o de sistemas, junto con sus requisitos de seguridad.
7.3 Aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos
Las aplicaciones de gestio´n de datos se basan en las conocidas acciones CRUD1 de
crear (create), leer (read), modificar (update) y borrar (delete) datos del almacenamien-
to persistente. Estas operaciones son los bloques ba´sicos de numerosas aplicaciones, por
ejemplo, pa´ginas web dina´micas donde los usuarios crean cuentas, almacenan y modifican
informacio´n y reciben vistas personalizadas basadas en sus datos almacenados. Cuando
los datos gestionados son sensibles la seguridad es una preocupacio´n, por lo que el uso de
estas acciones tiene que ser controlado.
El control de acceso es la estrategia esta´ndar para restringir las acciones de los usuarios
sobre los datos de la aplicacio´n. Cuando las pol´ıticas de control de acceso son suficiente-
mente simples, es posible formalizarlas de una manera declarativa independientemente de
la lo´gica de negocio de la aplicacio´n. Por ejemplo, los sistemas multicapa para aplicaciones
web a menudo construyen soporte para el control de acceso basado en roles en el servidor
de aplicaciones, el cual es configurado independientemente de los detalles procedimentales
de la aplicacio´n. Por el contrario, las pol´ıticas de control de acceso de grano fino pue-
den depender no so´lo de las credenciales de usuario sino tambie´n de la satisfacibilidad de
restricciones en el estado de la capa persistente, es decir, en los valores de los elementos
almacenados. En tales casos, las comprobaciones de autorizacio´n t´ıpicamente son imple-
mentadas mediante programacio´n, codifica´ndolas directamente en los lugares apropiados
1Esto es cierto para aplicaciones cuya capa persistente es una base de datos. Cuando es un LDAP o un
almacenamiento en la nube, no son exactamente las mismas acciones.
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Figura 7.3: Desarrollo dirigido por modelos de GUIs con seguridad.
del co´digo de la aplicacio´n. Desafortunadamente, estas codificaciones son dif´ıciles de ma-
nejar, propensas a errores y escalan de forma pe´sima. Adema´s, son dif´ıciles de auditar y
mantener ya que las comprobaciones de autorizacio´n esta´n esparcidas a lo largo del co´digo,
por lo que cambios en la pol´ıtica de seguridad requieren cambios en el co´digo.
7.4 Desarrollo dirigido por modelos de aplicaciones de ges-
tio´n segura de datos
En este trabajo proponemos una metodolog´ıa de desarrollo dirigido por modelos para
aplicaciones seguras de gestio´n de datos. Consiste en un conjunto de lenguajes para mode-
lar sistemas multicapa y en un conjunto de herramientas para generar estas aplicaciones.
En nuestra metodolog´ıa, una aplicacio´n de gestio´n segura de datos es modelada a partir
de tres modelos relacionados entre ellos:
1. Un modelo de datos define la estructura de datos de la aplicacio´n en te´rminos de sus
clases, atributos, asociaciones y me´todos (que no modifican el estado);
2. Un modelo de seguridad define la pol´ıtica de seguridad de la aplicacio´n en te´rminos
de acceso autorizado a las acciones sobre los recursos proporcionados por el modelo
de datos.
3. Una interfaz gra´fica de usuario o modelo GUI define la interfaz gra´fica de la apli-
cacio´n y la lo´gica de la aplicacio´n. En particular este modelo formaliza ambos, la
estructura de la GUI y el comportamiento.
El nu´cleo de esta metodolog´ıa, ilustrado en la Figura 7.3, es una funcio´n de trans-
formacio´n de modelos que automa´ticamente traslada la pol´ıtica que esta´ especificada en
el modelo de seguridad al modelo de GUI. La idea es simple pero poderosa. El modelo
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de seguridad especifica bajo que´ condiciones las acciones sobre datos esta´n autorizadas.
La informacio´n de control en el modelo de GUI especifica que´ acciones son ejecutadas en
respuesta a que´ eventos. Trasladar la pol´ıtica esencialmente consiste en prefijar cada una
de las acciones sobre datos en el modelo de GUI con la comprobacio´n de autorizacio´n espe-
cificada en el modelo de seguridad. El modelo de GUI resultante contiene la especificacio´n
de seguridad. En concreto, especifica la estructura de la GUI, el flujo de informacio´n con
el almacenamiento persistente y todas las comprobaciones de autorizacio´n.
Hemos implementado esta metodolog´ıa con un conjunto de herramientas, llamado Ac-
tionGUI [1], el cual implementa esta transformacio´n de modelos. A partir del modelo de
GUI con seguridad resultante, ActionGUI genera una aplicacio´n desplegable junto con
todo el soporte para el control de acceso, basada en la siguiente arquitectura esta´ndar de
tres capas.
1. Capa de presentacio´n (tambie´n conocida como front-end): Los usuarios acceden a las
aplicaciones web a trave´s de navegadores esta´ndares, los cuales renderizan el conte-
nido (HTML y JavaScript) proporcionado por el servidor web de forma dina´mica.
2. Capa de aplicacio´n: El conjunto de herramientas genera Aplicaciones Web Java.
Las aplicaciones corren en un servidor web (como Tomcat o GlassFish), procesan
las solicitudes de los clientes y generan contenido el cual es enviado de vuelta al
cliente para ser renderizado. Cuando las solicitudes de los clientes son procesadas la
aplicaciones generadas interpretan su modelo de GUI con seguridad subyacente.
3. Capa persistente: La aplicacio´n generada gestiona la informacio´n almacenada en
una base de datos. Para cada aplicacio´n, el conjunto de herramientas genera el
correspondiente esquema de la base de datos a partir del modelo de datos de la
aplicacio´n.
7.4.1 Las principales contribuciones del autor
ActionGUI es el u´ltimo resultado de un proyecto muy ambicioso en el que numerosos
investigadores han contribuido de diferentes maneras durante los u´ltimos siete an˜os. Los
comienzos de este proyecto se remontan a 2008 cuando Manuel Clavel, Viviane da Silva,
Christiano Braga y Marina Egea llevaron a cabo el proyecto reportado en [36]. El elemento
principal tras este trascendental trabajo fue el uso de la seguridad dirigida por modelos
para desarrollar una aplicacio´n industrial. Los autores tuvieron e´xito en modelar, usando
SecureUML [11], la pol´ıtica de grano fino de control de acceso de la aplicacio´n. Sin embargo,
el proceso de codificar manualmente la pol´ıtica modelada en la interfaz gra´fica de usuario de
la aplicacio´n — liderada por Felipe Padilha, un estudiante de Christiano Braga— consumio´
demasiado tiempo y fue propenso a errores. Este resultado insatisfactorio proporciono´
la raison d’eˆtre para el proyecto ActionGUI: la bu´squeda de una solucio´n dirigida por
modelos al problema de trasladar la pol´ıtica de control de acceso, t´ıpicamente especificada
sobre los datos de la aplicacio´n, a la interfaz gra´fica de usuario de la aplicacio´n. Adema´s,
proporciono´ los criterios de e´xito del proyecto: a saber, que la solucio´n prevista debe
soportar un desarrollo dirigido por modelos (de modelos a co´digo) y debe ser capaz de
tratar aplicaciones de taman˜o industrial.
Como se detallara´ ma´s abajo, las contribuciones del autor al proyecto ActionGUI han
estado siempre dirigidas hacia la satisfaccio´n de los anteriormente mencionados criterios
de e´xito. De hecho, se puede decir con total sinceridad que e´l es el responsable del grado
al que estos criterios de e´xito son satisfechos, gracias a su ininterrumpido trabajo en las
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sucesivas versiones del conjunto de herramientas de ActionGUI y sus reiterados esfuerzos
en aplicar la metodolog´ıa ActionGUI en casos de estudio de complejidad cada vez mayor.
La primera solucio´n concreta dirigida por modelos para nuestro problema llego´ en 2009.
En particular, Manuel Clavel en colaboracio´n con David Basin (ETH), Marina Egea y su
estudiante Michael Schla¨pfer introdujeron por primera vez en [77, 13] la idea de usar una
transformacio´n de muchos modelos a un modelo para construir un modelo de GUI seguro
con respecto a un modelo de seguridad. La primera implementacio´n de esta transformacio´n
la hizo Michael, la cual se explica en [76]. Esta solucio´n fue pronto soportada por SSG [44],
un novedoso entorno de desarrollo para construir GUIs seguras automa´ticamente. SSG fue
la primera contribucio´n del autor al proyecto. Consist´ıa en una serie de plugins de Eclipse
que inclu´ıan tres editores de modelos, una herramienta de transformacio´n de modelos y
un generador de co´digo. Una parte clave en el trascendental generador de co´digo de SSG
fue EOS [33], un componente Java disen˜ado e implementado por el autor para evaluar
de manera eficiente expresiones OCL que aparecen tanto en los modelos de seguridad
(restricciones de autorizacio´n), como en los modelos de GUI (condiciones y argumentos
de acciones). EOS fue posteriormente reemplazado por MySQL4OCL [50], implementado
por Carolina Dania bajo la direccio´n de Marina Egea. El mapeo de expresiones OCL
a procedimientos almacenados MySQL con MySQL4OCL ten´ıa la ventaja sobre EOS de
evaluar expresiones OCL directamente sobre la base da datos de la aplicacio´n. Finalmente,
MySQL4OCL fue a su vez reemplazado por un nuevo evaluador OCL, implementado por
Gonzalo Ortiz Jaureguizar, el cual integraba de manera satisfactoria una solucio´n h´ıbrida
con las mejores caracter´ısticas de EOS y MySQL4OCL. Aunque no inicialmente integrado
en SSG, el autor tambie´n implemento´ durante ese tiempo un mapeo de OCL a lo´gica de
primer orden para la comprobacio´n de restricciones OCL [34] usando resolutores de SMT.
Este mapeo fue revisado y extendido para los valores OclUndefined y OclInvalid en [39]
por Carolina Dania y Manuel Clavel, el cual esta´ actualmente integrado en el conjunto
de herramientas de ActionGUI, en parte gracias al autor. Entre otras aplicaciones, este
mapeo ha sido usado de manera satisfactoria para razonar formalmente sobre pol´ıticas de
control de acceso de grano fino [43].
De acuerdo con los criterios de e´xito del proyecto, era necesario probar la solucio´n
dirigida por modelos y el conjunto de herramientas propuestos en un escenario real. Para
este fin, el autor obtuvo una beca de un an˜o de la Fundacio´n Vodafone (Septiembre de
2010 – Agosto de 2011) para desarrollar una solucio´n CRM y un sistema de gestio´n de
voluntarios para un hospital y un centro de cuidados paliativos de Madrid. Para llevar a
cabo estas aplicaciones, las cuales fueron finalmente reportadas en [12], el autor tuvo que
extender de varias maneras decisivas la solucio´n originalmente propuesta en [13], adema´s
del conjunto de herramientas asociado [44]. En particular, a nivel de lenguaje de modelado
de GUIs el autor introdujo variables de widget como un elemento de modelado clave. Las
variables de widget son variables que poseen los widgets. En principio, son declaradas por el
modelador pero tambie´n hay variables de widget que, por defecto, posee cada widget segu´n
su tipo. Los valores de algunas variables de widget son manejados de formas especiales. Por
ejemplo, las variables caller y role pertenecen por defecto a cada ventana. Ellas almacenan,
respectivamente, el usuario de la aplicacio´n y el rol del usuario y sus valores se pasan de
forma impl´ıcita como argumentos en cada accio´n de abrir una nueva ventana. Adema´s de
las variables de widget, el autor introdujo tablas y listas desplegables en el lenguaje de
GUI como nuevos tipos de widgets con sus respectivas variables de widget por defecto:
rows para almacenar la coleccio´n de elementos que pueden ser seleccionados, row para
referenciar a cada uno de los elementos de la coleccio´n y selected para referenciar a los
elementos seleccionados (si existen) por el usuario. Luego, a nivel de lenguaje de modelado
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de pol´ıticas de seguridad el autor extendio´ SecureUML en dos formas cruciales. Primero,
reemplazando la accio´n de modificar (update) un enlace entre dos objetos (cuyo significado
era originalmente ambiguo debido a que pod´ıa implicar crear un enlace, borrar un enlace o
ambas) por dos nuevas acciones separadas, una para crear un enlace y otra para borrar un
enlace. Segundo, el autor extendio´ SecureUML permitiendo dos nuevas variables especiales,
value y target, en las restricciones de autorizacio´n: la primera refirie´ndose al valor que sera´
usado para modificar un atributo, si el permiso es concedido. La segunda refirie´ndose al
objeto que sera´ enlazado (o desenlazado) en el otro extremo de la asociacio´n, si el permiso es
concedido. Lo´gicamente, estos cambios en los lenguajes de modelado tuvieron un impacto
directo y de gran taman˜o en el conjunto de herramientas que soportan la metodolog´ıa.
El autor, como principal responsable en ese momento del conjunto de herramientas de
ActionGUI, fue el que estuvo al cargo de implementar, de una manera efectiva, todas
las nuevas caracter´ısticas de modelado anteriormente mencionadas. La solucio´n mejorada
para nuestro problema, junto con el conjunto de herramientas asociadas, fue por primera
vez presentada en [10].
El siguiente mayor caso de estudio fue llevado a cabo por el autor en el contexto del
proyecto NESSoS (Octubre de 2010 – Marzo de 2014). NESSoS (de sus siglas en ingle´s) es
la Red de Excelencia sobre la creacio´n de Servicios y Sistemas de Software Seguros para
el Internet del Futuro [71]. El caso de estudio, el cual fue reportado en [42], consiste en
un sistema web para la gestio´n de registros electro´nicos de salud (EHRM, de sus siglas
en ingle´s). Los registros electro´nicos de salud (EHR, de sus siglas en ingle´s) almacenan
informacio´n creada por, o en nombre de, un profesional de la salud en el contexto del
cuidado de un paciente. La especificacio´n de la aplicacio´n EHRM de NESSoS define di-
ferentes casos de uso del sistema junto con la pol´ıtica de control de acceso asociada. Los
casos de uso incluyen: registrar nuevos pacientes en un hospital y asignarles profesionales
de la salud tales como enfermeros o doctores, recuperar la informacio´n de un paciente,
registrar nuevos enfermeros y doctores y asignarlos a un departamento, cambiar enferme-
ros o doctores de un departamento a otro y reasignar pacientes a doctores. Mientras se
llevo´ a cabo el caso de estudio de NESSoS, el autor descubrio´ una gran limitacio´n en la
transformacio´n de modelos para trasladar la pol´ıtica de seguridad a nivel de GUI. En el
trabajo previo [13, 10], esta traslacio´n consistio´ en prefijar cada evento del modelo de GUI
con la comprobacio´n de autorizacio´n especificada en el modelo de seguridad. Sin embargo,
el autor se dio cuenta de que, debido a que las acciones sobre datos que se ejecutan en
un evento pueden cambiar el estado de la capa persistente, comprobar la autorizacio´n a
nivel de eventos y por lo tanto antes de ejecutar cada una de las acciones sobre datos, era
suficiente so´lo si la pol´ıtica de seguridad subyacente no conten´ıa restricciones de autoriza-
cio´n (las cuales son asumidas de manera expl´ıcita en [13]) o si las conten´ıa, no depend´ıan
de los valores que eran modificados durante la ejecucio´n de las acciones sobre datos del
evento (tal y como ocurre en los ejemplos tratados en [10]). Para resolver esta limitacio´n,
el autor propuso comprobar las autorizaciones entes de ejecutar cada una de las acciones
sobre datos del evento dotando a los eventos de una sema´ntica de transaccio´n: o todas
las acciones sobre datos son ejecutadas en el orden dado o ninguna de ellas es ejecuta-
da. Esta importante generalizacio´n de [13, 10] aparecio´ por primera vez en [12, 6] y esta´
actualmente soportada en el conjunto de herramientas de ActionGUI.
Por u´ltimo, si bien no menos importante, el autor ha contribuido de manera significa-
tiva al proyecto ActionGUI escribiendo el manual de usuario y el manual de instalacio´n
del conjunto de herramientas de ActionGUI, as´ı como la documentacio´n te´cnica de los
lenguajes de modelado de ActionGUI. Es meritorio mencionar que este material (en sus
diferentes versiones) ha sido usado de manera satisfactoria por estudiantes e instructores
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en varios cursos, incluyendo: “Generacio´n Automa´tica de Modelos de GUI Inteligentes
y Seguros.” (Seminario de Ingenier´ıa Dirigida por Modelos, IRISA, Rennes, Francia, No-
viembre de 2009); “Seguridad dirigida por modelos: fundamentos, herramientas y pra´ctica”
(11 Escuela Internacional de Fundamentos de Ana´lisis y Disen˜o de Seguridad, Bertinoro,
Italia, Septiembre de 2011); “Ingenier´ıa de Seguridad” (curso de nivel de ma´ster, ETH
Zu´rich, Suiza, Octubre de 2012 – Enero de 2013); “ActionGUI Day” (Dı´a de formacio´n
industrial para el uso de ActionGUI, IMDEA Software, Junio de 2013) e “Ingenier´ıa Diri-
gida por Modelos en Accio´n” (curso de facultad, Universidad Industrial de la Ciudad de
Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, Enero de 2014 – Febrero de 2014). Las u´ltimas versiones de los
manuales de usuario y de instalacio´n de ActionGUI, esta´n disponibles en la pa´gina web
de ActionGUI [1].
7.5 Resumen
Cap´ıtulo 8: Una metodolog´ıa para el desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura
de datos. Presentamos ActionGUI como una metodolog´ıa innovadora dirigida por
modelos para el desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos. Los desarro-
lladores de sistemas proceden modelando las tres vistas diferentes de la aplicacio´n
deseada: el modelo de datos, el modelo de seguridad y el modelo de GUI. Estos mo-
delos formalizan respectivamente el dominio de los datos de la aplicacio´n, la pol´ıtica
de autorizacio´n y la interfaz gra´fica junto con el comportamiento de la aplicacio´n.
Despue´s, una funcio´n de transformacio´n de modelos traslada la pol´ıtica especificada
por el modelo de seguridad al modelo de GUI. Esto permite una separacio´n de ta-
reas, donde el comportamiento y la seguridad son especificados de manera separada
y posteriormente son combinados para generar un modelo GUI con seguridad.
Cap´ıtulo 9: Soporte para nuestra metodolog´ıa de desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n
segura de datos. Tras un breve informe del estado actual del conjunto de herramien-
tas de ActionGUI, reportamos nuestra experiencia en el desarrollo del evaluador Eye
OCL Software (EOS), un componente Java para la evaluacio´n eficiente de OCL en
escenarios mediano-grandes y tambie´n exploramos varias estrategias de evaluacio´n
de expresiones OCL en escenarios realmente grandes. A continuacio´n, proponemos
un mapeo de un subconjunto de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden (FOL) y usamos
este mapeo para comprobar la insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos de restricciones OCL.
Argumentamos que nuestro mapeo es simple, ya que las sentencias FOL resultantes
son muy similares a las restricciones OCL originales, y tambie´n pra´ctico, ya que
podemos usar herramientas de razonamiento automa´tico, tales como demostradores
automa´ticos de teoremas y resolutores SMT, para comprobar automa´ticamente la
insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos no triviales de restricciones OCL. Finalmente, propo-
nemos una metodolog´ıa para el razonamiento sobre pol´ıticas de control de acceso de
grano fino, cuyas restricciones de autorizacio´n son especificadas en OCL mediante el
uso del mapeo de OCL a FOL anteriormente mencionado.
Cap´ıtulo 10: Desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos con nuestra me-
todolog´ıa. Proporcionamos un informe detallado de nuestro uso de ActionGUI para
desarrollar una aplicacio´n de gestio´n segura de datos. Esta aplicacio´n esta´ basada
en un caso de estudio propuesto en NESSoS (de sus siglas en ingle´s), la Red de
Excelencia sobre la creacio´n de Servicios y Sistemas de Software Seguros para el
Internet del Futuro [71]. El caso de estudio eHealth consiste en un sistema web para
la gestio´n de registros electro´nicos de salud (EHRM, de sus siglas en ingle´s). Los
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registros electro´nicos de salud almacenan informacio´n creada por, o en nombre de,
un profesional de la salud en el contexto del cuidado de un paciente. El caso de
estudio eHealth es interesante como ejemplo de desarrollo de una aplicacio´n de ges-
tio´n segura de datos, proporcionando una prueba de concepto de la aplicacio´n de
la metodolog´ıa ActionGUI sobre un problema relevante a nivel industrial. Para pro-
porcionar ma´s evidencias de la usabilidad de nuestra tecnolog´ıa, inclu´ımos en este
Cap´ıtulo un resumen de otras cuatro aplicaciones web que han sido desarrolladas
usando ActionGUI.
Cap´ıtulo 11: Trabajo relacionado. Primero nos centramos en los trabajos que esta´n
directamente relacionados con nuestra principal contribucio´n, a saber, ActionGUI:
una novedosa metodolog´ıa dirigida por modelos y con soporte de herramienta pa-
ra el desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos. Segundo, comparamos
ActionGUI con otras herramientas (en este caso herramientas comerciales) para el
desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos.
Cap´ıtulo 12: Conclusiones y trabajo futuro. Discutimos las dos principales l´ıneas en
las cuales se continuara´ el desarrollo del proyecto ActionGUI. Primero, planeamos
mejorar el conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI para convertirlo en una robusta y
total plataforma de desarrollo a nivel industrial. Segundo, planeamos extender la
aplicabilidad de la tecnolog´ıa ActionGUI a partir de la generalizacio´n de sus prin-
cipales componentes tecnolo´gicos, implementa´ndolos como servicios software (SaaS,
de sus siglas en ingle´s).
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Cap´ıtulo 8
Modelado de aplicaciones seguras
de gestio´n de datos
En este Cap´ıtulo presentamos ActionGUI como una novedosa metodolog´ıa para el
desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos. Los desarrolladores de sistemas
proceden modelando tres vistas diferentes de la aplicacio´n deseada: el modelo de datos,
el modelo de seguridad y el modelo de GUI. Estos modelos formalizan respectivamente
el dominio de datos de la aplicacio´n, la pol´ıtica de autorizacio´n y la interfaz de usuario
junto con el comportamiento de la aplicacio´n. Despue´s, una funcio´n de transformacio´n de
modelos traslada la pol´ıtica especificada en el modelo de seguridad al modelo de GUI. Esto
permite una separacio´n de tareas, donde el comportamiento y la seguridad de la aplicacio´n
son especificados de forma separada y posteriormente combinada para generar un modelo
de GUI con seguridad.
En [10, 13, 44] propusimos la idea de usar transformaciones de modelos para elevar
la pol´ıtica de seguridad formulada en te´rminos del modelo de datos al modelo de GUI.
Aqu´ı mejoramos y generalizamos este trabajo previo. Trasladar consist´ıa previamente en
prefijar cada evento en el modelo de GUI con la restriccio´n de autorizacio´n especificada
en el modelo de seguridad. Sin embargo, debido a que las acciones sobre datos ejecutadas
por un evento pueden cambiar el estado de la capa persistente, el chequeo de autorizacio´n
a nivel de los eventos, y por lo tanto antes de ejecutar ninguna accio´n, es suficiente so´lo
si la pol´ıtica de seguridad subyacente no contiene restricciones de autorizacio´n (lo cual
se asumı´a de manera impl´ıcita en [13]), o no depende de valores que han cambiado
durante la ejecucio´n de acciones sobre datos de un evento (como era el caso en los ejemplos
analizados en [10]). Para vencer esta limitacio´n ahora comprobamos las autorizaciones
antes de ejecutar cada una de las acciones sobre datos de un evento, proporcionando a los
eventos una sema´ntica de transaccio´n: o todas las acciones sobre datos son ejecutadas en
el orden dado o ninguna de ellas es ejecutada. La descripcio´n formal completa de nuestra
metodolog´ıa se detalla en el informe te´cnico [6]. En su lugar, aqu´ı proporcionamos una
descripcio´n a alto nivel de la correccio´n de la funcio´n de transformacio´n de modelos sobre
la cual radica el nu´cleo de nuestra metodolog´ıa.
8.1 Background
Para modelar la estructura de datos y la pol´ıtica de seguridad de una aplicacio´n ha-
cemos uso de los ya existentes lenguajes de modelado llamados ComponentUML y Se-
cureUML [11]. En esta Seccio´n introducimos de manera breve estos lenguajes. Ya que
SecureUML usa el Lenguaje de Restriccio´n de Objetos (OCL, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [73]
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para modelar restricciones de autorizacio´n, tambie´n resumiremos sus principales carac-
ter´ısticas.
8.1.1 ComponentUML
Los modelos de datos proporcionan una visio´n orientada de los datos de un sistema.
T´ıpicamente son usados para especificar co´mo los datos son estructurados, el formato de
cada uno de los elementos que lo compone y su organizacio´n lo´gica, es decir, co´mo se
agrupan y se relacionan los elementos que componen el modelo de datos. Nuestra meto-
dolog´ıa usa ComponentUML para el modelado de datos. ComponentUML proporciona un
subconjunto de los diagramas de clases UML donde las entidades (clases) pueden estar re-
lacionadas mediante asociaciones y pueden tener atributos y me´todos. En ComponentUML
las asociaciones son binarias: esta´n compuestas siempre de dos extremos de asociacio´n que
conectan dos (no necesariamente distintas) entidades. En el Ape´ndice A se encuentra la
definicio´n completa de la sintaxis de ComponentUML.
8.1.2 Lenguaje de Restriccio´n de Objetos (OCL)
El Lenguaje de Restriccio´n de Objetos (OCL, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [73] es un lenguaje
para especificar restricciones y consultas usando una notacio´n textual. Como parte del
esta´ndar UML estaba originalmente pensado para modelar propiedades que no pod´ıan ser
expresadas de forma sencilla mediante notacio´n gra´fica, como por ejemplo, los invariantes
de clases en un diagrama de clases UML. Cada expresio´n OCL esta´ escrita en el contexto
de un modelo (llamado modelo contextual) y es evaluado en un modelo de objetos (tambie´n
llamado instancia o escenario) del modelo contextual. Esta evaluacio´n devuelve un valor
pero en ningu´n caso altera el modelo de objetos dado, debido a que la evaluacio´n en OCL
se realiza sin modificar el estado.
OCL esta´ fuertemente tipado. Las expresiones tienen tipo primitivo, tipo clase, tipo
tupla o tipo coleccio´n. OCL proporciona operadores esta´ndares sobre datos primitivos,
tuplas y colecciones. OCL proporciona tambie´n un operador punto (.) para acceder a los
valores de los atributos y extremos de asociacio´n de los objetos pertenecientes al escenario
dado.
8.1.3 SecureUML
SecureUML [11] extiende Control de Acceso Basado en Roles (RBAC) [52] con res-
tricciones de autorizacio´n. Estas restricciones pueden ser usadas para especificar pol´ıticas
que dependen de propiedades del estado del sistema, por ejemplo, que un usuario so´lo
pueda escribir un mensaje en una sala de chat donde participa. De manera ma´s espec´ıfica,
SecureUML permite al modelador formalizar decisiones de control de acceso dependiendo
de dos tipos de informacio´n:
1. informacio´n esta´tica, referida a las asignaciones de usuarios y permisos a roles y la
jerarqu´ıa de roles; e
2. informacio´n dina´mica, referida al cumplimiento de las restricciones de autorizacio´n
en el estado actual del sistema.
Por lo tanto, SecureUML soporta el modelado de roles y sus jerarqu´ıas, permisos, acciones,
recursos y restricciones de autorizacio´n. Adema´s, permite el modelado de asignaciones:
que´ permisos son asignados a un rol, que´ acciones son permitidas por un permiso, que´
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Tabla 8.1: SecureUML+ComponentUML: acciones y recursos.
Recurso Acciones Ato´micas Acciones Compuestas
Entidad create, delete read, update, full access
Atributo read, update full access
Me´todo execute
Extremo de asociacio´n read, create, delete full access
recursos son afectados por un permiso y que´ restriccio´n de autorizacio´n debe cumplirse
antes de conceder un permiso.
SecureUML es, sin embargo, un lenguaje gene´rico ya que deja abierta la naturaleza de
los recursos protegidos, a saber, si estos recursos son datos, objetos de negocio, estados
de controlador, etc. En nuestra metodolog´ıa usamos una extensio´n de SecureUML [11]
que combina SecureUML con ComponentUML. En esta extensio´n, que por simplicidad
seguiremos llamando SecureUML, los recursos protegidos son las entidades, junto con sus
atributos, me´todos y extremos de asociacio´n, mientras que las acciones son las mostradas
en la Tabla 2.1.
Hay dos clases de acciones: ato´micas y compuestas. Las acciones ato´micas esta´n pen-
sadas para ser mapeadas directamente a operaciones existentes en la capa persistente. Las
acciones compuestas agrupan de manera jera´rquica acciones ato´micas de nivel inferior. Por
ejemplo, la accio´n compuesta full access de un atributo agrupa las acciones ato´micas read
y update de este atributo. Finalmente, las restricciones de autorizacio´n esta´n especificadas
usando OCL, donde el contexto de una expresio´n OCL es el modelo de datos subyacente.
Adicionalmente, las expresiones OCL en los modelos de seguridad pueden contener las
variables self, caller, value y target, las cuales son interpretadas como sigue:
self se refiere al recurso sobre el cual la accio´n sera´ ejecutada, si el permiso es con-
cedido. Notar que el recurso de un atributo, me´todo o extremo de asociacio´n es la
entidad a la cual pertenece.
caller se refiere al usuario que ejecutara´ la accio´n, si el permiso es concedido.
value se refiere al valor que sera´ usado para modificar un atributo, si el permiso es
concedido.
target se refiere al objeto que sera´ an˜adido (o eliminado) de un extremo de asociacio´n,
si el permiso es concedido.
El lector familiarizado con la presentacio´n original de SecureUML [11] notara´ que
hemos introducido dos nuevas variables que pueden ser usadas en las restricciones de
atutorizacio´n: las variables value y target. Adema´s, para evitar potenciales ambigu¨edades,
hemos refinado la accio´n update de extremos de asociacio´n en dos acciones separadas: la
accio´n create y la accio´n delete de extremos de asociacio´n. En el Ape´ndice B se encuentra
la definicio´n completa de la sintaxis de SecureUML.
SecureUML proporciona varias constructoras para expresar pol´ıticas de control de
acceso complejas de manera compacta e intuitiva, por ejemplo, haciendo uso de la jerarqu´ıa
de acciones y roles o declarando pol´ıticas por defecto. Sin embargo, tal y como se describe
en la Seccio´n 8.3.1, todo modelo de seguridad S puede ser un´ıvocamente transformado en
un modelo S[ sema´nticamente equivalente para el que se cumple lo siguiente:
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Remark 3 Sea S un modelo de seguridad, para toda accio´n ato´mica act y todo rol r en
S, existe exactamente un permiso en S[ (posiblemente con la restriccio´n false) en r para
ejecutar act.
Informalmente, el modelo S[ hace completamente expl´ıcita la pol´ıtica de seguridad
especificada en S. Por consiguiente, sea Auth la funcio´n que, para todo modelo de seguridad
S, rol r y accio´n act , devuelve la restriccio´n de autorizacio´n asociada al u´nico permiso que
esta´ definido en S[, del rol r, para ejecutar act . Usaremos esta funcio´n Auth para definir la
transformacio´n de modelos que, en nuestra metodolog´ıa, traslada la pol´ıtica de seguridad
desde el modelo de seguridad al modelo de GUI.
8.2 Modelos de GUI
Los modelos de GUI proporcionan una vista de un sistema orientada a la interfaz hu-
mana. Junto con los modelos de datos, constituyen modelos de aplicaciones independientes
de plataforma omitiendo los aspectos relacionados con la seguridad.
De manera informal, una GUI esta´ compuesta de widgets: elementos visuales que
muestran informacio´n y ejecutan acciones. En esta Seccio´n presentamos un componente
clave de nuestra metodolog´ıa: un innovador lenguaje para modelar GUIs de aplicaciones de
manejo de datos llamado GUI Modeling Language (GUIML, de sus siglas en ingle´s). En el
Ape´ndice C se encuentra la definicio´n completa de la sintaxis de GUIML. Es importante,
sin embargo, entender que GUIML es un lenguaje para modelar no so´lo la estructura de una
GUI, es decir, los elementos (widgets) que la componen, sino tambie´n el comportamiento de
la GUI, es decir, co´mo los elementos reaccionara´n (acciones) en respuesta a la interaccio´n
de los usuarios con ellos (eventos). De hecho, la caracter´ıstica fundamental de GUIML es el
lenguaje que proporciona para modelar el comportamiento de la GUI, el cual usa OCL para
especificar las condiciones y los argumentos de las diferentes acciones. Esta caracter´ıstica
permite a los modelos de seguridad y de GUI “hablar” el mismo lenguaje (a saber, OCL
en el contexto del modelo de datos comu´n subyacente). Esto nos permite definir de manera
rigurosa la funcio´n de transformacio´n que traslada la pol´ıtica de seguridad al nivel de GUI.
A continuacio´n describimos los principales elementos de GUIML, a saber, widgets (con
sus variables asociadas), eventos y acciones.
Widgets
Un modelo de GUI consta de widgets de diferentes tipos: ventanas (pa´ginas, cuando
se refiere a aplicaciones web), desplegables (listas seleccionables), tablas, campos de fe-
cha, cambos booleanos (cajas seleccionables), botones, campos de texto y etiquetas. Los
widgets pueden ser mostrados en contenedores, los cuales tambie´n son widgets. Los wid-
gets distintos a las ventanas deben estar contenidos en otro widget. So´lo las ventanas, los
desplegables y las tablas pueden contener otros widgets. Los widgets pueden contener va-
riables (las cuales almacenan valores para su posterior uso) y disparar eventos (los cuales
ejecutan acciones).
Variables
Cada declaracio´n de un widget puede contener declaraciones de variables, listando las
variables que el widget posee.
Adema´s de las variables expl´ıcitamente declaradas, hay variables que existen por de-
fecto que todo widget de un tipo dado posee. Estas variables son declaradas de manera
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impl´ıtica en toda declaracio´n de widget y sus valores almacenados son manejados de ma-
neras especiales. La descripcio´n de cada una de esta variables, se encuentra en la pa´gina
web de ActionGUI [1].
Eventos
Cada declaracio´n de widget puede contener declaraciones de eventos. Los eventos son
disparados cuando el usuario interactu´a con los widgets de la GUI, ejecutando acciones
sobre datos o sobre otros widgets.
Las acciones ejecutadas cuando un evento se dispara son especificadas mediante el uso
de sentencias. Una sentencia puede ser una accio´n, una sentencia condicional, una iteracio´n
o una secuencia de sentencias. En GUIML, las condiciones en las sentencias condicionales
y en las iteraciones son especificadas mediante el uso de expresiones OCL, cuyo contexto
es el modelo de datos subyacente. De manera adicional, estas expresiones pueden referirse
a variables de widgets. Cada secuencia de sentencias asociada a un evento es ejecutada
como una simple transaccio´n: o todas sus sentencias son ejecutadas con e´xito en el orden
dado o ninguna de ellas es ejecutada.
Acciones
Toda declaracio´n de evento contiene una secuencia de sentencias que especifica las
acciones ejecutadas cuando el evento es disparado. Estas acciones pueden ser ejecutadas
sobre objetos que pertenecen a la capa persistente o sobre objetos que pertenecen a la capa
de presentacio´n. En el primer caso se llaman acciones sobre datos y en el segundo caso se
llaman acciones de GUI. Mencionar que algunas acciones pueden tomar argumentos cuyos
valores son conocidos u´nicamente en tiempo de ejecucio´n, por ejemplo, una accio´n de borrar
(delete) cuyo argumento es el elemento seleccionado por el usuario en un desplegable o
una accio´n de actualizacio´n (update) cuyo argumento es el nu´mero introducido por el
usuario en una caja de texto. En GUIML, estos valores se especifican mediante el uso de
expresiones OCL. De nuevo, el contexto de estas expresiones OCL es el modelo de datos
subyacente y tambie´n pueden referirse a variables de widgets.
A continuacio´n, describimos brevemente de manera informal la sema´ntica de algunas
de las acciones de datos de GUIML.
Entity create: Crea una instancia de una entidad en la capa persistente.
Entity delete: Borra una instancia de una entidad de la capa persistente.
Attribute read: Lee el valor de un atributo de una instancia de la capa persistente.
Attribute update: Modifica el valor de un atributo de una instancia de la capa
persistente.
Association-end read: Lee la coleccio´n de instancias asociadas al extremo de aso-
ciacio´n de una instancia de la capa persistente.
Association-end create: Crea un enlace entre dos instancias de la capa persistente
a trave´s de un extremo de asociacio´n.
Association-end delete: Borra un enlace entre dos instancias de la capa persistente
a trave´s de un extremo de asociacio´n.
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Finalmente, describimos brevemente de manera informal la sema´ntica de algunas de
las acciones de GUI definidas en GUIML.
Set: Modifica el valor de una variable de widget.
Open: Abre una ventana. Adicionalmente, puede tomar como argumentos parejas
(variablei, valor i) donde variablei es el nombre de una variable que pertenece a la
ventana destino y valor i es el valor que sera´ asignado a variablei cuando la ventana
destino sea abierta.
Back: Vuelve a la ventana anterior en el historial de navegacio´n.
Fail: Deshace la transaccio´n actual, por lo que la sentencia actual no se ejecuta de
manera satisfactoria.
Skip: No hace nada.
8.3 Modelos de GUI con Seguridad
8.3.1 Pol´ıtica de seguridad expl´ıcita
En esta Seccio´n definimos una transformacio´n que, para cada modelo de seguridad S,
produce el modelo de seguridad S[ el cual hace expl´ıcita la pol´ıtica de seguridad declarada
en S. Definimos esta transformacio´n en cuatro pasos. Tal y como se declara en la Defini-
cio´n 3, al final de nuestra transformacio´n se cumple que: para cada accio´n ato´mica act y
cada rol r en S, existe exactamente un permiso en S[ (posiblemente restringido por false)
en r para ejecutar act .
Paso 1: Copiar los permisos expl´ıcitos
Acciones ato´micas. Sea act una accio´n ato´mica. Supongamos que existe un permiso
en S de un rol r para ejecutar act bajo una restriccio´n auth. Entonces tambie´n existe
un permiso en S[ del rol r para ejecutar act bajo la misma restriccio´n auth.
Paso 2: Desplegar el modelo de seguridad
Jerarqu´ıa de acciones. Sea CA una accio´n compuesta. Supongamos que existe un
permiso en S del rol r para ejecutar CA bajo una restriccio´n auth. Entonces para
cada accio´n ato´mica act contenida en CA existe un nuevo permiso en S[ del rol r
para ejecutar act bajo la misma restriccio´n de autorizacio´n auth.
Jerarqu´ıa de roles. Sea act una accio´n ato´mica, y sean r y r′ dos roles. Supongamos
que r es un sub-rol de r′ en S y que tambie´n existe un permiso en S del rol r′ para
ejecutar act bajo la restriccio´n auth. Entonces existe un nuevo permiso en S[ del rol
r para ejecutar act bajo la misma restriccio´n de seguridad auth.
Acciones de borrar (delete). Sea entity una entidad. Supongamos que existe un per-
miso en S del rol r para borrar una instancia de la entidad entity bajo una restriccio´n
auth. Entonces para cada extremo de asociacio´n assoc perteneciente a entity , existe
un nuevo permiso en S[ del rol r para ejecutar la accio´n Delete::assoc bajo la misma
restriccio´n auth.
Extremos de asociacio´n opuestos. Sean assoc y assoc′ dos extremos de asociacio´n
opuestos. Sea act una accio´n Create::assoc. Supongamos que existe un permiso en S
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del rol r para ejecutar act bajo la restriccio´n auth. Entonces existe un nuevo permiso
en S[ del rol r para ejecutar la accio´n Create::assoc′ bajo la restriccio´n que resulta
de reemplazar simulta´neamente en auth la variable self por target y la variable target
por self. El despliegue es similar cuando act es la accio´n Delete::assoc.
Paso 3. An˜adir permisos por defecto al modelo de seguridad
Denegacio´n por defecto. Sea r un rol y sea act una accio´n ato´mica. Supongamos que
no existe un permiso en S[ del rol r para ejecutar act . Entonces existe un nuevo
permiso en S[ del rol r para ejecutar act bajo la restriccio´n false. Esto significa que
el rol r tendra´ denegado el acceso para ejecutar act en todas las circunstancias.
Paso 4. Simplificar el modelo de seguridad resultante
Disyuncio´n de restricciones. Sea r un rol y sea act una accio´n ato´mica. Supongamos
que existen n permisos en S[ del rol r para ejecutar act . Entonces estos n permisos
son simplificados en un u´nico permiso, cuya restriccio´n de autorizacio´n resulta de la
disyuncio´n de todas las restricciones de autorizacio´n de cada uno de los n permisos
individuales.
8.3.2 Modelos de GUI seguros
En esta Seccio´n describimos el corazo´n de nuestra metodolog´ıa: una funcio´n de trans-
formacio´n de modelos Sec que, dado un modelo de GUI G y un modelo de seguridad S,
genera automa´ticamente un nuevo modelo GUI Sec(G,S). El modelo generado es ide´ntico
a G excepto que es seguro con respecto a S. La funcio´n de transformacio´n Sec funciona
envolviendo alrededor de cada accio´n de datos act en G una sentencia “if-then-else” con
los siguientes argumentos:
una condicio´n que refleja las restricciones asociadas a los permisos especificados en
S, para cada uno de los diferentes roles, para ejecutar la accio´n act ;
una rama “then” que contiene la accio´n act y
una rama “else” que contiene la accio´n fail.
Por lo tanto, la sema´ntica de la sentencia “if-then-else” asegura que act so´lo sera´ eje-
cutada,si se cumplen las restricciones asociadas a los permisos correspondientes. Adema´s,
esta sema´ntica garantiza que si estas restricciones no se cumplen, entonces la accio´n fail
sera´ ejecutada deshaciendo la transaccio´n actual.
De manera ma´s espec´ıfica, para generar la sentencia “if-then-else” anteriormente men-
cionada, la funcio´n Sec hace uso de la Definicio´n 3. En particular, para cada rol r en S,
Sec llama a la funcio´n Auth(S, r, act) para obtener la expresio´n que finalmente (es decir,
cuando la pol´ıtica de seguridad se ha hecho completamente expl´ıcita) restringe el permi-
so dado por r para ejecutar act . Sin embargo, ya que esta expresio´n puede contener las
variables self, value, target y caller, la funcio´n Sec debe tambie´n reemplazar estas variables
por los actuales argumentos de la accio´n act (incluyendo su usuario actual). Denotamos
la expresio´n OCL resultante por Auth(S, r, act)[args] donde args son los argumentos espe-
cificados en el modelo GUI por la accio´n act . Finalmente, ya que diferentes roles pueden
estar restringidos por diferentes expresiones, la condicio´n generada por Sec tendra´ la forma:
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((r1 = [Window .role] and Auth(S, r1, act)[args])
or . . . or
(rn = [Window .role] and Auth(S, rn, act)[args])),
donde r1, . . . , rn son todos los roles declarados en S. El actual usuario de la aplicacio´n y
su rol esta´n almacenados en las variables de widget caller y role, las cuales pertenecen a
cada una de las ventanas en el modelo de GUI.
8.3.3 Correccio´n de la Transformacio´n de Modelos
Resumimos aqu´ı la correccio´n de la transformacio´n de modelos Sec, la cual se define
de manera relativa a la sema´ntica de los modelos de GUI. Todos los detalles se encuentran
en [6]. Definimos la sema´ntica de los modelos de GUI dando primero un conjunto de reglas
de inferencia que define una relacio´n de transicio´n −→ entre triplas de la forma 〈stm, I, θ〉,
donde stm es una sentencia, I es un escenario (es decir, una instancia del modelo de datos
subyacente) y θ representa un estado de las variables de widget. Proporcionamos reglas
de inferencia para cada posible sentencia: para cada tipo de accio´n de datos y de accio´n
de GUI (casos base) y para secuencias arbitrarias de sentencias, sentencias condicionales
y sentencias de iteracio´n (casos inductivos). En particular, para acciones de datos la regla
de inferencia tiene la forma
〈act(args), I, θ〉 −→ 〈skip, res(I), res(θ)〉 ,
donde:
args son los argumentos de la accio´n de datos act ;
res(I) especifica el escenario que resulta de ejecutar act(args) en el escenario I con
el estado de variables de widget θ y
res(θ) especifica el nuevo estado de las variables de widget tras la ejecucio´n de
act(args) en el escenario I y estado de las variables de widget θ.
De manera crucial, no se define ninguna regla de inferencia que lleve a skip para la accio´n
de GUI fail.
Luego definimos la sema´ntica operacional de un evento ev que ejecuta las acciones
especificadas por la sentencia stm como el conjunto de todas las transiciones
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗ 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉 ,
donde −→∗ es la clausura reflexiva-transitiva de −→.
Por definicio´n, esta sema´ntica de operaciones para eventos es sin seguridad : no respeta
las restricciones de seguridad que, de acuerdo con el modelo de seguridad dado, deben
restringir la ejecucio´n de las acciones de datos. Para proporcionar una sema´ntica opera-
cional para eventos con seguridad definimos la versio´n segura de las reglas de inferencia.
En particular, dado un modelo de seguridad S, para cada rol r y para cada tipo de accio´n
de datos act , la versio´n segura de la regla de inferencia para act y r tiene la forma
J(Auth(S, r, act)[args])θKI = true
〈act(args), I, θ〉 −→ 〈skip, res(I), res(θ)〉 ,
donde:
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JexprKI denota el valor de la expresio´n expr en el escenario I y por lo tanto;
J(Auth(S, r, act)[args])θKI denota la evaluacio´n en el escenario I de la autorizacio´n
Auth(S, r, act) que restringe el u´nico permiso que, de acuerdo con la Definicio´n 3,
finalmente permite a los usuarios con rol r ejecutar la accio´n act , siendo arg los
argumentos de act y θ el estado de las variables de widget.
Estas reglas de inferencia con seguridad definen la relacio´n de transicio´n −→S . Final-
mente, dado un modelo de seguridad S definimos la sema´ntica operacional con seguridad
de un evento ev que ejecuta las acciones especificadas por una sentencia stm como el
conjunto de todas las transiciones
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗S 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉 .
El siguiente teorema formaliza la correccio´n de nuestra funcio´n de transformacio´n de
modelos Sec. Declara que la evaluacio´n de una sentencia transformada por Sec, siguien-
do la sema´ntica operacional sin seguridad, devuelve el mismo resultado que la evaluacio´n
de la sentencia original usando la sema´ntica operacional con seguridad. Por lo tanto, la
sentencia transformada respeta la restriccio´n de autorizacio´n formalizada en el modelo de
seguridad subyacente.
Teorema Sea S un modelo de seguridad y sea stm una sentencia. Entonces para cada
escenario I y cada estado de variables de widget θ.
〈Sec(stm, S), I, θ〉 −→∗ 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉 ⇐⇒
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗S 〈skip, I ′, θ′〉.
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Cap´ıtulo 9
Soporte para el desarrollo dirigido
por modelos
Los modelos de GUI con seguridad son independientes de plataforma y pueden ser
mapeados a implementaciones que emplean diferentes tecnolog´ıas. Esto incluye aplicacio-
nes de escritorio, aplicaciones web y aplicaciones para mo´viles. Como parte de nuestro
trabajo construimos el conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI [1], el cual genera de manera
automa´tica aplicaciones web de gestio´n de datos a partir de modelos de GUI con seguridad.
Tras una breve descripcio´n del estado actual del conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI,
en este Cap´ıtulo describimos nuestra experiencia en el desarrollo del evaluador “Eye OCL
Software” (EOS, de sus siglas en ingle´s). EOS es un componente Java para la evaluacio´n
eficiente de OCL en escenarios mediano-grandes. Comparamos EOS con otros evaluadores
de OCL en escenarios mediano-grandes y exploramos varias estrategias de evaluacio´n de
expresiones OCL en escenarios realmente grandes. Luego proponemos un mapeo de un
subconjunto de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden (FOL) y usamos dicho mapeo para compro-
bar la insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos de restricciones OCL. Argumentamos que nuestro
mapeo es simple, ya que las sentencias FOL resultantes se asemejan mucho a las restric-
ciones OCL originales, y pra´ctico, ya que podemos usar herramientas de razonamiento
automa´tico, tales como demostradores automa´ticos de teoremas y resolutores SMT, para
comprobar de forma automa´tica la insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos no triviales de restriccio-
nes OCL. Finalmente, proponemos una metodolog´ıa para el razonamiento sobre pol´ıticas
de control de acceso de grano fino, cuyas restricciones de autorizacio´n son especificadas en
OCL, mediante el uso del mapeo de OCL a FOL anteriormente mencionado.
9.1 El conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI
El conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI dispone de editores de modelos para construir
y manipular modelos de datos, de seguridad y de GUI. Estos editores comparten nuestro
propio analizador sinta´ctico de OCL, el cual toma como entrada adicional las variables
introducidas por los distintos modelos junto con sus respectivos tipos: en el caso de los
modelos de seguridad las variables self, caller, target y value, y en el caso de los modelos de
GUI todas las variables de widget dadas. De forma crucial, el conjunto de herramientas
ActionGUI implementa nuestra transformacio´n de modelos para generar modelos de GUI
con seguridad. Finalmente, incluye un generador de co´digo que, dado un modelo de GUI
con seguridad, produce una aplicacio´n web basada en la siguiente arquitectura esta´ndar
de tres capas.
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1. Capa de presentacio´n (tambie´n conocida como front-end): Los usuarios acceden a las
aplicaciones web a trave´s de navegadores esta´ndares, los cuales renderizan el conte-
nido (HTML y JavaScript) proporcionado por el servidor web de forma dina´mica.
2. Capa de aplicacio´n: El conjunto de herramientas genera Aplicaciones Web Java im-
plementadas mediante el uso de la librer´ıa Vaadin [82]. Las aplicaciones corren en un
servidor web (como Tomcat o GlassFish), procesan las solicitudes de los clientes y ge-
neran contenido el cual es enviado de vuelta al cliente para ser renderizado. Tambie´n
pueden manipular datos almacenados en la capa persistente. Cuando las solicitudes
de los clientes son procesadas la aplicacio´n generada interpreta su modelo de GUI
con seguridad subyacente. En particular, lleva a cabo las comprobaciones de segu-
ridad requeridas antes de modificar algu´n dato almacenado en la capa persistente o
antes de enviar algu´n dato a la capa persistente.
3. Capa persistente (tambie´n conocida como capa de datos o back-end): La aplicacio´n
generada gestiona la informacio´n almacenada en una base de datos. Para cada apli-
cacio´n, el conjunto de herramientas genera el correspondiente esquema de la base
de datos a partir del modelo de datos de la aplicacio´n. Dicho esquema contiene los
comandos que crean la base de datos.
El conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI produce sus mejores resultados cuando la
funcionalidad de la aplicacio´n de gestio´n de datos pretendida se puede reducir a acciones
de tipo CRUD y su dina´mica consiste en navegar entre ventanas e intercambiar informacio´n
con la base de datos subyacente. Para aplicaciones en esta categor´ıa, ActionGUI genera
de forma automa´tica la implementacio´n completa a partir de los modelos de datos, de
seguridad y de GUI. Las llamadas a acciones de tipo CRUD son modeladas en GUIML
mediante el uso de acciones sobre datos y la navegacio´n y el paso de informacio´n entre
ventanas es modelado mediante el uso de acciones de GUI: open, back y set. Por supuesto,
algunas aplicaciones de gestio´n de datos pueden requerir funcionalidad adicional, como
por ejemplo, la posibilidad de enviar correos electro´nicos, imprimir tablas o exportar datos
en formatos espec´ıficos. Como es de esperar, el conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI no
genera co´digo para estos me´todos no-CRUD. En su lugar, incluye su implementacio´n —
la cual debe ser proporcionada por el desarrollador de la aplicacio´n — en la aplicacio´n
generada de manera que cuando la aplicacio´n necesita interpretar alguno de estos me´todos
simplemente llama al me´todo provisto.
9.2 Evaluacio´n de expresiones OCL
En [33] presentamos nuestra experiencia en el desarrollo del evaluador Eye OCL Soft-
ware (EOS), un componente Java para la evaluacio´n eficiente de OCL. Primero motivamos
la necesidad de una implementacio´n eficiente de OCL para hacer frente a los novedosos
usos del lenguaje. Luego analizamos algunos aspectos que, basados en nuestra experien-
cia, deber´ıan tenerse en cuenta a la hora de construir un evaluador OCL para escenarios
de taman˜o mediano-grande. Finalmente, exploramos algunas estrategias de evaluacio´n de
expresiones OCL en escenarios realmente grandes.
9.2.1 Motivacio´n
Como parte de nuestra investigacio´n, hemos buscado distintos usos de OCL ma´s alla´
de su “requisito inicial de lenguaje de modelado preciso como complemento de las espe-
cificaciones UML”. Dos tipos de usos de OCL relacionados entre s´ı han atra´ıdo nuestra
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atencio´n [16, 3, 4, 35, 8], ambos tienen que ver con el uso de OCL para analizar modelos
definidos por el usuario mediante la evaluacio´n de consultas sobre las correspondientes
instancias de nuestros metamodelos. Debido a que estas instancias suelen contener un
gran nu´mero de elementos, la evaluacio´n de expresiones sobre ellos conlleva un alto coste
computacional.
Consideremos, por ejemplo, el uso de OCL para expresar me´tricas de programas Java
(miembros del grupo Triskell en IRISA, Francia, nos sugirieron este uso de OCL). Los
escenarios en los cuales las me´tricas del programa sera´n evaluadas son las instancias del
metamodelo de Java correspondiente a los programas: por lo tanto, cuanto ma´s largos
son los programas ma´s largos son los escenarios1 y consecuentemente mayor es el coste
computacional de evaluar las me´tricas del programa.
En [33] describimos nuestra experiencia en el desarrollo del componente Eye OCL
Software [41] (EOS, de sus siglas en ingle´s), un evaluador de OCL disen˜ado con el obje-
tivo de realizar una evaluacio´n eficiente de expresiones OCL sobre escenarios de taman˜o
mediano-grande. En particular, analizamos i) la necesidad de una implementacio´n eficien-
te de OCL para cubrir los distintos usos del lenguaje; ii) los aspectos que hemos tenido
que tener en cuenta para mejorar la eficiencia del evaluador EOS en escenarios de taman˜o
mediano-grande y iii) los l´ımites de las actuales implementaciones de OCL sobre escena-
rios de taman˜o realmente grande. Para ello, en [33] analizamos los resultados de aplicar
un banco de pruebas sobre varios evaluadores de OCL (incluyendo el evaluador EOS) con
los objetivos de: i) mostrar el rendimiento de estos evaluadores sobre escenarios de ta-
man˜o mediano-grande y ii) de ilustrar los aspectos que consideramos que deben tenerse en
cuenta a la hora de implementar un evaluador OCL eficiente sobre escenarios de taman˜o
mediano-grande. De forma interesante, esta calidad — la eficiencia del motor OCL sobre
escenarios de taman˜o mediano-grande — no es cubierta en el banco de pruebas propuesto
en [54]: de hecho, el escenario ma´s grande para la comprobacio´n de la eficiencia del motor
OCL propuesto en [55],contiene so´lo 42 objetos y 42 enlaces entre ellos. A pesar de los
resultados de nuestro banco de pruebas esta Seccio´n no es una propaganda del evaluador
EOS: como “producto”, el evaluador esta´ aun en su infancia.
9.2.2 Medidas de coste de evaluacio´n de expresiones
Aunque el coste computacional de evaluar una expresio´n OCL particular en un escena-
rio dado obviamente depende de los algoritmos y las estructuras de datos usadas en cada
herramienta, basa´ndonos en nuestra experiencia existen dos tipos de medidas que mere-
cen la pena ser consideradas antes de ejecutar la evaluacio´n de una expresio´n: primero,
el ma´ximo nu´mero de veces que se accede a las propiedades de un objeto y segundo, el
taman˜o ma´ximo de las colecciones que sera´n construidas. En el caso de escenarios de ta-
man˜o mediano-grande el reto para los motores de OCL es que los valores de estas medidas
son t´ıpicamente grandes. El uso de los tipos de medidas anteriormente mencionadas nos
permite comprobar el rendimiento del evaluador EOS, as´ı como buscar posibles optimiza-
ciones.
9.2.3 La implementacio´n del evaluador EOS
ITP/OCL [31] es un evaluador de OCL basado en reescritura, implementado a partir
de una sema´ntica ecuacional ejecutable para OCL [49]. Aunque esta herramienta rinde ra-
1Como ejemplo, la aplicacio´n SpoonEMF desarrollada por el grupo Triskell genera, para un programa
esta´ndar de Java de 10 l´ıneas de co´digo, un escenario con 113 objetos; para un programa de 100 l´ıneas,
uno con 1180 objetos y para un programa de 500 l´ıneas, uno con 3470 objetos.
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zonablemente bien sobre escenarios de taman˜o pequen˜o-mediano, su rendimiento no escala
en el caso de escenarios de taman˜o mediano-grande. Provocado por nuestro intere´s sobre
aplicaciones que requieren una evaluacio´n eficiente de OCL sobre escenarios de taman˜o
mediano-grande, decidimos implementar el evaluador Eye OCL Software (EOS). EOS es
un componente Java cuyo disen˜o sigue las ideas clave que hay detra´s de la herramienta
ITP/OCL. Su implementacio´n incluye un analizador sinta´ctico (parser) de OCL (el cual
hace uso de la librer´ıa SableCC [53]) y un evaluador OCL (implementado en unas 7K
l´ıneas de co´digo Java). EOS soporta la Librer´ıa Esta´ndar de OCL 2.0 [72], casi en su
totalidad, con la excepcio´n del tipo OclMessage y sus operaciones. Con la idea de hacerlo
lo ma´s general posible, el componente EOS no esta´ basado en un entorno de desarrollo
sobre (meta)modelos en particular: su interfaz pu´blica proporciona me´todos para insertar
elementos, uno a uno, en los modelos y escenarios del usuario y para insertar expresiones al
evaluador como cadenas de caracteres ASCII. Esta decisio´n tambie´n nos permitio´ disen˜ar
la estructura de datos de EOS para almacenar internamente los modelos y escenarios del
usuario de tal manera que el acceso a las propiedades de los objetos fuera eficiente. La otra
posible novedad en su implementacio´n es que, antes de evaluar una expresio´n de tipo collect,
intentamos (sobre)estimar el taman˜o de la coleccio´n resultante para asignar la memoria
por adelantado. Es resto de la implementacio´n es bastante directa: las expresiones itera-
doras de OCL son implementadas por bucles while/for en Java y las operaciones esta´ndar
de OCL, cuando es posible, se implementan usando los operadores Java correspondientes.
Como es de esperar, EOS evalu´a las expresiones siguiendo una estrategia impaciente: en
particular, las expresiones de tipo coleccio´n son evaluadas en su totalidad asignando en
memoria todos los elementos resultantes.
9.2.4 Limitaciones
Para evaluar expresiones en escenarios realmente grandes necesitamos primero resolver
el problema de cargar los escenarios en los evaluadores OCL. Para ello, hemos explorado
dos estrategias diferentes ambas basadas en la representacio´n de los modelos y escenarios
del usuario como bases de datos relacionales. La primera estrategia consiste en modificar
el evaluador OCL de forma que busque la informacio´n contenida en los escenarios direc-
tamente en su representacio´n en la base de datos. La ventaja de esta estrategia es que
so´lo requiere modificar la evaluacio´n de las expresiones de punto (expresiones de acceso
a propiedades de objetos) de la forma esperada: el acceso al valor de un atributo o un
extremo de asociacio´n de un objeto sera´ ahora implementado como una consulta select
ba´sica de SQL. La forma concreta de estas consultas depende, por supuesto, del mapeo
usado para representar modelos como bases de datos relacionales (ver, por ejemplo, [75, 80]
y [56]). Para comprobar la viabilidad de esta estrategia realizamos las modificamos corres-
pondientes en el evaluador EOS: desafortunadamente, el coste de evaluar expresiones de
punto a trave´s del uso del controlador JDBC era tan alto que hac´ıa impracticable el uso del
evaluador EOS modificado, a la hora evaluar expresiones en escenarios realmente grandes.2
La segunda estrategia consiste en traducir las expresiones OCL a expresiones en un
lenguaje de consultas ya disponible para las bases de datos relacionales. Segu´n nuestros
conocimientos, los resultados ma´s interesantes en esta l´ınea son analizados en [47, 58]
y proporcionan los fundamentos de la herramienta OCL2SQL [57, 81]. Sin embargo, la
solucio´n propuesta en [47, 58] no es del todo satisfactoria. Primero, so´lo considera un sub-
conjunto restringido de OCL: en particular, no maneja iteradores ni tuplas ni colecciones.
2Para este experimento, mapeamos cada clase del modelo a una tabla cuyas columnas corresponden a
sus atributos y mapeamos cada asociacio´n a una tabla cuyas columnas corresponden a sus extremos de
asociacio´n.
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Segundo, so´lo se aplica sobre expresiones de tipo Boolean y no sobre consultas arbitrarias.
Finalmente, la complejidad de las consultas SQL obtenidas de esta traduccio´n es tan alta
que hace impracticable el uso de la evaluacio´n OCL sobre escenarios de taman˜o realmente
grande. 3
9.3 Comprobacio´n de insatisfacibilidad de expresiones OCL
En [34] proponemos un mapeo de un subconjunto de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden
(FOL) y usamos este mapeo para comprobar la insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos de restric-
ciones OCL. En [34] argumentamos que nuestro mapeo es simple, ya que las sentencias
FOL resultantes son muy similares a las restricciones OCL originales, y pra´ctico, ya que
podemos usar herramientas de razonamiento automa´tico, tales como demostradores au-
toma´ticos de teoremas y resolutores de Satisfacibilidad Mo´dulo Teor´ıas (SMT, de sus
siglas en ingle´s), para comprobar de manera automa´tica la insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos
no triviales de restricciones OCL. SMT generaliza la satisfacibilidad booleana (SAT) in-
corporando razonamiento de igualdad, aritme´tica, vectores de bits de taman˜o fijo, arrays,
cuantificadores y otras u´tiles teor´ıas de primer orden [5].
9.3.1 Motivacio´n
La falta de soporte de herramientas para OCL fue sen˜alado en [29] como la principal
causa de la limitada adopcio´n del lenguaje en la industria. Desde entonces, varias iniciativas
han tenido e´xito en este sentido y sus resultados esta´n disponibles para los modeladores
(ver [46]).
El trabajo presentado en [34] propone un mapeo de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden,
el cual es definido con el propo´sito de soportar comprobaciones de insatisfacibilidad sin
l´ımites, de expresiones OCL mediante el uso de herramientas de razonamiento automa´tico.
Bajo nuestro punto de vista, poder comprobar la insatisfacibilidad de (conjuntos de) ex-
presiones OCL es una herramienta potente ya que permite a los modeladores (entre otras
tareas):
verificar invariantes de clases, comprobando que lo´gicamente implican las propieda-
des/restricciones esperadas;
verificar pre-condiciones de me´todos, comprobando que las invariantes de clases no
implican lo´gicamente sus negaciones y
verificar post-condiciones de me´todos, comprobando que no implican lo´gicamente la
negacio´n de (alguna de) las invariantes de clases.
Sin embargo, bajo nuestro punto de vista, lo que hace a un resolutores de insatisfacibi-
lidad no so´lo potente, sino tambie´n pra´ctico, es que sea automa´tico. Dada la naturaleza
indecidible del lenguaje OCL completo, se espera tener un comprobador de insatisfacibi-
lidad automa´tico para un gran tipo de expresiones OCL. En [34] no tratamos de definir
co´mo de grande y/o interesante es la clase de expresiones OCL insatisfacibles que podemos
comprobar automa´ticamente. Sin embargo, argumentamos que nuestro mapeo es simple,
ya que las sentencias FOL resultantes son muy similares a las restricciones OCL origina-
les, y pra´ctico, ya que podemos usar demostradores de teoremas automa´ticos (como por
3El principal desarrollador de la herramienta OCL2SQL nos confirmo´ que la eficiencia de la herramienta
OCL2SQL no hab´ıa sido probada en escenarios de taman˜o realmente grande (comunicacio´n por correo
electro´nico, mayo del 2008).
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ejemplo Prover9 [67]) y resolutores SMT (como por ejemplo Yices [48]), para comprobar
automa´ticamente la insatisfacibilidad de conjuntos de restricciones de OCL no triviales.
9.3.2 Insatisfacibilidad de restricciones OCL
La nocio´n de insatisfacibilidad que proponemos enfatiza el significado lo´gico de las
restricciones OCL, de hecho, ba´sicamente traduce para OCL la nocio´n esta´ndar de insa-
tisfacibilidad para fo´rmulas de primer orden.
En lo que sigue, denotamos restriccio´n OCL a cualquier expresio´n OCL de tipo Boolean.
Asumimos que las instancias de los modelos no siempre tienen un nu´mero finito de ele-
mentos.
Definition 2 Dado un modelo (diagrama de clases) M y un conjunto de restricciones
OCL Φ, decimos que Φ es M-insatisfacible si y so´lo si no existe una M-instancia (dia-
grama de objetos) O sobre el cual toda restriccio´n en Φ evalu´a a true.
Otras nociones de satisfacibilidad/insatisfacibilidad de modelos UML con restricciones
OCL pueden encontrarse en la literatura. En particular, las nociones usadas en [23, 24] son
las nociones de satisfacibilidad de´bil y satisfacibilidad fuerte (y otras nociones relacionadas
son tambie´n introducidas en [18]). Satisfacibilidad de´bil significa que existe un nu´mero
finito de instancias del modelo en las cuales al menos una clase contiene al menos un
elemento. Satisfacibilidad fuerte significa que existe un nu´mero finito de instancias del
modelo en las cuales todas sus clases tienen al menos un elemento. Si un conjunto de
restricciones es insatisfacible (en nuestro sentido) entonces no puede ser ni de´bilmente
satisfacible ni fuertemente satisfacible. Por otro lado, si un conjunto de restricciones no es
ni de´bilmente satisfacible ni fuertemente satisfacible, no implica que sea instatisfacible (en
nuestro sentido). Esto se debe a que la instancia vac´ıa del modelo, en la que ninguna clase
contiene algu´n elemento, podr´ıa ser satisfacible (en nuestro sentido) siempre y cuando se
cumplan todas las restricciones.
9.3.3 Un mapeo de OCL a FOL
En esta Seccio´n proporcionamos una descripcio´n de alto nivel de un mapeo de un
subconjunto de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden (FOL). El lector interesado puede encontrar
en [34] todos los detalles de esta definicio´n. Dado un conjunto de restricciones OCL,
nuestro mapeo genera un conjunto de fo´rmulas FOL tales que si el conjunto resultante es
insatisfacible, entonces el conjunto original tambie´n es insatisfacible.
Las restricciones OCL especifican propiedades que un modelo debe satisfacer. Para po-
der hacer esto de manera concisa, OCL proporciona diferentes constructoras para referirse
a colecciones de elementos espec´ıficos. De forma breve, nuestro mapeo esta´ definido de
manera recursiva sobre la estructura de las expresiones OCL:
Las expresiones de tipo Boolean se traducen a fo´rmulas (las cuales esencialmente
reflejan su estructura lo´gica), las expresiones de tipo Integer ba´sicamente son copiadas
y, en este punto, no mapeamos expresiones de tipo String.
Las expresiones de tipo Collection se traducen a predicados cuyos significados se de-
finen mediante fo´rmulas adicionales generadas por el mapeo y, en este punto, so´lo
mapeamos expresiones de coleccio´n de tipo Set.
Los extremos de asociacio´n se traducen a predicados los cuales son tambie´n definidos
mediante fo´rmulas adicionales generadas por el mapeo y, en este punto, no mapeamos
asociaciones cualificadas.
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Los atributos se traducen a funciones, las cuales no son interpretadas por el mapeo.
Una ventaja crucial de nuestro mapeo es que la insatisfacibilidad de las fo´rmulas resul-
tantes puede ser comprobada mediante el uso de herramientas de razonamiento automa´tico,
tales como demostradores automa´ticos de teoremas y resolutores SMT. Para ilustrar esta
idea, en [34] presentamos una serie de resultados obtenidos a partir de probar (de manera
automa´tica) la insatisfacibilidad de diferentes subconjuntos de restricciones OCL. Para
ello, usamos dos herramientas: Prover9 [67] (un demostrador automa´tico de teoremas) y
Yices [48] (un resolutor SMT). Ambas herramientas terminaron cada una de las pruebas
en menos de un segundo usando un ordenador porta´til esta´ndar.
9.3.4 Limitaciones
El mapeo de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden que aqu´ı se presenta soporta el uso direc-
to de resolutores SMT para comprobar la satisfacibilidad de expresiones OCL, pero bajo
restricciones espec´ıficas sobre las expresiones que son permitidas y sobre las instancias
de los modelos de datos (escenarios) que son comprobados. No sorprende que algunas de
estas restricciones sean impuestas para evitar el problema de tratar la indefinibilidad en
OCL. En particular, nuestro mapeo i) so´lo considera instancias (objetos) cuyos atributos
esta´n definidos y ii) no permite expresiones que contengan operadores que puedan gene-
rar valores indefinidos. En [39] se proponen modificaciones al mapeo de OCL a lo´gica de
primer orden que, a pesar de estar basado en los mismos principios que nuestro mapeo
subyacente, esta´ disen˜ado para tratar las limitaciones del anterior mapeo que tienen que
ver con la indefinibilidad en OCL. A continuacio´n explicamos de forma breve la diferencia
clave entre ambos mapeos. Bajo las restricciones i) y ii) descritas arriba, una expresio´n
OCL de tipo Boolean so´lo puede evaluarse a true o false. Por lo tanto, para razonar en este
contexto mediante el uso de expresiones de tipo Boolean basta con definir un mapeo que
formalice cua´ndo una expresio´n OCL de tipo Boolean se evalu´a a true. Esto es precisamente
lo que hacemos en nuestro mapeo aqu´ı presentado. Sin embargo, en presencia de la in-
definibilidad las expresiones OCL de tipo Boolean tambie´n pueden ser evaluadas a null o
invalid. Para tratar este hecho, [39] define cuatro mapeos diferentes los cuales formalizan,
respectivamente, cua´ndo una expresio´n OCL de tipo Boolean se evalu´a a true, cua´ndo a
false, cua´ndo a null, y cua´ndo a invalid.
9.4 Razonamiento sobre pol´ıticas de control de acceso
En esta Seccio´n presentamos una metodolog´ıa novedosa y con soporte de herramienta
para el razonamiento sobre pol´ıticas de control de acceso de grano fino (FGAC). Adema´s,
describimos nuestra experiencia con respecto al uso del resolutor SMT Z3 [45] para probar
de forma automa´tica propiedades no triviales sobre pol´ıticas FGAC.
El componente clave de nuestra metodolog´ıa es el mapeo [34, 39] de OCL a lo´gica de
primer orden presentado en la Seccio´n 9.3.3, el cual permite transformar cuestiones sobre
pol´ıticas FGAC a problemas de satisfacibilidad en lo´gica de primer orden. A pesar de que
este mapeo no cubre el lenguaje OCL al completo, nuestra experiencia muestra que el tipo
de expresiones OCL que t´ıpicamente se usa para especificar invariantes y restricciones de
autorizacio´n son cubiertas por el mapeo. Ma´s interesante es, sin embargo, la efectividad
de los resolutores SMT para razonar automa´ticamente sobre pol´ıticas FGAC. A pesar de
que nuestra experiencia es extremadamente alentadora (todos los problemas son resueltos
en menos de un segundo), no debemos olvidar que nuestros resultados dependen comple-
tamente de la interaccio´n entre i) la forma en que nuestros mapeos traducen a lo´gica de
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primer orden las expresiones OCL relevantes (invariantes y restricciones de autorizacio´n)
y ii) las heur´ısticas implementadas por el resolutor SMT.
9.4.1 Motivacio´n
La ingenier´ıa dirigida por modelos (MDE, de sus siglas en ingle´s) soporta el desarrollo
de sistemas de software complejos para la generacio´n de software a partir modelos. La
seguridad dirigida por modelos (MDS, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [9] es una especializacio´n
de este paradigma, donde los disen˜os de sistemas son modelados junto con sus requisitos
de seguridad y las infraestructuras de seguridad son generadas directamente a partir de
los modelos. Por supuesto, la calidad del co´digo generado depende de la calidad de los
modelos fuente. Si los modelos no especifican de forma apropiada el comportamiento del
sistema deseado, cabe esperar que el sistema generado correspondiente tampoco lo haga.
Quod natura non dat, Salmantica non praestat. Nuestra experiencia muestra que incluso
usando lenguajes potentes y de alto nivel, es fa´cil cometer errores lo´gicos y omisiones.
Por lo tanto, es cr´ıtico no so´lo que el lenguaje de modelado tenga una sema´ntica bien
definida, sino que tambie´n exista un soporte de herramienta para analizar las propiedades
modeladas del sistema.
9.4.2 Categor´ıas de propiedades de seguridad
A continuacio´n, explicaremos co´mo usar el mapeo de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden
propuesto en [39] para razonar sobre modelos de seguridad. Este mapeo consiste esencial-
mente en dos componentes relacionados entre s´ı: i) un mapeo de los modelos de datos y
expresiones OCL de tipo Boolean a fo´rmulas de primer orden, llamado ocl2foldef , y ii) un
mapeo de expresiones OCL de tipo Boolean a fo´rmulas de primer orden, llamado ocl2fol.
La siguiente Definicio´n formaliza la propiedad principal de este mapeo:
Remark 4 Sea D un modelo de datos con las invariantes expr1, . . . , exprn y sea expr una










∪ ocl2foldef(expr) ∪ {¬(ocl2fol(expr))}
es insatisfacible.
En lo que sigue, dado un modelo de seguridad S usamos el te´rmino escenario para
referirnos a cualquier instancia va´lida del modelo de datos subyacente de S, en el cual un
usuario solicita permiso para realizar una accio´n. Para simplificar, asumiremos que ni el
usuario que solicita el permiso ni el recurso sobre el que la accio´n sera´ ejecutada pueden
ser indefinidos.
En [43] definimos cuatro categor´ıas o bloques de propiedades de seguridad para el
razonamiento sobre pol´ıticas FGAC. Cada uno de estos bloques viene acompan˜ado en [43]
con una serie de ejemplos ilustrativos. A continuacio´n, se definen estos cuatro bloques de
propiedades de seguridad.
En el primer bloque estamos interesados en saber si existe un escenario en el que
alguien con rol r pueda ejecutar una accio´n act . Segu´n la Definicio´n 4, la respuesta sera´
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‘No’ si y so´lo si el siguiente conjunto de fo´rmulas es insatisfacible:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
En el segundo bloque estamos interesados en saber si existe un escenario en el que
alguien con rol r no pueda ejecutar una accio´n act . Segu´n la Definicio´n 4, la respuesta
sera´ ‘No’ si y so´lo si el siguiente conjunto de fo´rmula es insatisfacible:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ¬(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
En el tercer bloque estamos interesados en saber si existe un escenario en el que nadie
con rol r pueda ejecutar una accio´n act. Segu´n la Definicio´n 4, la respuesta sera´ ‘No’ si y
so´lo si el siguiente conjunto de fo´rmulas es insatisfacible:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)∀(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r)⇒
¬(ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act))))}.
En el cuarto bloque estamos interesados en saber si para todo escenario, existe al menos
un objeto sobre el que nadie con rol r pueda ejecutar una accio´n act. Segu´n la Definicio´n 4,
la respuesta es ‘S´ı’ si y so´lo si el siguiente conjunto de fo´rmulas es insatisfacible:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∀(self )∃(target)∃(value)∃(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
9.4.3 Pruebas de propiedades de seguridad
Presentamos brevemente nuestra experiencia en el uso del resolutor SMT Z3 [45] para
obtener automa´ticamente las respuestas a los ejemplos descritos en [43], pertenecientes a
cada una de los bloques o categor´ıas de propiedades de seguridad descritos arriba. En [43]
mostramos, para cada ejemplo, el tiempo que Z3 tarda en dar una respuesta (el cual es
siempre menor de un segundo), la respuesta que devuelve (la cual es siempre la esperada)
y cuando la respuesta es sat, el modelo de primer orden que Z3 genera cuando el conjun-
to de fo´rmulas de entrada es satisfacible. Las fo´rmulas de primer orden que sirven como
entrada para Z3 han sido generadas mediante nuestra herramienta SecProver [79]. Esta
herramienta toma los siguientes para´metros: un modelo de datos, un modelo de seguridad,
un conjunto (posiblemente vac´ıo) de invariantes sobre el modelo de datos, una accio´n, un
rol, un conjunto (posiblemente vac´ıo) de restricciones adicionales y un tipo de pregunta4.
SecProver genera de forma automa´tica un conjunto de fo´rmulas de primer orden cuya sa-
tisfacibilidad determinara´, de acuerdo con nuestra metodolog´ıa, la respuesta a la pregunta
dada.
4El tipo de pregunta hace referencia al bloque o categor´ıa de propiedad de seguridad a comprobar.
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Cap´ıtulo 10
Validacio´n del desarrollo dirigido
por modelos
Para proporcionar evidencias de la usabilidad de nuestra metodolog´ıa, en este Cap´ıtulo
hacemos una breve descripcio´n de cinco aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos desarro-
lladas mediante el uso de ActionGUI, centra´ndonos en la aplicacio´n eHRMApp. Dicha
aplicacio´n esta´ basada en la gestio´n de salud electro´nica (eHealth) propuesto en NESSoS,
la Red de Excelencia sobre la creacio´n de Servicios y Sistemas de Software Seguros para
el Internet del Futuro [71].
En general, nuestra experiencia con este caso de estudio demuestra el potencial de la
metodolog´ıa para el desarrollo de aplicaciones reales. Primero, el uso de una transformacio´n
de modelos y de un generador de co´digo libera al desarrollador de programar restricciones
de autorizacio´n de grano fino y de insertarlas con los argumentos correctos, en todos
los lugares requeridos a lo largo del co´digo de la aplicacio´n. Excepto para aplicaciones
pequen˜as, esta tarea es tediosa y propensa a errores ya que el nu´mero de acciones de datos
asociadas a los eventos puede ser del orden de cientos. Segundo, nuestra metodolog´ıa
soporta modularidad y separacio´n de tareas. En particular, el modelo de seguridad puede
ser modificado de forma independiente al modelo de GUI sin la necesidad de reprogramar
ni reinsertar las nuevas restricciones de autorizacio´n de grano fino, ya que esto se hace de
forma automa´tica por nuestra transformacio´n de modelos.
10.1 Una aplicacio´n segura de eHealth
La aplicacio´n eHRMApp esta´ basada en un caso de estudio propuesto en NESSoS, la
Red de Excelencia sobre la creacio´n de Servicios y Sistemas de Software Seguros para el
Internet del Futuro [71]. El caso de estudio de eHealth consiste en un sistema web para
la gestio´n de registros de salud electro´nicos (EHRM). Los registros de salud electro´nicos
(EHR) almacenan informacio´n creada por, o en nombre de, un profesional de la salud en
el contexto del cuidado de un paciente.
Los registros de salud electro´nicos son altamente sensibles y, por lo tanto, su acceso
debe ser controlado. Parte del reto en este caso de estudio fue modelar la pol´ıtica de
control de acceso y construir una aplicacio´n que la aplique en tiempo de ejecucio´n. La
pol´ıtica consiste en varias reglas de autorizacio´n similares a: El criterio de control de
acceso a un EHR depende, adema´s de otros, del tipo de EHR. Por ejemplo, un registro
altamente sensible de un paciente deber´ıa estar disponible so´lo para el doctor que trata a
dicho paciente (y quiza´s algunos otros, en ocasiones excepcionales). Tales reglas necesitan
control de acceso de grano fino donde las decisiones de control de acceso dependen, no
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so´lo de las credenciales del usuario, sino tambie´n, de la satisfaccio´n de restricciones en el
estado de la capa persistente, es decir, en los valores de los elementos almacenados.
En general, el caso de estudio de eHealth es interesante como un ejemplo de desarrollo
de una aplicacio´n de gestio´n segura de datos y proporciona una prueba de concepto de
la aplicacio´n de la metodolog´ıa ActionGUI sobre un problema de relevancia industrial. A
continuacio´n describimos brevemente las principales caracter´ısticas de la aplicacio´n eHR-
MApp.
El modelo de datos El modelo de datos completo de la aplicacio´n contiene 18 entidades,
40 atributos y 48 extremos de asociacio´n.
Las invariantes del modelo de datos El modelo de datos completo de la aplicacio´n
esta´ restringido por 66 invariantes formalizadas en OCL.
El modelo de seguridad Los registros de salud electro´nicos son, por su naturaleza,
altamente sensibles. Por ello, el caso de estudio de NESSoS define informalmente la pol´ıtica
que regula el acceso a estos registros. Como es de esperar, la autorizacio´n para llevar a
cabo ciertas acciones no esta´ so´lo basada en los roles sino tambie´n en el contexto. En otras
palabras, la pol´ıtica de control de acceso de eHRMApp es de grano fino.
El modelo completo de seguridad de la aplicacio´n contiene 5 roles y 573 permisos, donde
cada permiso autoriza a los usuarios con un rol a ejecutar una accio´n bajo la satisfaccio´n
de una restriccio´n de autorizacio´n formalizada en OCL.
Los modelos de seguridad de ActionGUI son formulados en te´rminos de los datos de
la aplicacio´n. Esta formalizacio´n es independiente de co´mo los datos son visualizados o
accedidos desde la interfaz gra´fica de usuario de la aplicacio´n.
El modelo de GUI El modelo completo de GUI de la aplicacio´n contiene 8 ventanas
para los siguientes casos de uso: acceso la informacio´n de un centro me´dico, registro de un
nuevo paciente, revisio´n de la informacio´n de un paciente, reasignacio´n de un paciente a
un doctor y departamento, acceso a las opciones reservadas al director del centro me´dico,
registro de un profesional en el sistema y reasignacio´n de un profesional a un departamento.
E´stos son algunos datos sobre el taman˜o del modelo de GUI: i) widgets: 19 botones,
73 etiquetas, 19 cajas de texto, 5 campos booleanos, 1 campo de fecha, 1 desplegable y
9 tablas; ii) sentencias: 34 sentencias if-then-else; iii) acciones sobre datos: 11 acciones de
crear, 41 acciones de actualizar (update), 5 acciones de crear un enlace y 2 acciones de
eliminar un enlace; iv) acciones de GUI: 157 acciones set y 7 acciones de abrir (open) y v)
expresiones OCL: 361 expresiones (77 no literales).
El modelo de GUI con seguridad Tal y como se explica en la Seccio´n 8.3, el nu´cleo
de ActionGUI es la funcio´n de transformacio´n de modelos que, esencialmente, prefija cada
accio´n sobre datos en el modelo de GUI con una comprobacio´n de autorizacio´n especificada
en el modelo de seguridad. El modelo completo de GUI contiene 59 acciones sobre datos y,
por lo tanto, el modelo de GUI con seguridad de la aplicacio´n automa´ticamente generado
contiene el mismo nu´mero de comprobaciones de autorizacio´n.
La generacio´n de la aplicacio´n El conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI genera la
aplicacio´n completa en menos de 10 segundos. El archivo .war generado incluye la librer´ıa
de Vaadin as´ı como otras librer´ıas externas. La librer´ıa de Vaadin es responsable del 70 %
del taman˜o del archivo generado y so´lo el 10 % de este archivo corresponde al co´digo que
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ActionGUI genera para interpretar los modelos de la aplicacio´n. El taman˜o del archivo
.war que contiene la aplicacio´n completa es de aproximadamente 12 MB.
10.2 Otras aplicaciones
Aqu´ı presentamos otras cuatro aplicaciones web que hemos desarrollado utilizando Ac-
tionGUI. Comenzamos haciendo una breve descripcio´n de estas aplicaciones, a continua-
cio´n detallamos las diferentes me´tricas que usamos para medir el taman˜o de las aplicaciones
desarrolladas y por u´ltimo concluimos con algunas consideraciones subjetivas.
Gestio´n de Relaciones entre Clientes (CRMApp) Es una aplicacio´n web para
la gestio´n de clientes de un centro hospitalario. Esta aplicacio´n permite gestionar la in-
formacio´n de contactos, incluyendo filtros de contactos basados en diferentes criterios y
exportacio´n de los resultados a hojas de ca´lculo. Ya que los datos de un cliente son alta-
mente sensibles, los datos esta´n sujetos a pol´ıticas de control de acceso restrictivas. Por
ejemplo, el personal de marketing so´lo puede acceder a la informacio´n de contacto de aque-
llos clientes previamente seleccionados como objetivos para una campan˜a de marketing,
a la cual el personal de marketing es asignado. La aplicacio´n tambie´n permite un Gestor
General para crear campan˜as de marketing, seleccionar los pacientes objetivos para las
campan˜as y asignar personal de marketing a las campan˜as.
Gestio´n del Voluntariado (VMApp) Es una aplicacio´n web para la gestio´n del pro-
grama de voluntarios de un centro de cuidados paliativos. Mediante el uso de esta apli-
cacio´n, los coordinadores del programa pueden realizar acciones tales como: introducir
nuevos voluntarios en el programa, crear, modificar y eliminar tareas de voluntariado y
proponer estas tareas a los voluntarios basa´ndose en la disponibilidad temporal y las pre-
ferencias de los propios voluntarios. La pol´ıtica de control de acceso estipula, por ejemplo,
que los voluntarios esta´n autorizados a modificar u´nicamente su propia informacio´n perso-
nal, como sus preferencias y su disponibilidad temporal, y de aceptar o rechazar sus tareas
asignadas.
Gestio´n de Servicio de Comidas (MSMApp) Es una aplicacio´n web para la gestio´n
del servicio de comidas para residencias de estudiantes. Mediante el uso de esta aplicacio´n,
un residente puede notificar a la administracio´n de la residencia si va a comer en la
cafeter´ıa de la residencia, en que´ opcio´n de comida dentro de las disponibles y si traera´
algu´n invitado. Un residente debe poder modificar so´lo sus propias opciones de comida
y siempre dentro de una ventana temporal la cual depende de la opcio´n de comida. Los
administradores de la aplicacio´n pueden crear nuevas altas de cuentas de residentes y listar
las opciones de comidas solicitadas para cada tipo de comida.
Salas de Conversacio´n (ChatApp) Es una aplicacio´n web basada en salas de con-
versacio´n. Dicha aplicacio´n proporciona un lugar online de discusio´n donde los usuarios
pueden conversar mediante el env´ıo de mensajes. Los usuarios pueden estar o no regis-
trados. Adema´s de enviar mensajes a una sala de conversacio´n seleccionada, los usuarios
tambie´n pueden crear y eliminar salas de conversacio´n bajo condiciones espec´ıficas.
CRMApp, VMApp y MSMApp son aplicaciones comerciales. Han sido desarrolladas
para clientes reales y actualmente esta´n siendo usadas por dichos clientes. En contraste,
eHRMApp ha sido desarrollada, tal y como explicamos en la Seccio´n 10.1, como parte de
un caso de estudio propuesto por socios empresariales en un proyecto europeo. El lector
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interesado puede encontrar ma´s informacio´n sobre este caso de estudio, as´ı como una
versio´n de demostracio´n de la aplicacio´n eHRMApp, en [1].
Para medir estas aplicaciones nos basamos en dos para´metros: el taman˜o de los datos
de la aplicacio´n y el taman˜o de los modelos subyacentes de la aplicacio´n. Con respecto al
taman˜o de los datos de la aplicacio´n tenemos en cuenta: el nu´mero de usuarios registrados,
el taman˜o actual de la base de datos, el nu´mero de tablas definidas en el esquema de la
base de datos y el ma´ximo nu´mero de filas que actualmente contiene cada una de las
tablas. Con respecto al taman˜o de los modelos subyacentes de la aplicacio´n, tenemos en
cuenta: el taman˜o de los archivos XML de cada uno de los modelos, el nu´mero de widgets
de cada tipo de la aplicacio´n, el nu´mero de cada tipo de accio´n de datos y de accio´n
de GUI asociadas a los eventos de los widgets y el nu´mero de expresiones OCL usadas
para definir las condiciones en las sentencias de tipo if-then-else, las colecciones fuente en
las sentencias iteradoras y los argumentos de las acciones de datos y de GUI. Adema´s,
indicamos tambie´n cua´ntas de estas expresiones OCL no son valores literales, el taman˜o
medio de las expresiones y el nu´mero medio de variables de widget que referencian.
Con respecto a la generacio´n de co´digo, el conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI genera
de forma automa´tica todas nuestras aplicaciones en menos de un minuto. El archivo .war
generado incluye la dependencia a la librer´ıa Vaadin y a otras librer´ıas externas (adema´s de,
en el caso de las aplicaciones CRMApp y VMApp, co´digo personalizado para enviar correos
electro´nicos y exportar datos). La dependencia a la librer´ıa Vaadin es de hecho responsable
del 70 % del taman˜o del archivo generado, mientras que so´lo un 10 % corresponde al co´digo
que ActionGUI genera de manera automa´tica para interpretar los modelos de la aplicacio´n
(como es de esperar, el taman˜o de este inte´rprete no var´ıa mucho entre aplicaciones). Para
nuestros ejemplos, el taman˜o medio del archivo .war que contiene cada aplicacio´n es de
aproximadamente 12 MB.
10.3 Evaluacio´n
Concluimos este Cap´ıtulo con varias consideraciones subjetivas. Ya que dichas con-
sideraciones esta´n basadas en nuestra propia experiencia, su importancia no debe ser
exagerada. Sin embargo, pueden dar al lector una impresio´n de lo que implica el uso de
ActionGUI.
Primero, la curva de aprendizaje de ActionGUI es moderada. El tiempo requerido
para aprender a modelar una aplicacio´n de gestio´n segura de datos depende de la fami-
liarizacio´n que el modelador tiene con los diagramas de clases, diagramas de seguridad y,
principalmente, con OCL. Asumiendo un modesto conocimiento de UML, el aprendizaje
requerido para modelar aplicaciones (reales) mediante el uso de ActionGUI lleva menos
de 4 horas, que es discutiblemente mucho menos tiempo del que se requiere para adquirir
el suficiente conocimiento de tecnolog´ıas web para poder programar (y desplegar de forma
correcta) estas aplicaciones. Esta estimacio´n esta´ basada, en parte, en nuestra experiencia
impartiendo el desarrollo dirigido por modelos de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos
a estudiantes en el ETH de Zu´rich, los cuales tuvieron que modelar proyectos mediante el
uso de ActionGUI.
Segundo, el tiempo que se necesita para modelar una aplicacio´n de gestio´n segura de
datos depende de la experiencia del modelador (en particular, de su destreza en el uso
del lenguaje OCL) y de la complejidad de la aplicacio´n (en particular, del nu´mero y el
taman˜o de las expresiones OCL que se usan en el modelo). Sin embargo, en general, el
modelado de una ventana de menu´, que contiene 6 botones que al pinchar sobre ellos se
abren otras ventanas, puede llevar menos de 30 minutos. En contraste, el modelado de una
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ventana que contiene un formulario online, con 10 campos de texto y un boto´n que cuando
pinchas sobre e´l primero comprobara´ que las entradas han sido correctamente rellenadas
y luego enviara´ en formulario (es decir, actualizara´ la base de datos), puede llevar 1 o 2
horas. Y aproximadamente el mismo tiempo es requerido para modelar una ventana del
tipo seleccionar y mostrar, que contiene una tabla con 5 columnas y un desplegable y que
la informacio´n mostrada en la tabla cambiara´ dependiendo de la seleccio´n del desplegable.
La conclusio´n es que el tiempo de modelado es directamente proporcional al nu´mero y el
taman˜o de las expresiones OCL usadas en los modelos. Esto no es una sorpresa ya que
estas expresiones son las que definen la lo´gica de la aplicacio´n.
Finalmente, las principales ventajas de nuestra metodolog´ıa tienen que ver con la
calidad y la facilidad de mantenimiento de las aplicaciones generadas, las cuales se generan
de forma automa´tica mediante el uso de nuestra transformacio´n de modelos y generador de
co´digo. Primero, esta transformacio´n libera de manera efectiva al desarrollador de tener que
programar restricciones de autorizacio´n de grano fino y de insertarlas con los argumentos
correctos, en todos los puntos del co´digo de la aplicacio´n requeridos. Salvo para aplicaciones
pequen˜as, esta tarea es tediosa y propensa a errores ya que el nu´mero de acciones de datos
asociadas a eventos puede ser del orden de cientos como, por ejemplo, las aplicaciones
CRMApp y VMApp. Adema´s, estas acciones de datos son normalmente llamadas con
diferentes argumentos cada vez. Segundo, nuestra metodolog´ıa soporta modularidad y
separacio´n de tareas. En particular, el modelo de seguridad se puede modificar de manera
independiente al modelo de GUI sin tener que preocuparnos de reprogramar ni reinsertar
todas las nuevas restricciones de autorizacio´n de grano fino, ya que esto se realiza de
forma automa´tica por nuestra transformacio´n de modelos. De nuevo, debido al nu´mero
de estas comprobaciones junto con la complejidad de las correspondientes autorizaciones,
argumentamos que, para aplicaciones reales de gestio´n segura de datos nuestra metodolog´ıa
reduce de forma efectiva los costes de mantenimiento.
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Cap´ıtulo 11
Trabajo relacionado
En este Cap´ıtulo, nos centramos en trabajos que esta´n directamente relacionados con
la principal contribucio´n de nuestro trabajo, a saber, ActionGUI como una metodolog´ıa
dirigida por modelos y con soporte de herramienta para el desarrollo de aplicaciones de
gestio´n segura de datos. Hemos organizado el trabajo relacionado en dos secciones no
completamente disjuntas. Primero, compararemos ActionGUI con otras propuestas de
modelado de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos y, en particular, con sus interfaces
gra´ficas de usuario. Luego, compararemos ActionGUI con otras herramientas (en este caso,
herramientas comerciales) para el desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos.
Modelado de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos Como herramienta de mo-
delado, UWE [14, 21, 19, 63] proporciona al modelador un nivel de abstraccio´n mayor que
ActionGUI. En particular, las acciones ejecutadas por los eventos de los widgets son des-
critas en UWE mediante el uso del lenguaje natural. De este modo, salvo que los modelos
sean refinados de forma apropiada tal y como se argumenta en [63], UWE no soporta gene-
racio´n de co´digo. Por contra, UWE proporciona diagramas espec´ıficos para el modelado de
presentaciones y navegaciones de GUI, los cuales facilitan la tarea de modelar interfaces
gra´ficas. En este sentido, en [20] definimos un mapeo que transforma modelos UWE de
alto nivel a modelos de ActionGUI ma´s concretos que, una vez completados por el mode-
lador, pueden ser directamente usados para generar las aplicaciones deseadas. Finalmente,
[19] extiende UWE con el uso de SecureUML para el modelado de pol´ıticas de seguridad.
Sin embargo, este trabajo no usa una transformacio´n de modelos para elevar la pol´ıtica
de seguridad al nivel de la GUI. En su lugar, el modelador de UWE es el responsable de
an˜adir todas las comprobaciones de autorizacio´n apropiadas en el modelo de GUI.
Como ActionGUI, ZOOM [60] permite a los modeladores de GUIs especificar widgets,
sus eventos y sus acciones. Adema´s, mediante el uso de una extensio´n de Z [86] se pueden
especificar las condiciones de las acciones y sus argumentos de forma similar a como ocurre
en ActionGUI mediante el uso de OCL. A diferencia de ActionGUI, ZOOM no proporciona
un lenguaje para el modelado de la seguridad ya que aspectos relacionados con seguridad
no se consideran de forma expl´ıcita en esta metodolog´ıa. Adema´s, ZOOM no soporta
generacio´n de co´digo. So´lo proporciona inte´rpretes para la animacio´n de modelos.
En contraste con ActionGUI, UWE y ZOOM, las metodolog´ıas presentadas en [37, 38,
51] no proporcionan un lenguaje para el modelado de GUIs. En su lugar, implementan
diferentes reglas para derivar de forma automa´tica las GUIs basadas en el modelo de
datos de la aplicacio´n (como en [37, 38]) o en escenarios protot´ıpicos de la aplicacio´n
(como en [51]). Como es de esperar, el comportamiento de las GUIs obtenidas es limitado
y, basa´ndonos en nuestra experiencia, insuficiente para hacer frente a la lo´gica contenida en
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aplicaciones reales de gestio´n de datos. Adema´s, aspectos de seguridad no son abordados
por estas propuestas.
Hay otro trabajo relacionado que se encuentra entre los dos extremos de modelado
completo de GUIs y derivacio´n completa de GUIs. La propuesta OO-method [74, 69]
soporta la construccio´n de GUIs mediante el uso de patrones de interfaces gra´ficas. Estos
patrones especifican las posibles interacciones con los datos de la aplicacio´n basados en
las clases, atributos y asociaciones que esta´n declaradas en el modelo de datos subyacente.
Esta metodolog´ıa tiene la ventaja de reducir el tiempo requerido para el modelado de GUIs.
Sin embargo, los patrones de interfaces gra´ficas imponen restricciones en el tipo de GUIs
que se pueden modelar, tanto en su estructura como en su comportamiento. Adema´s, esta
metodolog´ıa soporta control de acceso basado en roles pero no soporta control de acceso
de grano fino. El Lenguaje de Modelado de Interaccio´n de Flujo (IFML, de sus siglas en
ingle´s) [85] es otra metodolog´ıa que se encuentra en esta categor´ıa. IFML es el lenguaje de
modelado esta´ndar de la OMG para expresar contenido, interacciones de usuario y control
del comportamiento de los front-ends de las aplicaciones, as´ı como el enlace de las capas
de persistencia y de lo´gica de negocio de las aplicaciones. IFML es una versio´n mejorada
de su predecesor, el lenguaje WebML [28]. Concretamente, WebML estaba orientado a al
disen˜o basado en componentes de modelos espec´ıficos de plataforma (PSMs, de sus siglas
en ingle´s) para front-ends de aplicaciones web; mientras que IFML esta´ orientado al diseo
basado en componentes de modelos independientes de plataforma (PIMs, de sus siglas en
ingle´s) para front-ends de cualquier tipo de aplicacio´n. IFML esta´ integrado en el conjunto
de herramientas WebRatio [84]. Su lenguaje de disen˜o basado en componentes, de nuevo,
restringe el tipo de GUIs que pueden ser modeladas. Adema´s, aspectos de seguridad no
son del todo considerados en IFML.
Otras metodolog´ıas que se encuentran en esta categor´ıa son [78, 64]. En ambos casos, el
modelador tiene que asociar a cada contenedor de widgets el tipo de dato al que se accede
mediante su uso. Como antes, las posibles interacciones con el modelo de datos subyacente
esta´n limitadas por el comportamiento implementado por defecto para estos contenedores
de widgets. Aspectos de seguridad no son considerados tampoco en esta metodolog´ıa.
Finalmente, existen metodolog´ıas centradas principalmente es el soporte de disen˜o de
interfaces gra´ficas a distintos niveles de abstraccio´n. Ejemplos importantes son el Lenguaje
XML de Interfaces de Usuario (XUL, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [70] y el Lenguaje de Marcado
Extensible de Interfaces de Usuario (UsiXML, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [65]. XUL es el
lenguaje basado en XML de Mozilla para la construccio´n de interfaces de usuario para
aplicaciones de la plataforma Mozilla (como Firefox). UsiXML en un lenguaje de marcado
basado en XML que describe interfaces gra´ficas para mu´ltiples contextos de uso tales
como Interfaces de Caracteres de Usuario (CUIs), Interfaces Gra´ficas de Usuario (GUIs),
Interfaces de Auditor´ıa de Usuario e Interfaces Multimodales de Usuario.
Claramente, ActionGUI esta´ disen˜ado para un propo´sito distinto al de XUL y UsiXML.
En particular, ActionGUI esta´ disen˜ado para el desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n se-
gura de datos. Una decisio´n de disen˜o clave en ActionGUI fue asegurar que el modelo de
seguridad y el modelo de GUI “hablen” el mismo lenguaje. Segu´n nuestros conocimientos,
ni XUL ni UsiXML tienen en cuenta los aspectos de seguridad de las interfaces gra´ficas.
Adema´s, ActionGUI esta´ disen˜ado para el desarrollo dirigido por modelos de aplicaciones
de gestio´n segura de datos y esto tiene dos claras consecuencias. Primero, los lengua-
jes de modelado de ActionGUI esta´n disen˜ados para ser tecnolo´gicamente agno´sticos, en
contraste con XUL, el cual esta´ fuertemente ligado a la plataforma de Mozilla. Segun-
do, los lenguajes de modelado de ActionGUI esta´n disen˜ados para soportar la generacio´n
automa´tica, a partir de los modelos, de aplicaciones listas para ser desplegadas. Como
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consecuencia, los modelos de ActionGUI son ma´s concretos que los modelos generales de
UsiXML, los cuales pueden ser definidos en cualquiera de los cuatro niveles de abstraccio´n
especificados en la Entorno de Referencia Cameleon (CRF) [25]. En ActionGUI en parti-
cular, un modelador de GUI trabaja siempre al nivel Concreto de UI de CRF, mientras
que el archivo WAR (archivo de aplicacio´n web) generado a partir del modelo de GUI
(junto con los modelos de datos y seguridad asociados) pertenece al nivel Final de UI de
CRF.
Finalmente, mencionar que [83] ha llevado a cabo un prometedor trabajo de extensio´n
de nuestra metodolog´ıa para trabajar con procesos de negocio, los cuales son t´ıpicamente
definidos en el nivel de abstraccio´n de Tareas y Conceptos de CRF. En esta l´ınea, ser´ıa
interesante investigar formas de extender nuestra metodolog´ıa para soportar el modelado
de UIs al nivel Abstracto de UI de CRF, donde los detalles de interaccio´n son abstra´ıdos.
Desarrollo de aplicaciones de gestio´n segura de datos Existen tambie´n otras he-
rramientas como WebRatio [84], Olivanova [26] y Lightswitch [68] que soportan metodo-
log´ıas de desarrollo para la construccio´n de aplicaciones de gestio´n de datos, similares a la
metodolog´ıa de ActionGUI. En estas herramientas, el desarrollo de la aplicacio´n comienza
con la construccio´n de un modelo de datos que refleja la estructura de datos requerida
por la base de datos. El proceso de desarrollo continua con la aplicacio´n sobre el modelo
de datos de diferentes patrones de generacio´n de interfaces gra´ficas. Estos patrones per-
miten la recuperacio´n de datos, la edicio´n de datos, la creacio´n de datos y la bu´squeda
en la base de datos. En contraste con lo que estas herramientas pueden proporcionar, el
conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI ofrece a los desarrolladores flexibilidad total para
crear los disen˜os sin las restricciones impuestas por la obligatoriedad de usar un nu´mero
fijo de patrones dados. Las herramientas presentadas arriba imponen adema´s una mayor
restriccio´n a nivel de gestio´n de datos, es decir, al nivel de acceso y visualizacio´n de da-
tos: la informacio´n que puede ser referenciada, y por lo tanto que puede ser accedida y
visualizada en una pantalla, puede u´nicamente venir de una tabla de la base de datos, o a
lo sumo, de dos tablas que esta´n relacionadas entre ellas mediante una navegacio´n directa
(de un u´nico paso).
Estas tres herramientas, WebRatio, Olivanova y Lightswitch soportan la definicio´n y
generacio´n de pol´ıticas RBAC a diferentes niveles de granularidad. Lightswitch soporta la
concesio´n o denegacio´n de permisos de usuario, para los diferentes roles (cuyos compor-
tamientos reales tienen que ser programados de forma manual), de ejecucio´n de acciones
sobre entidades de crear, leer, modificar y borrar. WebRatio y Olivanova soportan tambie´n
la concesio´n y denegacio´n de permisos de usuario, para los diferentes roles, de ejecucio´n
de conjuntos de acciones similares sobre propiedades de entidades, individualmente. En
WebRatio y Olivanova el rol de las restricciones de autorizacio´n puede seguir las reglas
de las precondiciones sujetas a la invocacio´n de acciones a trave´s de una interfaz gra´fica
concreta. Sin embargo, ninguna de estas herramientas implementa un algoritmo capaz de
trasladar a las interfaces gra´ficas, la pol´ıtica de seguridad que gobierna el acceso a los
datos.
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Cap´ıtulo 12
Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
La metodolog´ıa que proponemos constituye un extenso desarrollo de la idea de seguri-
dad dirigida por modelos(MDS, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [9]. Las dos principales innovaciones
son un lenguaje expresivo para modelar la interfaz gra´fica de usuario y el comportamiento
de una aplicacio´n y una transformacio´n de modelos que traslada la pol´ıtica de seguridad,
especificada sobre el modelo de datos de la aplicacio´n, al modelo de comportamiento de
GUI. Nuestra funcio´n de transformacio´n captura la idea de que las pol´ıticas de autori-
zacio´n, que regulan las complejas transacciones, pueden ser generadas uniformemente a
partir de pol´ıticas ma´s simples sobre datos. A pesar de nuestro uso de lenguajes expre-
sivos de modelado hemos mostrado para aplicaciones de gestio´n de datos, que es posible
generar de manera automa´tica aplicaciones completas y listas para desplegar. Nuestra
metodolog´ıa esta´ soportada por el conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI. Las aplicacio-
nes presentadas muestran el potencial del conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI, para el
desarrollo de aplicaciones del mundo real.
En el futuro, planeamos extender el desarrollo del proyecto ActionGUI en dos direc-
ciones principales:
Mejora del conjunto de herramientas ActionGUI. Todav´ıa hay mucho trabajo
por delante para convertir este conjunto de herramientas en una plataforma de desarrollo
completa, robusta y de nivel industrial. A corto plazo, planeamos desarrollar mejores edi-
tores de modelos y un mejor soporte para integrar co´digo personalizado. Luego a medio
plazo, tambie´n nos gustar´ıa soportar el ana´lisis de modelos basado en la sema´ntica formal
de nuestros modelos y en la correccio´n de nuestra transformacio´n de modelos. A conti-
nuacio´n, mostramos ejemplos de preguntas que nos gustar´ıa poder contestar de manera
formal. ¿Preservara´n las invariantes del modelo de datos todas las secuencias de acciones
ejecutadas por cada uno de los eventos en el modelo? ¿Forzara´n alguna vez las comproba-
ciones de autorizacio´n un roll-back de una transaccio´n? ¿Son redundantes las condiciones
en el modelo de GUI con respecto a las comprobaciones de autorizacio´n generadas por
la transformacio´n de modelos? El soporte de ana´lisis nos ayudar´ıa a optimizar el co´digo
generado y soportar´ıa actividades seguras como la certificacio´n de sistemas. Finalmente,
a largo plazo, nos gustar´ıa soportar la generacio´n de GUIs para diferentes plataformas
como dispositivos mo´viles. Tambie´n planeamos an˜adir soporte para manejar pol´ıticas de
privacidad : modelado y generacio´n de co´digo para forzar que el uso de los datos siga el
propo´sito para el que los datos fueron obtenidos y puedan implicar obligaciones.
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Figura 12.1: Arquitectura Actual de SecureDAO
Extensio´n de la aplicabilidad de la metodolog´ıa y herramientas de ActionGUI.
SecureDAO es una librer´ıa Java desarrollada por Gonzalo Ortiz de Jaureguizar para forzar
el control de acceso de grano fino en las aplicaciones ActionGUI. Esta´ disen˜ado para ejecu-
tar cualquiera de las llamadas acciones CRUD (crear, leer, modificar y borrar datos) pero
so´lo si la restriccio´n de autorizacio´n especificada por esta accio´n se satisface en el modelo
de seguridad dado. Las acciones CRUD son ejecutadas por el gestor de recursos de Secu-
reDAO, mientras que las restricciones de autorizacio´n son comprobadas por el gestor de
control de acceso de SecureDAO. SecureDAO posee una arquitectura muy modularizada,
la cual se ilustra en la Figura 12.1.
En el futuro, planeamos desarrollar un mecanismo de aplicacio´n de seguridad orientado
a empresas y dirigido por modelos, extendiendo SegureDAO en las siguientes l´ıneas:
SecureDAO como servicio, de manera que no so´lo una aplicacio´n sino mu´ltiples
aplicaciones puedan gestionar los mismos recursos con las mismas pol´ıticas de control
de acceso.
Un gestor de recursos ma´s gene´rico, de manera que no so´lo datos sino tambie´n
me´todos puedan ser gestionados.
Un gestor de control de acceso ma´s gene´rico, de manera que no so´lo pol´ıticas basadas
en SecureUML sino tambie´n otras pol´ıticas puedan ser comprobadas de manera
efectiva.
Para cumplir estos objetivos necesitaremos abordar los siguientes retos tecnolo´gicos y
de investigacio´n:
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SecureDAO esta´ actualmente implementado como una librer´ıa Java. Para proporcio-
nar SecureDAO como un servicio necesitamos encapsularlo en un aplicacio´n empre-
sarial, que pueda ser usada por diferentes aplicaciones de clientes a trave´s de puntos
de entrada a nivel de aplicacio´n. Nuestro reto aqu´ı es proveer de manera automa´tica
puntos de entrada de SecureDAO, fa´ciles de usar y sin errores de tipos, basados en
el modelo de datos subyacente de la aplicacio´n del cliente.
La aplicabilidad del gestor de recursos de SecureDAO esta´ actualmente limitada
por los datos que son almacenados en las bases de datos MySQL, los cuales usan
esquemas de bases de datos muy espec´ıficos. Un gestor de recursos ma´s general
deber´ıa, lo primero de todo, ser capaz de gestionar datos almacenados en diferentes
(incluso no relacionales) bases de datos. Nuestro reto aqu´ı es construir un gestor
de recursos gene´rico, el cual pueda ser instanciado proporcionando un mapeo bien
definido del modelo de datos subyacente de la aplicacio´n del cliente al esquema de la
base de datos de la aplicacio´n del cliente. Adema´s, un gestor de recursos ma´s general
deber´ıa permitir ejecutar tambie´n acciones no CRUD (a saber, me´todos generales).
Nuestro reto aqu´ı es proporcionar una conexio´n entre el gestor de recursos y las
librer´ıas que implementan las acciones no CRUD requeridas.
La aplicabilidad del gestor de control de acceso de SecureDAO esta´ actualmente limi-
tada a pol´ıticas declaradas mediante el uso de modelos SecureUML, cuyas restriccio-
nes de autorizacio´n esta´n formalizadas mediante el uso del Lenguaje de Restriccio´n
de Objetos (OCL, de sus siglas en ingle´s) [73]. Nuestro reto aqu´ı es construir un
gestor gene´rico de control de acceso, el cual pudiera ser instanciado proporcionando
una sema´ntica de evaluacio´n bien definida de un lenguaje de autorizacio´n arbitrario.
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Abstract
Nowadays, most of the main database management
systems offer, in one way or another, the possibil-
ity of protecting data using fine-grained access con-
trol (FGAC) policies, i.e., policies that depend on
dynamic properties of the system state. Reasoning
about FGAC policies typically amounts to answering
questions about whether a security-related property
holds in a (possibly infinite) set of system states. To
carry out this reasoning, we propose a novel, tool-
supported methodology, which consists in transform-
ing the aforementioned questions about FGAC poli-
cies into satisfiability problems in first-order logic.
In addition, we report on our experience using the
Z3 Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver for
automatically checking the satisfiability of the first-
order formulas generated by the tool implementing
our methodology, called SecProver, for a non-trivial
set of examples.
1 Introduction
In Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo
et al. 2001), permissions specify which roles are al-
lowed to perform given operations. These roles typi-
cally represent job functions within an organization.
Users are granted permissions by being assigned to
the appropriate roles based on their competencies and
responsibilities in the organization. RBAC allows one
to organize the roles in a hierarchy where roles can in-
herit permissions along the hierarchy. In this way, the
security policy can be described in terms of the hier-
archical structure of an organization. However, it is
not possible in RBAC to specify fine-grained access
control (FGAC) policies, i.e., policies that depend on
dynamic properties of the system state, for example,
to allow an operation only during weekdays.
SecureUML (Basin et al. 2006) is a modeling
language for formalizing FGAC policies. It ex-
tends RBAC with authorization constraints, which
allow one to specify constraints for granting permis-
sions. Authorization constraints are formalized in
This work is partially supported by the Spanish Min-
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SecureUML using the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) (Object Management Group 2014). Using Se-
cureUML, one can then model access control decisions
that depend on two kinds of information:
1. static information, namely the assignments of
users and permissions to roles, and the role hier-
archy, and
2. dynamic information, namely the satisfaction of
authorization constraints in the given system
state.
SecureUML is currently supported by Ac-
tionGUI (Basin et al. 2014, ActionGUI 2012), a
model-driven methodology for developing secure
data-management applications. In ActionGUI, sys-
tem developers proceed by modeling three different
views of the desired application: its data model, se-
curity model, and GUI model. These models formal-
ize respectively the application’s data domain, autho-
rization policy, and its graphical interface together
with the application’s behavior. Afterwards a model-
transformation function lifts the policy specified by
the security model to the GUI model. Finally, a code
generator generates a multi-tier application, along
with all support for fine-grained access control, from
the security-aware GUI model.
In this paper we propose a novel methodology for
carrying out formal reasoning about FGAC policies
specified using SecureUML. Reasoning about FGAC
policies typically amounts to answering questions
about whether a security-related property holds in
a (possibly infinite) set of states. The key compo-
nent of our methodology is a mapping from OCL to
first-order logic (Clavel et al. 2009, Dania & Clavel
2013), thanks to which we are able to transform the
aforementioned questions about FGAC policies into
satisfiability problems in first-order logic. Finally,
to validate our methodology, we have implemented
a tool, called SecProver (SecProver 2014), and we
have applied the Z3 SMT solver (de Moura & Bjørner
2008) for automatically checking the satisfiability of
the first-order formulas generated by SecProver, for
a non-trivial set of security-related questions about
SecureUML models.
Organization. In Section 2 we provide background
information about SecureUML, and we also discuss its
semantics and compare its expressiveness with that
of other languages currently supported by commer-
cial database management systems. In Section 3 we
summarize the key principles underlying our mapping
from OCL to first-order logic. Then, in Section 4,
we explain how, using the aforementioned mapping,
interesting questions about SecureUML models can
be translated into satisfiability problems in first-order
logic, and, in Section 5, we report on our experience
using the Z3 SMT solver for automatically checking
the satisfiability of the formulas generated by our
methodology, for a non-trivial set of examples. We
conclude the paper with sections on related work and
future work.
2 Modeling Fine-Grained Access Control
Policies
SecureUML (Basin et al. 2006) is a modeling lan-
guage for specifying fine-grained access control poli-
cies (FGAC) for actions on protected resources. Us-
ing SecureUML one can model roles (with their hi-
erarchies), permissions, actions, resources, and con-
straints on the permissions, which are called autho-
rization constraints. SecureUML is, however, generic
in that it leaves open the nature of the protected re-
sources, i.e., whether these resources are data, busi-
ness objects, processes, controller states, etc. Basin
et al. (2006) initially combined SecureUML with a
design modeling language based on class diagrams,
called ComponentUML, and with a language based
on state diagrams, called ControllerUML. More re-
cently, Basin et al. (2014) have combined SecureUML
with a language for modeling graphical user inter-
faces for data-centric applications, called ActionGUI.
In this work, we will use the aforementioned combi-
nation of SecureUML with ComponentUML, called
SecureUML+ComponentUML.
Next, we will explain, and illustrate with exam-
ples, the main concepts used when modeling with Se-
cureUML+ComponentUML: namely, resources and
actions; invariants; authorization constraints; and
permissions. Also, we will briefly compare Se-
cureUML+ComponentUML with other languages
supported by commercial data management systems
for specifying FGAC policies
2.1 Resources and Actions
ComponentUML provides a subset of UML class
models where entities (classes) can be related by
associations and may have attributes. In Se-
cureUML+ComponentUML, the protected resources
are the ComponentUML entities, along with their at-
tributes and association-ends (but not the associa-
tions as such), and the actions that they offer to the




Association-end read, create, delete
Example 1 In Figure 1 we show a ComponentUML
model, named EmplBasic.dtm. This model speci-
fies that every employee may have a name, a sur-
name, and a salary; that every employee may have
a supervisor and may in turn supervise other em-
ployees; and that every employee may take one of
two roles: Worker or Supervisor. In the termi-
nology of ComponentUML, Employee is an entity ;
name, surname, salary, and role are attributes;
supervisedBy and supervises are association-ends;
and Role is an enumerated class. Notice that the
association-end supervises has multiplicity 0..*,
meaning that an employee may supervise zero or more
employees, while the association-end supervisedBy
has multiplicity 0..1 meaning that an employee may
have at most one supervisor.
< < r o l e > >
Worker
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(b) Instance 2
Figure 2: Two instances of EmplBasic.dtm
As expected, the instances of ComponentUML
models are, basically, UML object models where ob-
jects can be related by links and can have values for
their attributes.
Example 2 In Figure 2 we show two different in-
stances of EmplBasic.dtm. In Instance 2a there are
three employees, e1, e2 and e3, and e1 is supervised
by e2, e2 is supervised by e3, and e3 has no supervisor
at all. Moreover, e1 has role Worker and both e2 and
e3 have role Supervisor. Instance 2b has also three
employees, e1, e2 and e3, but this time e1 is super-
vised by e2, e2 is supervised by itself, and e3 has no
supervisor at all. As before, e1 has role Worker and
both e2 and e3 have role Supervisor.
2.2 Invariants
ComponentUML models can be further refined by
adding to them invariants, i.e., expressions specifying
properties that every valid instance of the model must
satisfy. Invariants are formalized in ComponentUML
using the Object Constraint Language (OCL) (Ob-
ject Management Group 2014).
OCL is a strongly typed, declarative language: ex-
pressions either have a primitive type (integer, real,
string, or boolean), an entity type, a tuple type, or
a collection type (set, bag, or collection). It provides
standard operators on collections, such as→isEmpty,
→includes, and →excluding, as well as opera-
tors to iterate over collections, such as →forAll,
→exists, and →select. It also provides stan-
dard operators on primitive data and tuples, and a
dot-operator to access the values of the objects’ at-
tributes and association-ends. Moreover, it includes
two constants, null and invalid, to represent un-
definedness. Intuitively, null represents unknown
or undefined values, whereas invalid represents er-
ror and exceptions. To check if a value is null or
invalid, it provides, respectively, the boolean oper-
ators oclIsUndefined() and oclIsInvalid().
Example 3 We can refine the model
EmplBasic.dtm (Figure 1) by adding invariants
to this model. In particular, consider the following
constraints:
1. There is exactly one employee who has no super-
visor.
2. Nobody is its own supervisor.
3. An employee has role Supervisor if and only if
it has at least one supervisee.
4. Every employee has one role.







(e.role = Supervisor implies
e.supervises->notEmpty())
and (e.supervises->notEmpty()
implies e.role = Supervisor))
(4) Employee.allInstances()→forAll(e|
not(e.role.oclIsUndefined())
In what follows, we will refer to the constraint (1)
as oneBoss, (2) as noSelfSuper, (3) as roleSuper,
and (4) as allRole. Also, we will denote by
Empl1.dtm the refined version of EmplBasic.dtm
that includes as invariants the constraints oneBoss,
noSelfSuper, roleSuper, and allRole. Notice
that these four constraints evaluate to true in In-
stance 2a of EmplBasic.dtm (Figure 2), and there-
fore we say that this instance is a valid instance of
Empl1.dtm. On the other hand, since noSelfSuper
and roleSuper evaluate to false in Instance 2b of
EmplBasic.dtm (Figure 2), we say that this other in-
stance is a not a valid instance of Empl1.dtm.
2.3 Authorization Constraints
In SecureUML+ComponentUML, authorization con-
straints specify the conditions that need to be satis-
fied for a permission being granted to an actor (user)
who requests it to perform an action. They are for-
malized using OCL, but they can also contain the
following keywords:
• self: it refers to the root resource upon which
the action will be performed, if the permission is
granted. The root resource of an attribute or an
association-end is the entity to which it belongs.
• caller: it refers to the actor that will perform
the action, if the permission is granted.
• value: it refers to the value that will be used to
update an attribute, if the permission is granted.
• target: it refers to the object that will be linked
at the end of an association, if the permission is
granted.
< < r o l e > >
Worker
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Figure 3: Empl.stm: a SecureUML+ComponentUML
model for accessing employees’ information.
Example 4 In Figure 3 we show a SecureUML+-
ComponentUML model, named Empl.stm. This
model specifies a basic FGAC policy for accessing
the employees’ information modeled in Empl1.dtm.
Permissions are assigned to users depending on their
roles, which can be Worker or Supervisor. Also,
users with role Supervisor inherit all the permissions
granted to users with role Worker, since Supervisor
is a subrole of Worker. Finally, permissions are con-
strained by authorization constraints: namely,
1. A worker is granted permission to read an
employee’s s lary, provided that it is its own
salary, as specified by the authorization con-
straint caller = self.
2. A supervisor is granted unrestricted permission
to read an employee’s salary, as specified by the
authorization constraint true.
3. A supervisor is granted permission to update an
employee’s salary, provided that it supervises this
employee, as specified by the authorization con-
straint self.supervisedBy = caller.
2.4 Permissions
SecureUML+ComponentUML provides various syn-
tactic sugar constructs for expressing FGAC policies
in a more compact way. Basically, in the ‘sweeter’ pre-
sentation of a model, some roles may not have explic-
itly assigned any permission for some actions, while
the following always holds in the de-sugared presen-
tation of the model: every role has assigned exactly
one permission for every action, and this permission
has assigned exactly one authorization constraint.
Next, we will explain, and illustrate with exam-
ples, the rules that we apply for de-sugaring a Se-
cureUML+ComponentUML model S:
• Role hierarchies. Let act be an action and let r
and r′ be two roles. Suppose that r is a subrole of
r′ in S, and that there is a permission in S for r′
to execute act under the constraint auth. Then,
when de-sugaring S, we add a new permission to
S for the role r to execute act under the same
constraint auth.
• Delete actions. Let entity be an entity. Let
act be the action delete(entity). Suppose that
there is a permission in S for a role r to exe-
cute act under the constraint auth. Then, when
de-sugaring S, for every association-end assoc
owned by entity , we add to S a new permis-
sion for r to execute delete(assoc) under the same
constraint auth.
• Opposite association-ends. Let assoc and assoc′
be two opposite association-ends. Let act be the
action create(assoc). Suppose that there is a per-
mission in S for a role r to execute act under
the constraint auth. Then, when de-sugaring S,
we add to S a new permission for the role r to
execute create(assoc′) under the constraint that
results from replacing in auth the variable self
by target and the variable target by self. De-
sugaring is done similarly when act is the action
delete(assoc).
• Denying by default. Let r be a role and let act be
an action. Suppose that there is no permission in
S for the role r to execute act . When de-sugaring
S, we add to S a new permission for the role r
to execute act under the constraint false.
• Disjunction of authorization constraints. Let r
be a role and let act be an action. Suppose that
there are n permissions in S for the role r to
execute act . When de-sugaring S, we replace
these n permissions by a new permission and as-
sign to it the authorization constraint that re-
sults from disjoining together all the authoriza-
tion constraints of the original n individual per-
missions.
In what follows, we will denote by Auth(S, r, act)
the authorization constraint assigned, in the
de-sugared presentation of the Componen-
tUML+SecureUML model S, to the role r’s
permission for performing the action act .
Example 5 Consider the value of Auth(S, r, act) in
the following cases:
Auth(Empl.stm, Worker, update(salary))= false,
by the rule “denying by default”.
Auth(Empl.stm, Supervisor, update(salary))=
self.supervisedBy = caller or false,
by the combination of the rules “denying by default”,





caller = self or true,
by the combination of the rules “denying by default”,
“role hierarchies”, and “disjunction of authorization
constraints”.
2.5 Expressiveness
Traditionally, database management systems
(DBMS) support ‘all-or-nothing’ access control with
respect to the cells in the column of a table, i.e.,
a policy will either give or deny access to all the
cells in the column. Nowadays, however, some of the
main commercial DBMS also support fine-grained
access control, which means that a policy can also
give access only to a subset of the cells of the col-
umn. Next, we will provide some initial comparison
between SecureUML+ComponentUML and the
languages currently supported by Oracle Virtual
Private Database (Huey 2014), IBM/DB2 (IBM
2013), Microsoft SQL Server (SQL 2012), and
Teradata (Teradata 2014) for specifying FGAC
policies.
Oracle supports FGAC in its Virtual Private
Database (VPD) through the use of security pol-
icy functions (SPF), which are written in Oracle
PL/SQL. The idea is that when a user executes a
statement, the corresponding SPF is transformed into
a WHERE clause and is added to the user’s original
statement. Clearly, authorization constraints play the
same role as SPFs, and we conjecture, based on our
experience mapping OCL into SQL (Egea et al. 2010),
that any SPFs written in declarative SQL could be
formalized as an authorization constraint written in
OCL. However, since SPFs are written in PL/SQL,
they would typically contain non-declarative code.
IBM/DB2 implements FGAC through the use of
row access control and column access control rules.
They specify, respectively, which rows and columns
can be accessed and under which conditions. Again,
authorization constraints play the same role as row
and column access rules, and we also conjecture
that any combination of row and column access
control rules written in declarative SQL could be
formalized as an authorization constraint written
in OCL. On the other hand, and differently from
SecureUML+ComponentUML, IBM/DB2 only sup-
ports column access control rules for SELECT state-
ments, and, therefore, they can only be used, in gen-
eral, to protect read-actions over attributes.
Finally, both Microsoft SQL Server and Teradata
support FGAC policies through the use of security la-
bels, which can be assigned to users and resources, and
constraints. In SecureUML+ComponentUML, secu-
rity labels can be represented as additional attributes
of the entities representing users and resources, and
constraints can then be formalized as OCL authoriza-
tion constraints referring to the values of these addi-
tional attributes. On the other hand, security labels
can only be assigned to entities, and therefore, they
can not be used to protect read- or update-actions
over attributes.
3 Mapping OCL to First-Order Logic
In previous work (Clavel et al. 2009, Dania & Clavel
2013) we proposed a mapping from OCL to first-
order logic, which consists of two, inter-related com-
ponents: (i) a map from ComponentUML models
and boolean OCL expressions to first-order formulas,
called ocl2foldef ; and (ii) a map from boolean OCL ex-
pressions to first-order formulas, called ocl2fol. The
following remark formalizes the main property of our
mapping from OCL to first-order logic.
Remark 1 Let D be a ComponentUML model,
with invariants expr1, . . . , exprn, and let expr be a
boolean expression. Then, expr evaluates to true in









∪ ocl2foldef(expr) ∪ {¬(ocl2fol(expr))}
is unsatisfiable.
Next, we will explain, and illustrate with exam-
ples, the main ideas behind the maps ocl2foldef and
ocl2fol. We refer the interested reader to the original
papers (Clavel et al. 2009, Dania & Clavel 2013) for
a more formal presentation of these maps and of the
subset of OCL that they currently support.
3.1 The map ocl2foldef (models)
In our mapping from OCL to first-order logic, we rep-
resent entities by predicates, attributes by functions,
and association-ends, depending on their multiplicity,
either by binary predicates or by functions. Also, we
represent null and invalid, respectively, by the con-
stants null and invalid, and we introduce two unary
predicates IsNull and IsInvalid, to represent when an
element is null or invalid.
Let D be a ComponentUML model. ocl2foldef(D)
returns the axioms formalizing the properties of the
predicates and functions that represent the entities,
attributes and association-ends in D, as well as the
axioms formalizing the constants null and invalid, and
the predicates IsNull and IsInvalid.
Example 6 Consider the ComponentUML model
EmplBasic.dtm shown in Figure 1. Among others,
ocl2foldef(EmplBasic.dtm) returns the axiom
∀(x)(Employee(x)⇒ ¬(isNull(x) ∨ isInvalid(x))),
which formalizes that neither null nor invalid are
objects of the entity Employee, as well as the axiom
∀(x)∀(y)(supervises(y, x)⇒ (supervisedBy(x) = y)),
which formalizes the key property of supervises as
the opposite association-end of supervisedBy.
The following remark formalizes the main property
of the map ocl2foldef .
Remark 2 Let D be a ComponentUML model.
Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the instances of D and the first-order models that sat-
isfy ocl2foldef(D).
3.2 The map ocl2fol
In our mapping from OCL to first-order logic, we rep-
resent boolean expressions as formulas.
Let expr be a boolean expression. ocl2fol(expr) is
defined recursively over the structure expr , according
to the following principles:
• Each subexpression C.allInstances() is repre-
sented by a predicate formula whose predicate is
the one representing the entity C.
• Each boolean subexpression is represented by a
formula which mirrors its logical structure.
• Each integer subexpression is represented by the
corresponding functional expression.
• Each set subexpression is represented by a pred-
icate formula whose predicate’s definition is gen-
erated using the map ocl2foldef (see below).
Example 7 Consider the constraints oneBoss
and noSelfSuper introduced in Example 3.
ocl2fol(oneBoss) returns the formula
∃(e)(Employee(e) ∧ isNull(supervisedBy(e))
∧ ∀(e′)(Employee(e′) ∧ isNull(supervisedBy(e′))
⇒ e′ = e)),
and ocl2fol(noSelfSuper) returns the formula
∀(e)(Employee(e)⇒ ¬(supervisedBy(e) = e)).
The following remark formalizes the main property
of the map ocl2fol.
Remark 3 Let D be a ComponentUML model. Let
expr be a boolean expression. Suppose that expr
does not contain any subexpression of type collec-
tion. Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the instances of D in which the expr evalu-
ates to true and the first-order models that satisfy
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {ocl2fol(expr)}.
3.3 The map ocl2foldef (expressions)
Often, OCL expressions include subexpressions that
will evaluate to collections: e.g., those which are built
using →select, →collect, or →excluding. In our
mapping from OCL to first-order logic, when these
subexpressions are of type set, we represent them us-
ing new predicates whose definitions, which follow the
principles underlying ocl2foldef , are given by the map
ocl2foldef .
Example 8 Consider the expression
Employee.allInstances()→select(e|
e.supervises→notEmpty()).
This expression, which we refer to as colOfSuper,
will evaluate to a set containing only those employ-
ees whose list of supervisees is not empty. Then,
ocl2foldef(colOfSuper) returns the following axiom,
∀(x)(P colOfSuper(x)⇔
(Employee(x) ∧ ∃(y)(supervises(x, y)))),
where the new predicate P colOfSuper represents
the set that will be returned when evaluating
colOfSuper.
The following remark formalizes the main property
of the map ocl2foldef over expressions of type set.
Remark 4 Let D be a ComponentUML model. Let
expr be an expression of type set. Let P expr be the
predicate symbol generated by ocl2fol(expr). Then,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the in-
stances of D and the first-order models that satisfy
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ ocl2foldef(expr) for which the follow-
ing holds: expr evaluates to {o1, . . . , on} in I if and
only if the element that corresponds to oi belongs to
the set that interprets P expr , for i = 1, . . . , n.
3.4 Reasoning about Data Models
Here we provide a simple example of the use of our
mapping from OCL to first-order logic for reasoning
about ComponentUML models.
In what follows, when a ComponentUML model
D contains invariants expr1, . . . , exprn, we will con-
sider that ocl2foldef(D) includes also the formulas⋃n
i=1 ocl2foldef(expr i).
Example 9 Consider the following question about
the model Empl1.dtm in Example 3: Is there a valid
instance in which someone is supervised by one of its
own supervisees? Let us formalize the property that




We will refer to this expression as noMixSuper. Then,
according to Remark 1, the answer to our question is
‘Yes’ since
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {¬(ocl2fol(noMixSuper))}.
is satisfiable. Indeed, consider, for example, an in-
stance of Empl1.dtm with just four employees, e1,
e2, e3, and e4, such that e1 is linked through the
association-end supervisedBy with e4, and similarly
e3 with e2, and e2 with e3. Suppose also that e1
is of role Worker, and e2, e3, and e4 are of role
Supervisor. This instance is certainly a valid one,
since all the invariants evaluate to true. However, the
expression noMixSuper evaluates to false because e2
is linked through supervisedBy with e3, but at the
same time e2 is also linked through the association-
end supervises with e3 (since e3 is linked through
supervisedBy with e2).
4 Reasoning about Fine-Grained Access
Control Policies
As discussed by Basin et al. (2014), Se-
cureUML+ComponentUML models have a rig-
orous semantics. In particular, let S be a Se-
cureUML+ComponentUML model and let I be
an instance of its underlying data model. Also,
let u be a user, with role r, and let act be an
action, with arguments args. Then, according to
the semantics of SecureUML+ComponentUML,
S authorizes u to execute act in I if and only if
[Auth(S, r, act)](u,args) evaluates to true in I, where
[Auth(S, r, act)](u,args) is the expression that results
from replacing in Auth(S, r, act) the keyword caller
by u, and the keywords self, value, and target by
the corresponding values in args.
In what follows, given a SecureUML+Component-
UML model S, we use the term scenario to refer to
any valid instance of S’s underlying data model in
which a user requests permission to execute an action.
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that neither
the user requesting permission nor the resource upon
which the action will be executed can be undefined.
Next, we will explain, and illustrate with ex-
amples, how one can use the mapping from OCL
to first-order logic discussed in Section 3 to reason
about SecureUML+ComponentUML models. Un-
less stated otherwise, all our examples refer to the
SecureUML+ComponentUML model Empl.stm (Ex-
ample 4). Recall that this model’s underlying data
model is the ComponentUML model Empl1.dtm (Ex-
ample 3), which includes the invariants oneBoss,
noSelfSuper, roleSuper, and allRole.
We organize our examples in blocks or categories.
In the first block, we are interested in knowing if there
is any scenario in which someone with role r will be
allowed to execute an action act . Notice that, by
Remark 1, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the
following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
Example 10 Consider the following question: Is
there any scenario in which someone with role Worker
is allowed to change the salary of someone else (in-
cluding itself)? Recall that
Auth(Empl.stm, Worker, update(salary))= false.
According to Remark 1, the answer to this question
is ‘No’, since the following set of formulas is clearly
unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Worker)
∧ ocl2fol(false))},
(Note that ocl2fol(false) returns ⊥.) Indeed, there
is no scenario in which the expression false can eval-
uate to true.
Example 11 Consider the following question: Is
there any scenario in which someone with role
Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of some-
one else (including itself)? Recall that
Auth(Empl.stm, Supervisor, update(salary))=
(self.supervisedBy = caller or false).
According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is
‘Yes’, since the following set of formulas is satisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)
∧ ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false))}.
(Note that ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller) re-
turns supervisedBy(self ) = caller). Consider, for
example, a scenario with just two employees, e1
and e2, such that e1 is linked with e2 through the
association-end supervisedBy. Suppose also that
e1 has role Worker and e2 has role Supervisor.
Clearly, for caller = e2 and self = e1, the expres-
sion self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to true in
this scenario.
Example 12 Consider the following question: Is
there any scenario in which someone with role
Supervisor is allowed to change its own salary? No-
tice that in any scenario in which someone is request-
ing to change its own salary, the values of self (i.e., the
employee whose salary is to be updated) and caller
(i.e., the employee who is updating this salary) are
the same. According to Remark 1, the answer to this
question is ‘No’, since the following set of formulas is
unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)
∧ ocl2fol(self = caller and
(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Indeed, notice that, in every valid scenario the
invariant noSelfSuper evaluates to true, which
implies that there are no values for caller and
self such that the expressions self = caller and
self .supervisedBy = caller both evaluate to true.
Example 13 Consider the following question: Is
there any scenario in which someone with role
Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of some-
one who has no supervisor at all? Notice that in
any scenario in which someone (caller) is requesting
to change the salary of someone (self) who has no su-
pervisor at all, the value of self.supervisedBy must
be null. According to Remark 1, the answer to this
question is ‘No’, since the following set of formulas is
unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)
∧ ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = null and
(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Indeed, notice that, by assumption, caller
is always a defined object, i.e., it can not
be null, and therefore, if the expression
self .supervisedBy = null evaluates to true,
then the expression self .supervisedBy = caller
evaluates to false.
In our second block of examples, we are interested
in knowing if there is any scenario in which someone
with role r will not be allowed to execute an action
act . Notice that, by Remark 1, the answer will be
‘No’ if and only if the following set of formulas is
unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ¬(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
Example 14 Consider the following question: Is
there any scenario in which someone with role
Supervisor is not allowed to change the salary of
someone else (including itself)? According to Re-
mark 1, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the
following set of formulas is satisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(caller)∃(self )
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor) ∧
¬(ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Consider, for example, a scenario with just three em-
ployees, e1, e2, and e3 such that e1 is linked with e2
through the association-end supervisedBy, and sim-
ilarly e2 with e3; but e1 is not linked with e3 through
the association-end supervisedBy. Suppose that e2
and e3 have role Supervisor and e1 has role Worker.
Clearly, for caller = e3 and self = e1, the expression
self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to false in this
scenario.
In our third block of examples, we are interested in
knowing if there is any scenario in which nobody with
role r will be allowed to execute an action act. Notice
that, by Remark 1, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only
if the following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∃(self )∃(target)∃(value)∀(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r)⇒
¬(ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act))))}.
Example 15 Consider the following question: Is
there any scenario in which nobody with role
Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of some-
one else (including itself)? According to Remark 1,
the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the fol-
lowing set of formulas, which we will refer to as
Forms(Ex 15), is satisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∃(self )∀(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor)⇒
¬(ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Indeed, consider, for example, a scenario with just two
employees, e1 and e2, such that e1 is linked with e2
through the association-end supervisedBy. Suppose
that e1 has role Worker and e2 has role Supervisor.
Clearly, for self = e2, for every value for caller , the
expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to
false.
In our fourth block of examples, we are interested
in knowing if, in every scenario, there is at least one
object upon which nobody with role r will be allowed
to execute an action act. Notice that, by Remark 1,
the answer will be ‘Yes’ if and only if the following
set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(D) ∪ {∀(self )∃(target)∃(value)∃(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = r) ∧ ocl2fol(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
Example 16 Consider the following question: In
every scenario, is there at least one employee whose
salary can not be changed by anybody with role
Supervisor? According to Remark 1, the answer
to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of for-
mulas is unsatisfiable:
ocl2foldef(Empl1.dtm) ∪ {∀(self )∃(caller)
(ocl2fol(caller .role = Supervisor) ∧
ocl2fol(self .supervisedBy = caller or false))}.
Indeed, notice that in every valid scenario the in-
variant oneBoss evaluates to true, which means that
there is one employee in the scenario who has no su-
pervisor. In other words, for every valid scenario,
we can find a value for self such that no value
for caller can be found such that the expression
self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to true.
To end this section, we want to illustrate the
importance of taking into account the invariants of
the underlying data model when reasoning about
FGAC policies. Let Empl2.dtm be the Compo-
nentUML model that results from adding to the
model EmplBasic.dtm (Example 1) the invariants
noSelfSuper, roleSuper, allRole, plus the follow-
ing invariant:
5. Everybody has one supervisor.
This invariant, which we will refer to as allSuper,
can be formalized in OCL as follows:
Employee.allInstances()→forAll(e|
not(e.supervisedBy.oclIsUndefined())).
Example 17 Consider the security model Empl.stm
(Example 4), but this time with Empl2.dtm as
its underlying data model. Consider again the
question that we asked ourselves in Example 15:
namely, is there any scenario in which nobody with
role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of
someone else (including itself)? According to Re-
mark 1, the answer to this question is different
from Example 15, namely, ‘No’, since the set of
formulas Forms(Ex 15) is now unsatisfiable. In-
deed, notice that in every valid scenario the in-
variants allSuper and roleSuper both evaluate
to true, which means that, for each value for
self , we can find a value for caller such that
the expressions self .supervisedBy = caller and
caller .role = Supervisor both evaluate to true.
Finally, let Empl3.dtm be the ComponentUML
model that results from removing from Empl2.dtm,
the invariant roleSuper.
Example 18 Consider the security model Empl.stm
(Example 4), but this time with Empl3.dtm as its
underlying data model. Consider, once again, the
question that we asked ourselves in Example 15:
namely, is there any scenario in which nobody with
role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of
someone else (including itself)? According to Re-
mark 1, the answer to this question is now different
from Example 17, namely, ‘Yes’, since the set of for-
mulas Forms(Ex 15) is now satisfiable. Indeed, con-
sider a scenario with three employees e1, e2, and e3,
such that e1 is linked with e2 through the association-
end supervisedBy, and similarly e2 with e3 and e3
with e1. Suppose also that e2 and e3 have role
Supervisor, but e1 has role Worker. (Notice that,
since roleSuper is not included in Empl3.dtm, noth-
ing prevents e1 from not having the role Supervisor,
despite the fact that it is linked with e3 through the
association-end supervises.) Clearly, for self = e3,
for every caller of role Supervisor, namely, e2 and e3,
the expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates
to false.
5 Automatically Reasoning about Fine-
Grained Access Control Policies
Satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers are tools
for automatically proving the satisfiability of first-
order formulas in a number of logical theories and
their combination (Barrett et al. 2009). Basically,
SMT generalizes boolean satisfiability (SAT) by in-
corporating equality reasoning, arithmetic, fixed-size
bit-vectors, arrays, quantifiers, and other useful first-
order theories. Of course, when dealing with quanti-
fiers, SMT solvers cannot be complete, and may re-
turn unknown after a while, meaning that they can
neither prove the quantified formula to be unsatisfi-
able, nor can they find an interpretation that makes
it satisfiable. In the past years, there has been a great
deal of interest and research on the foundational and
practical aspects of SMT. They have also become the
backbone of numerous applications in automated ver-
ification, artificial intelligence, program synthesis, se-
curity, product configuration, and much more.
We briefly report here on our experience using the
Z3 SMT solver (de Moura & Bjørner 2008) to auto-
matically obtain the answers to the questions posed
in the examples in Section 4. Table 1 below sum-
marizes the results of our experiments. For each ex-
ample, we show the time it takes Z3 to return an
answer (in all cases, less than 1 second); the answer
that it returns (in all cases, the expected one); and
the first-order model that it generates when the an-
swer is sat, i.e., when it finds that the input set of
formulas is satisfiable. Each model represents a sce-
nario (not necessarily the one discussed in Section 4
for the corresponding example), and here we simply
indicate the number of employees that it contains,
which employees are linked through the association-
end supervisedBy, which employees have the role
Worker, which employees have the role Supervisor,
which employee is the one requesting permission to
change the salary (caller), and which employee is
the one whose salary will be changed (self ) if per-
mission is granted. We ran our experiments on a
laptop computer, with a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo
processor and 4GB 1067 MHz memory, using Z3
version 4.3.2 9d221c037a95-x64-osx-10.9.2. Finally,
the input for Z3 has been generated using our tool
SecProver (SecProver 2014). This tool takes the fol-
lowing parameters: a data model, a security model, a
set (possibly empty) of invariants, an action, a role,
a set (possibly empty) of additional constraints, and
a question type.1 SecProver automatically generates
1Currently, only four question types are supported, which cor-
respond to the four blocks of examples considered in Section 4,
but other question types will be added soon. The reason for using
question types is to make it easier for those users who may not be
familiar with first-order logic to understand the precise meaning
of their questions, as well as the responses eventually given by the
Ex. Time Ans. Interpretation
10 0.078s unsat —–
11 0.107s sat
#employees = 3
supervisedBy = {(e3, e2),
(e1, e2)}
Worker = {e1, e3}
Supervisor = {e2}
caller = e2, self = e1
12 0.041s unsat —–
13 0.042s unsat —–
14 0.306s sat
#employees = 6
supervisedBy = {(e1, e2),
(e2, e3), (e4, e2),
(e5, e3), (e6, e3)}
Worker = {e1, e4, e5, e6}
Supervisor = {e2, e3}







16 0.485s unsat —–
17 0.060s unsat —–
18 0.506s sat
#employees = 15
supervisedBy = {(e1, e2),
(e2, e4), (e3, e4), (e4, e6),
(e5, e4)(e6, e12), (e7, e4),
(e8, e14), (e9, e4), (e10, e4),
(e11, e15), (e12, e13),




Table 1: Automatic reasoning over the examples 10-
18 introduced in Section 4.
the set of first-order formulas whose satisfiability will
determine, according to our methodology, the answer
to the given question.
6 Related Work
Many proposals exist for reasoning about RBAC
policies, each one using a different logic or formal-
ism, including the so-called “default” logic (Woo &
Lam 1993), modal logic (Massacci 1997), higher-
order logic (Appel & Felten 1999), C-Datalog (Ba-
con et al. 2002), first-order logic (Jajodia et al. 2001,
Bertino et al. 2003), and description logic (Zhao et al.
2005). To the best of our knowledge none of these
proposals has been properly extended to cope with
FGAC policies. In recent years, however, there has
been a growing interest in finding appropriate for-
malisms and frameworks for specifying and analysing
FGAC policies. In a nutshell, our proposal dif-
fers from other approaches in that: (i) we use Se-
SMT solver to these questions.
cureUML+ComponentUML (Basin et al. 2006) for
modeling FGAC policies, and (ii) we use a mapping
from OCL to first-order (Clavel et al. 2009, Dania &
Clavel 2013) for reasoning about these policies. In our
opinion, our approach has two main advantages: (i)
the reasoning about FGAC policies can take into ac-
count the properties of the system states, since OCL
is the language that we use both for specifying the
invariants in the data model and the authorization
constraints in the security model; and (ii) the reason-
ing about FGAC policies can be done automatically
(although sometimes may fail to find a result), since
the mapping that we use for translating OCL into
first-order logic supports the effective application of
SMT solvers over the generated formulas.
Halpern & Weissman (2008) have proposed an
interesting framework for specifying and reasoning
about FGAC policies, called Lithium. It is based
on a decidable fragment of (multi-sorted) first-order
logic. Differently from OCL, this logic does not con-
sider undefined values, which, based on our experi-
ence, is something crucial when formalizing proper-
ties of the system states. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of case studies that have been carried out us-
ing Lithium, and which we could use to compare it
with our approach in terms of the expressiveness of
the underlying formalisms and of the effectiveness of
the associated reasoning tools.
Kuhlmann et al. (2011, 2013) propose a domain-
specific language for specifying role-based policies
which is based on UML and OCL. For the purpose
of analyzing these policies, they propose to use SAT
solvers, and, in particular the one implemented in Al-
loy (Jackson 2002). Differently from SMT solvers,
Alloy requires the search space to be bounded, by ex-
plicitly indicating the number of objects in each en-
tity, the number of links of each association and the
possible values of each attribute. Also, integer expres-
sions are not allowed, neither in the invariants nor in
the policies under consideration. On the other hand,
this approach enables one to include, within the poli-
cies, some time-constraints, which are not possible in
our approach.
Finally, in the context of XACML (OASIS 2013),
there exists a XACML profile for the specification of
RBAC policies (OASIS 2010). However, no meth-
ods have been proposed for reasoning about policies
written with this profile. Also, it is unclear whether
this profile can be extended to cope with fine-grained
access control policies. To address the first concern,
Helil & Rahman (2010) propose an extension of the
XACML profile for RBAC based on OWL. This ap-
proach supports the use of an OWL-DL reasoner for
deciding about RBAC policies within XACML. More
interestingly, Ramli et al. (2014) have recently pro-
posed a new syntax and semantics for XACML, for
the purpose of supporting formal reasoning about
XACML policies. One of the challenges here is to
formalize the different algorithms for enforcing pol-
icy rules which are available in XACML. Ramli et al.
(2014) formalize the majority of these algorithms, and
propose two new algorithms (one of which is very close
to the semantics of SecureUML+ComponentUML.)
Another challenge is to formalize the concepts of obli-
gations and advices in XACML, but they are not
covered by Ramli et al. (2014). Finally, with re-
spect to methods for reasoning about XACML poli-
cies, Ramli et al. (2014) propose to explore the use of
SMT solvers, but no experiments are reported yet.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Model-driven engineering supports the development
of complex software systems by generating software
from models. Model-driven security (Basin et al.
2011) is a specialization of this paradigm, where sys-
tem designs are modeled together with their security
requirements and security infrastructures are directly
generated from the models. Of course, the quality
of the generated code depends on the quality of the
source models. If the models do not properly spec-
ify the system’s intended behavior, one should not
expect the generated system to do so either. Experi-
ence shows that even when using powerful, high-level
modeling languages, it is easy to make logical errors
and omissions. It is critical not only that the mod-
eling language has a well-defined semantics, but also
that there is tool support for analyzing the modeled
systems’ properties.
In this paper we have presented a novel, tool-
supported methodology for reasoning about fine-
grained access control policies (FGAC). We have also
briefly reported on our experience using the Z3 SMT
solver (de Moura & Bjørner 2008) for automatically
proving non-trivial properties about FGAC policies.
Within our methodology, we use SecureUML (Basin
et al. 2006) to specify FGAC policies. SecureUML is
a modeling language that extends role-based access
control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al. 2001) with autho-
rization constraints, which are formalized using the
Object Constraint Language (OCL) (Object Manage-
ment Group 2014).
The key component of our methodology is a map-
ping from OCL to first-order logic (Clavel et al. 2009,
Dania & Clavel 2013), which allows one to trans-
form questions about FGAC policies into satisfiabil-
ity problems in first-order logic. Although this map-
ping does not cover the complete OCL language, our
experience shows that the kind of OCL expressions
typically used for specifying invariants and authoriza-
tion constraints are covered by our mapping. More
intriguing is, however, the issue about the effective-
ness of SMT solvers for automatically reasoning about
FGAC policies. Although our experience so far is ex-
tremely encouraging (all problems are solved in less
than a second), we should not forget that our results
completely depend on the interaction between (i) the
way our mapping translates into first-order logic the
relevant OCL expressions (invariants and authoriza-
tion constraints) and (ii) the heuristics implemented
in the SMT solver. We are currently analyzing this
interaction in depth to better understand its scope
and limitations. Ultimately, we know that there is a
trade-off when using SMT solvers. On the one hand,
they are necessarily incomplete and their results de-
pend on heuristics, which may change. In fact, we
have experienced (more than once) that two differ-
ent versions of Z3 may return ‘sat’ and ‘unknown’ for
the very same problem. This is not surprising (since
two versions of the same SMT solver may implement
two different heuristics) but it is certainly disconcert-
ing. On the other hand, SMT solvers are capable of
checking, in a fully automatic and very efficient way,
the satisfiability of large sets of complex formulas. In
fact, we have examples, involving more than a hun-
dred non-trivial OCL expressions, which are checked
by Z3 in just a few seconds.
Finally, as part of our future work, we plan to de-
fine formal mappings between the FGAC languages
and frameworks supported by commercial DBMS
(e.g., Oracle, IBM/DB2, Microsoft SQL Server and
Teradata) and SecureUML. These mappings will al-
low us to apply our methodology also when reasoning
about FGAC policies in commercial DBMS.
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A Model-Driven Methodology for Developing
Secure Data-Management Applications
David Basin, Manuel Clavel, Marina Egea, Miguel A. Garcıa de Dios, and Carolina Dania
Abstract—We present a novel model-driven methodology for developing secure data-management applications. System developers
proceed by modeling three different views of the desired application: its data model, security model, and GUI model. These models
formalize respectively the application’s data domain, authorization policy, and its graphical interface together with the application’s
behavior. Afterwards a model-transformation function lifts the policy specified by the security model to the GUI model. This allows a
separation of concerns where behavior and security are specified separately, and subsequently combined to generate a security-aware
GUI model. Finally, a code generator generates a multi-tier application, along with all support for access control, from the security-
aware GUI model. We report on applications built using our approach and the associated tool.
Index Terms—Model-driven development, model-driven security, access control, GUI models, model transformation
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1 INTRODUCTION
DATA-MANAGEMENT applications are focused around so-called CRUD actions that create, read, update, and
delete data from persistent storage. These operations are the
building blocks for numerous applications, for example
dynamic websites where users create accounts, store and
update information, and receive customized views based
on their stored data. When the data managed is sensitive,
then security is a concern and the use of these actions must
be controlled.
Access control is the standard approach to restricting
users’ actions on data. When the access-control policies are
sufficiently simple, it may be possible to formalize them
declaratively, independent of the application’s business
logic. For example, multi-tier systems for web-based appli-
cations often build support for role-based access control
(RBAC) into the application server, which is configured
independently of the application’s procedural details. In
contrast, fine-grained access control policies may depend
not only on the user’s credentials but also on the satisfaction
of constraints on the state of the persistence layer, i.e., on
the values of stored data items. In such cases, authorization
checks are typically implemented programmatically, by
directly encoding them at appropriate places in the applica-
tion. Unfortunately, these programmatic additions are cum-
bersome, error prone, and scale poorly. Moreover, they are
difficult to audit and maintain as the authorization checks
are spread throughout the code and security policy changes
require code changes.
In this paper, we propose a methodology for the model-
driven development of secure data-management applica-
tions. It consists of languages for modeling multi-tier sys-
tems, and a toolkit for generating these systems. Within our
methodology, a secure data-management application is
modeled using three interrelated models:
1. A data model defines the application’s data domain in
terms of its classes, attributes, associations, and
(non-CRUD) methods;
2. A security model defines the application’s security
policy in terms of authorized access to the actions on
the resources provided by the data model.
3. A graphical user interface, or GUI model, defines the
application’s graphical interface and application
logic. Note, in particular, that this model formalizes
both UI structure and behavior.
The heart of this methodology, illustrated in Fig. 1, is
a model-transformation function that automatically lifts
the policy that is specified in the security model to the
GUI model. The idea is simple but powerful. The secu-
rity model specifies under what conditions actions on
data are authorized. The control information in the GUI
model specifies which actions are executed in response
to which events. Lifting essentially consists of prefixing
each data action in the GUI model with the authorization
check specified in the security model. The resulting GUI
model is security aware. It specifies UI structure, infor-
mation flow with persistent storage, and all authoriza-
tion checks.
We have implemented this methodology within a toolkit,
called ActionGUI [1], that performs this many-models-to-
model transformation. From the resulting security-aware
GUI model, ActionGUI generates a deployable application,
along with all support for access control. In particular,
when the security-aware GUI model contains only calls to
execute CRUD actions, then ActionGUI will generate the
complete implementation automatically.
The methodology and tool that we report on constitute a
substantial further development of [2], [3]. In this previous
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work, we proposed the idea of using model transformations
to lift the security policy, formulated in terms of the data
model to the GUI model. Here we improve and generalize
this previous work and we provide an updated presentation
of the modeling languages, the toolkit, and the example
applications that we developed.
Let us expand on the main generalization with respect to
our previous work. Lifting previously consisted of prefixing
each event in the GUI model with the authorization check
specified in the security model. However since the data
actions executed by an event may change the persistence
layer’s state, checking authorization at the level of events,
and therefore before executing any data action, is sufficient
only if the underlying security policy does not contain
authorization constraints (which was explicitly assumed in
[3]), or if they do not depend on values that are changed
during the execution of the event’s data actions (as was the
case in the examples discussed in [2]). To overcome this lim-
itation, we now check authorization before executing each
event’s data actions and we provide events with a transac-
tion semantics: either all of the data actions are executed in
the given order, or none of them are executed at all.
Overall, we see our contributions as follows. First, our
methodology offers Model Driven Architecture’s purported
benefits [4], [5] for data-management applications. By work-
ing with models, designers can focus on the application’s
data, behavior, security, and presentation, independent of
the different, often complex, technologies that are used to
implement them. Second, our use of model transformations
leads to modularity and separation of concerns: the GUI
model and the security model can be changed indepen-
dently and by different developers, if desired. This avoids
the problems mentioned earlier with fine-grained, hard-
coded security policies that are difficult to maintain and
audit. Finally, our methodology is quite powerful and com-
pares favorably to alternatives, which are described in detail
in Section 6 on related work. In particular, it leverages well-
known security languages [6] for modeling rich, fine-
grained access control policies, which must often be manu-
ally encoded in other proposals. Moreover, our new lan-
guage for GUIs supports modeling realistic, dynamic web
interfaces (where the web content varies based on the user’s
actions or user-provided data), without limiting the interfa-
ces to a fixed set of templates or interaction patterns, as in
other methodologies. Of course, the proof of the pudding is
in the eating and we report on applications that we devel-
oped, which provide evidence of the applicability of this
approach.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2 we present background on the existing
modeling languages that we use, namely, ComponentUML
and SecureUML; in Appendix A we provide additional
explanation on the semantics of the latter. In Section 3 we
introduce a new modeling language, called GUIML, for
modeling graphical user interfaces together with their
behavior. In Section 4 we discuss our many-models-to-
model transformation and in Section 5 we report on our tool
support and on example applications that we developed
using it. Finally, in Section 6 we survey related work and
we draw conclusions in Section 7. Due to space limitations,
we omit the formal account of our methodology, which is
given in the technical report [7]. Instead, we provide in
Appendix B a high-level account of the correctness of the
model-transformation function, which lies at our method-
ology’s core.
2 BACKGROUND
For modeling an application’s data and security policy,
we leverage existing modeling languages, namely, Compo-
nentUML and SecureUML [6]. In this section we briefly
introduce these languages. Since SecureUML uses the
Object Constraint Language (OCL) [8] to model authoriza-
tion policies, we also summarize its main features.
2.1 ComponentUML
Data models provide a data-oriented view of a system. Typ-
ically they are used to specify how data is structured, the
format of data items, and their logical organization, i.e.,
how data items are grouped and related. Our methodology
employs ComponentUML for data modeling. Componen-
tUML provides a subset of UML class models where entities
(classes) can be related by associations and may have attrib-
utes and methods. In ComponentUML, associations are
binary: they always have two association-ends connecting
two, not necessarily distinct, entities.
While ComponentUML and SecureUML have a graphi-
cal concrete syntax (see [6]), to simplify and clarify the pre-
sentation, we shall use textual concrete syntax. In this
syntax, entities are declared with the keyword Entity fol-
lowed by the entity’s name, and its attributes and associa-
tion-ends, which are enclosed within brackets. Attributes
and association-ends are declared together with their types.
Moreover, since associations are binary, each association-
end is declared together with its opposite association-end,
Fig. 1. Model-driven development of security-aware GUIs.
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designated by the keyword oppositeTo. Multiplicities
other than  and 1 are specified using OCL invariants.
Finally, comments are introduced with //.
As the following example illustrates, ComponentUML
models specify how the application’s data is structured,
independently of how it will be visualized or accessed.
Example 1. We use a simple chatroom application as a
running example throughout this paper. A demo ver-
sion of this application can be found at [1]. The appli-
cation provides an online discussion site where users
converse by posting messages. Note that there are two
types of users: registered and unregistered users. Reg-
istered users have their nicknames and passwords
stored in the persistence layer. As usual, some options
are only available to registered users, who log into
the application by entering a valid nickname and
password.
Here we use ComponentUML’s textual syntax to
model the chatroom’s data model. The model, called
ChatRoomDTM, consists of three entities representing
chatrooms, registered users, and messages. The associa-
tions between these entities represent the relations
between the registered users and the chatrooms in which
they participate, the relations between the registered
users and the messages that they have written, and the
relations between the messages and the chatrooms where
they have been posted. The entities’ attributes represent
that each chatroom has a topic, each chatroom can be
public or not, each registered user has a nickname and a
password, and each message has a body.
2.2 Object Constraint Language
The Object Constraint Language [8] is a language for speci-
fying constraints and queries using a textual notation. As
part of the UML standard, it was originally intended for
modeling properties that could not be easily expressed
using graphical notation, such as class invariants in a UML
class diagram. Every OCL expression is written in the con-
text of a model (called the contextual model), and is evaluated
on an object model (also called the instance or scenario) of the
contextual model. This evaluation returns a value but does
not alter the given object model, since OCL’s evaluation is
side-effect free.
OCL is strongly typed. Expressions either have a primi-
tive type, a class type, a tuple type, or a collection type.
OCL provides standard operators on primitive data, tuples,
and collections. For example, the operator!includes checks
whether an object is part of a collection. OCL also provides a
dot-operator to access the values of the objects’ attributes
and association-ends in the given scenario. For example,
suppose that the contextual model includes a class cwith an
attribute at and an association-end as. Then, if o is an object
of the class c in the given scenario, the expression o.at refers
to the value of the attribute at for the object o in this sce-
nario, and o.as refers to the objects linked to the object o
through the association-end as. Finally, OCL provides oper-
ators to iterate over collections, such as !forAll, !exists,
!select,!reject,!collect, and!iterate.
2.3 SecureUML
SecureUML [6] extends role-based access control [9] with
authorization constraints. These constraints can be used to
specify policies that depend on properties of the system
state, for example, that a user can only post a message to a
chatroom where the user participates. More specifically,
SecureUML allows one to formalize access control decisions
that depend on two kinds of information:
1. static information, namely the assignments of users
and permissions to roles, and the role hierarchy,
and
2. dynamic information, namely the satisfaction of
authorization constraints in the current system
state.
SecureUML therefore supports the modeling of roles and
their hierarchies, permissions, actions, resources, and authoriza-
tion constraints. Moreover, one can also model assignments:
which permissions are assigned to a role, which actions are
allowed by a permission, which resources are affected by a
permission, and which authorization constraint must be sat-
isfied before granting a permission.
In our methodology, we use an extension of SecureUML
to specify security policies over ComponentUML models.
In this extension, the protected resources are the entities,
along with their attributes, methods, and association-ends,
while the actions are those shown in Table 1.
Note that there are two classes of actions: atomic and
composite. Atomic actions are intended to map directly onto
existing operations on the persistence layer. Composite
actions hierarchically group lower-level actions. For exam-
ple, the full access action for an attribute groups together
the read and update actions for this attribute. Finally,
TABLE 1
SecureUML+ComponentUML: Actions and Resources
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authorization constraints are specified using OCL, where
the context of an OCL expression is the underlying
ComponentUML model. Additionally, OCL expressions in
SecureUML models may contain the variables self, caller,
value, and target, which are interpreted as follows:
 self refers to the root resource upon which the
action will be performed if the permission is
granted. The root resource of an attribute, a method,
or an association-end is the entity to which it
belongs.
 caller refers to the user that will perform the action if
the permission is granted.
 value refers to the value that will be used to update
an attribute if the permission is granted.
 target refers to the object that will be added (or
removed) at an association-end if the permission is
granted.
The reader familiar with the original presentation of
SecureUML [6] may notice that we have introduced two
new variables that can be used in authorization constraints:
the variables value and target. Furthermore, to avoid poten-
tial ambiguities, we have refined the association-end update
action into two separate actions: association-end create and
association-end delete.
In our concrete syntax, the entity modeling the system’s
users (or, more specifically, the system’s callers) is declared
with the keyword User. The roles that these users can take
are declared with the keyword Role followed by the role’s
name, and its permissions, which are enclosed within
brackets. The keyword inherits, appearing between two
roles, declares that the first role is subordinated to the sec-
ond role in the role hierarchy, and therefore inherits all its
permissions.
Permissions are introduced by naming the root resources
to which they grant access. Each permission consists of a list
of actions through which the corresponding root resource
can be accessed. Actions on attributes, methods, or associa-
tion-ends are declared along with their names. For example,
Read::attr denotes the read action on the attribute attr. The
if-then construction is used to declare that the permission
to execute an action is constrained by a condition. This con-
dition is the authorization constraint that is associated to
the permission.
As the following example illustrates, SecureUML models
specify the application’s access control policy in a fine-
grained way. These models depend, of course, on how the
application’s data is structured, but not on how it is visual-
ized or accessed through the application’s graphical user
interface.
Example 2. We use the SecureUML’s textual syntax to
model a policy for posting and reading chatroom mes-
sages. Our model, called ChatRoomSTM, has two
roles: the role DefaultR represents everybody, i.e., both
registered and unregistered users, and the role UserR
represents only registered users. Our policy states that
everybody can read any message posted in a public
chatroom, but that only registered users can read mes-
sages posted in a private chatroom, provided they par-
ticipate in that chatroom. Moreover, only registered
users can post messages in public chatrooms; they can
also post to private chatrooms, provided they also par-
ticipate in that chatroom.
SecureUML provides various constructs for expressing
complex access control policies compactly and intuitively,
for example, by using action and role hierarchies or by
declaring default policies. Nevertheless, as described in
Appendix A, every SecureUML model S can be uniquely
transformed into a semantically equivalent model S[ for
which the following holds:
Remark 1. Let S be a SecureUML model. Then, for every
atomic action act and every role r in S, there is exactly
one permission in S[ (possibly constrained by false) for r
to execute act.
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Informally, the model S[ makes the security policy speci-
fied in S completely explicit. Thus, let Auth be the function
that, for every SecureUML model S, role r, and action act,
returns the authorization constraint associated to the unique
permission that is defined in S[ for r to execute act. We will
use this function Auth to define the model-transformation
that, in our methodology, lifts the security policy from the
security model to the GUI model. We conclude this section
with some examples that illustrate in which sense Auth
makes the security policy specified in a security model
explicit.
Example 3. Consider the chatroom’s security model, Cha-
tRoomSTM, in Example 2. Note that UserR is a subrole
of DefaultR (in line 11), which means that UserR will
inherit all the DefaultR’s permissions. Thus, Auth(Cha-
tRoomSTM, UserR, Read::body) returns:
self.chatroom.public (from ln. 10)
or
self.chatroom.participants!includes(caller) (from ln. 21).
Note also that the association-end messages is oppo-
site to the association-end owner. This means that a cre-
ate (respectively delete) action on messages will be
constrained by the same authorization that constrains a
create (respectively delete) action on owner, having
simultaneously replaced the variable self by target and
the variable target by self. Thus, although no permission
is explicitly given for the role UserR to execute a create
action on messages, Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Cre-
ate::messages) returns:
target.owner.oclIsUndefined() and self=caller (from
ln. 27).
Finally, note that there is no permission explicitly
given to the role DefaultR for executing an action update
on the attribute body. Since permissions are denied by
default (and no other rules can be applied in this case,
like the ones for role inheritance or opposite association-
ends) Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Update::body)
returns false.
3 GUI MODELS
GUI models provide a human-interface oriented view of a
system. Together with data models, they constitute platform
independent application models, omitting security aspects.
Informally, a GUI consists of widgets, which are visual
elements that display information and trigger events that
execute actions. In this section we present a key component
of our methodology: a novel language for modeling GUIs
for data-management applications, called GUIML (GUI
Modeling Language). It is important, however, to under-
stand that GUIML is a language for modeling not only the
structure of a GUI, i.e., the elements (widgets) that comprise
it, but also the GUI’s behavior, i.e., how its elements will react
(actions) in response to user interactions with them (events).
In fact, the key feature of GUIML is the language it provides
for modeling the GUI’s behavior, which uses OCL to specify
both the conditions and the arguments for the different
actions. This feature enables both the security model and
the GUI model to “speak” the same language (namely, OCL
in the context of the common, underlying data model). This
allows us to define rigorously the transformation function
that lifts the security policy to the GUI level.
We next briefly describe the main elements of GUIML,
namely, widgets (with their associated variables), events, and
actions. We will also illustrate them later with a simple
example: a window for our chatroom application, where
users can read and post messages in a chatroom.
Widgets. A GUIML model consists of widgets of different
types: windows (pages, when referring to web applica-
tions), combo-boxes (selectable lists), tables, date fields,
boolean fields (check boxes), buttons, text fields, and labels.
Widgets can be displayed in containers, which are also widg-
ets. Widgets other than windows must be contained in
another widget, and only windows, combo-boxes and tables
may contain other widgets. Widgets may own variables,
which store values for later use, and trigger events, which
execute actions.
In concrete syntax, a widget is declared with a keyword
like Window, Button, and TextField, according to its type,
followed by the widget’s (local) name, and the declaration
of the variables it owns, the events it triggers, and the widg-
ets it contains, all enclosed in brackets. The global name of
each widget must be unique. If a widget is a window, its
global name is the name given in its declaration. Otherwise,
the global name results from concatenating, using dot, the
global name of the widget’s container with the name given
in its declaration.
Variables. Each widget declaration may contain variable
declarations, listing the variables owned by the widget. In
concrete syntax, a variable declaration consists of the varia-
ble’s type followed by its name.
There are also variables that are, by default, owned by
every widget of a given type. These variables are implicitly
declared in every widget declaration, and their values are
handled in special ways. Here we only discuss the prede-
fined variables that we will use in our example. The varia-
bles caller and role are predefined in every window. They
store, respectively, the application’s user and the user’s
role. The variable text is predefined in every label, button,
and text field. This variable stores the string displayed on
the screen within the label, button, and text field; also, when
a user types in a text field, the value of its variable text is
automatically updated. The variable rows is predefined in
every combo-box and table. This variable stores the collec-
tion of items that can be selected from the combo-box or
table. The variable row is also predefined in every combo-
box and table where, for each row, it stores the item that can
be selected.
Events. Each widget declaration may contain event decla-
rations. Events are triggered when specific actions are exe-
cuted upon their widgets, and they themselves can execute
actions either on data or on other widgets.
The actions executed when an event is triggered are spec-
ified using statements. A statement is either an action, a con-
ditional statement, an iteration, or a sequence of statements.
In GUIML, the conditions in both conditional statements
and iterations are specified using OCL expressions, whose
context is the underlying ComponentUML model. Addi-
tionally, they can refer to the widget variables. In GUIML,
when widget variables are used within OCL expressions,
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they are enclosed in square brackets. Note that each
sequence of statements associated to an event is executed as
a single transaction: either all its statements successfully exe-
cute in the given order, or none of them are executed at all.
In concrete syntax, events are declared by indicating
their types followed by the sequence of statements that they
execute, enclosed in brackets. In our example we will use
two types of events: OnCreate and OnClick. The former are
triggered when the widgets are created and the latter are
triggered when widgets are clicked upon. In particular, a
window is created when an open action that has this win-
dow as its target is executed. All the other widgets are cre-
ated immediately after their corresponding containers are
created.
Actions. Every event declaration contains a sequence of
statements that specifies the actions executed when the
event is triggered. These actions can be executed either on
objects belonging to the persistence layer or on objects
belonging to the visualization layer. The former are called
data actions, and the latter are called GUI actions. Note that
some actions may take arguments whose values are only
known at run-time, for example a delete action whose argu-
ment is the item selected by the user in a combo-box, or an
update action whose argument is the number entered by
the user in a text field. In GUIML, these values are specified
using OCL. Again, the context of these expressions is the
underlying ComponentUML model, but they can also refer
to the widget variables.
Next, we briefly describe some of the GUIML data
actions and their concrete syntax.
 Entity create. It creates a data item in the persistence
layer. Its arguments are the type of the data item and
the variable that stores the data item. It is declared by
the statement variable := new type.
 Entity delete. It deletes a data item from the persis-
tence layer. Its argument is object, which is the data
item deleted. It is declared by the statement delete
object.
 Attribute read. It reads the value of a data item’s attri-
bute in the persistence layer. Its arguments are the
data item object whose property is read, the attribute
read, and the variable that stores the value read. It is
declared by the statement variable := object.attribute.
 Attribute update. It modifies the value of a data item’s
attribute in the persistence layer. Its arguments are
the data item object whose attribute is modified, the
attribute modified, and the new value. It is declared
by the statement object.attribute := value.
 Association-end read. It reads the collection of items
linked to an item’s association-end in the persistence
layer. Its arguments are the data item object whose
property is read, the association-end assocEnd read,
and the variable that stores the collection read. It is
declared by the statement variable := object.assocEnd.
 Association-end create. It creates a link in the persis-
tence layer between two data items. Its arguments
are the source data item srcObject, the target data
item tgtObject, and the association-end assocEnd-
through which the target data item is linked to the
source data item. An association-end create action is
declared by the statement srcObject.assocEnd +=
tgtObject.
 Association-end delete. It deletes a link in the persis-
tence layer between two data items. Its arguments
are the source data item srcObject, the target data
item tgtObject, and the association-end assocEnd from
which the target data item is removed. It is declared
by the statement srcObject.assocEnd –= tgtObject.
Finally, we describe some of the GUI actions that are
defined in GUIML.
 Set. It updates the value of a variable. Its arguments
are the name of the variable and variable’s new value.
It is declared by the statement variable := value.
 Open. It opens a window. Its argument is target,
which names the window opened. Additionally, it
may take as arguments any number of pairs
(variablei, valuei), where variablei is the name of a
variable owned by its target window, and valuei is
the value that is assigned to variablei when target is
opened. It is declared by the statement open target
with variable1:= value1 . . .variablen:= valuen.
 Back. It moves back to the previous window. It is
declared using the keyword back.
 Fail. It forces a rollback in the current transaction,
whereby the corresponding statement is not success-
fully executed. It is declared using the keyword fail.
 Skip. It does nothing. It is declared using the key-
word skip.
We now provide an example that illustrates the main ele-
ments of the GUIML language: a window ReadPostWI for
our chatroom application, where users can read and post
messages in (previously selected) a chatroom. As this exam-
ple will show, GUIML models depend on how the
application’s data is structured—after all, they describe how
users interact with this data—but not on the application’s
access control policy.1 In our example, this separation of con-
cerns is reflected by the fact that the GUIML model for the
window ReadPostWI is completely unaware of the security
policy for reading and posting messages in our chatroom
application.
Example 4. We use GUIML to model the window of our
chatroom application where users can read and post
messages in a chatroom. This window is named Read-
PostWI. It owns a variable chatroomSel that stores a pre-
viously selected chatroom (the action that opens the
window ReadPostWIwill assign a value to this variable).
The window ReadPostWI contains four widgets:
 a table ReadPostsTB for visualizing the messages
posted in the selected chatroom;
 a text field WritePostEN for writing a new
message;
 a button PostBU for posting in the selected chat-
room the message written in the text field Write-
PostEN; and
 a button BackBU for moving back to the previous
window.
1. Of course, in terms of the final application’s usability, there is a
dependency: an application’s GUI can end up being unusable precisely
because of the application’s security policy.
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Note that the tableReadPostTB and the buttonsPostBU
and BackBU are modeled partially inside the window
ReadPostWI and partially outside this window. This is
supported by our concrete syntax in order to improve the
readability of the GUIML models. However, to avoid
ambiguities, when a widget is modeled outside its widget
container, the widget’s global name is used. Note too that
the table ReadPostTB is unaware of the security policy for
visualizingmessages, which in our running example states
that only registered users are authorized to read messages
posted in private chatrooms. Similarly, the button PostBU
is unaware of the security policy for posting messages,
which is that only registered users can post messages in
public chatrooms and inprivate chatroomsbut, in the latter
case, theymust also participate in these chatrooms.
4 SECURITY-AWARE GUI MODELS
In this section we describe the heart of our methodology: a
model-transformation function Sec that, given a GUIML
model G and a SecureUML model S, automatically gener-
ates a new GUIML model SecðG; SÞ. The generated model is
identical to G except that it is security aware with respect to
S. The transformation function Sec works by wrapping
around every data action act in G an if-then-else statement
with the following arguments:
 a condition that reflects the constraints associated to
the permissions specified in S, for each of the differ-
ent roles, to execute the action act;
 a then-branch that contains the action act; and
 an else-branch that contains the action fail.
Thus, the semantics of the if-then-else statement ensures
that act will only be executed if the constraints associated to
the corresponding permissions are satisfied. Moreover, this
semantics also guarantees that, if these constraints are not
satisfied, then the action fail will be executed, forcing a roll-
back in the current transition.
More specifically, to generate the aforementioned if-then-
else statement, the function Sec makes use of Remark 1.
In particular, for each role r in S, it calls the function
AuthðS; r; actÞ to obtain the expression that ultimately (i.e.,
when the security policy is made completely explicit) con-
strains the permission given to r for executing act. How-
ever, since this expression may contain the variables self,
value, target, and caller, the function Sec must also replace
these variables by the actual arguments of the action act
(including its actual user). We denote the resulting OCL
expression by AuthðS; r; actÞ½args, where args are the argu-
ments specified in the GUI model for the action act. Finally,
since different roles may be constrained by different expres-
sions, the condition generated by Secwill have the form:
((r1 = [Window.role] and Auth(S, r1, act)[args])
or . . . or
(rn = [Window.role] and Auth(S, rn, act)[args])),
where r1; . . . ; rn are all the roles declared in S. (Recall
that the actual application’s user and its role are always
stored in the variables caller and role, which are owned by
every window in the GUI model.)
The following examples illustrate the model-transforma-
tion function Sec. As previously mentioned, the complete,
formal account of our methodology, including the model-
transformation function Sec, is given in [7]. Nevertheless,
the interested reader can find in Appendix B a high-level
account of the correctness of Sec.
Example 5. Consider line 32 in Example 4. It specifies the
third action that will be executed when the button Read-
PostWI.PostBU is clicked upon, namely,
newPost.body := [ReadPostWI.WritePostEN.text].
Recall that := refers to an update action, in this case to
the action Update::body. The function Sec will replace
this by the following if-then-else statement:
To understand the condition generated by Sec, note that
Auth(ChatRoomSTM, DefaultR, Update::body) is equal to
false, but that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Update::body)
is equal to self.owner ¼ caller and self.chatroom.oclIsUnde-
fined(). Thus, the function Sec must replace the variable self
by thenewlycreatedmessagenewPost (since this is theobject
upon which the action Update::bodywill be executed), and
the variable caller byReadPostWI.caller (since this is the user
thatwill execute the actionUpdate::body).
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Example 6. Consider line 31 in Example 4. It specifies the
second action that will be executed when the button
ReadPostWI.PostBU is clicked upon, namely,
newPost.owner += [ReadPostWI.caller].
Recall that += refers to an association-end create
action, in this case to the action Create::owner. Then, the
function Sec will replace this line by the following if-
then-else statement:
To understand the condition generated by Sec, note
that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, DefaultR, Create::owner) is
equal to false, but that Auth(ChatRoomSTM, UserR, Cre-
ate::owner) is equal to self.owner.oclIsUndefined() and
target=caller. Thus, the function Secmust replace the var-
iable self by the newly created message newPost (since
this is the object upon which the action Create::owner
will be executed), the variable caller by ReadPostWI.cal-
ler (since this is the user that will execute the action Cre-
ate::owner), and the variable target also by ReadPostWI.
caller (since the actual user is precisely the object that
will be added by the Create::owner as the owner of the
newly created message).
Our next example illustrates how our model transforma-
tion Sec leads to modularity and separation of concerns
whereby the GUI model and the security model can be
changed independently, if desired.
Example 7. Suppose that we decide to allow anyone (not
only registered users, but also unregistered ones) to post
messages in public chatrooms. To update the chatroom
application’s security-aware GUIML model, we just
carry out the following steps:
 Step 1. Change the original chatroom’s Secure-
UML model to reflect our security policy changes.
We call the new security model PubCha-
tRoomSTM and show below the new permissions
for the role DefaultR (i.e., for everybody using the
application) to create a message, update the body
of a message, and post a message in a chatroom:
 Step 2. Apply our model transformation to the
original chatroom GUIML model and the modi-
fied chatroom SecureUML model to generate the
updated security-aware GUIML model. We show
below the result of this transformation for line 32
in Example 4.
It is interesting to compare this result with the one
explained in Example 5 for the case of the security model
ChatRoomSTM. To understand the differences, note that
Auth(ChatRoomSTM, DefaultR, Update::body) is equal
to false, but that Auth(PubChatRoomSTM, DefaultR,
Update::body) is equal to self.owner.oclIsUndefined()
and self.chatroom.oclIsUndefined(). Also, recall that
UserR inherits all permissions from DefaultR and, in par-
ticular, its newpermission for updating the body of ames-
sage, which is constrained by Auth(PubChatRoomSTM,
DefaultR,Update::body).
Note that in this example, the function Sec may gener-
ate conditions that can be further simplified. However,
for the sake of illustration, here and elsewhere, we show
the results of Secwithout further simplification.
5 ACTIONGUI TOOLKIT AND APPLICATIONS
5.1 ActionGUI Toolkit
Security-aware GUIML models are platform independent
and can be mapped to implementations employing different
technologies. This includes desktop applications, web appli-
cations, and mobile applications. As part of our work, we
built the ActionGUI Toolkit [1], which automatically gener-
ates web-based data-management applications from secu-
rity-aware GUIML models.
The ActionGUI Toolkit features model editors for con-
structing and manipulating ComponentUML, SecureUML,
andGUIMLmodels. These editors share our ownOCLparser,
which takes as additional input the variables introduced by
the different models, along with their respective types: in the
case of SecureUML models, the variables self, caller, target,
and value, and in the case of GUIML models, all the given
widget variables. Crucially, the ActionGUI Toolkit imple-
ments our model transformation to generate security-aware
GUIML models. Finally, it includes a code generator that,
given a security-aware GUIML model, produces a web appli-
cation based on the following, standard three-tier architecture.
1. Presentation tier (also known as front-end). Users access
web applications through standard web browsers,
which render the content (HTML and JavaScript)
dynamically provided by the application server.
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2. Application tier. The toolkit generates Java Web
Applications, implemented using the Vaadin frame-
work. The applications run in a servlet container (such
as Tomcat or GlassFish), process client requests and,
generate content, which is sent back to the client for
rendering. They may also manipulate data stored in
the persistence tier. When processing client requests,
the generated application interprets its underlying
security-aware GUIML model. In particular, it per-
forms the required security checks before modifying
any data stored in the persistence tier or sending any
data to the presentation tier. This involves, of course,
dynamically evaluating the OCL expressions appear-
ing in the security-awareGUIMLmodel.
3. Persistence tier (also known as data tier or back-end). The
generated application manages information stored
in a database. For each application, the toolkit gener-
ates the corresponding database schema from the
application’s ComponentUML model.
As a model-driven development tool, the ActionGUI
Toolkit produces its best results when the data-management
application’s functionality can be reduced to CRUD actions
and its dynamics consists of navigating and passing infor-
mation through windows, and exchanging information
with the underlying database. For applications in this cate-
gory, ActionGUI automatically generates the complete
implementation from the corresponding ComponentUML,
SecureUML, and GUIML model. Note that calling CRUD
actions is modeled in GUIML using data actions, and navi-
gating and passing information through windows is mod-
eled using GUI actions, namely, open, back, and set.
Of course, some data-management applications will
require functionality that goes beyond CRUD actions. For
example, they may need to send emails, print tables, or
export data in some desired format. As expected, the
ActionGUI Toolkit does not generate code for such meth-
ods. Instead, it includes their implementation—which must
be provided by the application developer—in the generated
application. When the application needs to interpret one of
these methods, it simply calls the method provided.
5.2 Applications
We report here on five web applications that we developed
using ActionGUI. Our objective is to show that one can use
our methodology and the ActionGUI Toolkit to develop
non-toy secure data-management applications. We begin by
briefly describing our applications. In Table 2 we provide
different measurements of the applications’ size, defined in
terms of their underlying GUIML models.
a) Customer Relationship Management (CRMApp). We have
developed a web application for managing customers of a
Hospital and Care Center. This application allows market-
ing and public relations personnel to manage contact infor-
mation, including filtering contacts based on different
criteria and exporting the results in Excel files. As customer
data is highly sensitive, data is subject to a restrictive
access-control policy. For example, a marketing and PR staff
member can only access the contact information of those
contacts previously selected as targets of a marketing cam-
paign to which he is assigned. The application also allows a
General Manager to create marketing campaigns, select the
targeted patients, and assign marketing and PR staff mem-
bers to campaigns.
b) Volunteer Management (VMApp). We have developed a
web application for managing a care center’s volunteer
TABLE 2
Example Applications: Size of the Application’s Models
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program. Using this application, the program’s coordinators
can take actions such as: introduce new volunteers; create,
edit, and modify tasks; and propose these tasks to the vol-
unteers, based on the volunteers’ time availability and pref-
erences. The access-control policy stipulates, for example,
that volunteers are only authorized to edit their own per-
sonal information, such as their preferences and time avail-
ability, and to accept or reject their own tasks.
c) Meal Service Management (MSMApp). This is a web
application for managing a student residence’s meal service.
Using this application, a resident can notify the administra-
tion whether he will have a meal at the residence’s cafeteria,
in which of the available time slots, and if he will bring a
guest. A resident shall only edit his own meal selection and
within a specific time window, which depends on the
selected meal. Administrators can create new resident
accounts, and list the meals requested for each available
time slot.
d) EHealth Record Management (eHRMApp). This is a web
application for managing eHealth records. It allows users
with the appropriate roles to: register new patients in a hos-
pital and assign to them clinicians (doctor, nurses, etc.);
retrieve patient information; register new nurses and doc-
tors in a hospital and assign them to a ward; change nurses
or doctors from one ward to another; and move patients to
a different practice. The access-control policy regulates, in
particular, access to the patients’ highly sensitive records.
These records shall only be retrieved by their handling doc-
tors, although this policy can be relaxed in an emergency
situation.
e) Chatroom (ChatApp). This is an extension of our run-
ning example: in addition to posting messages in a selected
chatrooms, users can also create and delete chatrooms,
under specific conditions.
CRMApp, VMApp, and MSMApp are commercial appli-
cations. They were developed for actual customers, and
they are currently being used by their different stakehold-
ers. In contrast, EHRMApp was developed as part of a case
study proposed by industrial partners in a European proj-
ect. The interested reader can find more information about
this case study, as well as demo versions of the EHRMApp
and ChatApp applications, at [1]. With respect to code-gen-
eration, for MSMApp, EHRMApp, and ChatApp, the
ActionGUI’s code generator automatically generates
100 percent of their implementation (no non-CRUD actions
are ever called). In contrast, CRMApp and VMApp contain
custom code for sending mails and for generating Excel
files, which we borrowed from existing Java libraries. For
all our examples, the ActionGUI’s code generator produces
the corresponding applications in under a minute.
We conclude this section by summarizing the key contri-
butions of our methodology and toolkit. Our experience
developing the reported applications provides evidence of
the methodology’s potential for developing real-world
applications. First, the use of model-transformation and
code generation frees the developer from programming
fine-grained authorization constraints and inserting them at
all the required places throughout the application’s code
and with the correct arguments. Except for small applica-
tions, this is cumbersome and error-prone, since the number
of data actions associated to events may be on the order of
hundreds; see, for example, the applications CRMApp and
VMApp in Table 2. Second, our methodology supports
modularity and separation of concerns. In particular, the
security model can be changed independently of the GUI
model, without requiring one to re-program and re-insert
all the new fine-grained authorization constraints since this
is automatically done by our model-transformation. This
substantially aided developing our applications as our cli-
ents changed, several times, their security policies for
CRMApp, VMApp, and MSMApp.
6 RELATED WORK
Over the past 15 years, there have been numerous research
advances in the model-driven development of data manage-
ment applications. Among these, UWE [10], [11], [12], [13]
and ZOOM [14] are the most closely related to our work.
As a modeling tool, UWE [10], [11], [12], [13] provides the
modeler with a higher-level of abstraction than ActionGUI.
In particular, the actions executed by the widgets’ events
are described in UWE using natural language. Thus, unless
the models are appropriately refined, as discussed in [13],
UWE does not support code-generation. In contrast, UWE
provides specific diagrams for modeling GUI presentations
and navigations, which facilitate the task of GUI modeling.
In this respect, we define in [15] a mapping that transforms
high-level UWE models into more concrete ActionGUI
models that, once completed by the modeler, can be directly
used to generate the intended applications. Finally, Busch
[12] extends UWE to use SecureUML for modeling security
policies. However, this work does not use a model-transfor-
mation to lift the security policy to the GUI level. Instead
the UWEmodeler is responsible for adding all the appropri-
ate authorization checks to the GUI model.
Like ActionGUI, ZOOM [14] allows GUI modelers to
specify widgets, their events, and their actions. Moreover,
using an extension of Z [16], one can specify the conditions
of the actions and their arguments, similar to how this is
done in ActionGUI using OCL. In contrast to ActionGUI,
ZOOM does not provide a language for modeling security
and security aspects are not explicitly considered in this
approach. Moreover, ZOOM does not support code-genera-
tion. It only provides interpreters for model animation.
In contrast to ActionGUI, UWE, and ZOOM, the
approaches presented in [17], [18], [19] do not provide a lan-
guage for modeling GUIs. They instead implement different
rules for automatically deriving GUIs based on either the
application’s data model, as in [17], [18], or the application’s
prototypical scenarios, as in [19]. As expected, the behavior
of the resulting GUIs is limited and, based on our experi-
ence, insufficient to cope with the logic embedded in real
data-management applications. Moreover, security aspects
are not addressed in these proposals.
There is other related work that falls between the two
extremes of full GUI modeling and full GUI derivation.
Both the OO-method [20], [21] and WebML [22], [23] sup-
port building GUIs using UI-patterns. These patterns specify
the possible interactions with the application’s data based
on the classes, attributes, and associations that are declared
in the underlying data model. These approaches have the
advantage of reducing the time required for modeling
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GUIs. However, the UI-patterns impose restrictions on the
type of GUIs that can be modeled, both in terms of their
structure and their behavior. Moreover, these approaches
only support role-based access control, but not fine-grained
access control. Other approaches that fall in this category
are [24], [25]. In both cases, the modeler must associate to
each widget container the specific data type accessed using
the widget. As before, the possible interactions with the
underlying data is limited by the default behavior imple-
mented for these widget containers. Security aspects are
also not considered.
Finally, there are approaches whose primary focus is to
support UI design at different levels of abstraction. Promi-
nent examples are the XML User Interface Language (XUL)
[26] and the USer Interface eXtensible Markup Language
(UsiXML) [27]. XUL is Mozilla’s XML-based language for
building user interfaces of applications like Firefox. UsiXML
is an XML-compliant markup language that describes the
UI for multiple usage contexts, such as Character User Inter-
faces (CUIs), Graphical User Interfaces, Auditory User
Interfaces, and Multimodal User Interfaces.
Clearly, ActionGUI is designed for a different purpose
than XUL and UsiXML. In particular, ActionGUI is
designed for developing secure data-management applica-
tions. A key design decision for ActionGUI was to ensure
that the security model and the GUI models “speak” the
same language. To the best of our knowledge, neither XUL
nor UsiXML are concerned with security aspects of the UIs.
Moreover, ActionGUI is designed for themodel-driven devel-
opment of secure data-management applications and this
has two clear consequences. First, ActionGUI’s modeling
languages are designed to be technology-agnostics, in con-
trast with XUL, which is tightly linked to Mozilla-related
technologies. Second, ActionGUI’s modeling languages are
designed to support the automatic generation of ready to be
deployed applications from the models. As a result, Action-
GUI models are more concrete than general UsiXML mod-
els, which can be defined at any of the four abstraction
levels specified in the Cameleon Reference Framework
(CRF) [28]. In particular, a GUIML modeler always works at
the CRF-Concrete UI level, while the WAR (Web application
ARchive) file generated from a GUIML model (along with
the associated security and data models) belongs to the
CRF-Final UI level. Also, we note that [29] has carried out
promising work on extending our methodology to cope
with business processes, which are typically defined at the
Task & Concepts abstraction level in CRF. Along these lines,
it would be interesting to investigate ways of extending our
methodology to support UI modeling at the CRF-Abstract
UI level, where interaction details are abstracted away.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The methodology we proposed constitutes a further devel-
opment of the idea of model-driven security [30]. The two
main innovations are an expressive language for modeling
an application’s graphical user interface and behavior, and
a many-models-to-model transformation that lifts a security
policy specified on the application’s data model to this
behavioral model. Our transformation function captures the
idea that authorization policies regulating complex
transactions can be generated uniformly from much simpler
policies on data. Despite our use of expressive modeling
languages, we have shown for data-management applica-
tions that it is possible to generate automatically complete
deployable applications.
Our methodology is supported by the ActionGUI Tool-
kit. Applications like those described in Section 5.2 show
the toolkit’s potential for developing real-world applica-
tions. Nevertheless, there is still much work ahead to turn
this toolkit into a full, robust, industrial-strength develop-
ment platform. In the short term, we plan to develop
improved model editors and better support for integrating
custom code. In the long term, we would like to support
GUIs running on different platforms, like mobile devices.
We also plan to add support for handling privacy policies:
modeling and generating code to enforce that data usage
must follow the purpose for which the data was collected
and may entail obligations.
Finally, we would like to support model analysis, based
on the formal semantics of our models and on the correct-
ness of our model transformation. The following are exam-
ples of questions we would like to be able to formally
answer. Will every sequence of action executed by every
event in the model preserve the data model’s invariants?
Will authorization checks ever force a transaction roll-back?
Do the conditions in the GUI model make redundant the
authorization checks generated by the model transforma-
tion? Analysis support would allow us to optimize gener-
ated code and support assurance activities like system
certification.
APPENDIX A
A.1 Making the Security Policy Explicit
In this appendix we define a transformation that, for every
SecureUML model S, produces the SecureUML model S[,
which makes explicit the security policy declared in S. We
define this transformation in four steps. Note that, as stated
in Remark 1, the following holds at the end of our transfor-
mation: for every atomic action act and every role r in S,
there is exactly one permission in S[ (possibly constrained
by false) for r to execute act.
Step 1. Copy the explicit permissions
 Atomic actions. Let act be an atomic action. Suppose
that there is a permission in S for a role r to execute
act under a constraint auth. Then, there is also a per-
mission in S[ for r to execute act under the same con-
straint auth.
Step 2. Unfold the security model
 Action hierarchies. Let CA be a composite action. Sup-
pose that there is a permission in S for a role r to exe-
cute CA under a constraint auth. Then for every
atomic action act contained in CA, there is a new
permission in S[ for r to execute act under the same
constraint auth.
 Role hierarchies. Let act be an atomic action and let r
and r0 be two roles. Suppose that r is a subrole of r0
in S, and that there is also a permission in S for r0 to
execute act under the constraint auth. There is then a
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new permission in S[ for the role r to execute act
under the same constraint auth.
 Delete actions. Let entity be an entity. Suppose that
there is a permission in S for a role r to delete entity
under a constraint auth. Then for every association-
end assoc owned by entity, there is a new permission
in S[ for r to execute the action Delete::assoc under
the same constraint auth.
 Opposite association-ends. Let assoc and assoc0 be
two opposite association-ends. Let act be the action
Create::assoc. Suppose that there is a permission in
S for a role r to execute act under the constraint auth.
There is then a new permission in S[ for the role r to
execute Create::assoc0 under the constraint that
results from simultaneously replacing in auth the
variable self by target and the variable target by self.
Unfolding is similar when act is the action
Delete::assoc.
Step 3. Add default permissions to the security model
 Denying by default. Let r be a role and let act be an
atomic action. Suppose that there is no permission
in S[ for the role r to execute act. There is then
a new permission in S[ for the role r to execute
act under the constraint false. That is, the role r
will be denied access to execute act in all
circumstances.
Step 4. Simplify the resulting security model
 Disjunction of constraints. Let r be a role and let act be
an action. Suppose that there are n permissions in S[
for the role r to execute act. These n permissions are
then simplified to a single permission whose authori-
zation constraint results from disjoining together all
the authorization constraints of the n individual
permissions.
APPENDIX B
B. 1 Correctness of our Model Transformation
In this paper we have focused on our methodology and tool
support for designing and generating secure data-manage-
ment applications. Our approach also has a formal basis
and we sketch here the correctness of our model transfor-
mation Sec, which is defined relative to the semantics of
GUI models. Full details are provided in [7].
We define the semantics of GUI models by first giving a
set of inference rules that defines a transition relation !
between triples of the form hstm; I; ui, where stm is a state-
ment, I is a scenario (i.e., an instance of the underlying data
model), and u represents a state of the widget variables. We
provide inference rules for each possible statement: namely,
for every type of data action and GUI action (base cases),
and for arbitrary sequences of statements, conditional
statements, and iterator-statements (inductive cases). In par-
ticular, for data actions, the inference rules have form
hactðargsÞ; I; ui!hskip; resðIÞ; resðuÞi ;
where:
 args are the arguments of the data action act,
 resðIÞ specifies the scenario that results from execut-
ing actðargsÞ in the scenario I and widget variable
state u, and
 resðuÞ specifies the widget variables’ new state after
executing actðargsÞ in the scenario I and widget vari-
able state u.
Crucially, no inference rule leading to skip is defined for the
GUI action fail.
We then define the operational semantics of an event ev
that executes the actions specified by an statement stm as
the set of all the transitions
hstm; I; ui!hskip; I 0; u0i ;
where ! is the reflexive-transitive closure of !.
By definition, this operational semantics for events is
security-unaware: it does not respect the authorization con-
straints that, according to the given security model, should
constrain the execution of data actions. To provide a
security-aware operational semantics for events, we define
the security-aware versions of the inference rules. In particu-
lar, given a security model S, for each role r, and for each
type of data action act, the security-aware version of the
inference rule for act and r has the form
½½ðAuthðS; r; actÞ½argsÞuI ¼ true
hactðargsÞ; I; ui!hskip; resðIÞ; resðuÞi ;
where:
 ½½exprI denotes the value of the expression expr in
the scenario I; and, therefore,
 ½½ðAuthðS; r; actÞ½argsÞuI denotes the evaluation in
the scenario I of the authorization AuthðS; r; actÞ
that constrains the only permission that, according
to Remark 1, ultimately allows users with the role
r to execute the action act, given that arg are the
arguments of act and u is the state of the widget
variables.
These security-aware inference rules define the transition
relation !S . Finally, given a security model S, we define
the security-aware operational semantics of an event ev that
executes the actions specified by an statement stm as the set
of all the transitions
hstm; I; ui!Shskip; I 0; u0i :
The theorem below formalizes the correctness of our
model-transformation function Sec. It states that evaluating
a statement transformed by Sec following the security-
unaware operational semantics returns the same result as
evaluating the original statement using the security-aware
semantics. Hence the transformed statement respects the
authorization constraints formalized in the underlying secu-
rity model.
Theorem. Let S be a security model and let stm be a statement.
Then, for every scenario I, and every widget variable state u,
hSecðstm; SÞ; I; ui!hskip; I 0; u0i()
hstm; I; ui!Shskip; I 0; u0i:
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Abstract. We report on our use of ActionGUI to develop a secure
eHealth application based on the NESSoS eHealth case study. ActionGUI
is a novel model-driven methodology with an associated tool for de-
veloping secure data-management applications with three distinguishing
features. First, it enables a model-based separation of concerns, where
behavior and security are modeled individually and subsequently com-
bined. Second, it supports model-based quality assurance checks, where
the properties proven about the models transfer to the generated appli-
cations. Finally, for data-management applications, the ActionGUI tool
automatically generates complete, ready-to-deploy, security-aware, web
applications. We explain these features in the context of the eHealth
application.
1 Introduction
In [3] we proposed a novel methodology, called ActionGUI, for the model-driven
development of secure data-management applications. This methodology enables
a model-based separation of concerns, where an application’s behavior and secu-
rity are modeled individually and subsequently combined. Moreover, it supports
model-based quality assurance checks, where relevant properties may be proven
about the combined models. These properties then transfer to the automatically
generated data-management applications.
We report here on our use of ActionGUI to develop a secure data-mana-
gement application. This application is based on a case study proposed within
NESSoS, the European Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future
Internet Software Services and Systems [12]. The eHealth case study consists of a
web-based system for electronic health record management (EHRM). Electronic
health records (EHR) store information created by, or on behalf of, a health
professional in the context of the care of a patient.
Electronic health records are highly sensitive and therefore their access must
be controlled. Part of the challenge in this case study was to model the access
control policy and build an application that enforces it at runtime. The policy
consists of various authorization rules along the lines of: The access control cri-
teria for an EHR depends, among others, on the type of EHR. For instance,
a highly sensitive record might be only available to the patient’s treating doctor
(and perhaps a few others, in rare situations). Such rules necessitate fine-grained
access control, where access control decisions depend not only on the user’s cre-
dentials but also on the satisfaction of constraints on the state of the persistence
layer, i.e. on the values of stored data items.
We show how ActionGUI’s modeling languages can be used to specify the
application’s data model (e.g., hospital staff, health records), security policy
(e.g., rules like the above) and behavior. Moreover, by illustrative examples, we
highlight various features of the ActionGUI methodology and associated tool.
Overall, the eHealth case study is interesting as an example of developing a
secure data-management application and it provides a proof-of-concept for the
application of the ActionGUI methodology to an industry-relevant problem.
Organization. In Section 2 we provide background on the ActionGUI methodol-
ogy and tool. In Section 3 we give an account of our modeling and generation of
the EHRM application with ActionGUI. In Section 4 we describe a proof method
for checking that the behavior of the modeled data-management application re-
spects the invariants of the application’s underlying data model, and we apply
it to our EHRM models. Finally, in Section 5, we draw conclusions.
2 ActionGUI
ActionGUI [3] is a methodology for the model-driven development of secure
data-management applications. It consists of languages for modeling multi-tier
systems, and a toolkit for generating these systems. Within this methodology, a
secure data-management application is modeled using three interrelated models:
1. A data model defines the application’s data domain in terms of its classes,
attributes, associations, and methods.
2. A security model defines the application’s security policy in terms of autho-
rized access to the actions on the resources provided by the data model.
3. A graphical user interface, or GUI model, defines the application’s graphical
interface and application logic. Note, in particular, that this model formalizes
both UI structure and behavior.
The heart of this methodology, illustrated in Figure 1, is a model-transfor-
mation function that automatically lifts the policy that is specified in the security
model to the GUI model. The idea is simple but powerful. The security model
specifies under what conditions actions on data are authorized. The control in-
formation in the GUI model specifies which actions are executed in response
to which events. Lifting essentially consists of prefixing each data action in the
GUI model with the authorization check specified in the security model. The
resulting GUI model is security aware. It specifies UI structure, information flow
with persistent storage, and all authorization checks.
The ActionGUI methodology is implemented within a toolkit, also called Ac-
tionGUI [1], which performs the aforementioned many-models-to-model trans-
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Fig. 1. Model-driven development of security-aware GUIs.
a deployable application along with all support for access control. In particular,
when the security-aware GUI model contains only calls to execute CRUD actions,
i.e., those actions that create, read, update, and delete data, then ActionGUI
will generate the complete implementation automatically.
In the remaining part of this section we briefly introduce the languages that
are used within the ActionGUI methodology to model the applications’ data,
security, and GUI models, including their constraints, as well as the tools sup-
porting the ActionGUI methodology. In the next section we will use the NESSoS
EHRM application scenario to illustrate these modeling languages as well as the
model-based separation of concerns supported by the ActionGUI methodology.
2.1 Data models
Data models provide a data-oriented view of a system. They typically specify
how data is structured, the format of data items, and their logical organization,
i.e., how data items are grouped and related. ActionGUI employs Component-
UML [4] for data modeling. ComponentUML provides a subset of UML class
models where entities (classes) can be related by associations and may have
attributes and methods.
2.2 Constraints
The Object Constraint Language (OCL) [13] is a language for specifying con-
straints and queries using a textual notation. ActionGUI supports different uses
of OCL: it is used in data models to specify data invariants, in security models
to specify authorization constraints, and in GUI models to specify if-then-else
conditions and action arguments.
Every OCL expression is written in the context of a model (called the con-
textual model), and is evaluated on an object model (also called the instance or
scenario) of the contextual model. This evaluation returns a value but does not
alter the given object model, since OCL’s evaluation is side-effect free.
OCL is strongly typed. Expressions either have a primitive type, a class type,
a tuple type, or a collection type. OCL provides: standard operators on primitive
data, tuples, and collections; a dot-operator to access the values of the objects’
attributes and association-ends in the given scenario; and operators to iterate
over collections. Particularly relevant for its use in ActionGUI models, OCL
includes two constants, null and invalid, to represent undefinedness. Intuitively,
null represents unknown or undefined values, whereas invalid represents error and
exceptions. To check if a value is null or invalid, OCL provides, respectively, the
Boolean operators oclIsUndefined() and oclIsInvalid().
2.3 Security models
SecureUML [4] extends Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [9] with authoriza-
tion constraints. These constraints are used to specify policies that depend on
properties of the system state. SecureUML supports the modeling of roles and
their hierarchies, permissions, actions, resources, and authorization constraints.
In ActionGUI, we use an extension of SecureUML for specifying security
policies over data models. In this extension:
– The protected resources are the entities, along with their attributes, meth-
ods, and association-ends.
– The controlled actions are: to create and delete entities; to read and up-
date attributes; to read, create, and delete association-ends; and to execute
methods.
– The authorization constraints are specified using OCL.
The contextual model of the authorization constraints is the underlying data
model. Additionally, authorization constraints may contain the variables self,
caller, value, and target, which are interpreted as follows:
– self refers to the root resource upon which the action will be performed if
permission is granted. The root resource of an attribute, a method, or an
association-end is the entity to which it belongs.
– caller refers to the user that will perform the action if the permission is
granted.
– value refers to the value that will be used to update an attribute if the
permission is granted.
– target refers to the object that will be added to (or removed from) the (root)
resource at an association-end if the permission is granted.
2.4 GUI models
GUI models provide a human-interface oriented view of a system. A GUI consists
of widgets, which are visual elements that display information and trigger events
that execute actions. In ActionGUI, we use GUIML [3] for modeling both
– the GUI’s structure, i.e, the elements (widgets) that comprise it,
– and the GUI’s behavior, i.e., how its elements will react (actions) in response
to user interactions with them (events).
Behavioral modeling is a key feature of GUIML and uses OCL to specify both the
conditions and the arguments for the different actions; the contextual model of
these conditions and arguments is again the underlying data model. This enables
both the security model and the GUI model to “speak” the same language,
namely OCL in the context of the common, underlying data model. This allows
us to define rigorously the transformation function that lifts the security policy
to the GUI level.
We next briefly describe the main elements of GUIML, namely, widgets (with
their associated variables), events, and actions.
Widgets. A GUI model consists of widgets of different kinds. Examples include
windows (pages, when referring to web applications), combo-boxes (selectable
lists), tables, date fields, boolean fields (check boxes), buttons, text fields, and
labels.
Variables. Widgets may own variables, which store values for later use. Each
widget declaration may contain variable declarations, listing the variables owned
by the widget. There are variables that are, by default, owned by every widget
of a given type. In particular, the variables caller and role are predefined in every
window. They store, respectively, the application’s user and the user’s role.3 The
variable text is predefined in every label, button, and text field. This variable
stores the string displayed on the screen within the label, button, and text field.
The variable rows is predefined in every combo-box and table. This variable stores
the collection of items that can be selected from the combo-box or table. The
variable row is also predefined in every combo-box and table where, for each row,
it stores the item that corresponds to this row. Finally, the variable selected is
also predefined in every combo-box or table where it stores the item(s) selected
in the combo-box or table.
3 Currently it is a task for the GUI modeler to guarantee that the variables caller
and role always store an authenticated user and a valid role. This can be done, for
example, by modeling a login window where the users will need to enter a valid
nickname and password before accessing the application.
Events. Widgets may trigger events, which execute actions either on data or
on other widgets. The actions executed when an event is triggered are specified
using statements. A statement is either an action, a conditional statement, an
iteration, a try-catch, or a sequence of statements. The conditions in conditional
statements are specified using OCL expressions, whose context is the underlying
data model. Additionally, they can refer to the widget variables. Note that each
sequence of statements associated to an event is executed as a single transaction:
either all statements in the sequence successfully execute in the given order, or
none of them are executed at all.
Actions. Events trigger actions that can be executed either on objects belonging
to the persistence tier or on objects belonging to the presentation tier. The former
are called data actions and the latter are called GUI actions. Data actions are
precisely those controlled in the security model, namely: to create and delete
entities; to read and update attributes; to read, create, and delete association-
ends; and to execute methods. GUI actions include those for setting the value
of a widget variable, opening a window (open), moving back to the previous
window (back), and forcing a rollback of the current transaction (fail). Note that
some actions may take arguments. The values of these arguments are specified
using OCL expressions, whose context is the underlying data model, and they
can also refer to the widget variables.
2.5 Security-aware GUI models
The heart of ActionGUI is a model-transformation function Sec that, given a
GUIML model G and a SecureUML model S, automatically generates a new
GUIML model Sec(G,S). The generated model is identical to G except that it
is security aware with respect to S. The transformation function Sec works by
wrapping around every data action act in G an if-then-else statement with the
following arguments:
– a condition that reflects the constraints associated to the permissions speci-
fied in S, for each of the different roles, to execute the action act ;
– a then branch that contains the action act ; and
– an else branch that contains the action fail.
Thus, the semantics of an if-then-else statement ensures that act will only be
executed if the constraints associated to the corresponding permissions are sat-
isfied. Moreover, if these constraints are not satisfied, then the action fail will be
executed, forcing a rollback in the current transaction.
2.6 Tool support
Security-aware GUI models are platform independent and can be mapped to
implementations employing different technologies. This includes desktop appli-
cations, web applications, and mobile applications. The ActionGUI Toolkit [1],
automatically generates web-based data-management applications from security-
aware GUIML models.
The ActionGUI Toolkit features model editors for constructing and ma-
nipulating ComponentUML, SecureUML, and GUIML models. Crucially, the
ActionGUI Toolkit implements our model transformation to generate security-
aware GUIML models. Moreover, it includes a code generator that, given a
security-aware GUIML model, produces a web application based on the follow-
ing three-tier architecture:
1. Presentation tier (also known as front-end): Users access web applications
through standard web browsers, which render the content (HTML and Java-
Script) dynamically provided by the application server.
2. Application tier: The toolkit generates Java Web Applications, implemented
using the Vaadin framework. The applications run in a servlet container
(such as Tomcat or GlassFish), process client requests, and generate content,
which is sent back to the client for rendering.
3. Persistence tier (also known as data tier or back-end): The generated appli-
cation manages information stored in a database.
3 The EHRM ActionGUI Application
The NESSoS EHRM application scenario defines different system use cases along
with the associated access control policy. The use cases include: register new
patients in a hospital and assign them to clinicians, such as nurses or doctors;
retrieve patient information; register new nurses and doctors in a hospital and
assign them to a ward; change nurses or doctors from one ward to another; and
reassign patients to doctors. Due to space limitations, we will not describe how
we model all of these use cases. We focus instead on a representative use case as
a running example: reassigning patients to doctors. We will use this example to
illustrate ActionGUI’s modeling languages as well as the model-based separation
of concerns supported by the ActionGUI methodology.
3.1 The EHRM’s data model
The full data model for the EHRM application contains 18 entities, 40 at-
tributes, and 48 association-ends. We discuss below just the entities, attributes,
and association-ends that are required for our running example.
Figure 2 presents this data model, formalized using ActionGUI’s textual
syntax. In this syntax, entities are declared with the keyword entity followed by
the entity’s name, and its attributes and association-ends, which are enclosed
within brackets. Attributes and association-ends are declared together with their
types. Moreover, since associations are binary, each association-end is declared
together with its opposite association-end, designated by the keyword oppositeTo.
As this example shows, ActionGUI data models specify how the application’s
data is structured, independently of how it will be visualized or accessed.
Professional. This entity represents the EHRM’s users. The role assigned to each
user is specified by its role attribute. The roles considered are DIRECTOR, ADMIN-
ISTRATOR, DOCTOR, NURSE, and SYSTEM. The medical centers where a user
works are linked to the user through the association-end worksIn. If a user is a
doctor, then it is linked to the corresponding doctor information through the
association-end asDoctor. Similarly, if a user is an administrative staff, then it is
linked to staff information through the association-end asAdministrative.
MedicalCenter. This entity represents medical centers. The departments belonging
to a medical center are linked to the medical center through the association-end
departments. The professionals working for a medical center are linked to the
medical center through the association-end employees.
Doctor. This entity represents doctor information. Doctor information is linked
to the corresponding professional through the association-end doctorProfessional.
The departments where a doctor works are linked to the doctor’s information
through the association-end doctorDepartments. The patients treated by a doctor
are linked to the doctor’s information through the association-end doctorPatients.
Administrative. This entity represents administrative staff information. Adminis-
trative staff information is linked to the corresponding professional through the
association-end administrativeProfessional.
Department. This entity represents departments. The medical center to which
a department belongs is linked to the department through the association-end
belongsTo. The doctors working in a department are linked to the department
through the association-end doctors. The patients treated in a department are
linked to the department through the association-end patients.
Patient. This entity represents patients. The doctor treating a patient is linked to
the patient through the association-end doctor. The department where a patient
is treated is linked to the patient through the association-end department.
3.2 The EHRM data model’s invariants
The full EHRM application data model is constrained by 66 data invariants,
formalized using OCL. The following three invariants are representative.
1. Each patient is treated by a doctor.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|not(p.doctor.oclIsUndefined()))
2. Each patient is treated in a department.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|not(p.department.oclIsUndefined()))
3. Each patient is treated by a doctor who works for a set of departments, in-




Set(MedicalCenter) worksIn oppositeTo employees
Doctor asDoctor oppositeTo doctorProfessional
Administrative asAdministrative oppositeTo administrativeProfessional }
entity MedicalCenter {
Set(Department) departments oppositeTo belongsTo
Set(Professional) employees oppositeTo worksIn }
entity Doctor {
Professional doctorProfessional oppositeTo asDoctor
Set(Department) doctorDepartments oppositeTo doctors
Set(Patient) doctorPatients oppositeTo doctor }
entity Administrative {
Professional administrativeProfessional oppositeTo asAdministrative }
entity Department {
MedicalCenter belongsTo oppositeTo departments
Set(Doctor) doctors oppositeTo doctorDepartments
Set(Patient) patients oppositeTo department }
entity Patient {
Doctor doctor oppositeTo doctorPatients
Department department oppositeTo patients }
enum Role { DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATOR DOCTOR NURSE SYSTEM }
Fig. 2. The eHRMApp’s data model (partial).
These invariants make precise the intended meaning of the associations be-
tween the entities Patient, Doctor, and Department. The first two invariants state
that the doctor and the department associated to a patient cannot be undefined,
i.e., null. The third invariant states that a doctor who treats a patient must work
in the department where the patient is treated, although the doctor may also
work in other departments.
3.3 The EHRM’s security model
Electronic health records are by their nature highly sensitive and the NESSoS
case study informally defines the policy that regulates their access. As expected,
the authorization to carry out certain actions is not only role-based, but also
context-based. In other words, the EHRM access control policy is fine grained.
The full EHRM application’s security model contains 5 roles and 573 permis-
sions, where each permission authorizes users in a role to execute an action upon
the satisfaction of an authorization constraint formalized in OCL. In Figure 3 we
present examples of two permissions, modeled using ActionGUI’s textual syn-
tax. In this syntax, the roles that users can take are declared with the keyword
role followed by the role’s name, and its permissions, which are enclosed within
brackets. Permissions are introduced by naming the root resources to which they
grant access. Each permission consists of a list of actions through which the cor-
responding root resource can be accessed. Actions on attributes, methods, or
association-ends are declared along with their names. For example, update(attr)
denotes the update action on the attribute attr. The keyword constrainedBy is
used to declare that the permission to execute an action is constrained by the
given condition (enclosed in square brackets).
The first permission authorizes a user (caller) with the role ADMINISTRATOR
to reassign a patient to a department (value) provided that the user works in a set
of medical centers that includes the one to which the department belongs where
the patient will be reassigned. The second permission authorizes a user (caller)
with the role ADMINISTRATOR to reassign a patient (self ) to a doctor (value)
provided two conditions are satisfied: (i) among the medical centers where the
user works, there is at least one where the doctor to which the patient will be
reassigned also works; and (ii) the user works in medical centers that includes
the center to which the department belongs where the patient is currently being
treated. Note that no other role has permissions associated to the actions of
reassigning a patient to a department or to a doctor.
As this example illustrates, ActionGUI security models are formulated in
terms of the application’s data. This formalization is independent of how the
data is visualized or accessed through the application’s graphical user interface.
1 role ADMINISTRATOR {
2 Patient{
3 update (department) constrainedBy [caller.worksIn→includes(value.belongsTo)] }
4 Patient{
5 update (doctor) constrainedBy
6 [caller.worksIn→exists(m|value.doctorProfessional.worksIn→includes(m))
7 and caller.worksIn→includes(self.department.belongsTo)] }
Fig. 3. Examples of the EHRM security model’s permissions.
3.4 The EHRM’s GUI model
The full EHRM application’s GUI model contains 8 windows for the following
use cases: login to the application; access a medical center’s information; register
a new patient; review a patient’s information; reassign a patient to a doctor and
department; access options reserved for the medical center’s director; introduce
a professional into the system; and reassign a professional to a department.4
4 Here are some other concrete figures about the size of the GUI model: i) Widgets:
19 buttons; 73 labels; 19 text fields; 5 boolean fields; 1 date field; 1 combo-box;
and 9 tables; ii) Statements: 34 if-then-else statements; iii) Data actions: 11 create
actions; 41 update actions; 5 add link actions; and 2 remove link actions; iv) GUI
actions: 157 set actions; and 7 open actions; v) OCL expressions: 361 expressions
(77 non-literals).
We discuss below the window relevant for our running example: the window
movePatientWI for reassigning a patient to a doctor and a department. Figures 4
and 5 present our model of this window, in ActionGUI’s textual syntax. Figure 6
contains a screenshot of the actual window generated from this model.
In ActionGUI’s textual syntax, a widget is declared with a keyword like
Window, Button, and TextField, according to its type, followed by the widget’s
name, and the declaration of the variables it owns, the events it triggers, and
the widgets it contains, all enclosed in brackets. A variable declaration consists
of the variable’s type followed by its name, possibly followed by the variable’s
initial assignment (if any) and by the statement that will be executed every time
the variable’s value changes (if any), the latter enclosed in brackets. Events are
declared by indicating their types followed by the sequence of statements that
they execute, enclosed in brackets. The syntax for declaring the different data
and GUI actions should be clear from the example below.
The window movePatientWI assumes that both a medical center and a patient
have previously been selected. This information is stored, respectively, in the
variables medicalCenter and patient (lines 2-3). The window movePatientWI contains
the following widgets:
– A label patientLa that displays the name and surname of the selected patient
(lines 5–7).
– A label departmentLa that displays the name of the department where the
selected patient is treated (lines 8–9).
– A label doctorLa that displays the name and surname of the doctor who treats
the selected patient (lines 10–13).
– A label departmentsLa that displays a message inviting the user to select a
department (lines 14–15).
– A label doctorsLa that displays a message inviting the user to select a doctor
(lines 16–17).
– A table departmentsTa that displays information about the departments that
belong to the selected medical center (line 22); in particular, the name of
each of these departments is shown (line 31-34). Also, when the user selects a
department from this list, it refreshes the list of doctors displayed in the table
doctorsTa (see below) with the doctors who work for the selected department
(lines 19–21).
– A table doctorsTA that is initially empty (line 24). As previously explained,
upon selection of a department in the table departmentsTa, it displays in-
formation about the doctors who work for the selected department (lines
19–21); in particular, the name and surname of each of these doctors are
shown (lines 35-41).
– A button moveBu that, when clicked upon, if there is a department selected
in the table departmentsTa (line 44), and there is also a doctor selected in the
table doctorsTa (line 45), then:
• it reassigns the selected department to the selected patient (line 46);
• it reassigns the selected doctor to the selected patient (line 47);
• it notifies the user that the reassignment succeeded (lines 48).
Otherwise, it notifies the user that either a doctor (line 50) or a department
(line 52) must first be selected.
– A button backBU that, when the user clicks on it, it returns to the previous
window (line 55).
As this example illustrates, ActionGUI GUI models depend on how the ap-
plication’s data is structured — after all, they describe how users interact with
this data — but not on the application’s security policy. Of course, in terms of
the final application’s usability, there is a dependency: a GUI can end up being
unusable precisely because of the application’s security policy.
3.5 The EHRM’s security-aware GUI model
As explained in Section 2.5, the heart of ActionGUI is a model-transformation
function that, essentially, prefixes each data action in the GUI model with the
authorization check specified in the security model. The full EHRM application’s
GUI model contains 59 data actions, and therefore the automatically generated
EHRM application’s security-aware GUI model contains the same number of
authorization checks.
To illustrate our model-transformation function, we show in Figure 7 the part
of the security-aware GUI model for the button moveBu’s event onClick that is
relevant for our running example. The action of reassigning the selected patient
to the department selected in the table departmentsTa (line 46 in Figure 5) is
now wrapped by an if-then-else statement (lines 46.1-46.5 in Figure 7) whose
condition reflects the permission for executing this action given by line 3 in
Figure 3. Similarly, the action of reassigning the selected patient to the doctor
selected in the table doctorsTa (line 47 in Figure 5) is wrapped by an if-then-else
statement (lines 47.1-47.7 in Figure 7) whose condition reflects the permission
for executing this action given by lines 5–7 in Figure 3.
3.6 Generating the EHRM application
The ActionGUI Toolkit automatically generates the complete EHRM application
in under 10 seconds. The generated .war file includes the Vaadin library as well
as other external libraries. The Vaadin library is responsible of 70% of the size
of the generated file and only 10% of this file corresponds to the code that
ActionGUI automatically generates to interpret the application’s model. The
size of the .war file containing the complete application is roughly 15 MB.
4 Analyzing the EHRM ActionGUI Application
Model-Driven Architecture supports the development of complex software sys-
tems by generating software from models. Of course, the quality of the generated
code depends on the quality of the source models. If the models do not properly
1 Window movePatientWi {
2 MedicalCenter medicalCenter
3 Patient patient
4 String text := [’Move a patient’]
5 Label patientLa {
6 String text := [’Patient: ’.concat($movePatientWi.patient$.contact.name)
7 .concat(’ ’).concat($movePatientWi.patient$.contact.surname)] }
8 Label departmentLa {
9 String text := [’Department: ’.concat($movePatientWi.patient$.department.name)] }
10 Label doctorLa {
11 String text := [’Doctor: ’.concat($movePatientWi.patient$.doctor.
12 doctorProfessional.name).concat(’ ’).
13 concat($movePatientWi.patient$.doctor.doctorProfessional.surname)] }
14 Label departmentsLa {
15 String text := [’Select the new department:’] }
16 Label doctorsLa {
17 String text := [’Select the new doctor:’] }
18 Table departmentsTa {
19 Department selected {
20 if [not $selected$.oclIsUndefined()] {
21 movePatientWi.doctorsTa.rows := [$selected$.doctors] } }
22 Set(Department) rows := [$movePatientWi.medicalCenter$.departments] }
23 Table doctorsTa {
24 Set(Doctor) rows := [Doctor.allInstances()→select(false)]
25 Doctor selected }
26 Button moveBu {
27 String text := [’Move the patient’] }
28 Button backBu {
29 String text := [’Back’]
30 }
Fig. 4. A window for reassigning a selected patient (part I)
31 Table movePatientWi.departmentsTa {
32 columns{
33 [’Department’] : Label department {
34 String text := [$departmentsTa.row$.name] } } }
35 Table movePatientWi.doctorsTa {
36 columns {
37 [’Doctor’] : Label doctor {
38 String text :=
39 [$doctorsTa.row$.doctorProfessional.name
40 .concat(’ ’)
41 .concat($doctorsTa.row$.doctorProfessional.surname)] } } }
42 Button movePatientWi.moveBu {
43 event onClick {
44 if [not $departmentsTa.selected$.oclIsUndefined()] {
45 if[not $doctorsTa.selected$.oclIsUndefined()] {
46 [$movePatientWi.patient$.department] := [$departmentsTa.selected$]
47 [$movePatientWi.patient$.doctor] := [$doctorsTa.selected$]
48 notification([’Success’],[’The patient has been reassigned.’],[0]) }
49 else {
50 notification([’Error’],[’Please, select first a doctor.’],[0]) } }
51 else {
52 notification([’Error’],[’Please, select first a department.’],[0]) } } } }
53 Button movePatientWi.backBu {
54 event onClick {
55 back } }
Fig. 5. A window for reassigning a selected patient (part II)
Fig. 6. Screenshot of the window for reassigning a selected patient
46.1 if [[$movePatientWi.role$ = ADMINISTRATOR
46.2 and $movePatientWi.caller$.worksIn
46.3 →includes($departmentsTa.selected$.belongsTo)] {
46.4 [$movePatientWi.patient$.department] := [$departmentsTa.selected$] }
46.5 else { fail }





47.6 [$movePatientWi.patient$.doctor] := [$doctorsTa.selected$] }
47.7 else { fail }
Fig. 7. The security-aware actions for reassigning a selected patient
specify the system’s intended behavior, one should not expect the generated sys-
tem to do so either. Quod natura non dat, Salmantica non praestat.5 Experience
shows that even when using powerful, high-level modeling languages, it is easy
to make logical errors and omissions. It is critical not only that the modeling
language has a well-defined semantic, so one can know what one is doing, but
also that there is tool support for analyzing the modeled systems’ properties.
In this section we explain how we can reason about an important property
of ActionGUI models, called data invariant preservation. We use the EHRM
application for illustration.
4.1 Data invariant preservation
We first introduce some terminology. Recall that the actions triggered by an
event may be specified using if-then-else statements. At execution time, the
exact sequence of actions taken is determined by how the different conditions of
each if-then-else statements are evaluated in the system’s state at the time of
evaluation. Note that this state includes both the state of the persistence layer
and the state of the GUI, in particular, its widget variables. Since each action
may update the system’s state, a sequence of actions gives rise to a sequence of
states, which we call an execution path.
ActionGUI’s data model may include data invariants. We have given several
examples of these in Section 3.2. These are properties that are required to be
satisfied in every (reachable) system state. Invariance of a property must be
proven and the standard way to do this is to show that the property is inductive,
that is, it is satisfied in the system’s initial state and, whenever it is satisfied in
a state, it is satisfied in all possible successor states. Below we shall focus on the
inductive step: proving invariant preservation.
5 Less elegantly said, garbage in, garbage out.
Formally, let Φ be a collection of data invariants. An event preserves a data
invariant φ ∈ Φ if and only if for every execution path triggered by the event, if
every data invariant ψ ∈ Φ is satisfied at the initial state of the execution path,
then φ is also satisfied at the final state. Here we leverage ActionGUI’s trans-
action semantics and that transactions are implemented in a way that ensures
their atomicity: The intermediate states of an execution path may be considered
to be internal and may therefore (temporarily) violate ψ. An event is Φ-data
invariant preserving when it preserves all data invariants in Φ.
Our proof procedure, illustrated below, is based on the fact that each event
defines an action tree. The nodes in this tree are the actions triggered by the
event and branching corresponds to the if-then-else conditions governing the
execution of these actions. As expected, every successful transaction corresponds
to executing a sequence of actions given by one of the branches of the action
tree, from the root to a leaf. Note that, to simplify our exposition we omit both
iteration statements and event-triggering actions; including these would lead to
action graphs rather than trees.
1 Each patient is treated by a doctor.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|not(p.doctor.oclIsUndefined()))
2 Each patient is treated in a department.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|not(p.department.oclIsUndefined()))
3 Each patient is treated by a doctor who works for a set of departments that
includes the department where the patient is treated.
Patient.allInstances()→forAll(p|
p.doctor.doctorDepartments→includes(p.department))
Fig. 8. Examples of the EHRM data model’s invariants.
Reassigning doctors and departments to patients We show in Figure 9
the action tree defined by the the button moveBu’s event onClick. For ease of
later reference, we assign labels for the actions and the if-then-else conditions.
Note that:
– Branch 1 corresponds to the case when a department and a doctor are both
selected when the button moveBU is clicked-on. In this situation, the patient
will be first assigned to the selected department, and then to the selected
doctor; finally, a message confirming these actions will be displayed.
– Branch 2 corresponds to the case when a department is not selected when
the button moveBU is clicked-on. In this situation, a message stating that a
department must be first selected will be displayed.
– Branch 3 corresponds to the case when a department is selected, but a doctor
is not, when the button moveBU is clicked-on. In this situation, a message
stating that a doctor must first be selected will be displayed.
Next, we use this action tree to reason about whether the button moveBu’s
event onClick preserves the data invariants 1–3 listed in Figure 8.
Actions
assign dept = [$movePatientWi.patient$.department] := [$departmentsTa.selected$]
assign doctor = [$movePatientWi.patient$.doctor] := [$doctorsTa.selected$]
notify reassign = notification([’Success’],[’The patient is reassigned.’],[0])
error select doctor = notification([’Error’],[’Select first a doctor.’],[0])
error select dept = notification([’Error’],[’Select first a department.’],[0])
If-then-else conditions
a dept is selected = not $departmentsTa.selected$.oclIsUndefined()
a doctor is selected = not $doctorsTA.selected$.oclIsUndefined()
Branch 1






a dept is selected = false
nodes actions
1 error select dept
Branch 3
a dept is selected = true ∧ a doctor is selected = false
nodes actions
1 error select doctor
Fig. 9. Action tree for the button moveBU’s onClick.
Branch 1: Data invariants 1 and 2. Recall that these data invariants state that
every patient is assigned to exactly one doctor and one department. Observe
that the initial state in every successful transaction in this branch will satisfy the
conditions a dept is selected and a doctor is selected. Therefore the arguments
of the actions assign dept and assign doctor will necessarily not be null (neither
invalid) when these actions are called. Thus, the conditions a dept is selected and
a doctor is selected, together with the postconditions of the actions assign dept
and assign doctor, guarantee that every successful transaction in this branch
preserves the data invariants 1 and 2.
Branch 1: Data invariant 3. Recall that this data invariant states that every
patient is assigned to a department where its doctor works. Interestingly, there
is no guarantee that every successful transaction in this branch preserves the
data invariant 3. This is because the doctors shown in the table doctorsTa are
those belonging to the selected department at the time of this selection (line
19–21 in Figure 4); however, there is no guarantee that, by the time the user
clicks on the button moveBu, this relationship still holds for the selected doctor.
To guarantee that data invariant 3 is preserved by every successful transac-
tions in this branch, we can simply enclose the sequence of actions assing dept,
assig dept, and notifiy reassignment (lines 46-54 in Figure 5) within an (addi-
tional) if-then-else with the following condition:
$departmentsTa.selected$.doctors→includes($doctorsTa.selected$).
Branch 2 and 3. Since these branches do not contain any data actions, every
successful transaction in these branches will trivially preserve all the data model’s
invariants.
We conclude this section by summarizing in Figure 10(a) our analysis of
data invariant preservation for the button moveBu’s event onClick. For the sake
of illustration, we also consider in Figures 10(b) and 10(c) data invariant preser-
vation for two modified versions of the button moveBu’s event onClick. In the first
case, we have removed the innermost if-then-else, i.e., the one whose condition
checks that a doctor has been selected. In the second case, we have removed the
outermost if-then-else, i.e., the one whose condition checks that a department
has been selected. As expected, if we remove the innermost if-then-else, there is
no guarantee that data invariant 1, i.e., that every patient is assigned to exactly
one doctor, will be preserved. Similarly, if we remove the outermost if-then-else,
there is no guarantee that data invariant 2, i.e., that every patient is assigned
to exactly one department, will be preserved.
Branches
Invs. 1 2 3
1 3 3 3
2 3 3 3


















Fig. 10. Checking data invariants preservation for different versions of the button
moveBu’s onClick.
4.2 Checking data invariant preservation
We now describe how we check whether modeled events preserve data invariants.
Fix a data model D and a GUI model G. Let Φ be D’s declared invariants.
Let ev be an event in G and let B be a branch of ev ’s action tree containing
n actions. To check that every instance of B preserves the invariants in Φ, we
proceed as follows:
1. We define a ComponentUML data model Dn that represents all sequences
of n states. Recall that a state is any instance of the data model D along
with any assignment to the widget variables in G.
2. For 1 ≤ i < n, we formalize an OCL expression, in the context of Dn, that
the i-th action’s postconditions are satisfied in the (i+1)-th state. We denote
by Posts(B) the resulting set of OCL expressions.
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we formalize an OCL expression, in the context of Dn,
that the guard of the i-th action is satisfied in the i-th state. We denote by
Guards(B) the resulting set of OCL expressions.
4. For each invariant φ ∈ Φ, we formalize an OCL expression, in the context
of Dn, that φ is satisfied in the first state (initial state). We denote by Φ(1)
the resulting set of OCL expressions.
5. For each invariant φ ∈ Φ, we formalize an OCL expression ψ(n), in the
context of Dn, stating that ψ is satisfied in the n-th (final) state.
6. We prove that there is no instance of Dn that satisfies
Φ(1) ∪ Posts(B) ∪Guards(B) ∪ {¬ψ(n)} .
This formula expresses that there is no sequence of n states where the first state
satisfies all the invariants, each state satisfies the postcondition of the action
leading to it, each state satisfies the condition that guards the action leading to
the next state, and the final state does not satisfy ψ.
We have built a tool that implements the above steps. For every data model
D with invariants Φ, GUI model G, and event ev in G, our tool automatically
generates the set of branches Π corresponding to ev . Then, for each branch
B ∈ Π and invariant ψ ∈ Φ, it generates the data model Dn and the sets
of OCL expressions Φ(1), Posts(B), Guards(B), and {¬ψ(n)}, where n is B’s
length. Finally, our tool uses the mapping OCL2FOL+ [8] to generate the first-
order proof-score corresponding to step 6 above, both in SMT-LIB syntax [2]
and DFG syntax [14].
4.3 Analyzing the EHRM application
We report here on preliminary experiments where we used our tool to check
data invariant preservation for the EHRM application. The application’s full
GUI model only contains 8 events whose associated statements include data
actions, and therefore must be checked. Moreover, the action trees defined by
these events contain 49 branches in total, but only 8 of these branches include
data actions. Therefore, since the full EHRM application’s data model contains
66 invariants, we must perform a total of 528 checks (8 branches × 66 invariants)
to prove data invariant preservation for this application.
We ran these checks on a laptop computer, with a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2
Duo processor and 4Gb 1067MHz. memory, using SPASS [15] as the back-end
theorem-prover. Here we summarize the results. First, for branches containing up
to 3 data actions (50% of the non-trivial checks fall into this category, including
our running example) checking takes less than 10 milliseconds to return “proof
found” when the invariants are preserved. Second, when checking branches con-
taining 8-10 actions and 8-10 conditions (45% of the non-trivial checks), we also
obtain “proof found” in less than 30 seconds when the invariants are preserved,
except for some complex invariants where checking takes up to 3 minutes. Third,
for a branch containing 30 actions and 6 conditions, cheking also takes less than
40 seconds to return “proof found” when the invariants are preserved, except
again for some complex invariants where it takes up to 5 minutes.
Finally, note that all these results depend on the interaction between (i) the
way we formalize sequences of n states, OCL invariants, actions’ guards, and
actions’ post-conditions, and (ii) the heuristics implemented in the verification
back-end we use, here SPASS. We are currently analyzing this interaction in
depth to better understand the scope and limitations of our tool. For example,
we already know that SPASS seems not able to return “completion found” (we
timed out after four days) when, for the sake of experiment, we remove some
conditions from the branches, thereby violating some of the invariants.
5 Conclusions
This chapter complements the article [3], where we present the ActionGUI
methodology and tool in detail. [3] also contains an extensive comparison with
related work and provides summary statistics from five different developments.
The eHealth application was one of the smallest examples considered there and
other examples are roughly an order of magnitude larger, e.g., with hundreds
of windows, buttons, labels, and if-then-else statements and thousands of OCL
statements. In contrast, in this paper, we present one case study in detail. We
also describe model-based property checking, which was not addressed in [3].
Among the methodologies and tools reviewed in [3], UWE [7, 6, 11] and
ZOOM [10] are the most closely related to our work. As a modeling tool, UWE
provides the modeler with a higher-level of abstraction than ActionGUI. In par-
ticular, the actions executed by the widgets’ events are described in UWE using
natural language. Thus, unless the models are appropriately refined, as discussed
in [11], UWE does not support code-generation. In contrast, UWE provides spe-
cific diagrams for modeling GUI presentations and navigations, which facilitate
the task of GUI modeling. [6] extends UWE to use SecureUML for modeling
security policies. However, this work does not use model-transformation to lift
automatically the security policy to the GUI level. Instead the UWE modeler
is responsible for adding all the appropriate authorization checks to the GUI
model. Like ActionGUI, ZOOM allows GUI modelers to specify widgets, their
events, and their actions. Moreover, using an extension of Z [16], one can specify
the conditions of the actions and their arguments, similar to how this is done
in ActionGUI using OCL. In contrast to ActionGUI, ZOOM does not provide a
language for modeling security and security aspects are not explicitly considered
in this approach. Moreover, ZOOM does not support code-generation. It only
provides interpreters for model animation.
In the following we draw some conclusions based on our experience with the
eHealth application and developing other applications with ActionGUI. First,
ActionGUI’s security modeling language is well suited for modeling access con-
trol policies that combine both declarative and programmatic aspects. Declara-
tive access control policies depend on static information, namely the assignments
of users and permissions to roles. Programmatic access control depends on dy-
namic information, namely the satisfaction of authorization constraints in the
current system state. Programmatic access control is formalized using authoriza-
tion constraints and, as Section 3.3 illustrates, this allows us to model directly
the kinds of authorization rules considered in the eHealth case study.
Second, ActionGUI’s graphical user interface modeling language is well suited
for modeling dynamic web pages. These are pages, displayed at the client, that
are generated at the time of access by a user or that change as a result of user
interaction. As Section 3.4 illustrates, an important aspect of our methodology is
that developers can model this behavior independent of the access control policy.
The policy is later lifted from the security model to this behavioral model, as
described in Section 3.5.
Third, as explained in Section 3.6, the ActionGUI code generator can au-
tomatically generate ready-to-deploy, security-aware, data-management web ap-
plications. By data-management, we mean that most of the behavior described
in the GUI model is built from CRUD actions (which create, read, update and
delete data). When all behavior can be described this way, then the entire ap-
plication can be generated from the models, including a complete, configured
security infrastructure and back-end database support.
Finally, our case study illustrates how users can specify properties of Ac-
tionGUI models, such as invariant preservation. Moreover, as described in Sec-
tion 4, our approach to checking these properties based on translation to first-
order logic is practical, see also [5]. This is a form of model-checking and, as
in other domains, it has an important role to play in building and certifying
security-critical systems. Designers and system certifiers can reason about sys-
tems at the model level using automated tool support. Moreover, with our ap-
proach, they can afterwards generate model-conform, and therefore property-
conform, systems simply by pressing a button. Our experience with ActionGUI
shows that this is not merely a vision for the future, but it is realizable today,
at least for small and medium-scale data-management applications.
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Abstract. In this technical report we provide the formal account of our
ActionGUI methodology, including the semantics of the modeling lan-
guages that we use, the definition of our many-models-to-models trans-
formation, and the proof of its correctness.
1 ComponentUML
In this section we first define ComponentUML data models. Then, given a Com-
ponentUML data model D, we define D-object models. Finally, we define the
semantics of a ComponentUML data model D as the set Sem(D) of all the
D-object models.
Notation. Let TP = {Integer,Real,String,Boolean} be the set of Componen-
tUML primitive data types. In what follows, we denote by JtKTP the standard
carrier set of t, for each primitive data type t ∈ TP, e.g., JIntegerKTP = Z.
Let A ⊂ JStringKTP be the set of all finite strings that only contain letters of
the English alphabet.
1.1 ComponentUML data models
Definition. A ComponentUML data model is a tuple 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉 such
that:
– C ⊂ A is a set of class identifiers.
– AT is a set of triples 〈at , c, t〉, also represented as at (c,t), where at ∈ A is
an attribute identifier, c ∈ C, t ∈ C ∪ TP, and c and t are, respectively, the
class and the type of the attribute at .
– AS is a set of triples 〈as, c, c′〉, also denoted as as(c,c′), where as ∈ A is an
association-end identifier, c, c′ ∈ C, and c and c′ are, respectively, the source
and the target classes of as.
– ASO is a symmetric relation, ASO ⊆ AS × AS , where (as(c,c′), as ′(c′,c)) ∈
ASO represents that as ′ is the association-end opposite to as, and vice versa,
and c, c′ ∈ C.
Invariants.
– There is no class whose identifier also belongs to TP.
– Attributes and associations-ends of the same class always have different iden-
tifiers.
– Every association-end is related with exactly another association-end. That
is, for every tuple 〈as, c, c′〉 in AS , there exists exactly one other tuple
〈as ′, c′, c〉 in AS such that (〈as, c, c′〉, 〈as ′, c′, c〉) in ASO .
1.2 ComponentUML object models
Definition. Let D be a ComponentUML data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Then,
a D-object model is a tuple 〈O,VA,LK 〉, such that:
– O is a set of pairs 〈o, c〉, where o ∈ A is an object identifier and c ∈ C. Each
pair 〈o, c〉, also represented as oc, denotes that the object o is of the class c.
– VA is a set of triples 〈oc, at (c,t), va〉, where at (c,t) ∈ AT , oc ∈ O, t ∈ TP, and
va ∈ JtKTP is a value of type t. Each triple 〈oc, at (c,t), va〉 denotes that va is
the value of the attribute at of the object o.
– LK is a set of triples 〈oc, as(c,c′), o′c′〉, where as(c,c′) ∈ AS , and oc, o′c′ ∈ O.
Each tuple 〈oc, as(c,c′), o′c′〉 denotes that the object o′ is among the objects
that are linked to the object o through the association-end as.
Invariants.
– There are no two different values for the same attribute of the same object.
(However, it is not necessary that every attribute of an object has a value.)
– For every association-end as(c,c′) in AS , such that (as(c,c′), as
′
(c′,c)) in ASO , if
there is a link 〈oc, as(c,c′), o′c′〉 ∈ LK between two objects oc and o′c′ through
this association-end, then there is also a link 〈o′c′ , as ′(c′,c), oc〉 ∈ LK between
these two objects through the opposite association-end.
1.3 Semantics of ComponentUML data models
Definition. Let D be a ComponentUML data model. The semantics of D, de-
noted by Sem(D), is the set of all the ComponentUML D-object models.
2 SecureUML
In this section we first define SecureUML data actions and SecureUML autho-
rization constraints, both relative to a given ComponentUML data model. Then,
we define SecureUML security models, also relative to a given ComponentUML
model. Next, given a SecureUML security model S, we define S-authorized ac-
tions. Finally, we define the semantics of a SecureUML security model as the set
Sem(S) of all the S-authorized actions and, based on this definition, we define
the notion of a consistent SecureUML security model.
Notation. LetD be a data model, and let I be aD-object model, I = 〈O,VA,LK 〉.
In what follows, we will use the following notation:
– We denote by Typ(D) the set of all the OCL types, given the classes declared
in D. These types are defined in the OCL standard [1].
– We denote by Expr(D) the set of all the OCL expressions that haveD as their
contextual model. These expressions are defined in the OCL standard [1].
Note that, by definition, they do not contain free variables.
– Let X be a set of pairs 〈x, t〉, also written as xt, where x ∈ A is a variable
identifier of type t ∈ Typ(D). Then, we denote by Expr(D,X) the set of
all the OCL expressions that have D as their contextual model but that
may also contain variables in X as free variables. Moreover, for every expr ∈
Expr(D,X), we denote by FVar(expr) ⊆ X the set of all the free variables
contained in expr .
– We denote by Expr(DI) the set of all the OCL expressions that have D as
their contextual model and may also contain as constants the objects oc ∈ O.
– Let expr be an OCL expression in Expr(DI). Then, we denote by JexprKI
the evaluation of the expression expr in the object model I, as defined in the
OCL standard [1]. Note that the evaluation of an OCL expression always
return a literal expression in Expr(DI), which can not be further reduced
and which does not contain any variables.
– Let X be a set of variables xt, where t ∈ Typ(D). Then, a (X, I)-substitution
θ is a function, θ : X → Expr(DI), that assigns to each variable in X an
expression in Expr(DI) of the appropriate type.
Now, let xt ∈ X be a variable and let expr in Expr(DI) be an expres-
sion of type t. Then, we denote by θ ⊕ {xt 7→ expr}, θ ⊕ {xt 7→ expr} :
X → Expr(DI), the overriding of θ by {xt 7→ expr}. That is, θ ⊕ {xt 7→
expr}(xt) = expr , but, for every other x′t′ ∈ X, xt 6= x′t′ , θ ⊕ {xt 7→
expr}(x′t′) = θ(x′t′).
Moreover, for every (X, I)-substitution θ, we denote as θˆ the homomorphic
extension of θ over the set Expr(D,X). Finally, for expr ∈ Expr(D,X), we
write θˆ(expr) as (expr)θ.
2.1 SecureUML data actions
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Then, we denote by
Act(D) the set of all the (atomic) data actions that can be executed on D-
object models. Act(D) is defined as follows: for every class c ∈ C, every attribute
at (c,t) ∈ AT , and every association-end as(c,c′) ∈ AS ,
Create(c),Delete(c) ∈ Act(D).
Read(at (c,t)),Update(at (c,t)) ∈ Act(D).
Read(as(c,c′)),Create(as(c,c′)),Delete(as(c,c′)) ∈ Act(D).
The notation action(resource) reflects that data actions are always upon
resources.
2.2 SecureUML authorization constraints
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let u ∈ C be a class
that represents the users. Let act ∈ Act(D) be a data action. Then, we denote
by AuthExpr(D,u, act) the set of all the authorization constraints that can be
imposed on users of type u for executing the data action act with respect to
the data model D. Informally, an authorization constraint is an (extended) OCL
expression that may contain distinguished keywords (logically interpreted as free
variables) that refer to the user attempting to execute the action (caller), to the
data upon which the action is to be executed (self), or to the data that the action
takes as its arguments (value and target).
More formally, AuthExpr(D,u, act) is defined as follows: for every class c ∈
C, every attribute at (c,t) ∈ AT , and every association-end as(c,c′) ∈ AS :
AuthExpr(D,u,Create(c)) = Expr(D, {calleru}).
AuthExpr(D,u,Delete(c)) = Expr(D, {selfc, calleru}).
AuthExpr(D,u,Read(at (c,t))) = Expr(D, {selfc, calleru}).
AuthExpr(D,u,Update(at (c,t))) = Expr(D, {selfc, valuet, calleru}).
AuthExpr(D,u,Read(as(c,c′))) = Expr(D, {selfc, calleru}).
AuthExpr(D,u,Create(as(c,c′))) = Expr(D, {selfc, targetc′ , calleru}).
AuthExpr(D,u,Delete(as(c,c′))) = Expr(D, {selfc, targetc′ , calleru}).
2.3 SecureUML security models
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Then, a SecureUML D-
security model S is a tuple 〈D,R,RH , u, P 〉 such that:
– R ⊂ A is a set of role identifiers.
– RH ⊂ R×R is a partial order representing the role hierarchy.
– u ∈ C is a class that represents the users.
– P is a set of triples 〈r, act , expr〉 representing permissions: namely, that the
role r ∈ R is granted permission for the action act ∈ Act(D) provided the
constraint expr ∈ AuthExpr(D,u, act) is satisfied.
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let S be a D-security
model 〈D,R,RH , u, P 〉. Then, AuthPerm(S, r, act) is the disjunction of all the
authorization constraints controlling the access for users in the role r to execute
the action act , according to S. AuthPerm(S, r, act) is defined as follows: Let
Q = {expr | ∃r′ ∈ R. 〈r′, act , expr〉 ∈ P ∧ (r, r′) ∈ RH }. Then,
AuthPerm(S, r, act) =
{
expr1 or . . . or exprn, if Q = {expr1, . . . , exprn}.
false, if Q = ∅.
Note that, by definition, AuthPerm(S, r, act) ∈ Expr(D,X), where X is the
set containing calleru plus the appropriate instances of self, target, and value,
depending on the type of the action act .
2.4 SecureUML authorized actions
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let S be a D-security
model 〈D,R,RH , u, P 〉. Let I be a D-object model 〈O,VA,LK 〉. Let ou ∈ O be
a user, r ∈ R be a role, and act ∈ Act(D) be a D-data action. Moreover, let θ
be a (FVar(AuthPerm(S, r, act)), I)-substitution.
Then, 〈I, ou, r, act , θ〉 is an S-authorized action if and only if
JAuthPerm(S, r, act)(θ ⊕ {calleru 7→ ou})KI = true.
Note that, given our definition of AuthPerm,
– No permission is granted for executing an action, unless it is explicitly de-
clared.
– All permissions are inherited along the role hierarchy.
2.5 Semantics of SecureUML security models
Definition. Let D be a data model and let S be a D-security model. Then, the
semantics of S, given by Sem(S), is the set of all the S-authorized actions.
3 GUIML
In this section we first define GUIML layout models, which simply model graph-
ical user interfaces without considering their behaviors. Then, we define GUIML
statements, which specify sequences of actions that are possibly conditional and
iterated. Next, we define GUIML behavioral models, which are GUIML layout
models but also with associated behavior, i.e., with statements associated to
each of the widget events. Finally, we define a set of inference rules that will
provide the (operational) semantics of GUIML events as the set Sem(G, ev) of
all the transitions defined by these rules.
Notation. In what follows, let ET be the set of GUIML event types,
ET = {onClick, onCreate}.
Also, let WT be the set of GUIML widget types,
WT = {Window,Table,Combo-box,
Button,Text field, Label,Boolean check}.
3.1 GUIML layout models
Definition. A GUIML layout model H is a tuple 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉 such that:
– W is a set of pairs 〈w,wt〉, also represented as wwt , where w ∈ A is a widget
identifier, and wt ∈WT is the widget’s type.
– WC ⊂W ×W is a relation representing the widget containment.
– X is a set of pairs 〈〈x, t〉, 〈w,wt〉〉, called widget variables, also represented
as 〈xt, wwt〉, where x is a variable identifier, t ∈ Typ(D) is the variable’s
type, and 〈w,wt〉 ∈W is the widget that owns this variable.
– EV is a set of pairs 〈ev , 〈w,wt〉〉, also represented as 〈ev , wwt〉, where ev ∈
ET is an event type and 〈w,wt〉 ∈W is the widget that supports this event
type.
Invariants.
– The containment relation WC defines set of rooted trees. Moreover, at the
root of every tree in WC there is a widget of type Window and, conversely,
every widget in W of type Window is the root of a tree in WC .
– There are no two variables owned by the same widget with the same identi-
fier.
– If two widgets are directly contained in the same widget, then they have
different identifiers.
Notation. Let H be a GUIML layout model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉. In what follows
we will use the following notation:
– We denote by WC+ the transitive closure of the containment relation defined
in WC .
– Let wwt ∈ W be a widget in W , wt 6= Window. Then, we denote by
Win(H,wwt) the window that contains wwt in W , i.e., (wwt ,Win(H,wwt)) ∈
WC+.
– Let wwt ∈ W be a widget in W . Then, we denote by Var(H,wwt) the set
of variables in X that are owned by wwt , i.e., Var(H,wwt) = {〈xt, w′wt′〉 |
〈xt, w′wt′〉 ∈ X ∧ wwt = w′wt′}.
– Let wwt ∈ W be a widget in W . Then, we denote by Var](H,wwt) the set
of the variables in X that are visible from wwt . Var
](H,wwt) is defined as
follows:
Var](H,wwt) = Var(H,wwt) ∪
{〈xt, w′wt′〉 | 〈xt, w′wt′〉 ∈ Var(H,w′wt′) ∧
(w′wt′ ,Win(H,wwt)) ∈WC+}.
Note that, by definition, if two widgets are contained in the same window,
then their sets of visible variables are identical. Also, the set of visible vari-
ables of a widget is the same than the set of visible variables of the widget’s
containing window.
3.2 GUIML statements
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let H be a GUIML layout
model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉. Let wwt be a window in H, i.e., wWindow ∈ W . Then,
we denote by Stm(D,H,w) the set of all the statements that can be written in
the context of the window w. This set is inductively defined as follows:
Base case (data actions): The building block for statements are the data ac-
tions along with the GUI actions. The GUIML data actions are the SecureUML
data actions introduced before, except that they now take additional arguments
that, depending on the action’s type, either specify, using OCL (extended with
widget variables), the object self upon which the action is to be executed,
or the value and target of this action, or indicate the widget variable where
the action’s outcome is to be stored. To reflect this difference between the
GUIML data actions and their corresponding SecureUML data actions, we use
the notation action(resource)[arguments] for GUIML data actions. Thus, if
action(resource)[arguments] is a GUIML data action, then action(resource) is
its corresponding SecureML data action.
– For every entity create action Create(c) ∈ Act(D) and every variable of type
c in Var](H,wwt), then
Create(c)[variable] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every entity delete action Delete(c) ∈ Act(D) and every expression self
of type c in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), then
Delete(c)[self ] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every attribute read action Read(at (c,t)) ∈ Act(D), every expression self
of type c in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), and every widget variable of type t in
Var](H,wwt), then
Read(at (c,t))[self , variable] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every attribute update action Update(at (c,t)) ∈ Act(D), every expression
self of type c in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), and every expression value of type
t in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), then
Update(at (c,t))[self , value] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every association-end read action Read(as(c,c′)) ∈ Act(D), every ex-
pression self of type c in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), and every variable of type
Set(c′) in Var](H,wwt), then
Read(as(c,c′))[self , variable] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every association-end create action Create(as(c,c′)) ∈ Act(D), every ex-
pression self of type c in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), and every expression target
of type c′ in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), then
Create(as(c,c′))[self , target ] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every association-end delete action Delete(as(c,c′)) ∈ Act(D), every ex-
pression self of type c in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), and every expression target
of type c′ in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), then
Delete(as(c,c′))[self , target ] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
Base case (GUI actions):
– For every type t ∈ Typ(D), every variable of type t in Var](H,wwt) and
every expression value of type t in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), then
Set[variable, value] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every window 〈w′,Window〉 ∈ W , every list of variables variable1,. . . ,
variablen, such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, variablei is of type ti in Var(H,w′Window),
and every list of expressions value1, . . . , valuen, such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
valuei is of type ti in Expr(D,Var
](H,wwt)), then




– For every expression cond of type Boolean in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)), and
every statements stm1, stm2 ∈ Stm(D,H,w), then
if then else[cond , stm1, stm2] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For every expression source of type Sequence(t) in Expr(D,Var](H,wwt)),
every widget variable variable of type t in Var](H,wwt), and every statement
body ∈ Stm(D,H,w), then
iterator[source, variable, body ] ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
– For all statements stm, stm ′ ∈ Stm(D,H,w), then
stm ; stm ′ ∈ Stm(D,H,w).
3.3 Behavioral GUIML models
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let H be a GUIML
layout model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉. Then, a GUIML behavioral model G is a tuple
〈D,H,EST 〉 such that:
– EST is a set of pairs 〈〈ev , wwt〉, stm〉, where
• 〈ev , wwt〉 ∈ EV is an event.
• stm ∈ Stm(D,H,Win(H,wwt)) is the statement associated to this event.
Invariants.
– Every event is associated with exactly one statement.
– In every sequence of statement associated to an event, the GUI actions Open
and Back can only appear (if at all) at the last position.5
5 When this last position is occupied by an if-then-else, then Open and Back can only
appear (if at all) at the last position of its then- or else-branches (and recursively in
the case of nested if-then-elses). The situation is similar for iterator statements.
3.4 Operational semantics for events
Notation. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let I be a D-object model
〈O,VA,LK 〉. In what follows we will use the following notation:
– Let oc ∈ O be an object. Then, (VA \ oc) denotes the set that results
from deleting from VA every triple that contains oc. That is, (VA \ oc) =
{〈o′c′ , at (c′,t′), va〉 | 〈o′c′ , at (c′,t′), va〉 ∈ VA ∧ o′c′ 6= oc}.
– Let oc ∈ O be an object. Then, (LK \ oc) denotes the set that results
from deleting from LK every triple that contains oc. That is, (LK \ oc) =
{〈o′c′ , as(c′,c′′), o′′c′′〉 | 〈o′c′ , as(c′,c′′), o′′c′′〉 ∈ LK ∧ o′c′ 6= oc ∧ o′′c′′ 6= oc}.
– Let at (c,t) ∈ AT be an attribute. Let oc ∈ O be an object and let va ∈JtKTP be a value of type t. Then VA ⊕ 〈oc, at (c,t), va〉 denotes the set that
results from overriding (i.e., updating) in VA the value of the attribute at
of the object oc with va. That is, (VA⊕〈oc, at (c,t), va〉) = {〈oc, at (c,t), va〉}∪
{〈o′c′ , at ′(c′,t′), va ′〉 | 〈o′c′ , at ′(c′,t′), va ′〉 ∈ VA ∧ o′c′ 6= oc ∧ at ′(c′,t′) 6= at (c,t)}.
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉. Let H be a GUIML layout
model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉. Let G be a GUIML behavioral model 〈D,H,EST 〉. Let
ev ∈ EV be an event in G with 〈ev , stm〉 ∈ EST . Then, Sem(G, ev) is the set
of all the transitions
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗ 〈Skip, I ′, θ′〉
where −→∗ is the transitive closure of the small-step transition relation −→ de-
fined by the following inference rules. For every D-object model I = 〈O,VA,LK 〉
and every (X, I)-substitution we have:
Base case (data actions)
oc 6∈ O
〈Create(c)[variable], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, 〈O ∪ {oc},VA,LK 〉, θ ⊕ {variable 7→ oc}〉
.
J(self )θKI = o
〈Delete(c)[self ], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, 〈(O \ oc), (VA \ oc), (LK \ oc)〉, θ〉
.
J(self .at)θKI = va
〈Read(at (c,t))[self , variable], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, I, θ ⊕ {variable 7→ va}〉
.
J(self )θKI = o, J(value)θKI = va
〈Update(at (c,t))[self , value], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, 〈O, (VA⊕ 〈o, at , va〉),LK 〉, θ〉
.
J(self .as)θKI = {o1, . . . , on}
〈Read(as(c,c′))[self , variable], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, I, θ ⊕ {variable 7→ {o1, . . . , on}〉
.
J(self )θKI = o, J(target)θKI = o′, (as(c,c′), as ′(c′,c)) ∈ ASO
〈Create(as(c,c′))[self , target ], I, θ〉 −→
〈Skip, 〈O,VA, (LK ∪ {〈o, as, o′〉, 〈o′, as ′, o〉})〉, θ〉
.
J(self )θKI = o, J(target)θKI = o′, (as(c,c′), as ′(c′,c)) ∈ ASO
〈Delete(as(c,c′))[self , target ], I, θ〉 −→
〈Skip, 〈O,VA, (LK \ {〈o, as, o′〉, 〈o′, as ′, o〉})〉, θ〉
.
Base case (GUI actions)
J(value)θKI = va
〈Set[variable, value], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, I, θ ⊕ {variable 7→ va}〉 .
〈Open[〈w,Window〉, (variable, value)], I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, I, θ〉 .
〈Back, I, θ〉 −→ 〈Skip, I, θ〉 .
Inductive case
J(cond)θKI = true
〈If then else[cond , stm1, stm2], I, θ〉 −→ 〈stm1, I, θ〉
.
J(cond)θKI = false
〈If then else[cond , stm1, stm2], I, θ〉 −→ 〈stm2, I, θ〉
.
J(source)θKI = [v1, . . . , vn]
〈Iterator[source, variable, body ], I, θ〉 −→
〈(Set(variable, v1) ; body ; . . . ; Set(variable, vn) ; body), I, θ〉
.
〈stm1, I, θ〉 −→ 〈stm ′1, I ′, θ′〉
〈(stm1 ; stm2), I, θ〉 −→ 〈stm ′1 ; stm2, I ′, θ′〉
.
〈(Skip ; stm2), I, θ〉 −→ 〈stm2, I, θ〉
.
4 Security-aware GUIML
In this section we first characterize security-awareness of GUIML behavior mod-
els in terms of a transition relation defined by a security-aware version of the
inference rules that define the (non security-aware) operational semantics of
GUIML events. Then, we define a model transformation that, given a GUIML
model G and a SecureUML model S, generates a new GUIML model that is se-
curity aware with respect to S. Finally, we formalize and prove the correctness
of our model transformation.
4.1 Operational semantics for security-aware events
Informally, security-aware events are those events where the execution of the
associated actions are conditional on the satisfaction of the corresponding au-
thorization constraints. However, which constraint these are depends, of course,
on the role of the actual user who triggers this event. Thus, in order to be able
to refer to the user’s role (when specifying the aforementioned conditions within
the statement associated to the event), we will explicitly require that:
– The underlying data model D includes a class Role, with an attribute name
of type String.
– Every window in the GUIML model owns two distinguished variables, caller
(of the same type than the users) and role (of type Role), whose intented
values are, respectively, the actual user and its role
Moreover, when discussing security-awareness with respect to a security model
S we will be interested only in D-object models whose objects of type Role are
conformant with the roles declared in S, in the following sense: Let D be a data
model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉, such that Role ∈ C and 〈name,Role,String〉 ∈ AT . Let
S be a D-security model 〈D,R,RH, u, P 〉. Let I = 〈O,VA,LK 〉 be a D-object
model. Then, we say that I is R-conformant if and only if
R = {va | 〈oRole, name(Role,String), va〉 ∈ VA}.
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉, such that Role ∈ C and
〈name,Role,String〉 ∈ AT . Let S be a D-security model 〈D,R,RH, u, P 〉. Let H
be a GUIML layout model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉 such that, for every wWindow ∈ W ,
〈roleRole, wWindow〉 ∈ X and 〈calleru, wWindow〉 ∈ X. Let G be a GUIML behavioral
model 〈D,H,EST 〉. Let ev ∈ EV be an event in G whose associated statement
is stm, i.e., 〈ev , stm〉 ∈ EST . Then, the security-aware operational semantics for
the event ev is given by the set of all the transitions
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗sec 〈Skip, I ′, θ′〉
such that I is R-conformant and −→∗sec is the transitive closure of the small-step
transition relation −→sec defined by the security-aware versions of the inference
rules that define the operational semantics of GUIML events. Formally, for every
GUIML data action act [arg ], the security-aware version of the corresponding
inference rule includes the following additional condition:
J(AuthPerm(S, J(roleWin(H,ev).name)θKI , act)(Subst(act [arg])))θKI = true,
where Subst(act [arg ]) is the substitution defined below, which depends on the
type of the action act .
Subst(Create(c)[variable]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉}.
Subst(Delete(c)[self ]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉, selfc 7→ self }.
Subst(Read(at (c,t))[self , variable]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉, selfc 7→ self }.
Subst(Update(at (c,t))[self , value]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉, selfc 7→ self , valuet 7→ value}.
Subst(Read(as(c,c′))[self , variable]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉, selfc 7→ object}.
Subst(Create(as(c,c′))[self , target ]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉, selfc 7→ self , targetc′ 7→ target}.
Subst(Delete(as(c,c′))[self , target ]) =
{calleru 7→ 〈calleru, wWindow〉, selfc 7→ self , targetc′ 7→ target}.
The inference rules for GUI actions are not modified in their security-aware
versions. The inference rules for if-then-else statements, iterator statements, or
sequences of statements also remain unmodified.
4.2 Security-aware model transformation
Definition. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉, such that Role ∈ C and
〈name,Role,String〉 ∈ AT . Let S be a D-security model 〈D,R,RH, u, P 〉. Let H
be a GUIML layout model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉 such that, for every wWindow ∈ W ,
〈roleRole, wWindow〉 ∈ X and 〈calleru, wWindow〉 ∈ X. Let G be a GUIML behav-
ioral model 〈D,H,EST 〉. Then, Sec(G,S) is the S-security-aware version of G,
defined as follows:
Sec(G,S) = 〈D,H, {〈ev ,Sec(stm, S)〉 | 〈ev , stm〉 ∈ EST}〉.
Here Sec(stm, S) is the S-security-aware version of the statement stm associated
to the event ev , defined recursively as follows:
Base case (data actions): Let R = {r1, . . . , rn}. Then,
Sec(act [arg], S) =
If then else[r1 = roleWin(H,ev).name,




If then else[rn = roleWin(H,ev).name,
If then else[AuthPerm(S, rn, act)(Subst(act [arg ])),
act [arg]),
Fail],
Fail] . . . ].
Here Subst(act [arg ]) is the substitution defined above, where wWindow is in this
case the window that contains the widget that supports the event ev .
Base case (GUI actions):
Sec(Set[variable, value], S) = Set[variable, value].
Sec(Back, S) = Back.
Sec(Skip, S) = Skip.
Sec(Open[wWindow, (variable, value)], S) = Open(wWindow, (variable, value)).
Inductive cases.
Sec(if then else[cond , stm1, stm2], S) =
if then else[cond ,Sec(stm1, S),Sec(stm2, S)].
Sec(iterator[source, variable, body ], S) = iterator[source, variable,Sec(body , S)].
Sec((stm1 ; stm2), S) = (Sec(stm1, S) ; Sec(stm2, S)).
4.3 Correctness
The following theorem basically states that the evaluation of a transformed state-
ment following the non-security-aware operational semantics for events returns
the same result than its evaluation using the security-aware version of this seman-
tics and, therefore, that the transformed statement respects the authorization
constraints formalized in the underlying security model.
Theorem. Let D be a data model 〈C,AT ,AS ,ASO〉, such that Role ∈ C and
〈name,Role,String〉 ∈ AT . Let S be a D-security model 〈D,R,RH, u, P 〉. Let H
be a GUIML layout model 〈W,WC , X,EV 〉 such that for every wWindow ∈ W ,
〈roleRole, wWindow〉 ∈ X and 〈calleru, wWindow〉 ∈ X. Let G be a GUIML be-
havioral model 〈D,H,EST 〉. Let wWindow ∈ W be a window and let stm ∈
Stm(D,H,w). Then, for every R-conformant D-object data model I, and every
(X, I)-substitution θ,
〈Sec(stm, S), I, θ〉 −→∗ 〈Skip, I ′, θ′〉.⇐⇒
〈stm, I, θ〉 −→∗sec 〈Skip, I ′, θ′〉.
Proof. By induction on stm.
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Abstract. In this tutorial we survey a very promising instance of model-
driven security: the full generation of security-aware graphical user in-
terfaces (GUIs) from models for data-centric applications with access
control policies. We describe the modeling concepts and languages em-
ployed and how model transformation can be used to automatically lift
security policies from data models to GUI models. We work through a
case study where we generate a security-aware GUI for a chatroom ap-
plication. We also present a toolkit that supports the construction of
security, data, and GUI models and generates complete, deployable, web
applications from these models.
1 Introduction
Model building is at the heart of system design. This is true in many engineering
disciplines and is increasingly the case in software engineering. Model-driven en-
gineering (MDE) [7] is a software development methodology that focuses on cre-
ating models of different system views from which system artifacts such as code
and configuration data are automatically generated. Proponents of model-driven
engineering have in the past been guilty of making overambitious claims: posi-
tioning it as the Holy Grail of software engineering where modeling completely
replaces programming. This vision is, of course, unrealizable in its entirety for
simple complexity-theoretic reasons. If the modeling languages are sufficiently
expressive then basic problems such as the consistency of the different models or
views of a system become undecidable. However, there are specialized domains
where MDE can truly deliver its full potential: in our opinion, security-aware
GUIs for data-centric applications is one of them.
Data-centric applications are applications that manage information, typically
stored in a database. In many cases, users access this information through graph-
ical user interfaces (GUIs). Informally, a GUI consists of widgets (e.g., windows,
text-fields, lists, and combo-boxes), which are visual elements that display and
A. Aldini and R. Gorrieri (Eds.): FOSAD VI, LNCS 6858, pp. 101–124, 2011.
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store information and support events (like “clicking-on” or “typing-in”). A GUI
defines the layout for the widgets, as well as the actions that the widgets’ events
trigger either on the application’s database (e.g., to create, delete, or update
information) or upon other widgets (e.g., to open or close a window).
There is an important, but little explored, link between visualization and se-
curity: When the application data is protected by an access control policy, the
application GUI should be aware of and respect this policy. For example, the
GUI should not display options to users for actions (e.g., to read or update in-
formation) that they are not authorized to execute on application data. This, of
course, prevents the users from getting (often cryptic) security warnings or error
messages directly from the database management system. It also prevents user
frustration, for example from filling out a long electronic form only to have the
server reject it because the user lacks a permission to execute some associated
action on the application data. However, manual encoding the application’s se-
curity policy within the GUI code is cumbersome and error prone. Moreover, the
resulting code is difficult to maintain, since any changes in the security policy
will require manual changes to the GUI code.
In this tutorial we spell out our model-driven engineering approach for devel-
oping security-aware GUIs for data-centric applications. The backbone of this
approach, illustrated in Figure 1, is a model transformation that automatically
lifts the access control policy modeled at the level of the data to the level of
the GUI [2]. More precisely, given a security model (specifying the access con-
trol policy on the application data) and a GUI model (specifying the actions
triggered by the events supported by the GUI’s widgets), our model transforma-
tion generates a GUI model that is security-aware. The key idea underlying this
transformation is that the link between visualization and security is ultimately
defined in terms of data actions, since data actions are both controlled by the
security policy and triggered by the events supported by the GUI. Thus, under
our approach, the process of modeling and generating security-aware GUI has
the following parts:
1. Software engineers specify the application-data model.
2. Security engineers specify the security-design model.
3. GUI designers specify the application GUI model.
4. A model transformation automatically generates a security-awareGUI model
from the security model and the GUI model.
5. A code generator automatically produces a security-aware GUI from the
security-aware model.
The other key components of this approach are the languages that we propose for
modeling the data (ComponentUML), the access control policy (SecureUML),
and the GUI (ActionGUI). These languages are defined by their corresponding
metamodels and support the rigorous modeling of a large class of data models,
security models, and GUI models. For data models, the main modeling elements
are entities, along with their attributes and associations; for security models,



















Fig. 1. Model-driven development of security-aware GUIs
these elements are roles, permissions (possibly constrained at runtime to satisfy
given properties), and the actions associated to these permissions. For GUI mod-
els, these elements are widgets, the (possibly conditional) events associated to
these widgets, and the (possibly conditional) actions associated to these events.
The constraint language OCL [10] is used in all of these models. For security
models, OCL is used to formalize the constraints on the permissions. For GUI
models, it is used to formalize the conditions on the actions, as well as to specify
the information to be displayed in widgets, updated in the database, or passed
from one widget to another.
To support a full model-driven engineering development process, we have built
a toolkit, named the ActionGUI Toolkit. This features specialized model editors
for data, security, and GUI models, and implements the aforementioned model
transformation to automatically generate security-aware GUI models. Moreover,
our toolkit includes a code generator that, given a security-aware GUI model,
automatically produces a complete web application, ready to be deployed in
web containers such as Tomcat or GlassFish. A key component of this code
generator is our translator from OCL to an SQL-based query language [5], which
handles the OCL expressions appearing in the security-aware GUI models. More
information about our ActionGUI Toolkit can be found at the URL http://
www.bm1software.com/actiongui.html.
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Overall, we see the full generation of security-aware GUIs from models for
data-centric applications as a very promising application for model-driven en-
gineering. By working with models and using code-generators to produce the
final products, GUI designers can focus on the GUI’s layout and behavior,
instead of wrestling with the different, often complex, technologies that are
used to implement them. Moreover, by using model transformations, the prob-
lem of establishing the link between visualization and security is successfully
addressed.
To appreciate this last point, consider the standard alternative: the default,
“ad-hoc” solution of directly hard-coding the security policy within the GUI.
This is clearly disadvantageous. First, the GUI designer is often unaware of
the application data security policy. Second, even if the designer is aware of it,
manual hard-coding the application data security policy within the GUI code
is cumbersome and error-prone. Finally, any changes in the security policy will
require manual changes to the GUI code that implements this policy, which again
is cumbersome and error-prone.
Organization
We explain in this tutorial our approach for developing security-aware GUIs for
data-centric applications and present a toolkit, named ActionGUI, supporting
this approach. We begin in Sections 2–4 by introducing our modeling languages
for data models (ComponentUML), security models (SecureUML), and GUI
models (ActionGUI). We also introduce our running example: a basic chatroom
application. In Section 5, we discuss the problem of lifting the security require-
ments from data models to GUI models, and we present our solution: a model
transformation that automatically transforms a GUI model into a security-aware
GUI model with respect to the security requirements imposed on the underlying
data model. We conclude this tutorial with a discussion on current and future
work. All of the models we present here (and many more) are available at the
ActionGUI home page. The interested reader can also evaluate there the code
generated by the ActionGUI Toolkit from these models.
2 Data Models: ComponentUML
In this and the next two sections, we introduce the modeling languages that we
use for the model-driven development of security-aware GUIs for data
centric applications. These languages are: ComponentUML, for modeling data;
SecureUML, for modeling the access control policy; and ActionGUI, for model-
ing the application’s GUI. To illustrate the main modeling concepts and rela-
tionships provided by these languages, we work through a running example: a
simple chat application named ChitChat, which supports multiple chat rooms
where users can converse with each other in different chat rooms. We begin
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then with ComponentUML, which is the language that we use for modeling
the application data. ComponentUML also gives us a context to introduce the
constraint language OCL [10], which we intensively use in our approach when
modeling both access control policies and the application’s GUIs.
Data models provide a data-oriented view of a system. Typically they are used
to specify how data is structured, the format of data items, and their logical
organization, i.e., how data items are grouped and related. ComponentUML
essentially provides a subset of UML class models where entities (classes) can
be related by associations and may have attributes and methods. Attributes and
association-ends have types (either primitive types or entity types). As expected,
the type associated to an attribute is the type of the attribute’s values, and the
type associated to an association-end is the type of the objects which may be
linked at this end of the association. The ComponentUML metamodel is shown
in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. The ComponentUML metamodel
The ChitChat data model. In our ChitChat application, each user has a nick-
name, a password, an e-mail address, a mood message, and a status. The user
may participate and be invited to participate in any number of chat rooms. Each
chat room is created by a user, has a name, a starting and ending date, and it
manages the messages sent by its participants.
The table shown in Figure 3 specifies the data model of the ChitChat ap-
plication, using the concepts and relationships provided by ComponentUML.
Each row in this table corresponds to an entity, and shows its attributes and
association-ends, with their corresponding types. Notice that we also indicate,
for each association-end, the association-end which corresponds to the other end
of the association. The reader can find on the ActionGUI home page the graph-
ical representation of the ChitChat data model using the concrete syntax for
ComponentUML that is supported by the ActionGUI Toolkit.
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Entity Attribute Type AssocEnd Type Other end
nickname String msgSent ChatMessage from
password String participates ChatRoom participants
email String owns ChatRoom ownedBy
ChatUser moodMsg String invitedTo ChatRoom invitees
status String
name String messages ChatMessage chat
ChatRoom start Date participants ChatUser participates
end Date ownedBy ChatUser owns
invitees ChatUser invitedTo
body String from ChatUser msgSent
ChatMessage chat ChatRoom messages
Fig. 3. The ChitChat data specification
OCL: constraints and queries
The Object Constraint Language (OCL) [10] is a specification language for ex-
pressing constraints and queries using a textual notation. As part of the UML
standard, it was originally intended for modeling properties that could not be
easily or naturally captured using graphical notation (e.g., class invariants in a
UML class diagram). In fact, OCL expressions are always written in the context
of a model, and they are evaluated on an instance of this model. This evaluation
returns a value but does not change anything; OCL is a side-effect free language.
We summarize here the main elements of the OCL language which are used
in this tutorial. OCL is a strongly type language. Expressions either have a
primitive type (namely, Boolean, Integer, Real, and String), a class type, or a col-
lection type, whose base type is either a primitive type or a class type. OCL
provides the standard operators on primitive types and on collections. For ex-
ample, the operator includes checks whether an object is part of a collection, and
the operator isEmpty checks whether a collection is empty. More interestingly,
OCL provides a dot-operator to access the values of the objects’ attributes and
association-ends. For example, let u be an object of the class ChatUser. Then, the
expression u.nickname refers to the value of the attribute nickname for the ChatUser
u, and the expression u.participates refers to the objects linked to the ChatUser u
through the association-end participates. Furthermore, OCL provides the opera-
tor allInstances to access to all the objects of a class. For example, the expression
ChatRoom.allInstances() refers to all the objects of the class ChatRoom. Finally,
OCL provides operators to iterate on collections. These are forAll, exists, select,
reject, and collect. For example, ChatUser.allInstances()−>select(u|u.status=’on−line’)
refers to the collection of objects of the class ChatUsers whose attribute status has
the value “on-line”.
ChitChat’s entity invariants. To illustrate the syntax (and the semantics) of the
OCL language, we formalize here some entity (class) invariants for ChitChat’s
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data model. For example, the following OCL expression formalizes that users’
nicknames must be unique:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>forall(u1,u2| u1 <> u2 implies u1.nickname <> u2.nickname).
Similarly, we can formalize that the status of a ChitChat user is either “off-
line” or “on-line” using the following OCL expression:
ChatUser.allInstances() −>forall(u|u.status=’off−line’ or u.status=’on−line’).
Finally, we can formalize that each message has exactly one sender:
ChatMessage.allInstances()−>forAll(m|m.from−>size()= 1).
3 Security Models: SecureUML+ComponentUML
SecureUML [3] is a modeling language for formalizing access control require-
ments that is based on RBAC [6]. In RBAC, permissions specify which roles are
allowed to perform given operations. These roles typically represent job func-
tions within an organization. Users are granted permissions by being assigned
to the appropriate roles based on their competencies and responsibilities in the
organization. RBAC additionally allows one to organize the roles in a hierarchy
where roles can inherit permissions along the hierarchy. In this way, the security
policy can be described in terms of the hierarchical structure of an organiza-
tion. However, it is not possible in RBAC to specify policies that depend on
dynamic properties of the system state, for example, to allow an operation only
during weekdays. SecureUML extends RBAC with authorization constraints to
overcome this limitation.
SecureUML provides a language for specifying access control policies for ac-
tions on protected resources. However, it leaves open what the protected re-
sources are and which actions they offer to actors. These are specified in a
so-called “dialect”. Figure 4 shows the SecureUML metamodel. Essentially, it
provides a language for modeling roles (with their hierarchies), permissions, ac-
tions, resources, and authorization constraints, along with their assignments, i.e.,
which permissions are assigned to a role, which actions are allowed by a permis-
sion, which resource is affected by the actions allowed by a permission, which
constraints need to be satisfied for granting a permission, and, finally, which
resource is affected by an action.
In our approach, we use a specific dialect of SecureUML, named Secure-
UML+ComponentUML, for modeling the access control policy on data models.
The SecureUML+ComponentUML metamodel provides the connection between
SecureUML and ComponentUML. Essentially, in this dialect of SecureUML, the
protected resources are the entities, along with their attributes, methods, and
association-ends (but not the associations as such), and the actions that they of-
fer to the actors are those shown in Figure 5. Essentially, there are two classes of
actions: atomic and composite. The atomic actions are intended to map directly
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Fig. 4. The SecureUML metamodel
Resource Actions
Entity create, read, update, delete, full access
Attribute read, update, full access
Method execute
AssociationEnd read, create, delete, full access
Fig. 5. The SecureUML+ComponentUML actions on protected resources
onto actual operations on the database. These actions are: create and delete for
entities; read and update for attributes; create and delete for association-ends;
and execute for methods. The underlined actions are the composite actions,
which hierarchically group lower-level actions. Composite actions allow model-
ers to conveniently specify permissions for sets of actions. For example, the full
access action for an attribute groups together the read and update actions for
this attribute.
Finally, in SecureUML+ComponentUML, authorization constraints are spec-
ified using OCL, extended by four keywords, self, caller, value, and target. These
keywords have the following meanings:
– self refers to the root resource upon which the action will be performed, if the
permission is granted. The root resource of an attribute, an association-end,
or a method is the entity to which it belongs.
– caller refers to the actor that will perform the action, if the permission is
granted.
– value refers to the value that will be used to update an attribute, if the
permission is granted.
– target refers to the object that will be linked at the end of an association, if
the permission is granted.
The ChitChat access control policy. For the sake of our running example, consider
the following (partial) access control policy for the ChitChat application:
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– Only administrators can create or delete users;
– Administrators can read any user’s nickname, email, mood message, and
status.
– Any user can read and update its own nickname, password, email, mood
message, and status.
– Any user can read other users’ nicknames, mood messages, and status.
– Users can join a chat room by invitation only, but they can leave at any
time.
The table shown in Figure 6 specifies this (partial) access control policy, using
the concepts and relationships provided by SecureUML+ComponentUML. Each
row in this table corresponds to a role, and shows its permissions. Moreover,
for each permission it shows the actions allowed by the permission, the resource
affected by each of these actions, and the constraint that must be satisfied for the
permission to be granted. For example, the permission DisjointChat authorizes
any user to leave a chat room at any anytime. More precisely, it allows any
user caller to delete a participates-link between a user self and a chat room target
(meaning that the user self leaves the chat room target), but only if the user caller
is indeed the user self (that is, the user caller is the one leaving the chat room
target), and also the chat room target indeed belongs to the collection of chat
rooms linked to the user caller through the association-end participates (that is,
the caller is actually participating in the chat room target). The reader can find
in the ActionGUI home page the graphical representation of ChitChat’s access
control policy using the concrete syntax for SecureUML+ComponentUML that
is supported by the ActionGUI Toolkit.
Role Permission Action Resource Authorization Constraint
create, delete ChatUser
read nickname









OtherUser read moodMsg true
read status
JointChat create participates self=caller and
caller.invitedTo−>includes(target)
DisjointChat delete participates self=caller and
caller.participates−>includes(target)
Fig. 6. The ChitChat access control policy (partial)
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4 GUI Models: ActionGUI
ActionGUI is a modeling language for formalizing the GUIs of a rich class of
data-centric applications. The ActionGUI metamodel is shown in Figure 7. In a
nutshell, ActionGUI provides a language to model widgets (e.g., windows, text-
fields, buttons, lists, and tables), events (e.g., clicking-on, typing-in), and actions,
which can be on data (e.g., to update a property of an element in the database)
or on other widgets, (e.g., to open a window), as well as the associations that link
the widgets with the events that they support and the events with the actions
that they trigger. In addition, ActionGUI provides support to formally model
the following features:
– Widgets can be displayed in containers, which are also widgets (e.g., a win-
dow can contain other widgets).
– Widgets may own variables, which are in charge of storing information for
later use.
– Events may be only supported upon the satisfaction of specific conditions,
whose truth value can depend on the information stored in the widgets’
variables or in the database.
– Actions may be only triggered upon the satisfaction of specific conditions,
whose truth value can depend on the information stored in the widgets’
variables or in the database.
– Actions may take their arguments (values that instantiate their parameters)
from the information stored in the widgets’ variables or in the database.
The ActionGUI metamodel’s invariants specify: (i) for each type of widget, the
“default” variables that widgets of this type always own; (ii) for each type of
widget, the type of events that widgets of this type may support; and (iii) for
each type of action, the arguments that actions of this type require, as well as
the arguments (if any) that these actions may additionally take. In particular,
the invariants of ActionGUI’s metamodel formalize, among others, the following
constraints about the different types of widgets:
– Windows. They can contain any type of widget, except windows. Windows
are not contained in any widget.
– Text-field. They can be typed-in. By default, each text-field owns a variable
text of type string, which stores the last string typed-in by the user. The
value of the variable text is permanently displayed in the text-field.
– Button. They can be clicked-on.
– List. They contain exactly one text-field. By default, each list owns a vari-
able rows of type collection. A list displays as many rows as elements are in
the collection stored by the variable rows, each row containing exactly one
instance of the text-field contained by the list. By default, each instance of
this text-field owns a variable row whose value is the element associated to
this row from those stored by the variable rows. Finally, by default, each list
owns a variable selected that holds the element associated to the last row
selected by the user.
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Fig. 7. The ActionGUI metamodel
– Combo-box. They are similar to lists, except that rows are displayed in a
drop-down box.
– Table. They are similar to lists, except that they can contain any number of
text-fields, buttons, lists, or even tables.
Also, the invariants of ActionGUI’s metamodel formalize, among others, the
following invariants about the different types of actions:
– Create. It creates a data item in the database. It takes two arguments: the
type of the new data item (type) and the variable that will store this element
for later reference (variable).
– Delete (entities). It deletes a data item in the database. It takes as argument
the element to be deleted (object).
– Read. It reads the value of a data item’s attribute in the database. It takes
three arguments: the data item whose property is to be read (object); the
property to be read (attribute); and the variable that will store, for later
reference, the value read (variable).
– Update. It modifies the value of a data item’s attribute in the database.
It takes three arguments: the data item whose attribute is to be modified
(object); the attribute to be modified (attribute); and the new value (value).
– Create (association-ends). It creates a new link in the database between two
data items. It takes three arguments: the source data item (sourceObject);
the target data item (targetObject); and the association-end (associationEnd)
through which the target data item will be linked to the source data item.
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– Delete (association-ends). It deletes a link in the database between two data
items. It takes three arguments: the source data item (sourceObject); the
target data item (targetObject); and the association-end (associationEnd) from
where the target data item will be removed.
– Open. It opens a window. It takes as argument the window to be opened
(target); additionally, for any of this window’s variables, it can take as argu-
ment a value to be assigned to this variable when opening the window.
– Back. It goes back to the window from which a window was open.
– Set. It assigns a new value to a widget’s variable. It takes two arguments:
the variable (target) and the value to be assigned to this variable (value).
Finally, actions’ conditions and arguments are specified in ActionGUI models
using OCL, extended with the widget’s variables (always enclosed in square
brackets). As expected, when evaluating an OCL expression that contains a
widget’s variable, the value of the corresponding subexpression is the value cur-
rently stored in the variable. In case of ambiguity, a widget’s variable is denoted
by its name, prefixed by the name of its widget (followed by a dot). Also, in case
of ambiguity, the name of a widget is prefixed by the name of its container (fol-
lowed by a dot). Notice that, within the same containers, widgets have unique
names. Moreover, a widget’s variable can only be used within the window that
contains its widget, either directly or indirectly.
The ChitChat login window. To continue with our running example, consider
the following interface for allowing a registered user to login into the ChitChat
application: a window (loginWi) containing:
– a writable text-field (nicknameEn), for the user to type its nickname in;
– a writable text-field (passwordEn), for the user to type its password in; and
– a clickable button (loginBu), for the user to login, using as its nickname
and password the strings that it typed in the text-fields nicknameEn and
passwordEn, respectively. Upon successful authentication, the user will be
directed to the application’s main menu window (menuWi) as the logged-in
user (caller).
The table shown in Figure 8 specifies this login window, using the concepts and
relationships provided by ActionGUI. Each row in this table correspond to a
widget, where the containment relationship is denoted by displaying the widgets
using tree-like notation. For each widget, we show the variables owned by the
widget and the events that it supports. Moreover, for each event, we show the
actions triggered by this event, as well as its arguments, indicating the values
for each of the actions’ parameters. However, we neither show in this table the
“default” widget’s variables nor the events supported by the widgets when they
do not trigger any action.
Notice also that there are two elements that we have intentionally left unde-
fined in this table: the value to be assigned to the menuWi’s variable caller when
opening the window menuWi, and the condition for this action. We now describe
how both elements can be defined using ActionGUI’s extension of OCL.
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|loginBu click-on open() window = menuWi
| menuWi.caller =
| authenticated user
() Upon successful authentication.
Fig. 8. The ChitChat login window
– The authenticated user should be the registered user in the database whose
nickname and password coincide with the values of the text-variables owned,
respectively, by text-fields nicknameEn and passwordEn. Using our extended
OCL, we can define the authenticated user as follows:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>any(u|
u.nickname= [nicknameEn.text] and u.password=[passwordEn.text])
Notice that, as one of the invariants of the ChitChat data model, we specified
that nicknames shall be unique. Thus, although the any-iterator will return
any registered user satisfying the body of the any-iterator, there will be at
most one such registered users.
– The condition for opening the window menuWi should be the existence in the
database of a registered user whose nickname and password coincide with
the values of the text-variables owned, respectively, by text-fields nicknameEn
and passwordEn. We can define this condition as follows:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>exists(u|
u.nickname= [nicknameEn.text] and u.password=[passwordEn.text])
The reader can find in the ActionGUI home page the graphical representation
of ChitChat’s login window using the concrete syntax for ActionGUI that is
supported by the ActionGUI Toolkit.
The ChitChat menu window. Consider now the following interface for allowing
a logged-in user to choose an option from ChitChat’s main menu: a window
(menuWi), owning a variable caller which stores the logged-in user, and containing:
– a selectable list (usersLi) with as many rows as registered users are online,
each of these rows containing an unwritable text-field (nicknameLa) showing
the nickname of the registered user associated to this row;
– a clickable button (editProfileBu) for the caller to access the interface for edit-
ing the profile (i.e., name, password, email, mood message, and status) of
the user selected in the list usersLi;
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– a clickable button (createChatBu) for the caller to access the interface for
creating a new chat room; and
– a clickable button (closeChatBu) for the caller to close the window.
The table shown in Figure 9 specifies this menu window, using the concepts and
relationships provided by ActionGUI. Notice that the collection of data items
to be displayed in the list usersLi, namely, the online users, is not formally
defined in this table. Using ActionGUI’s extension of OCL, we can define this
collection as follows:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>select(u|u.status= ’on−line’)
The reader can find in the ActionGUI home page the graphical representation
of ChitChat’s menu window using the concrete syntax for ActionGUI that is
supported by the ActionGUI Toolkit.
Widgets Variables Events Actions Arguments
menuWi caller
| usersLi on-create set target = rows
| value = on-line users
| | nicknameLa on-create read object = [UsersLi.row]
| | attribute = nickname
| | variable = text
| editProfileBu click-on open window = editProfileWi
| editProfileWi.selectedUser
| = [UsersLi.selected]
| createChatBu click-on open window = createChatWi
| closeChatBu click-on close
Fig. 9. The ChitChat menu window
5 Security-Aware ActionGUI Models
In this section, we propose our solution to what we believe is the key challenge
when modeling security-aware GUIs for data-centric applications: Which method
should the GUI designer use for establishing the link between visualization and
security? In other words, how should the GUI designer model their GUIs so
as to make them aware of and respect the access control policy that protects
the application data? As mentioned before, establishing this link is crucial when
modeling security-aware GUIs for data-centric applications. Basically, a GUI
should not display options to users for actions (e.g., to read or update informa-
tion) that they are not authorized to execute on application data. This prevents
the users from getting security warnings or cryptic error messages directly from
the database management system. It also prevents user frustration from filling
out a long electronic form only to have the server reject it because the user lacks
a permission to execute some associated action on the application data.
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As we will motivate in this section, manually modeling (and even worse,
manually encoding) the application’s security policy within the GUI model is
cumbersome, error prone, and scales poorly to large applications. Moreover, the
resulting models are difficult to maintain, since any changes in the security policy
will require manual changes to the GUI models. Our solution to this problem uses
a standard technique in model-driven development: model transformation. In
particular, we introduce a model transformation that automatically transforms
a GUI model into a security-aware GUI model with respect to the access control
policy imposed on the underlying data model. One additional and substantial
advantage of our solution is that, by keeping the security models and the GUI
model apart, the security engineers and the GUI designers can independently
model what they know best and maintain their models independently.
The ChitChat edit-profile window. To motivate the problem faced by a GUI
designer when modeling a security-aware GUI, let us continue with our running
example. Consider the interface for allowing a logged-in user (caller) to edit the
profile of a previously chosen user (selectedUser), which may of course be the caller
itself. More specifically, this interface shall consist of a window such that:
1. The current values of the selectedUser’s profile are displayed when opening
the window.
2. The caller can type in the new values (if any) for the selectedUser’s profile.
3. The selectedUser’s profile is updated with the new values typed in by the caller
when he or she clicks on a designated button.
Recall that a registered user’s profile is composed of the following attributes:
nickname, password, mood message, email, and status. Recall also that the access
control policy for reading and updating users’ profiles, as specified in Figure 6,
is the following:
4. A user is always allowed to read and update its own nickname, password,
mood message, email, and status.
5. A user is allowed to read another user’s nickname, mood message, and status,
but not the user’s password or email.
6. An administrator is always allowed to read a user’s nickname, mood message,
status, and email, but not the user’s password.
Now, if the GUI designer only takes into consideration the functional require-
ments (1–3), the ChitChat edit-profile window can be modeled as shown in
Figure 10. Namely, a window editProfileWi, which owns the variable selectedUser
and caller, and contains:
– A writable text-field nicknameEn, for the caller to type in the new value (if
any) with which to update the selectedUser’s nickname. Notice that when the
text-field nicknameEn is created, its “default” variable text will be assigned
the current value of the selectedUser’s nickname, and therefore this value will
be the string initially displayed in the text-field nicknameEn, as requested.
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Widgets Variables Events Actions Arguments
editProfileWi caller,
selectedUser
| nicknameEn on-create read object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = nickname
| variable = text
| passwordEn on-create read object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = password
| variable = text
| moodMsgEn on-create read object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = moodMsg
| variable = text
| emailEn on-create read object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = email
| variable = text
| statusEn on-create read object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = status
| variable = text
| updateBu click-on update object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = nickname
| value = [nicknameEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = password
| value = [passwordEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = moodMsg
| value = [moodMsgEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = email
| value = [emailEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
| attribute = status
| value = [statusEn.text]
Fig. 10. The ChitChat edit-profile window (although security-unaware)
– Analogous writable text-fields for each of the other elements in a registered
user’s profile: password, mood message, email, and status.
– A clickable button updateBu for the caller to trigger the sequence of actions
that will update, as requested, the selectedUser’s nickname, password, mood
message, and status, with the new values (if any) typed by the caller in the
corresponding text-fields.
Obviously, the edit-profile window modeled in Figure 10 does not satisfy the
security requirements (4–6). Any caller can read and update any value contained
in the profile of any selectedUser! So how can the GUI designer model the edit-
profile window to make it aware of and respect the security requirements (4–6)?
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There are essentially two solutions available. Unfortunately both of them, if
applied manually, are cumbersome and error prone and therefore impractical for
large applications with complex security policies. To understand the challenge
that faces a GUI designer when modeling security-aware GUIs, let us first high-
light the knowledge that he or she must acquire to accomplish this task. We
decompose this into two steps.
Step 1: For each action triggered by an event, and for each role considered by
the access control policy, the GUI designer must determine (i) the condi-
tions under which the given action can be securely executed by a user with
the given role. This depends, of course, on the underlying access control pol-
icy, and, more specifically, on the authorization constraints assigned to the
permissions which grant access to execute the given action for the given role.
Also, recall that permissions are inherited along the role hierarchy.
Notice however that, to obtain (i), the GUI designer can not simply com-
pose, using disjunctions, the authorization constraints assigned to the afore-
mentioned permissions. In particular, the variable caller, if it appears in any
of these authorization constraints, must be replaced by the (widget) variable
that stores the current application’s user. Furthermore, the variables self,
value, and target, if they appear in any of the aforementioned authorization
constraints, must also be replaced by the appropriate expressions, based on
the arguments taken by the given action. For example, in the case of a read-
action, the variable self should be replaced by the value of the parameter
object for this action.
Step 2: For each event supported by a widget, and for each role considered by
the access control policy, the GUI designer must determine (ii) the conditions
under which all the actions triggered by the given event can be securely exe-
cuted by a user with the given role. In this case, for each given role, the GUI
designer can simply compose, using conjunctions, the results to determine
(i) for every action triggered by the given event.
Let us now illustrate, using our running example, the two solutions that are cur-
rently available to the GUI modeler for turning a security-unaware GUI model
into a security-aware one. To simplify the discussion, we assume from now on
that the user currently logged-in is always stored in a (widget) variable caller,
that this variable is owned by every window, and that this variable’s value is au-
tomatically passed from one window to another window when opening the latter
from the former. Similarly, we assume the role of the user currently logged-in (if
he or she has several roles, then the “active” role) is always stored in a (widget)
variable role, that this variable is owned by every window, and that this vari-
able’s value is automatically passed from one window to another window when
opening the latter from the former.
Solution A. The first solution for the GUI designer consists in modeling as
many different edit-profile windows as possible security scenarios. In our case, the
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GUI designer must model three different edit-profile windows (editMyProfileWi,
editOthersProfile, and editUsersProfile), one for each of the following scenarios:
1. When the caller has the role ‘User’ and coincides with the selectedUser.
2. When the caller has the role ‘User’ but does not coincide with the selectedUser.
3. When the caller has the role ‘Admin’.
In particular, the window editMyProfileWi associated to the security scenario (1)
will contain exactly the same widgets as the window editProfileWi in Figure 10.
In contrast, the window editOthersProfileWi associated to the security scenario
(2), will only contain the text-fields nicknameEn, moodMsgEn, and statusEn (and
not the button updateBu), since a user with the role ‘User’ can only read (but
not update) other user’s nickname, mood message, and status. Similarly, the
window editProfilesWi will only contain the text-fields nicknameEn, moodMsgEn,
emailEn, and statusEn (and not the button updateBu), since a user with the role
‘Admin’ can read (but not update) any user’s profile, except its password.
Furthermore, for this solution to work, every event intended to give access
to the interface for editing users’ profiles must also be aware of the security
scenarios (1)–(3), in order to open the appropriate edit-profile window. In par-
ticular, the GUI designer must associate the sequence of conditional actions
shown in Figure 11 to each of the aforementioned events. Notice that for each
open-action, the imposed condition formalizes the conditions under which all the
actions triggered by all the events supported by the widgets which are contained
in the window being opened can be securely executed by a user. That is, the GUI
designer must gather all the knowledge corresponding to (ii), in Step 2 above, for
every event supported by any widget contained in the window which the action
under consideration is about to open.
Actions Arguments
if [role] = ’User’ and [caller] = [selected user]
then open window = editMyProfileWi
editMyProfileWi.selectedUser = [selected user]
if [role] = ’User’ and [caller] <> [selected user]
then open window = editOthersProfileWi
editOthersProfileWi.selectedUser = [selectedUser]
if [role] = ’Admin’
then open window = editUsersProfileWi
editUsersProfileWi.selectedUser = [selectedUser]
Fig. 11. Solution A: Conditions for opening the edit-profile windows
Solution B. Another solution for the GUI designer consists of specifying, for
each of event supported by a widget, the conditions under which all the actions
triggered by the given event can be securely executed by a user. In our case, the
GUI design must convert the edit-profile window model shown in Figure 10 into
the one shown in Figure 12.
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Widgets Events Actions Arguments
nicknameEn on-create if true
then read object = [selectedUser]
attribute = nickname
variable = text
passwordEn on-create if [role] = ’User’ and [caller] = [selectedUser]
then read object = [selectedUser]
attribute = password
variable = text
moodMsgEn on-create if true
then read object = [selectedUser]
attribute = moodMsg
variable = text
emailEn on-create if (([role] = ’User’ and [caller] = [selectedUser])
or [role] = ’Admin’)
then read object = [selectedUser]
attribute = email
variable = text
statusEn on-create if true
then read object = [selectedUser]
attribute = status
variable = text
updateBu click-on if [role] = ’User’ and [caller] = [selectedUser]
then update object = [selectedUser]
attribute = nickname
value = [nicknameEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
attribute = password
value = [passwordEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
attribute = moodMsg
value = [moodMsgEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
attribute = email
value = [emailEn.text]
update object = [selectedUser]
attribute = status
value = [statusEn.text]
Fig. 12. Solution B: The ChitChat edit-profile window (now security-aware)
This solution is certainly simpler and less intrusive than Solution A with
respect to the original, security-unaware GUI model (since, for example, no new
windows need to be added to the original design). However, in order to implement
this solution, the GUI designer must gather all the knowledge corresponding to
(ii), in Step 2 above, for every event supported by every widget in the model.
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A model-transformation approach. Clearly, manually modeling the appli-
cation’s security policy within the GUI model is problematic. It is cumbersome,
error prone, and scales poorly to large applications. Moreover, it requires the
GUI designer to have complete knowledge of the access control policy on the
application data. Finally, the resulting GUI models are difficult to maintain.
To address the problem of establishing the link between visualization and se-
curity, we employ a standard technique from model-driven development: model
transformation. A model transformation takes as input a model (or several mod-
els) conforming to given metamodel (respectively, several metamodels) and pro-
duces as output a model conforming to a given metamodel. More specifically,
the ActionGUI Toolkit implements a model transformation that takes as input
an ActionGUI model and a SecureUML+ComponentUML model, and automat-
ically produces as output an ActionGUI model. This output model is identical
to the input ActionGUI model except that it is now security-aware with respect
to the access control policy specified in the input SecureUML+ComponentUML
model. In particular, our model transformation follows the ideas behind Solu-
tion B: it specifies for each event supported by a widget, the conditions under
which all the actions triggered by this event can be securely executed by a user.
As expected, at the core of this model transformation, we have implemented a
function (on the input models) that automatically gathers all the knowledge cor-
responding to (i) and (ii), in Step 1 and Step 2 above, for each action triggered
by an event and for each event supported by a widget, respectively.
Continuing with our running example, let us consider how models can be
made security-aware and maintained over time. First, how can the GUI designer
model the edit-profile window to make it aware of and respect the security re-
quirements (4–6)? Using our ActionGUI Toolkit, the designer simply calls the
aforementioned model transformation on ChitChat’s access control policy shown
in Figure 6 and the (security-unaware) ChitChat edit-profile window model
shown in Figure 10. Our model transformation then automatically generates
(in practically no time) the security-aware ChitChat edit-profile window model
shown in Figure 12. Finally, what must the GUI designer do, with respect to the
edit-profile window model, if ChitChat’s security policy happens to change? For
example, suppose that any user is allowed to read the email of other users when
the former participates in a chat room where the latter is also participating. The
designer must simply call again the model transformation, this time taking as
inputs the modified model of ChitChat’s access control policy and, as before,
ChitChat’s (security-unaware) edit-profile window model. shown in Figure 10.
6 Related Work and Conclusions
The ever-growing development and use of information and communication tech-
nology is a constant source of security and reliability problems. Clearly we need
better ways of developing software systems and approaching software engineering
as a well-founded discipline. In many engineering disciplines, model building is at
the heart of system design. This is increasingly the case in software engineering
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since model-driven software engineering was first proposed over a decade ago.
In our opinion, the late adoption of this methodology is due to the difficulty in
defining effective domain-specific modeling languages and also the effort required
for developers to learn modeling languages and the art of model building.
Defining a good domain-specific modeling language requires finding the right
abstractions and degree of precision to capture relevant aspects of the structure
and the logic of a software system. In addition, for a modeling language to
be really usable and useful for software developers, appropriate tools must be
provided to build models, analyze them, and keep them synchronized with end
products. We wish to emphasize in this regard the need to focus on concrete
domains like access controls, GUIs, data models, and the like. In our experience,
only by limiting the domain is it possible to build sufficiently precise modeling
languages that support the automatic generation of fully functional applications.
Automatic code generation brings with it important advantages. Once a code
generator is implemented for a platform (a one-off cost), modelers can use it like
a compiler for a very high-level language, dramatically increasing their produc-
tivity. But even when the model-driven development process is not completely
automatic, there are experience reports (see, for instance, [9,11]), in which the
productivity of a developer in industry is said to increase by a factor of 2 or 3.
There is an additional argument for using model-driven development to de-
velop security-critical systems, i.e., for model-driven security [1]. Namely, secu-
rity is often built redundantly into systems. For example, in a web-application,
access control may be enforced at all tiers: at the web server, in the back-end
databases, and even in the GUI. There are good reasons for this. Redundant
security controls is an example of defense in depth and is also necessary to pre-
vent data access in unanticipated ways, for example, directly from the database
thereby circumventing the web application server. Note that access control on the
client is also important, but more from the usability rather than the security per-
spective. Namely, although client-side access control may be easy to circumvent,
it enhances usability by presenting honest users an appropriate view of their op-
tions: unauthorized options can be suppressed and users can be prevented from
entering states where they are unauthorized to perform any action, e.g., where
their actions will result in security exceptions thrown by the application server
or database.
The above raises the following question: must one specify security policies
separately for each of these tiers? The answer is “no” for many applications. Se-
curity can often be understood in terms of the criticality of data and an access
control policy on data can be specified at the level of component (class) models,
as discussed in Section 3. Afterwards, an access control policy modeled at the
level of components may be lifted to other tiers. When the tiers are also modeled,
this lifting can be accomplished using model transformation techniques and in a
precise and meaningful way as we have illustrated in Section 5. In general, model
transformations support problem decomposition during development where de-
sign aspects can be separated into different models which are later composed.
As a methodology for designing security-aware GUIs, this approach supports
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the consistent propagation of a security policy from component models to GUI
models and, via code generation, to GUI implementations. This decomposition
also means that security engineers and GUI designers can independently model
what they know best and maintain their models independently.
Related Work
There are also other tools like WebRatio [12], Olivanova [4], and Lightswitch [8]
that support development methodologies for building data-centric applications
that are similar to the model-driven methodology presented in this work. In these
tools, application development starts by building a data model that reflects the
data structure required for the database. The development process continues
by applying different UI generation patterns to the data model. These patterns
enable data retrieval, data editing, data creation, and database search. A detailed
comparison of the expressiveness provided by the languages supported by these
tools with the languages supported by the ActionGUI Toolkit is interesting;
however it falls out of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we note that, in
contrast to what these tools can provide, the ActionGUI Toolkit offers developers
the full flexibility to create designs without burdening them with the restrictions
imposed by the obligatory use of a fixed number of given patterns. The above
tools also impose a major restriction at the level of data management, i.e., at the
level of data access and visualization: The information that can be referenced and
therefore that can be accessed and visualized within one screen can only come
from one table of the database or, at most, from two tables that are reachable
from each other within one navigation step.
The three tools, WebRatio, Olivanova, and Lightswitch, support the defini-
tion and generation of RBAC policies at different granularity levels. Lightswitch
supports granting or denying permissions (whose actual behavior must be man-
ually programmed) to execute create, read, update, or delete actions on entities
for users in different roles. WebRatio and Olivanova also support granting or
denying permissions to execute a similar set of actions on entity’s properties,
individually, for users in different roles. In WebRatio and Olivanova, the role of
the authorization constraints could be played by preconditions restraining the
invocation of actions through a concrete UI. Note, however, that none of these
tools implement an algorithm capable of lifting to the UIs the security policy
that governs the access to data.
Future Work
The toolkit we presented supports the construction of security, data, and GUI
models and generates complete, deployable, security-aware web applications from
these models. However, there is still much work ahead to turn this toolkit into a
full, robust commercial application. In particular, we plan to add to the language
(and to its code-generator) other actions which do not act upon the database or
the GUI elements. Examples are sending an email to a contact selected in a list
or printing a table.
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Our work here, as well as our past work in model-driven security, has focused
primarily on access control. However, many systems have security requirements
that go beyond access control, for example, obligations on how data must or must
not be used once access is granted. We are currently working on handling usage
control policies in the context of model-driven security. The challenge here is to
define modeling languages that are expressive enough to capture these policies,
support their formal analysis, and provide a basis for generating infrastructures
to enforce or, at least, monitor these policies.
There are many challenging questions concerning model analysis. Here, our
goal is to be able to analyze the consistency of different system views. For exam-
ple, suppose that access control is implemented at multiple tiers (or levels) of a
system, e.g., at the middle tier implementing a controller for a web-based appli-
cation and at the back-end persistence tier. If the policies for both of these tiers
are formally modeled, we would like to answer questions like “will the controller
ever enter a state in which the persistence tier throws a security exception?”
Note that with advances in model transformations, perhaps such questions will
some day not even need to be asked, as we can uniformly map a security policy
across models of all tiers.
Ultimately we see model-driven security playing an important role in the con-
struction and certification of critical systems. For example, certification under
the Common Criteria requires models for the higher Evaluation Assurance Lev-
els. Model-driven security provides many of the ingredients needed: models with
a well-defined semantics, which can be rigorously analyzed and have a clear link
to code. As the acceptance of model-driven development techniques spread, and
as they become better integrated with well-established formal methods that sup-
port a detailed behavioral analysis, such applications should become a reality.
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SSG: A Model-Based Development Environment for Smart,
Security-Aware GUIs



















We present a development environment for automatically
building smart, security-aware GUIs following a model-based
approach. Our environment consists of a number of plugins
that have been developed using the Eclipse framework and
includes three model editors, a model-transformation tool,
and a code generator.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many programs, users access application data using
GUI widgets: data is created, deleted, read, and updated
using text boxes, check boxes, buttons, and the like. There
is an important, but little explored, link between visualiza-
tion and security. When the application data is protected
by an access control policy, the application GUI should be
aware of and respect this policy. For example, the GUI
should not display options to users for actions that they are
not authorized to execute on application data. This pre-
vents user frustration, for example, from filling out a long
electronic form only to have the server reject it because the
user lacks permissions to execute some associated actions
on the application data. Taking this idea one step further,
the GUI should not, for example, display options to users to
open other widgets when these widgets only display options
for actions that the users are not authorized to execute on
application data. That is, the application GUI should not
only be security-aware, it should also be smart.
Here we present an environment for developing such GUIs,
using the Eclipse framework. Our environment supports
linking visualization and security during system design and
using this design information to automatically generate GUI
implementations that are both smart and security-aware. To
the best of our knowledge, no other GUI development envi-
ronment currently provides this kind of support, either for
design or implementation.
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2. MODEL-BASED DEVELOPMENT OF
SMART, SECURITY-AWARE GUIS
The default, ad-hoc approach to linking visualization and
security would be to directly hardcode the security policy
within the GUI. But this is clearly inadequate. First, the
GUI designer is often not aware of the application data se-
curity policy. Second, even if the designer is aware of it,
hardcoding the application-data security policy within the
GUI code is cumbersome and error-prone, if done manually.
Finally, any changes in the security policy will require man-
ual changes to the GUI code where this policy is hardcoded,
which again is a cumbersome and error-prone task.
In [1] we propose a model-based approach to linking vi-
sualization and security. The key idea is that this link is
ultimately defined in terms of data actions, since data ac-
tions are both controlled by the security policy and triggered
by the events supported by the graphical user interface. The
key component of this solution is a many-models-to-model
transformation which, given a security-design model and a
GUI model, automatically generates a GUI model that is
both security-aware and smart.
Thus, under this model-based development approach, il-
lustrated in Figure 1, the process of building a smart, security-
aware GUI has the following parts.
1. Software engineers specify both the application-data
model C and the security-design model SC .
2. GUI designers specify the application GUI model GC .
3. A many-models-to-model transformation automatically
generates a smart, security-aware GUI modelM(GC ,SC)
from the security-design model SC and the GUI model
GC .
4. A code generator automatically produces the smart,
security-aware GUI from the smart, security-aware GUI
model M(GC ,SC).
As a design methodology, our model-based approach has
three main advantages over traditional approaches to user
interface design. First, security engineers and GUI design-
ers can independently model what they know best. Sec-
ond, security engineers and GUI designers can independently
change their models, and these changes are automatically
propagated to the security-aware GUI models. Third, GUI
designers can use the generated security-aware GUI models
to check that they are designing the right GUI to give the
(authorized) users access to the (intended) application data.
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Figure 1: Modeling a smart and security-aware GUI.
3. SSG: A SMART, SECURITY-AWAREGUI
BUILDER
SSG is a development environment, built using the Eclipse
framework, for generating smart, security-aware GUIs fol-
lowing the model-based approach described in Section 2. In
what follows, we describe the plugins included in SSG. All
of the plugins are publicly available at [3].
3.1 Data model editor
The data model GMF-editor allows users to graphically
model application data. This editor supports a simple lan-
guage, named ComponentUML, for modeling application
data. Essentially, this language provides a subset of UML
class models: entities can be related by associations and
may have attributes. Hence, the editor provides a concrete
graphical syntax for modeling entities, with their attributes
and association-ends.
3.2 Security-design model editor
The security-design model GMF-editor allows users to
model an application’s access control policy. This editor sup-
ports a language, named SecureUML+ComponentUML [2],
for modeling access control policies on ComponentUML re-
sources, i.e., on entities, their attributes, and associations.
The policies that can be specified in SecureUML+Compo-
nentUML are of two kinds: those that depend on static in-
formation, namely the assignments of users and permissions
to roles, and those that depend on dynamic information.
The actions that can be controlled in SecureUML+Compo-
nentUML are, e.g., those to ‘create’ and ‘delete’ entities, and
to ‘read’ and ‘update’ their attributes. SecureUML+Com-
ponentUML also provides composite actions, which group
primitive actions into a hierarchy of higher-level ones. The
composite actions are ‘read’, ‘update’, and ‘full access’ either
on entities or entity’s properties. For example, ‘full access’
on an attribute includes both ‘read’ and ‘update’ access on
the attribute.
3.3 GUI model editor
The GUI model GMF-editor allows users to model an ap-
plication’s graphical user interface. This editor supports a
language, named GUI [1, 3], for modeling the behavioral
properties of GUIs, namely what are the actions associated
to the different events that are supported by the GUI. In a
nutshell, this language can be used to model GUIs that con-
sist of widgets (buttons, entries, labels) that are displayed
inside containers (windows, combo-boxes), which are them-
selves widgets. Each widget has a set of associated events
(e.g., on-click and on-create). These are the events sup-
ported by the widget. Each event is associated with a set of
actions: these are the actions triggered by the event. Events’
actions are of two types: widget actions (which are actions
on GUI widgets, e.g., open, close, focus, and set) and data
actions (which are actions on the application data). Both
widget and data actions may take parameters. Also, each
container has a (possibly empty) set of variables associated
with it: these variables hold information that can be used
by actions within this container.
3.4 GUI model generator
This QVT-generator automatically transforms a GUI model
and a security-design model (both sharing the same data
model) into a model of a new GUI. The resulting model
has the same behavioral properties as the one modeled by
the given GUI model, except that it is now both smart and
security-aware with respect to the access control policy mod-
eled by the given security-design model. The new GUIs are
modeled using a language, named SecureUML+GUI, that
supports modeling the behavioral properties of GUIs along
with the information about which role can execute which
events on these GUIs.
3.5 Code generator
The JET-code generator automatically generates, from a
smart, security-aware GUI model, a full web application
consisting of a collection of PHP-web pages whose design
and behavior implements those modeled by the given smart,
security-aware GUI model. In particular, windows are im-
plemented as web pages. Thus, opening a window is imple-
mented as loading the corresponding page and closing a win-
dow is implemented as loading the previously visited page.
More interestingly, data actions (like ‘create’ or ‘delete’ enti-
ties and ‘update’ or ‘read’ their attributes) are implemented
as SQL queries or statements on a data-base implement-
ing the underlying data model; for convenience, the code
generator can also create this database for the user. Finally,
permissions to execute events on widgets (like clicking a but-
ton or creating an entry or a text box) are implemented by
appropriate conditional statements in the PHP-code respon-
sible for interpreting those events.
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Abstract: In this paper we propose a mapping from a subset of OCL into first-
order logic (FOL) and use this mapping for checking the unsatisfiability of sets
of OCL constraints. Although still preliminary work, we argue in this paper that
our mapping is both simple, since the resulting FOL sentences closely mirror the
original OCL constraints, and practical, since we can use automated reasoning tools,
such as automated theorem provers and SMT solvers to automatically check the
unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets of OCL constraints.
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1 Motivation
The lack of tool support for OCL was pointed out in [CBC05] as a main cause for the limited
adoption of the language in industry. Since then, many initiatives have been brought to fruition
and their outcomes are available to designers (see [Dem05]). Among the tool categories that
have received significant attention are:
• Parsers: to check the syntactical well-formedness of an expression: e.g., the Dresden OCL
2.0 parser [Kon05, Sof07].
• Evaluators: to obtain the value of an expression within a contextual model: e.g., USE
[Dat06], MDT OCL [Hus08], and EOS [CED08, DCE08].
• Translators: to map (for different purposes) an expression into a (logically equivalent)
expression in other languages and/or formalisms: e.g.,
– OCL2SQL [Hei06, Sof07] maps OCL constraints into SQL queries;
∗ Research partially supported by Spanish MEC projects TIN2006-15660-C02-01 and by Comunidad de Madrid
Program S-0505/TIC/0407.
1 / 13 Volume 24 (2009)
Checking Unsatisfiability for OCL Constraints
– UMLtoCSP [CCR07b, CCR07a] maps OCL constraints into constraint programming
expressions to support automated bounded verification of UML class diagrams an-
notated with OCL constraints;
– MOMENT [CRBG08] and ITP-OCL [CE08] map OCL into equational logic (al-
though using different approaches) to support automated evaluation of OCL expres-
sions using term-rewriting.
– KeY [BS07] includes a mapping of OCL into first-order logic to allow interactive
reasoning about UML diagrams with OCL constraints.
– HOL-OCL [Bru07, BW07] maps OCL into higher-order logic also to allow interac-
tive reasoning about UML diagrams with OCL constraints.
The work presented here belongs to the third category: it proposes a mapping from OCL to
first-order logic, which is defined with the purpose of supporting (unbounded) unsatisfiability
checks for OCL expressions using automated reasoning tools. In our view, being able to check
the unsatisfiability of (sets of) OCL expressions is a powerful tool, since it will allow modelers
to (among other tasks):
• Verify class invariants, by checking that they logically imply the expected constraints/prop-
erties;
• Verify method preconditions, by checking that the class invariants do not logically imply
their negations; and
• Verify method postconditions, by checking that they do not logically imply the negation
of (any of) the class invariants.
However, also in our view, what will make an unsatisfiability checker not only powerful, but
also practical, is being automated. Given the undecidable nature of the full OCL language, one
can only expect to have an automated unsatisfiability checker for a large class of OCL expres-
sions. In this paper we do not attempt to define how large and/or interesting is the class of
unsatisfiable OCL expressions that we are able to check automatically. Nevertheless, we will
argue that our mapping is both simple, since the resulting FOL sentences closely mirror the
original OCL constraints, and practical, since we can use existing automated theorem provers
(e.g., Prover9 [McC06]) and/or SMT solvers (e.g., Yices [DM08]) to automatically check the
unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets of OCL constraints.
Organization In Section 2 we define our notion of unsatisfiability for OCL constraints. Then,
in Section 3 we define our mapping from OCL to FOL. Next, in Section 4 we report on our expe-
rience using two different automated reasoning tools for checking the unsatisfiability of (sets of)
OCL constraints: namely, Prover9 [McC06] (an automated theorem prover) and Yices [DM08]
(an SMT solver). We conclude with a discussion on related and future work.
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Figure 1: A simple Library-model.
2 Unsatisfiability of OCL constraints
In this section we introduce our notion of unsatisfiability for OCL constraints, as well as the ex-
amples that we will use in the following sections. The notion of unsatisfiability that we propose
emphasizes the logical meaning of OCL constraints; in fact, it basically translates to OCL the
standard notion of unsatisfiability for logic formulas. There are other notions of satisfiability/un-
satisfiability for OCL constraints in the literature, which we will briefly discuss at the end of this
section.
In what follows, we denote by OCL constraint any OCL expression of type Boolean. We do
not assume that instances of models always have a finite a number of elements.
Definition 1 Given a model (class diagram) M , and a set of OCL constraints Φ, we say that
Φ is M -unsatisfiable if and only if there does not exist an M -instance (object diagram) O on
which every constraint in Φ evaluates to true.
To illustrate this notion, we introduce the following example. Table 1 shows a list of OCL
constraints: they all refer to the simple class diagram Library shown in Figure 1. In this model,
libraries contains Books and books have Authors, pages, and an ISBN code.
According to Definition 1, the following subsets (among others) of the constraints shown in
Table 1 are Library-unsatisfiable: {1,2}, {1,8}, {1,10}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {2,5}, {2,6}, {7,8}, {11,
13}, {12}, {14}, and {15}.
Notice that the subset {9,10,11} is not Library-unsatisfiable: a library with just one book
will satisfy these constraints. On the other hand, the subset {9,10,11,16} is indeed Library-
unsatisfiable. Notice also that the subset {17} is not Library-unsatisfiable: a library with an
infinite number of books will satisfy this constraint. On the other hand, the subset {17, 18} is
indeed Library- unsatisfiable.
As mentioned before, other notions of satisfiability/unsatisfiability of UML models with OCL
constraints can be found in the literature. In particular, the notions used in [CCR07b, CT07] are
those of weak and strong satisfiability (and related notions are also introduced in [BW07]). Weak
satisfiability means that there exists a finite instance of the model in which at least one class is
populated with at least one element. Strong satisfiability means that there exists a finite instance
of the model in which all its classes are populated with at least one element. Notice that, if a set
of constraints is unsatisfiable (in our sense), then it can not be weak nor strong satisfiable. On
the other hand, if a set of constraints is not weak nor strong satisfiable, it does not imply that is
unsatisfiable (in our sense).
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1. Book.allInstances()−>isEmpty().
2. Book.allInstances()−>exists(x|x.pages > 300).
3. Book.allInstances()−>forAll(x|x.pages < 300).
4. Book.allInstances()−>select(x|x.pages > 300)−>isEmpty().
5. Book.allInstances()−>reject(x|x.pages <= 300)−>isEmpty().
6. Book.allInstances()−>collect(x|x.pages)−>asSet()−>forAll(i|i < 300).
7. Book.allInstances()−>forAll(x|x.author−>isEmpty()).
8. Author.allInstances()−>exists(a|a.books−>notEmpty()).









16. Book.allInstances()−>size() > 1.
17. Book.allInstances()−>forAll(b|Book.allInstances()−>exists(x|x.pages > b.pages)).
18. Book.allInstances()−>size() = 2.
Table 1: List of constraints
3 A mapping from OCL to FOL
In this section we define a mapping from a subset of OCL into first-order logic (FOL). Given a
set of OCL constraints, our mapping generates a set of FOL formulas such that, if the resulting
set is unsatisfiable, then the original set is also unsatisfiable. We will argue in Section 4 that our
mapping is both simple and practical. At this preliminary stage, we are not ready, however, to
provide a formal proof of the correctness of this mapping (with respect to a well-defined formal
semantics for OCL).
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OCL constraints specify properties that must be satisfied by a model. In order to do so in a
concise way, OCL provides different constructors to refer to specific collections of elements. In
a nutshell, our mapping is defined recursively over the structure of OCL expressions:
• Boolean-expressions are translated to formulas, which essentially mirror their logical struc-
ture; Integer-expressions are basically copied; at this point, we do not consider String-
expressions.
• Collection-expressions are translated to predicates, whose meaning is defined by additional
formulas generated by the mapping; at this point, we only consider Set-expressions.
• Association-ends are translated by predicates, which are also defined by formulas gener-
ated by the mapping; at this point, we do not consider qualified associations.
• Attributes are translated by functions, which are left undefined by the mapping.
The function map() below defines our mapping from OCL to FOL. We do not attempt to cover
here the full OCL language, but only a subset that is significantly enough so as to show the
potential of our proposal.
In what follows, given an iterator variable x, the expression x[ denotes a fresh new logical
variable. Similarly, given Boolean-expressions BoolExpr, object expressions ObjExpr, and Set-
expressions SetExpr and SetExpr′, the expressions [collect, SetExpr, SetExpr’][, [select, SetExpr,
BoolExpr][, [reject, SetExpr, BoolExpr][, [including, SetExpr, ObjExpr][, and [excluding, SetExpr,
ObjExpr][ denote fresh new predicate names.
The auxiliary function name(), used in the definition of map(), is the one in charge of providing
unique names for the FOL predicates that translate the different OCL Collection-expressions; it
also translates OCL literal values by the corresponding FOL terms.
Definition 2 The auxiliary function name() is defined by the following clauses:
name(Integer) = Integer.
name(−Integer) =−Integer.











The auxiliary function in coll(), also used in the definition of map(), basically returns the
atomic formula that represents the application of a given predicate to a given number of argu-
ments.
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Definition 3 The auxiliary function in coll() is defined by the following clause:
in coll(Name,x) = Name(x).
Finally, the auxiliary function make conj returns the conjunction of a given set of formulas.
Definition 4 The auxiliary function make conj() is defined by the following clauses:
make conj( /0) =>.
make conj({φ}) = φ .
make conj({φ1, . . . ,φn+1}) = φ1∧·· ·∧φn+1.
We are now ready to define our mapping from OCL to FOL. First, the function map() gen-
erates, by default, the sentences defining the predicates that represent, in our mapping, the
association-ends specified in the given model.
Definition 5 Given an association between two classes Class1 and Class2, with association-





Next, we define the mapping from OCL Boolean-expressions to FOL formulas: essentially, we
mirror the logical structure of the OCL expressions in the resulting FOL formulas. In particular,
we map iterator variables into logical variables, which are existentially or universally quantified
depending on the iterator used.
Definition 6 The function map() on Boolean-expressions is defined by clauses shown in Fig-
ure 2.
Finally, we define the mapping from OCL Collection-expressions to FOL formulas. Recall
that collections are represented in our mapping by predicates. The function map() defines these
predicates by generating the appropriate FOL formulas. Recall also that the only Collection-
expressions currently covered by our mapping are the Set-expressions.
Definition 7 The function map() on Collection-expressions is defined by clauses shown in Fig-
ure 3.
4 Examples
In this section, we argue, using a set of examples, that our mapping is both simple and practical.











= {make conj(map(BoolExpr))∧make conj(map(BoolExpr′))}.
map(BoolExpr or BoolExpr′)
= {make conj(map(BoolExpr))∨make conj(map(BoolExpr′))}.
map(BoolExpr implies BoolExpr′)
= {make conj(map(BoolExpr))⇒make conj(map(BoolExpr′))}.
map(SetExpr−>isEmpty())
= {∀(x[)(¬(in coll(name(SetExpr),x[)))} ∪ map(SetExpr).
map(SetExpr−>notEmpty())
= {∃(x[)(in coll(name(SetExpr),x[))} ∪ map(SetExpr).
map(SetExpr−>excludes(ObjExpr))
= {¬(in coll(name(SetExpr),name(ObjExpr)))} ∪ map(SetExpr).
map(SetExpr−>includes(ObjExpr))
= {in coll(name(SetExpr),name(ObjExpr))} ∪ map(SetExpr).
map(SetExpr−>exists(x|BoolExpr))
= {∃(x[)(in coll(name(SetExpr),x[) ∧ make conj(map(BoolExpr[x 7→ x[])))}
∪ map(SetExpr).
map(SetExpr−>forAll(x|BoolExpr))
= {∀(x[)(in coll(name(SetExpr),x[) ⇒make conj(map(BoolExpr[x 7→ x[])))}
∪ map(SetExpr).
Figure 2: Definition: map() on Boolean-expressions.
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y[ = name(ObjExpr[x 7→ w[])))}.
map(SetExpr−>select(x|BoolExpr))
= {∀(y[)(in coll(name(SetExpr−>select(x|BoolExpr[x 7→ y[])),y[)
⇔ (in coll(name(SetExpr),y[)∧
make conj(map(BoolExpr[x 7→ y[]))))}.
map(SetExpr−>reject(x|BoolExpr))
= {∀(y[)(in coll(name(SetExpr−>reject(x|BoolExpr[x 7→ y[])),y[)
⇔ (in coll(name(SetExpr),y[)∧
¬(make conj(map(BoolExpr[x 7→ y[])))))}.
map(SetExpr−>excluding(ObjExpr))
= {∀(y[)(in coll(name(SetExpr−>excluding(ObjExpr)),y[)
⇔ (in coll(name(SetExpr),y[)∧ y[ 6= name(ObjExpr)))}.
map(SetExpr−>including(ObjExpr))
= {∀(y[)(in coll(name(SetExpr−>including(ObjExpr)),y[)
⇔ (in coll(name(SetExpr),y[)∨ y[ = name(ObjExpr)))}.
Figure 3: Definition: map() on Collection-expressions.
.
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4.1 Mapping constraints
With respect to other mappings previously proposed, one advantage of our mapping is that, in
addition to be mechanizable, the resulting formulas are similar to the original OCL constraints,
both in their size and in their logical structure. In this sense, we claim that our mapping is simple.
To illustrate this claim, we show in Figure 4 the FOL formulas that the function map() generates
to define the predicates that represent, in our mapping, the two association-ends in the Library-
model. More interestingly, we show in Figure 5 the FOL formulas resulting from applying the




Figure 4: Example: Mapping association-ends.
4.2 Checking unsatisfiability
Another crucial advantage of our mapping is that the resulting formulas can be checked for
unsatisfiability using automated reasoning tools. To illustrate our point, we have tried to auto-
matically prove the unsatisfiability of different subsets of the constraints shown in Table 1 using
Prover9 [McC06] (an automated theorem prover) and Yices [DM08] (an SMT solver). The re-
sults are shown in Table 2. Both tools finished their tasks in less than a second, running on a
standard laptop computer. In our experiments, we used both tools with their default (command)
options.
Prover9 [McC06] is a resolution/paramodulation automated theorem prover for first-order and
equational logic. It uses two default limits which, although good in practice, can prevent proofs
from being found. Not surprisingly (since it does not support integer arithmetic), Prover9 could
not automatically prove the unsatisfiability of some of the subsets of constraints in our experi-
ment.
Yices [DM08] is a high-performance SMT solver that decides the satisfiability of proposi-
tional formulas that mix uninterpreted function symbols and equality with interpreted symbols
from various theories, in particular for linear real and integer arithmetic, but also for recursive
datatypes, tuples, records, lambda expressions and quantifiers among others. Although Yices
is not complete when quantifiers are used, it was able to automatically prove the unsatisfiabil-
ity of all the subsets of constraints in our experiment. This result is certainly encouraging for
our purposes; moreover, we expect to take advantage of its decision procedures for recursive
datatypes, tuples, and records, in order to prove the unsatisfiability of more complex subsets of
OCL constraints.
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(1) map(Book.allInstances()−>isEmpty())
= {∀(x)(¬Book(x))}.
(2) map(Book.allInstances()−>exists(x|x.pages > 300))
= {∃(x)(Book(x)∧ (pages(x)> 300))}.
(3) map(Book.allInstances()−>forAll(x | x.pages < 300))
= {∀(x)(Book(x)⇒ (pages(x)< 300))}.
(4) map(Book.allInstances()−>select(x|x.pages > 300)−>isEmpty())
= {∀(x)¬(select1(x)),





(9) map(Book.allInstances()−>forAll(x,y|x<>y implies x.isbn<>y.isbn))
= {∀(x)(Book(x)⇒∀(y)(Book(y)⇒ (x 6= y⇒ isbn(x) 6= isbn(y))))}.
(10) map(Book.allInstances()−>exists(x|Book.allInstances()−>excluding(x)
−>forAll(y|y.isbn=x.isbn)))
= {∃(x)(Book(x)∧ [∀(y)(excluding1(y)⇒ (isbn(x) = isbn(y)))

















Figure 5: Example: Mapping constraints.
5 Related work
As already mentioned, there are other mappings from OCL into different languages and/or for-
malisms, each one with its own purposes and target reasoning tool, which makes difficult to do
a general comparison. We discuss here only those proposals that support (in one way or an-
other) our same objectives, namely, checking unsatisfiability for OCL constraints. In a nutshell,
none of these mappings supports both unbounded and automated unsatisfiability checks for OCL
constraints, as our mapping does, for a significantly subset of the language.
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{1,2} {1,8} {1,10} {2,3} {2,4} {2,5} {2,6} {7,8} {11,13} {12} {14} {15}
Prover9
√ √ √ • √ • • √ √ √ √ √
Yices
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Table 2: Case study: checking unsatisfiability
The KeY tool [BS07] is able to generate proof obligations from checking different properties of
UML models with OCL constraints (e.g., invariant preservation), using a translation of OCL into
first order predicate logic. To the best of our knowledge, the KeY tool translates OCL collection
expressions into first order terms, introducing additional axioms in order to constrain the inter-
pretation of the new function symbols which represent the OCL collections [BKS02].1 Users
can then interact with the KeY theorem prover to logically reason about their UML models. A
limited amount of automated reasoning is provided, which is far from what is currently offered
by modern SMT solvers.
HOL-OCL [BW07] is an interactive proof environment for OCL. It is implemented as a shal-
low embedding of OCL into higher-order logic (HOL) within the theorem prover Isabelle. The
resulting translations may be hard to understand by standard software engineers. Also, since the
amount of automated reasoning which is supported by HOL-OCL is limited, software engineers
may find hard to use this tool when reasoning about their UML models.
UMLtoCSP [CCR07b] provides bounded automatic verification of UML models annotated
with OCL constraints. The users must limit the search space by explicitly indicating the number
of objects in each class, the number of links of each association and the possible values of each
attribute. When the tool can not find a satisfying instance within the specified search space, this
does not means that the property does not hold: it can still hold for values outside the search
space (and the user may try to verify the property with wider intervals).
UML2Alloy [Ana, ABGR07] is a front-end that transforms UML diagrams annotated with
OCL constraints into the Alloy notation. It translates the model into a Boolean expression, which
is then analysed by the SAT solvers implemented within Alloy. As in the case of UMLtoCSP,
the domain must be bounded by the user before analysing the model.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have proposed a mapping from a significant subset of OCL into first-order logic
(FOL). Although this is still preliminary work, we have argued that our mapping is both simple,
since the resulting FOL sentences closely mirror the original OCL constraints, and practical,
since we can use automated theorem provers (e.g., Prover9) and/or SMT solvers (e.g., Yices) to
automatically check the unsatisfiability of non-trivial sets of OCL constraints.
In the near future, we plan to extend our mapping to deal with larger subsets of OCL. Since
this is preliminary work, the list of currently missing features is certainly large: we discuss here
1 Since the result is often lengthy and hard to read, it was suggested (via some examples) in [BKS02] to use, as an
alternative, a predicative translation to first order formulas. Again, to the best of our knowledge, this line of research
has not been followed up within the KeY community. Also the examples shown in [BKS02] do not provide enough
information so as to understand how this predicative translation will deal with other cases, like collect-expressions,
and including|excluding-expressions, or with nested-iterator expressions.
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only the most important ones. First, we should be able to deal with bags. Our idea here is to
translate Bag-expressions using predicates, as we do for Set-expressions, but with an additional
argument indicating the number of occurrences of a given element in the bag. Of course, the
proposed mapping for the different Collect-operations will have to be modified accordingly. Sec-
ond, we should be able to deal with generalizations. The idea here is to add, by default, the
expected sentences formalizing that every element in the subclass-collection also belongs to the
super-class collection. Third, we should be able to deal with size-expressions. Here, we do not
have yet a general solution: dealing with constraints like (16) and (18) in Table 1 and, in general,
with constraints that simply restrict the multiplicity of collections, is rather simple; defining a
mapping for arbitrary size-expressions appearing anywhere inside constraints requires further in-
vestigation. Finally, it would be interesting to define a mapping for general Collection-expressions
and for Tuple-expressions, and to explore the capabilities of SMT solvers to automatically check
the unsatisfiability of the resulting formulas. In the long term, we should prove, of course, the
correctness of our mapping with respect to a formal semantics of the OCL language.
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Abstract: In this paper we report on our experience developing the Eye OCL
Software (EOS) evaluator, a Java component for efficient OCL evaluation. We first
motivate the need for an efficient implementation of OCL in order to cope with novel
usages of the language. We then discuss some aspects that, based on our experience,
should be taken into account when building an OCL evaluator for medium-large
scenarios. Finally, we explore various approaches for evaluating OCL expressions
on really large scenarios.
Keywords: OCL,evaluation,efficiency,benchmark
1 Motivation
In the recent past we have worked on the definition of a formal and executable semantics for the
Object Constraint Language (OCL) [OCL06]. The results of this research appeared in a doctoral
dissertation [Ege08] and provide the foundations of the ITP/OCL tool [CE06], a rewriting-based
evaluator for OCL expressions on instances of user-defined models. As part of our research, we
have looked at different usages of OCL beyond its “initial requirements as a precise modeling
language complementing UML specifications.” Two related applications have drawn our inter-
est [eA01, BA03a, BA03b, CET07, BMDE08], both having to do with using OCL to analyze
user-defined models by evaluating queries on the corresponding instances of their metamodels.
Since these instances typically contain a large number of elements, evaluating expressions on
them comes at a high computational cost.
Consider, for example, the use of OCL to express metrics for Java programs (this application
was suggested to us by members of the Triskell group at IRISA, France). The scenarios on which
the program metrics will be evaluated are the instances of the Java metamodel corresponding to
the programs: thus, the larger the programs the larger the scenarios1 and, consequently, the
higher the computational cost of evaluating the program metrics.
1 An an example, the SpoonEMF application, developed by the Triskell group generates, for a standard Java
program with 10 lines, a scenario with 113 objects; for a program with 100 lines, one with 1180 objects; and for a
program with 500 lines, one with 3470 objects.
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We report here on our experience developing the Eye OCL Software [DCE08] (EOS) com-
ponent, an OCL evaluator designed with the goal of performing efficient evaluation of OCL
expressions on medium-large size scenarios. In particular, we discuss i) the need for an efficient
implementation on OCL in order to cope with the novel usages of the language; ii) the aspects
that we have taken into consideration to improve the efficiency of the EOS evaluator on medium-
large scenarios; iii) the limits of the current OCL implementations for dealing with really large
scenarios. Although we include the results of applying a benchmark to several OCL evaluators,
this paper is not a comparative study (see [GKB08b] for a recent study of this kind). In fact, the
results are included here only to show the current performance of some OCL tools on medium-
large scenarios and to illustrate the aspects that we consider that should be taken into account
when implementing an efficient OCL evaluator for medium-large scenarios. Interestingly, this
quality —OCL engine efficiency on medium-large scenarios— is not covered by the benchmark
proposed in [GKB08b]: in fact, the largest scenarios scenario proposed for testing OCL engine
efficiency in [GKB08a] contains only 42 objects and 42 links among them. Furthermore, despite
the results of our benchmark, this paper is not a promotional brochure for our EOS component:
as a “product”, our OCL evaluator is still in its infancy; the fact is that we have only worked a
few months in its implementation, which is rather straightforward except for those aspects that
are explicitely discussed in this paper.
To motivate the need for OCL engines that can efficiently evaluate expressions on medium-
large size scenarios, we show in Table 1 the time that currently takes to evaluate two given
OCL expressions on three different, small-medium size scenarios for a number of OCL eval-
uators: namely, USE 2.4.0 [Gro06], RoclET [BM07], OCLE [CBC+05], MDT OCL [HT08],
and EOS [DCE08].2 The tests were run on a laptop computer, with Windows XP Professional
installed, a processor Intel Pentium M 2.00GHz 600MHz, and 1GB of RAM. Also, in the case
of the EOS and USE evaluators, we run the JVM with its parameters -Xms and -Xmx set to
1024m.
The scenarios considered in these tests are instances of the model Library shown in Figure 1:
each scenario is referenced by a number n, which also indicates its “size”; more precisely, for
each n, the scenario #n is a library that contains exactly 10n books, each book with a unique title
different from “Hobbit”. The OCL expressions used in these tests are
Book.allInstances()−>forAll(b|b.title <> ’Hobbit’) (1)
Book.allInstances()−>forAll(b1,b2|b1 <> b2 implies b1.title <> b2.title). (2)
The first expression says that the library does not contain any book titled “Hobbit”, while the
second one says that the library does not contain two different books with the same title. Ob-
viously, the cost of evaluating these expressions depends on the number of books in the library
and the cost of accessing, and storing for later use, information about these books. For example,
in order to evaluate the expressions (1) and (2) on scenario #3 we have to perform, respectively,
103 and 2× 103× 103 times the operations of accessing and storing a book’s title. But this is
2 In the case of USE, we have run our experiments using its version 2.4.0. For MDT OCL, we have run the experi-
ments using the plug-in “OCL Interpreter”, version 1.2.0v200805130238. Finally, for our experiments in OCLE, we
have used its version 2.0.
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Scenario Expression RoclET OCLE MDT OCL EOS USE
#2 (1) < 1s < 1s < 1s 0ms 230ms
(2) > 10m ≈ 4s < 1s 50ms 240ms
#3 (1) − ≈ 3s < 1s 10ms 240ms
(2) − > 10m ≈ 4s 841ms 1s342ms
#4 (1) − − < 1s 20ms 261ms
(2) − − ≈ 5m12s 1m18s 2m12s
Table 1: Evaluating performance on medium-large scenarios.
Figure 1: The model Library.
precisely one of the challenges for OCL engines when evaluating expressions on medium-large
size scenarios: namely, to efficiently access the information contained in, possibly, all the objects
that populate the scenarios.
Notice that in Table 1 we use > t to indicate that we stopped an experiment after having
passed time t without obtaining the result. Also, we use a dash to indicate that we did not run the
experiment, because we already stopped the execution of a “simpler” one. Finally, since RoclET,
OCLE and MDT OCL do not report their execution time in milliseconds, we use < 1s to indicate
that the result of an evaluation was output in less than 1 second, and we use ≈ t to indicate that
the result of an evaluation was output approximately in time t.
2 Measuring the cost of evaluating expressions
Although the computational cost of evaluating a particular OCL expression on a given scenario
obviously depends on the algorithms and data structures used to implement each tool, based
on our experience, there are two measurements worthwhile considering before launching the
evaluation process: first, the maximum number of times that objects’ properties will be accessed
and, second, the maximum size of the collections that will be built. In the case of medium-large
size scenarios, the challenge for OCL engines is that these measurements typically return large
numbers.
To illustrate this challenge, we show in Table 2 the performance of MDT OCL, EOS, and
USE when evaluating different iterator-expressions whose evaluation require accessing many
times objects’ properties and/or building large collections. All the expressions in Table 2 were
evaluated on the same scenario, namely, an instance MyLibrary of the model Library shown in
Figure 1 which contains 103 authors, each author with 10 different books, and each book with
a title different from “Hobbit”.3 For the sake of the experiment, we artificially increased the
3 In the case of MDT OCL, the scenario MyLibrary was loaded from an XMI file; for EOS, it was built using a
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size of the collections to be iterated upon: in particular, in Table 2, the terms p1, p2, and p3
refer, respectively, to the expressions “Book.allInstances().author.books”, “p1.author.books”, and
“p2.author.books”, which on the scenario MyLibrary evaluate to collections with 105, 106, and
107 books, respectively.4 The iterator-expressions in Table 2 were evaluated on a laptop com-
puter, with Windows XP Professional installed, a processor Intel Pentium M 2.00GHz 600MHz,
and 1GB of RAM. Also, in the case of the EOS and USE evaluators, we run the JVM with its
parameters -Xms and -Xmx set to 1024m. For the reason explained above, in the case of the
MDT OCL evaluator all times shown in Table 2 are approximated (≈).5 The Error evaluation
time indicates that we could not evaluate the expression due to an OutOfMemoryError in Java.
Let exp(pi), with i ∈ {1,2,3}, be the time that takes to evaluate an iterator-expression exp on
the collection generated by evaluating the term pi. With respect to the performance of MDT
OCL, EOS, and USE, Table 2 shows that, for the same exp, the time exp(pi+1) is approximately
10×exp(pi) in these tools. Table 2 also shows that, for the same pi, the time exp(pi) depends for
these tools on the number of accesses to objects’ properties that are required to evaluate the body
of the iterator-expression exp; we have organized accordingly the expressions in three groups:
A, B, and C. Consider, for example, the evaluation times for the first expression in each group.
Finally, Table 2 shows that, again for the same pi, the time exp(pi) depends as well for these tools
on the size of the collection that need to be built. built. Consider, for example, the evaluation
time for the first two expressions in Group C: notice that to evaluate
p3−>collect(x|x.author.books.title)−>size() (3)
will require to allocate memory for storing a collection with 108 titles while evaluating
p3−>collect(x|x.author.books.title−>size())−>sum() (4)
will only require to allocate memory for storing a collection with 107 integers. Using these and
similar expressions, we regularly use the above mentioned measurements, namely, the maximum
number of times that objects’ properties will be accessed and the maximum size of the collec-
tions that will be built, to check the performance of the EOS evaluator and look for possible
optimizations.
3 The implementation of the EOS evaluator
As mentioned before, based on our executable equational semantics for OCL [Ege08], we have
implemented a rewriting-based OCL evaluator, named ITP/OCL [CE06]. Although our tool
Java program that simply calls the appropriate EOS’s interface methods for defining the scenario; and for USE, it was
loaded from a file that contained the appropriate USE commands to build the scenario.
4 A more “natural” approach will be to consider scenarios with larger number of books but, as we will discuss in
Section 4, none of the tools support well the loading of scenarios with more than 106 objects.
5 We have also run the same experiments using a desktop computer, with Window Vista Business installed, a
processor Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9300 2.50GHz 2.50 GHz, and 2GB of RAM. Again, in the case of the EOS and
USE evaluators, we run the JVM with its parameters -Xms and -Xmx set to 1024m. In the case of EOS and MDT
OCL the results were similar to those shown in Table 2. In the case of USE, however, the evaluations were completed,
approximately, in half the time taken by the single-core test machine.
Proc. OCL 2008 4 / 11
ECEASST
MDT EOS USE
p1 < 1s 30ms 1s12ms
p2 −>size() < 1s 190ms 7s330ms
p3 ≈ 5s 931ms 1m22s
Group A MDT EOS USE
p1 < 1s 80ms 1s212ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.title)−>size() ≈ 1s 391ms 10s84ms
p3 ≈ 18s 3s896ms 1m48s
p1 < 1s 90ms 981ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.title <> ’Hobbit’)−>size() ≈ 2s 481ms 8s432ms
p3 ≈ 20s 4s516ms 1m30s
Group B MDT EOS USE
p1 < 1s 240ms 6s810ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.author.books)−>size() ≈ 6s 2s140ms 1m42s
p3 ≈ 58s 17s736ms Error
p1 < 1s 221ms 3s565ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.author.books−>includes(x))−>size() ≈ 7s 1s893ms 32s677ms
p3 ≈ 1m1s 17s906ms 5m32s
p1 < 1s 251ms 3s475ms
p2 −>forAll(x|x.author.books−>includes(x)) ≈ 5s 1s963ms 32s6ms
p3 ≈ 53s 17s30ms 5m25s
p1 < 1s 260ms 3s685ms
p2 −>select(x|x.author.books−>includes(x))−>size() ≈ 5s 2s13ms 35s411ms
p3 ≈ 55s 17s605ms 5m51s
Group C MDT EOS USE
p1 ≈ 2s 290ms 8s412ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.author.books.title)−>size() ≈ 20s 2s573ms 1m27s
p3 ≈ 3m17s 23s684ms Error
p1 ≈ 2s 270ms 4s957ms
p2 −>collect(x|x.author.books.title−>size())−>sum() ≈ 19s 2s274ms 48s660ms
p3 ≈ 3m15s 20s840ms 10m54s
p1 ≈ 2s 280ms 4s777ms
p2 −>forAll(x|x.author.books.title−>excludes(’Hobbit’)) ≈ 20s 2s604ms 46s286ms
p3 ≈ 3m15s 22s802ms 7m52s
Table 2: Evaluating performance: MDT OCL, EOS, and USE.
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MDT OCL EOS USE
Scenario XMI Mem Time Mem Time Mem Time
#3 50KB 111MB < 1s 20MB 40ms 88MB 1s
#4 500KB 112MB < 1s 22MB 661ms 116MB 35s
#5 5MB 125MB ≈ 45s 50MB 2m36s 209MB 8m25s
#6 50MB > 20m > 20m > 20m
Table 3: Evaluating loading cost: MDT OCL, EOS, and USE.
performs reasonably well on small-medium size scenarios, its performance does not scale up to
medium-large size scenarios. Prompted by our interest on applications that require efficient OCL
evaluation on medium-large size scenarios, we decided to implement the Eye OCL Software
(EOS) evaluator, a Java component whose designed follows the key ideas behind the ITP/OCL
tool.
The implementation of the EOS component has taken 4 man-months. It includes an OCL
parser (which uses SableCC) and an OCL evaluator, the latter consisting of about 7K lines of
Java code. The current version handles most of OCL, including the possibility of adding user-
defined operations. With the idea of making it as ‘pluggable’ as possible, the EOS component
is not based on any particular (meta)modeling framework: its public interface provides methods
to insert elements, one-by-one, into user-models and scenarios, and to input the expressions
to be evaluated as strings of ASCII characters. This decision allowed us also to design the
EOS’s data structure for internally storing user-models and scenarios in such a way that objects’
properties are efficiently accessed. The other possible novelty in its implementation is that,
before evaluating a collect expression, we try to (over)estimate the size of the resulting collection
and allocate memory in advance. The rest of the EOS implementation is rather straightforward:
OCL iterator-expressions are executed using Java for/while loops and standard OCL operations,
when possible, are executed using the appropriate Java operators. As expected, expressions
are evaluated in EOS following an eager strategy: in particular, collection-expressions are fully
evaluated and their resulting elements are all allocated in memory. As part of our research
agenda, we plan to study the advantages/disadvantages of a lazy strategy for OCL evaluation,
where collection-expressions are only evaluated on-demand.
4 Dealing with really large scenarios
To evaluate expressions on really large scenarios, we need first to solve the problem of loading
the scenarios in the OCL evaluators. To illustrate this challenge, we show in Table 3 the time
and memory taken by MDT OCL, EOS, and USE, when loading different scenarios of the model
Library. Each of the scenarios is identified by a number n, which also indicates its “size”: more
precisely, for each n, the scenario #n exactly contains 10n books. Notice that for scenario #6,
with 106 books, none of the tools were able to finish in less than 20 minutes.6
6 With respect to the “extra” time taken by the EOS tool to store scenarios, compared to MDT OCL, it is possibly
due to the extra computation required to store scenarios in the EOS internal data structure.
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Scenario Time
# 1 ≈ 0m25s
# 2 ≈ 45m
Table 4: Evaluating performance: OCL2SQL
So far, we have explored two different approaches for addressing this problem, both based on
the representation of user-models and scenarios as relational databases. The first approach con-
sists on modifying the EOS evaluator so as to look for the information contained in the scenarios
directly in its database representation. The advantage of this approach is that it only requires
modifying the evaluation of dot-expressions in the expected way: namely, accessing the value of
an object’s attribute or the value of an object’s association-end will be now implemented as a ba-
sic SQL select-query. The concrete form of these queries depends, of course, on the mapping
used to represent models as relational databases (see, for example, [SC08, SI05] and [Gor05]).
To check the feasibility of this approach, we modified the EOS evaluator accordingly: unfortu-
nately, the cost of evaluating dot-expressions through the JDBC driver was so high that it made
impractical the use of the modified EOS evaluator for evaluating expressions on medium-large
scenarios.7
The second approach consists on translating OCL expressions into expressions in a query
language already available for relational databases. To the best of our knowledge, the most
interesting results in this line are discussed in [DHL01, HWD07] and provide the foundations of
the OCL2SQL tool [Hei06, Gro07]. However, the solution offered in [DHL01, HWD07] is not
satisfactory yet. First, it only considers a restricted subset of the OCL language: in particular,
it cannot deal with tuples or nested collections. Second, it only applies to boolean expressions
and not to arbitrary queries. Finally, the “complexity” of the SQL expressions resulting from this
translation is so high that makes also impractical its use for evaluating expressions on medium-
large scenarios.8 For example, consider a simple extension of model Library shown in Figure 1
where books have now an additional attribute pages. Then, consider the following invariant:
context Writer inv: self.books−>forAll(x | x.pages > 300) (5)
Applying to (5) the translation implemented in OCL2SQL, we automatically obtain the SQL
query shown in Figure 2. In Table 4 we show the results of evaluating this query on two different
scenarios: scenario #1 contains 102 writers and 104 books, each writer being the author of 102
different books; and scenario #2 contains 102 writers and 105 books, each writer being the author
of 103 different books. In both scenarios, all books have exactly 150 pages. The figures corre-
spond to the local execution of the above query in a PostgreSQL 8.3 database installed in a laptop
computer, with Windows XP Professional, a processor Intel Pentium M 2.00GHz 600MHz, and
1GB of RAM.
7 For this experiment, we mapped each class to a table whose columns correspond to its attributes, and each
association to a table whose columns correspond to its association-ends.
8 The OCL2SQL’s main developer has confirmed that the efficiency of the OCL2SQL tool has not been tested on
medium-large scenarios (e-mail communication, May 2008).
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create or replace view NAME as
(select *
from OV_Writer as SELF
where not (not exists (
select PK_Book
from (select PK_Book
from OV_Book as foo
where PK_Book in
(select FK_books
from ASS_Ownership as foo
where FK_author in
(select PK_Writer
from OV_Writer as foo
where PK_Writer = SELF.PK_Writer)))
as foo
where PK_Book in (
select PK_Book
from OV_Book as ALIAS2
where not (ALIAS2.pages> 300)
)
)))
Figure 2: An example of an SQL query generated by OCL2SQL.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have first motivated the need for efficient OCL evaluation support in order to
cope with the high-computational cost of evaluating OCL expressions in medium-large size sce-
narios. Then, we have discussed, based on a number of experiments, two measurements that
should be taken into consideration when building OCL evaluators for medium-large scenarios:
namely, the cost of accessing individual objects’ properties and the cost of building collections
to hold the partial results of an evaluation. Independently of the results of our benchmark, our
aim here is similar to that of [GKB08b]: we do not want to recommend the use of a particu-
lar tool, but would like to emphasize the need for a benchmark for OCL engine efficiency on
medium-large scenarios which can help to build OCL implementations. Next, we have briefly
discussed the implementation of the EOS evaluator [DCE08]. Finally, we have presented the
challenge of evaluating expressions on really large scenarios and discussed the feasibility of
various approaches to address this problem.
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